“把那些狗屎扔掉,”军士说,“跟我来。”他带马里奥到了军需帐篷,给他几盒配额食品和几包香烟。
一位驻扎在切里尼奥拉的投弹手,梅杰·里卡迪,是一对意大利移民夫妇的孩子。战争期间,他有四个兄弟在部队服役。他悉心照顾马里奥。每天他都教马里奥英语单词,执行任务归来,就和他一起复习。马里奥学会了这种语言,后来他说,要不是里卡迪的影响和英语课,“我已经成了一个流浪儿”。
对于政治,切里尼奥拉的人们之间没有什么争论。许多20世纪30年代曾是法西斯主义者的人改变了他们的想法。大家都同意的一个观点是,墨索里尼是多么疯狂,才把意大利拖入战争。人们会说,看看西班牙,那是一个法西斯国家,但弗朗哥一直让西班牙脱离于战争之外。墨索里尼为什么不这么做?按马斯托的说法,“意大利犯了两个错误。首先,参战。其次,参加了错误的一方”。
美国人来意大利不是看风景、浪漫、喝酒或者找什么乐子,他们来是要与德国人战斗,不是在地面和海上,而是空中。相对而言,他们有一些好处,例如睡在帆布床上,有厨师做好的、热的———虽然说不是很好的———食物,时间自由,升迁很快,等等。他们庆幸他们没去步兵部队,睡在散兵坑里等着被射杀;或者在海军部队,被囚禁于一条船上,做枯燥的长途航行,去船长指示的任何地方,除了在空中基本上看不到敌人,而且冒着极大的风险:船一旦被毁,所有同伴要么受伤致死,要么淹死。(除了少数志愿者,没有人愿意上潜艇)但在二战中的情形是,海军服役人员为他们呆在船上,而不是散兵坑或者轰炸机里而高兴,同时陆军人员也不想飞行———他们喜欢脚踏在地上。实际上,每一个海员或者步兵一想到飞机被敌机或防空炮火击中,就会颤抖起来。
麦高文战后遇到两个步兵军官,对他们说:“无论何时,我飞过你们上空都会想,在泥浆里行军,近距离的战斗,还有所有那些炮弹,是多么可怕呀。”而步兵告诉他:“看见你们在空中,我们想,如果被直接击中,你们根本没机会逃生。”让麦高文惊讶的是,“他们对我们心存歉疚”。麦高文说,对他自己而言,“我一直知道,最终将是步兵赢得战争,但我想到轰炸机和战斗机也很重要,没有这些飞机,步兵无法战胜德国人”。
对于陆航队中在飞机上飞行的战士,死亡是一个持续不断的威胁。456轰炸大队的卡普斯少尉于1944年1月到达切里尼奥拉。本月他庆祝了自己的21岁生日。和他一起的还有其他三名年轻军官,少尉道格拉斯·S摩根、盖尔·J斯葛里奇菲尔德和爱德华·J赫夫纳。摩根和斯葛里奇菲尔德是飞行员,赫夫纳是投弹手。他们之间友情甚笃。“我们都年轻、热情、爱国,急于开始战斗飞行的伟大冒险。”
起先他们在301轰炸大队的食堂吃饭。卡普斯永远忘不了301大队机组人员走进食堂时,那一张张脸。当时他们刚完成一个轰炸德国的任务归来。“他们看起来都在发愣,紧张、疲劳、精力耗尽,极其疲惫。他们自顾自地谈论着行动中弟兄们怎么被击落,看见几个降落伞从下落的飞机中出来,以及那些爆炸后没有跳伞机会的飞机。”
归来的机组人员的这些表现和他们说的东西,让卡普斯体会出真实的战斗是什么样子的,但“我不信我们会是被击落的那一个,迫不及待地打算去战斗”。
在卡普斯到达切里尼奥拉的四个月内,他的三个朋友———摩根、斯葛里奇菲尔德和赫夫纳———都死去了,他们死于B-24的坠毁。后来,卡普斯同一帐篷的伙伴,投弹手尼古拉斯·科利逖,也因为飞机被击落死亡。到卡普斯完成其任务数———一共51次!———时,即1944年7月7日,他的副驾驶悉尼·布鲁克斯成了飞行员。布鲁克斯担当指挥两个星期后,飞机被敌人击中机翼,与编队里另一架飞机相撞。布鲁克斯旋转着狠狠地摔到地上死去。另一架飞机爆炸。
同其他中队一样,741中队也伤亡惨重。兰福德队长差点儿成了其中之一。他因1944年3月17日领导一次对维也纳的轰炸任务获得杰出飞行十字勋章。但在7月21日,他的飞机在轰炸捷克斯洛伐克布吕克斯的任务中被击落。炮火严重炸伤了操控杆。兰福德试图向右转一个急弯,但“控制轮像赌博轮盘一样急速旋转”。飞机很快失去高度。他命令大家跳伞。兰福德安全落地,与铁托的游击队接上线,设法返回基地,他走进食堂大厅,受到执行官的热情迎接,他说:“上帝,我还以为你死了!”兰福德返回后继续进行战斗飞行,完成了他的任期。但中队的历史日志记录了他与其他人的B-24的被毁,并说:“我们急需代替者,因为当时我们的状态可以恰当地被称为半失控。”
事故导致的死亡甚至大大超出B-24被击落导致的死亡。麦高文机组的无线电操作员肯尼思·希金斯军士到意大利没多久,就看见了一起事故。刚一起飞时,飞行员应该踩住刹车踏板,让起落架上的轮子停止转动再收回去。但在那次事故中,当飞行员踩刹车踏板时,“解放者”还没有飞到空中,因此机头翻了过去,扎入地面。飞机前半部分的所有人都死了。另一次,一架B-24开始降落,但一枚炸弹还挂在炸弹舱门上。飞行员一定没有检查确认炸弹是否落下去,它的确没有。刚一降落,炸弹掉下来爆炸了,把整架飞机炸成碎片。“整个机组全都烧着了,”希金斯回忆说,“我的意思是他们被烧成灰烬。”
飞行员盖扬·菲利普斯看见另一次同样的事故。刚一离地,飞行员就踩下刹车。菲利普斯评论说:“没有充足的动力,一架满载油料和炸弹的B-24无法飞到空中。”这次飞机是在跑道尽头出事的。机首起落架折断,机首重重地栽到地面上,从引擎处断开。飞机前半部分的所有人当场死亡。
一次,一架轰炸机出了毛病,但还能勉强保持高度,机组人员尚有逃生机会。几个人设法逃出将毁的“解放者”,拉动降落伞拉索,安全落地。他们中的几个落在中立国瑞士或者南斯拉夫,幸运地找到了铁托的游击队,返回意大利。但好几个,或许是大多数,成了战俘。到突出部战役之前,陆军航空队的战俘一直比步兵多。
意大利,切里尼奥拉他们是一群优秀的人
陆军航空队知道跳伞的战士总是可能被抓住。为避免被抓,每位机组成员都得到一套逃生设备,包括几块糖棒、一管吗啡、一张丝质欧洲地图,还有一个罗盘。不是很多。战士们被指示只能向逮捕他们的人提供以下信息:他们的名字、军阶和系列号。一般而言,他们说的会比这些多,但不是自愿的,有时是为了避免拷打,更多情况下是从不经意的谈话中透露出来的。德国的讯问者都是年轻人,英语不错,往往是前飞行员(现在没有飞机或者受伤)。他们和战俘闲聊,就像同行间谈话。像他们这个年纪的大多数年轻人一样,战俘们喜欢吹嘘诸如此类的事情,如“你的飞机能飞多快”,“飞机里能转圈吗”,等等。而且,德国人已经掌握了准确的情报,例如中队的基地所在地,以及指挥官的名字。战后大多数战俘坚持说,他们从来没和德国人说过什么有价值的东西。但德国人说,他们已经从战俘那里得到他们想得到的一切。两边的人都经过恰当考量,曲解事实。 一旦被逮捕,战士就脱离了陆军航空队的控制,但他仍然在军队里,要服从部队的纪律。战俘都憎恶这种体验,但他们大多数还是活过来了,用不着妥协。741中队的飞行员沃尔特·肖斯塔克少尉是其中的一位。在他的第四次任务中,他的飞机飞到奥地利一个精炼厂上空,被一发炮弹直接击中,炮弹在B-24的机首爆炸,当场炸死投弹手和机首射手。飞机开始迅速失去高度,几乎撞上一座山。肖斯塔克命令机组跳伞。他们当时在南斯拉夫上空,包括肖斯塔克,全都安全跳伞着陆,但有三个人被党卫军射杀,后者认为他们是恐怖分子。“他们根本没机会解释。” 肖斯塔克一个人设法躲藏了一个星期。他联系上铁托的游击队,他们打算帮他逃亡。但他运气不好。他们在一个农舍停留时,一个男孩跑去告诉了为德国人打仗的游击队。他们在阁楼上找到肖斯塔克。得知他是美国人,就给了他一个苹果。肖斯塔克说俄语,俄语和塞尔维亚语很像。塞尔维亚人说,他们不打美国人,他们要打的是共产主义者。具有讽刺的意味是,肖斯塔克的家人离开俄罗斯就是为了逃离共产主义者。就像他所说的:“在这场无序的战争中,你真是很难说清谁是谁一头的。” 最终肖斯塔克被带到法兰克福,在那儿受到审讯。最先审问的德国人来自底特律,曾经是一个旧车推销员。当时是 1944年中期,肖斯塔克解释说:“他那时知道战争失败了,因此给我一些茶和饼干。”德国人其实是希望能让肖斯塔克松口,“但他运气不好,我在第四次任务时就被击落,什么也不知道”。肖斯塔克被送到第三空军战俘营。这是一个大的战俘营。在肖斯塔克去之前,里面的战俘曾经挖了一条地道,大概有六个人从那儿爬出去逃跑了,但他们运气不好,大部分被德国人抓住带回来,在其他战俘面前被射杀。因此他们不再挖地道了。对肖斯塔克而言,除了打牌,盼着下顿饭,等待战争结束,没有什么可干的。 因为德国人尊重军阶,肖斯塔克少尉和其他军官比起一般士兵有“一点点轻松时光”。军官不用干活。俘虏的营房分12排,每排12个铺———四张三层的床。肖斯塔克所在的营房有144个人,营房一头是炉子,另一头是一个冷水龙头。龙头是卫生设施。营房外有公共厕所,但战俘必须得到卫兵允许才能去。 食品配额非常可怜。面包明显是由锯屑制成,而且每个人只有一片。卫兵把食物放在营房门外地上。德国人还分发咖啡,但据肖斯塔克说,那是由刚长出来的橡树果子制成的。每个星期一次,如果他幸运的话,能得到一片马肉。偶尔战俘会收到红十字会的食品包裹。但第三空军战俘营旁边是一个俄国战俘分队———如果美国人觉得他们处境不好的话,最好让他们去看看俄国人,就知道什么叫悲惨了。因此,他们会打开红十字会包裹,把一半的食物扔过防护网,送给俄国人。 红十字会也会送来香烟,这“制造了一个交换食品的商品世界”。德国人会用一切东西来交换美国人的香烟。战俘有一个收音机,藏在锡罐里,这让他们知道外界发生的事。他们主要想知道的是,盟军离他们的战俘营还有多远?1945年4月29日,他们刚刚被解放,在收音机里听到了美军广播网的广播。他们首先听到的是一首流行歌曲,《不要把我关起来》。想到在这里已经将近一年,肖斯塔克觉得这“有些滑稽”。 肖斯塔克最后的判断是:“战争是可怕的事,告诉你战争不是如此的人,大概是在堪萨斯中部某地做后勤的某个军士,对于战争毫无概念。”就他所知,“它是我们不得不做的事”。最后他说:“我爱我的机组,而且那是我所爱的一切。战争不是令人愉悦的体验。”几十年后,他爱看战争电影,他妻子问他,既然如此憎恶战争,怎么还要这样。“我解释说,看电影时,你没有被击中的危险,可以专注于故事情节,不用担心一个弹片会穿过你的挡风玻璃。” 741中队有12架B-24以及23个机组。这意味着有46名飞行员或副驾驶,此外还有五十多个军官。麦高文报到时,许多人已经投入战斗,其他像他一样的人则等待投入战斗。无论他们是何种情况,每个人都明白被击落或者被迫跳伞的危险,也知道发生致命事故的可能性离他们多么近。死亡或者被俘的可能性围绕着这些年轻人。 无论是在军官还是士兵俱乐部,新来的人都会静静地坐在那儿,听完成任务归来的老兵们谈话。麦高文努力听着,听到不少怎样在战斗中驾驶B-24的忠告。谈话涉及什么事情发生了,飞机如何操作,德国人的防空炮火怎样,以及其他的细节。他们总是争论有多少降落伞从坠毁的飞机上飞出,但不说谁出来了而谁没有出来。他们假设降落伞打开就意味着人安全落地,但他们对于此人是否逃出并在回意大利的路上,是否已经成为战俘,或者是否在地面上被杀死,一无所知。肖斯塔克的名字从来没有在谈话中出现过。 梅尔·藤哈肯军士,455轰炸大队的一名无线电操作员,记得这些谈话既有启发性又很可怕。它不像一场测验或者橄榄球、篮球比赛后年轻人的谈话。“这里没有对个人成就的自豪之情,或者对战绩的互相比较、吹嘘”,而且,“没有人嘲笑那些还未参战的人(如藤哈肯、麦高文和其他刚来的人),因为大家知道明天或者后天他们就要参战”。藤哈肯还注意到:“那些完成34次任务的人没有表现得兴高采烈。”因为他们都记得“在第35次任务中死去的那个人”。没有人说话是为了出风头。大家交流经验只是因为更好地运用技术和战术将会提高生存机会。 藤哈肯军士和其他两个机组一起到达切里尼奥拉。其中一个机组先去执行任务。任务时间很长。他们的飞机安全归来,但被防空炮火在机翼和机身上打了几个洞。那天傍晚,做完任务后的询问之后,他们离群索居,不想说话。“他们觉得以后讨论这些感觉会更好,或许是我们都完成几次战斗任务之后。”对于藤哈肯及其机组成员而言,“我们不知道他们什么时候能恢复曾有的乐观、兴致勃勃及其正常个性”。 一天后,第二个机组执行他们的初次任务。两小时后飞机飞回基地。突然,在一排排的帐篷中间,黑暗中出现了一个射手,喘着粗气,降落伞一半收在手臂上,一半拖在地上。他吓坏了。他想知道机组中的其他人在哪儿。得知没人知道后,他解释说,他们的B-24在目标上空被击中,他无法估计伤害程度,但说他的飞行员把飞机开到机场,在空中转圈,测试控制设备,并烧完剩下的燃料———迫降一架B-24是非常危险的,尤其是在机翼中还有油的情况下。飞行员无法确定起落装置是否正常,因为他失去了液压动力。他命令机组跳伞。飞行员呆在飞机里,想把它降下去。 一个报信的人从保养维护区跑来说,飞行员安全降落,但飞机在降落时已经毁了。如果机组成员还在飞机上,一定会伤亡不少人。剩下的两个小时,其余机组成员一个个拖着降落伞回来了。没有庆祝,也没有多少讨论,但人们还是对那个飞行员的行为心存感激。 陆军航空队有一条规定,士兵和军官不允许深交,这就是为什么在切里尼奥拉,军官有自己的俱乐部,而士兵另有一个。但他们的帐篷紧挨着,他们一起吃饭,大多数时候,他们互相进入对方的俱乐部。俱乐部有啤酒,一般是不凉的,还有软饮料。大部分第二天早上要出任务的人,甚至连啤酒都不会多喝。大多数军官和军士认为不能深交的规定荒唐可笑。“我们机组是一个家庭,”肖斯塔克少尉说,“我们互相之间一直都有很深的交往。” 飞行员到哪里,机组就到哪里;而他按轰炸大队队长的命令行事。他们和一个步兵排、一个驱逐舰或其他战船的船员组是一样的。他们都需要把他们联结在一起的归属感。无论是在地面,还是在空中,他们共同拥有这种归属感。无论飞行员年纪多大,执行过多少次任务,机组成员都尊重他、信任他,按他说的话去做。同样地,上述那个飞行员让他的机组成员跳伞,而自己一个人降落飞机。尽管那是他的第一次战斗任务。 在欧战胜利50周年纪念日,我和乔(约瑟夫)·赫勒在一起,他是第十二航空队的一名投弹手,《第22条军规》的作者。赫勒告诉我:“我从来没遇到一位坏军官。”惊讶之余,我问:“乔,你创作了梅杰·梅杰少校、卡斯卡特上校、德里德尔将军、蒙德兵德少尉,以及其他一些不好的军官形象。世界上的人都知道他们,你怎么能说你从来没有遇到过坏军官?” “他们都是虚构的,”他回答说,“从我参军,到去意大利,到执行飞行任务,到退伍,我遇到的每一个军官都很好。”在为写作这本书采访麦高文的过程中,我告诉他赫勒的话。麦高文表示同意。“这是我的经验,”麦高文说,“我对飞行员、投弹手、导航员,以及大队的执行官、大队长,都有深刻印象。我觉得他们是一群优秀的人,而且老实说,我想不起任何一个不好的军官。在战斗中,我确定我们的军官知道该怎么做才是最好的———如果他们犯错,也不是愚蠢的错误。我们的军官很棒。” 显然,二战中的美军中有一些虚弱、贫乏、无效率或者马马虎虎的军官,有一些绝对糟糕的军官。但这样的人一到战斗岗位,陆军航空队、陆军、海军或者海军陆战队就会把他们淘汰,立刻。毕竟,人命掌握在他们手中。战斗官员明白这一点,并以此为出发点行动。问问和他们敌对的德国人,就知道他们有多么好。或者去问问日本人也一样。 美国军官很棒。而以上讲述的,就是驻在意大利切里尼奥拉的第455轰炸大队741中队中的例子。
在战斗中学会飞翔（英文版）Learning to Fly in Combat
...from The Wild Blue (Chapter 6) by Stephen E. Ambrose Learning to Fly in Combat The AAF policy in the Fall of 1944 was to have the pilots fly their first five combat missions as co-pilots with a veteran and an experienced crew. McGovern was, in his words, "lucky," because his pilot was Captain Howard Surbeck of Washington state. He was older, twenty-four-years-old to McGovern’s twenty-two, "and he had circles under his eyes and he was obviously feeling the strain of combat." He had flown 25 missions when McGovern flew with him. It was his tent that Rounds, with McGovern on board, had torn in half with his jeep, but Surbeck never mentioned it to McGovern. Surbeck let McGovern do quite a bit of the flying from his co-pilot’s seat, sometimes half the mission. The experience taught McGovern "more about what it’s like to have all that gear on and to go to 25,000 feet in sub-zero temperatures and stay in formation and get shot at and all the other things that go with combat missions." Surbeck "brought me along." McGovern’s first mission was November 11, 1944 — Armistice Day. The night before he checked and saw his name on the assignment sheet. The morning began for him when the operations sergeant came into his tent at 4:00 A.M. to wake him. On his first five missions, Rounds and Adams could stay in the sack, as they were not going. McGovern went to the mess hall for a powdered egg breakfast. Then he climbed into a truck for the drive to the group’s operations room for the briefing. At the door, an MP examined his identification and checked his name on the assignment sheet, then opened the door so McGovern and those from his truck could enter. Inside, the 300 or so crew sat on planks placed over cinder blocks. When a staff officer announced that they were all present and accounted for, the door was locked. The Group commander by the Fall of 1944 was Col. William Snowden. He was in his mid-forties, a "grandfather" figure to the pilots and crews. He had gray hair but a commanding presence. McGovern said he had "the total confidence of everyone in our group. A good man and a good leader. Just the way he moved around, he was reassuring without being condescending." When Colonel Snowden strode in, everyone stood at attention. Snowden climbed onto the platform, put the men at ease, and after saying good morning motioned to a member of his staff to pull a draw string. Behind the curtain was a large map of southern and central Europe. The pilots and crew members saw their route and the target drawn on the map with erasable marks. When it was Vienna, or Munich, or any other target known to be well defended by antiaircraft guns, or if it was four or more hours flying time from Cerignola, a dismal groan slowly became audible, but on this occasion there were murmurs of approval because the target was Linz, Austria, not so terribly far away, without any known antiaircraft batteries to fly over, and not so well protected itself. It could be what the men called a "milk run." Later in the war Linz would become one of the most heavily defended targets in Europe. Colonel Snowden got the men to quiet down and gave way to the weather officer, who described what the cloud cover and winds were likely to be like over Linz.. Then he went over conditions on the route and what to expect on the way home and what it would be like over Cerignola when they got back. Next the operations officer described the nature of the marshaling yards they were going after and explained that the mission was important because the Germans were moving men and materiel through Linz on their way to the Italian front. He warned the pilots and bombardiers to make every possible effort to avoid hitting the cultural sites and educational buildings. By this stage of the war, the bombardiers in the squadron would toggle their switches when they saw the lead plane, with the best navigator and bombardier, drop its bombs. Next the men were told who would be the pilot of the lead plane. He was always a good pilot. Sometimes he was a major, but often Colonel Snowden would lead the missions — when that happened, the men would again mummer their approval. The briefing would conclude with the group chaplain leading them in a prayer. Dismissal came from Snowden, but only after he had the men "hack" their watches. They would pull the stems of their watches when the second hand reached 12. Snowden would have them set the minute and hour hands to correspond to his, then count to ten and call "hack," and they would push the stems back in. They filed out of the briefing room, to go to another briefing — one for pilots and co-pilots, another for radio operators, another for navigators and bombardiers, still another for gunners. The men climbed into trucks for the ride to the storage sheds just off the runway where their flying equipment and parachutes were located. Each crew got out and dressed for the mission. They were going up to 20,000 feet or even higher and it was going to be cold up there, between 20 and 50 degrees below zero Fahrenheit. McGovern and the others pulled on heavy winter underwear. Next they put on long wool socks and a wool military uniform, slacks and shirts -- olive drab. Then a leather jacket and leather trousers, both lined with sheepskin, then sheepskin-lined heavy boots. Big, heavy silk-lined leather gloves followed. The sheepskin-lined helmet came down over the ears. Surbeck and McGovern wore Colt .45 pistols in a shoulder holster, then put on backpacks containing their parachutes. The other crew members picked up their parachutes in chest packs, which they carried into the plane by hand. They could snap them on if needed. The parachute packers made their standard joke when giving them out, "If it doesn’t work, bring it back and I’ll give you another." Dressed, they walked to their plane on its hard stand. Surbeck, accompanied by the chief of the ground crew, walked around the B-24, checking it out visually. The navigator, bombardier, radioman, and gunners would check out their equipment. Later, when the plane had gotten up to 10,000 feet, the pilots and crew put on their oxygen masks. It covered the nose. They plugged electric cords from their electrically heated flight suits into an outlet on the plane — the four engines created the power for the electricity. They could adjust the heat, turning it down a little or up a bit as needed. Below 15,000 feet the crew took off their oxygen masks. Surbeck and McGovern kept theirs on until they were down to 10,000 feet. At that altitude, all the smokers lit their cigarettes. The smoke was so thick it looked like there was a fire. The bombs had been loaded during the night into the bomb bay by the ground crew led by an ordnance officer. They assembled the bombs by taking the stabilizing fins, stored in a separate box, and screwing them on the bombs. Using winches and tractors, the ground crews had hoisted the unwieldy, blunt-nosed 500 pound bombs into their racks. They were inserted into the B-24's womb in a horizontal position and attached to the metal racks. They had a cardboard tag between the bomb and the nose fuse, and at the back end a wire-arming pin. The tail gunner would crawl out on the cat walk over the bomb bay door to pull the tag and then the pin. Climbing into the B-24 with those big heavy boots and the layers of clothes was always cumbersome, as the men waddled ponderously. They carried flak jackets, mandatory since Ploesti. The crew members had difficulty getting themselves into and adjusted in their cramped positions, especially the nose turret and the tail gunner. The belly turret gunner waited until they were in the air before squeezing — with the help of the waist gunner — into his bubble. Surbeck and McGovern settled into their seats, with their parachutes serving as a sort-of back rest. The seats were encased in cast iron. The iron came up to the knees, then under the seat and up the back. It was there in the event that flak hit the plane on the bottom side so that, in McGovern’s words, "the pilot and co-pilot would have some chance of survival because somebody has to fly the airplane. It wasn’t that they were worth more than anybody else on the crew, but if both got killed or badly injured, that plane is going to go down." The moment Surbeck got into the plane, went to his seat, and put on his earphones and mike — attached to his helmet — he was, in McGovern’s words, "totally in command, of the officers and sergeants." McGovern already knew that, but watching Captain Surbeck go through his routine reinforced the point. McGovern explained, "It had to be that way because the pilot was the only one with his hands on the controls that determined where the plane was going to go and how it was going to be flown." Of course he had help, especially from the navigator and bombardier, the radio operator and the flight engineers, "but the request for their help came from Surbeck." It was his job to check on the crew, frequently. He needed to make sure that nobody’s oxygen hose had come unhooked; if a tail gunner or someone else failed to answer when the pilot called to him on the intercom, he might well have passed out from a lack of oxygen or frozen because his electric plug had come out, without ever noticing that his hose or wire was unhooked. These and other things Surbeck did as a matter of routine, McGovern noted. To get the engines started, Surbeck would signal to the flight engineer, who would start the single-cylinder gasoline-powered unit on the B-24. It was called the "putt-putt" and gave a boost to the batteries. Engine number three, the one nearest McGovern, started first. It powered the generators which helped start the other engines. When all were operating, Surbeck did a "run up," checking on each engine’s performance, magnetos, temperature and pressure checks of fuel, oil and hydraulic systems. When a flare went up planes began to move out of their hard stands over the taxiway and onto the runway, looking like elephants getting ready for a circus parade. Surbeck called out the final checklist to McGovern: "Booster pumps" — "On" "Mixture" — "Auto rich" "Props" — "Full high" "Superchargers" — "Set" "Half flaps" — "Set" and so on. Surbeck lined his plane up on the taxi strip, behind some planes and ahead of others — there were 28 in the group, seven in each squadron. The 454th Bomb Group was on the other side of the runway, parallel to the 455th, so that the planes from each group could take off side by side. Setting the brakes, Surbeck pushed the throttle to get the engines running at maximum. When his turn to take off arrived, the roar was almost deafening. The plane vibrated as every nut and bolt, every rivet and tube rattled and shook. Twenty or at most thirty seconds after the plane ahead of him began to roll down the runway, Surbeck released the brakes. A modern air traffic controller, or a pilot of a commercial airliner, would be appalled at the sight, but for the bomber pilots of World War II that was how close to each other they were. Down the strip Surbeck started rolling, picking up speed until he reached 160 mph. He had his flaps set at 20 degrees, brought the engines to maximum power, and at the end of the runway he pulled the nose off the ground and became airborne. With the bomb load, the full tanks of fuel, the weight of the crew and their equipment, including the .50 caliber machine guns and ammunition for them, Surbeck had to fight to gain altitude. It seemed to McGovern that he would not get the plane above tree-top altitude, but he did. Barely, but he did. Once the plane was in the air, even if only just, McGovern as co-pilot had the task of raising the landing gear and bringing up the flaps. Surbeck circled, as did all the other pilots, their planes looking rather like hawks over a marsh. And he climbed. The gunners tested their guns. They were Browning M-2 .50 caliber machine guns. Each gun had about 150 working parts and the men had been required to strip and reassemble it blindfolded wearing gloves. The guns weighed sixty-four pounds and fired 800 rounds of ammunition per minute at a range of 600 yards. Sgt. Louie Hansen, a tail gunner in the 743rd Squadron, once discovered that both his guns were jammed — the cocking levers had been put in backward after the guns had been cleaned from the previous mission. He described what he did. "There was only space in the turret to get one hand through to a gun. I did one with my right hand, the other with my left. Sweat started to trickle down my back, my goggles steamed over which made no difference as there was no way to see what I was doing. The intense cold made me afraid to remove my gloves. But I got the job done and, as most combat crew members know, one can sweat at 50 degrees below." Fortunately for Surbeck and McGovern, the guns on their Liberator tested okay. After an hour or so, Surbeck’s plane had become a part of the formation. It was a squadron box of seven aircraft. There were two three-plane echelons. The lead plane had a wingman just behind and on either side. Surbeck was one of those on the wing of the leader. The second echelon was forty feet below and forty feet back of the lead echelon. The seventh aircraft, known as "Tail End Charlie," was behind the second echelon. Flying the wing, even for Surbeck, was more difficult than being in the lead, but easier than flying Tail End Charlie. As the last plane in the squadron, Tail End Charlie was the most vulnerable if German fighters attacked, and it was the hardest position to hold. Usually new pilots and crews got that assignment. On the wing, Surbeck wanted to stay close to the plane he was flying on so as to make as small and infrequent power changes as possible, to save the engines and save fuel. Pilot Lt. John Smith, said that "in due course flying formation became a reflex like driving a car." The group consisted of four squadrons, the lead box, the high box, the low box and the middle box. More climbing, to 20,000 and eventually 25,000 feet over the Adriatic. Then off for the target. When the group got to the initial point it turned. But clouds had moved in over Linz and the lead pilot decided to abort. He turned, so did the others, and returned to base, still fully loaded with the bombs. ________________________ McGovern’s first mission went better than that of Lt. David Gandin, a navigator in a B-24. In his war diary, Gandin reported that when his Liberator, called the Snafu, was over the target a piece of flak came through the cockpit window. The pilot, Lt. Bill Marsh, lost the top of his head. The co-pilot, Lt. Hilary Bevins, was on his first mission. He called to his radio man, who came to the cockpit wearing a walkaround oxygen bottle "and removed Marsh from the pilot’s seat. Bevins couldn’t stand it with Marsh in the seat and all the blood flowing around. "Bevins moved over to the pilot’s seat and kept in the formation until it headed off. All the compasses were out, so Bevins flew the opposite direction of the setting sun. All the men were freezing because of the hole in the top of the cockpit. The engineer was sick to his stomach from all the blood. Bevins’ eyeball was scratched and Marsh’s blood was frozen on his hands." When darkness descended, Blevin’s flew opposite the North Star. Finally Snafu got back to base — but Bevins had never made a night landing before. "As he came in, he banked too far to the left and knocked off the left landing gear, bounced over and did the same to the right one; the ship crash-landed and caught on fire. "Thank God all got out okay, though Bevins wouldn’t leave till they took Marsh’s body out also. The plane burned to a crisp." ___________________
