[18-27]Kenny, "Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China," p. 228; O'Dowd,
"The Last Maoist War," pp. 114-132.
[18-28]O'Dowd, "The Last Maoist War," pp. 165-166. 关于弱点部分，详见 Lewis and Xue,
Imagined Enemies, pp. 132-133; Zhang, "China's 1979 War with Vietnam," pp. 869-874.
[18-29]2006 年秋天在北京的采访。
[18-30]作者感谢 Michael Lampton，这是他当时在北京的观察。
[18-31]Kuan Yew Lee, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000
(New York: HarperCollins, 2000), pp. 669-670.
[18-32]James C. Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese
Military-Business Complex, 1978-1998 (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 53. 国防开支
每年大约增长 10%，但 1979 年因对越战争增长了 559 亿元，大约比平均年份多出近 50 亿元，前者占
全年军费预算的四分之一。1978 年的国防开支是 1678 亿元，1979 年 2227 亿元，1980 年 1933 亿元。
对越战争的额外支出由南部的广东、广西和云南等省承担。数据见财政部长张劲夫在 1979 年 6 月 21 日
第五届全国人大常委会第二次会议上关于 1978 年决算和 1979 年预算的报告，见"Quarterly Chronicle
and Documentation," The China Quarterly, no. 79 (September 1979): 661-663；以及财政部
长王丙乾 1980 年 8 月 30 日向第五届全国人大常委会第三次会议所做的财政工作报告，见"Quarterly
Chronicle and Documentation," The China Quarterly, no. 84 (December 1980): 799-802.
[18-33]M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in
China's Territorial Disputes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 217.
[18-34]《邓小平军事文集》，第 3 卷。
[18-35]对解放军学到的教训的说明，见 O'Dowd and Corbett, Jr., "The 1979 Chinese
Campaign in Vietnam: Lessons Learned," pp. 353-378.
[18-36]1978 年 2 月 16 日杰克逊参议员会见邓小平时。（出自 2010 年 10 月与 Dwight Perkins
的通信，他是代表团成员之一。）
[18-37]O'Dowd, "The Last Maoist War," p. 101.
[18-38]Zhang, "China's 1979 War with Vietnam," pp. 867-888.
[18-39]O'Dowd, "The Last Maoist War," pp. 179-184.
[18-40]Meeting with Vice President Mondale, August 27, 1979; Memcon, Summary of
the Vice President's Meeting with People's Republic of China Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping,
8/27/79, vertical file, China, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta.
[18-41]SWDXP-2, p. 92-93.
[18-42]他在许多场合都说过同样的话。例如在 1980 年 1 月 16 日一次中央干部工作会议上，见《邓
小平军事文集》，第 3 卷，页 165。
[18-43]Huang Hua, Huang Hua Memoirs (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2008), p.
294.
[18-44]沈志华编：《中苏关系史纲（1917-1991）》（北京：新华出版社，2007），页 406-407。
[18-45]Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China,
1969-1989 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), p.172.
[18-46]沈志华编：《中苏关系史纲（1917-1991）》，页 408。
[18-47]沈志华编：《中苏关系史纲（1917-1991）》，页 408-411。
[18-48]SWDXP-2, p, 224-226, January 16, 1980.
[18-49]SWDXP-2, p. 270, March 12, 1980.
[18-50]张星星：〈中国军队大裁军与新时期经济建设〉，《当代中国史研究》，2006 年第 1 期，
页 21-28。另参见 Huang, Huang Hua Memoirs, p. 291。
[18-51]正如前面提到的，邓小平愿意采取主动以减少冲突的危险，但是他仍然坚持为全面恢复正常
关系苏联必须离开阿富汗并从中苏边境撤军，越南也必须离开柬埔寨。这些条件直到 1980 年代末才成熟。
见 Qichen Qian, Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy, foreword by Ezra Vogel (New York:
HarperCollins, 2005), pp. 1-31.
[18-52]正如前面提到的，邓小平愿意采取主动以减少冲突的危险，但是他仍然坚持为全面恢复正常
关系苏联必须离开阿富汗并从中苏边境撤军，越南也必须离开柬埔寨。这些条件直到 1980 年代末才成熟。
见 Qichen Qian, Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy, foreword by Ezra Vogel (New York:
HarperCollins, 2005), pp. 13-14.
[18-53]Memcon, Summary of the Vice President's Meeting with People's Republic of
China Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, 8/27/79, vertical file, China, Jimmy Carter Library.
[18-54]Memcon, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the President, 1/8/80, National
Security Archive, Brzezinski Material, Far East, Brown (Harold) Trip file, box 69, Jimmy Carter
Library.
[18-55]Memcon, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the President, 1/8/80, National
Security Archive, Brzezinski Material, Far East, Brown (Harold) Trip file, box 69, Jimmy Carter
Library.
[18-56]Memcon, Meeting between Secretary of Defense and Vice Premier Geng Biao,
5/29/80, National Security Archive, Brzezinski Material, Far East, Geng Biao Visit file, box 70,
Jimmy Carter Library; Memcon, Meeting between Secretary of Defense Dr. Harold Brown and
Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China, Geng Biao, 5/27/80, National Security Archive,
Brzezinski Material, Far East, Geng Biao Visit file, box 70, Jimmy Carter Library; Memo,
Brzezinski to Carter, Summary of Dr. Brzezinski's Conversation with Vice Premier Geng Biao
of the People's Republic of China, 5/29/80, National Security Archive, Brzezinski Material, Far
East, Geng Biao Visit file, box 70, Jimmy Carter Library.
[18-57]《邓小平军事文集》，第 3 卷，页 154-155、168-174。
[18-58]Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao, pp. 58-59.
[18-59]Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao, pp. 60-61.
[18-60]Information Office, State Council, 2008 nian Zhongguo guofang (Chinese
National Defense in 2008) (Beijing: January 2009), appendix 5,
at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-01/20/content_1210075.htm, accessed April 9, 2011.
[18-61]William H. Overholt, The Rise of China: How Economic Reform Is Creating a New
Superpower (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), pp. 340-344.
[18-62]Robert J. Skebo, Gregory K. S. Man, and George H. Stevens, "Chinese Military
Capabilities: Problems and Prospects," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, China's
Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s: The Problems of Reforms, Modernization and
Interdependence (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991 and Armonk, N.Y.: M.
E. Sharpe, 1992), p. 665.
[18-63]Cheng Li and Scott Harold, "China's New Military Elite," China Security 3, no. 4
(Autumn 2007): 79. 对政治接班的一般论述见 Michael D. Swaine, The Military and Political
Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1992). 对
野战军人事背景重要性的介绍，一本早期的全面研究是 William W. Whitson, with Chen-hsia Huang,
The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71 (New York:
Praeger, 1973).
[18-64]Cheng Li and Lynn White, "The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping:
Familiar Fealties and Technocratic Trends," Asian Survey 33, no. 8 (August 1993): 772.
[18-65]Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb (New York: Praeger, 1965).
[18-66]Evan A. Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic
Competition from the Nuclear Age to the Information Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 2003).
[18-67]但是邓小平在 1975 年必须解决负责导弹和航天工业的七机部的派系斗争，见 Ibid.；另见
程中原、夏杏珍：《历史转折的前奏》，页 87-112。
[18-68]Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors. 对中国在边境地区的行动的论述见 Fravel,
Strong Borders, Secure Nation.
[18-69]M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: Exploring the Evolution of China's Military
Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
[18-70]Ellis Joffe, "People's War under Modern Conditions: A Doctrine for Modern War,"
The China Quarterly, no. 112 (December 1987): 555-571; Harlan W. Jencks, "People's War
under Modern Conditions: Wishful Thinking, National Suicide or Effective Deterrent?" The
China Quarterly, no. 98 (June 1984): 305-319; Paul H. B. Godwin, "Mao Zedong Revisited:
Deterrence and Defense in the 1980s," in Godwin, ed., The Chinese Defense Establishment:
Continuity and Change in the 1980s, pp. 21-40. 另参见 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, "Chinese Military Reforms: Social and Political Implications,"
Confidential Intelligence Report 1205-AR, December 6, 1985, available in DNSA.
[18-71]Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao, pp. 85-86; Godwin, "Mao Zedong
Revisited."
[18-72]Joffe, "People's War under Modern Conditions," pp. 568-569; John Wilson Lewis
and Litai Xue, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear
Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994); Alexander C. Huang, "The PLA Navy
at War, 1949-1999: From Coastal Defense to Distant Operations," in Ryan, Finkelstein, and
McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting, pp. 241-269.
[18-73]《邓小平军事文集》，第 3 卷，1979 年 7 月 29 日，页 161。
[18-74]Joffe, "People's War under Modern Conditions," p. 565.
[18-75]发展核潜艇和潜基弹道导弹计划的具体内容见 Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic
Seapower.
[18-76]SWDXP-2, p. 284.
[18-77]Skebo, Man, and Stevens, "Chinese Military Capabilities: Problems and
Prospects," pp. 663-675.
[18-78]SWDXP-2, pp. 269-275.
[18-79]SWDXP-2, pp. 269-275.
[18-80]《邓小平军事文集》，第 3 卷，1980 年 10 月 15 日，页 179。
[18-81]SWDXP-2, p. 284.
[18-82]张星星：〈中国军队大裁军与新时期经济建设〉，页 7。
[18-83]Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 121-124.
[18-84]SWDXP-3, p. 104-105, November 1, 1984; 《邓小平年谱（1975-1997）》，1984
年 11 月 1 日，页 1011-1012。
[18-85]SWDXP-2, p. 271, March 12, 1980.
[18-86]SWDXP-2, p. 271, March 12, 1980. 对 1980 年代军队教育的一般介绍见 William R.
Heaton, "Pro-fessional Military Education in the People's Republic of China," in Godwin, The
Chinese Defense Establishment, pp. 121-137; Dennis J. Blasko, Philip T. Klapakis, and John
F. Corbett, Jr., "Training Tomorrow's PLA: A Mixed Bag of Tricks," The China Quarterly, no.
146 (June 1996): 488-524.
[18-87]《邓小平军事文集》，第 3 卷，页 130。
[18-88]Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapower, p. 100.
[18-89]Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune, pp. 91-104.
[18-90]John Frankenstein and Bates Gill, "Current and Future Challenges Facing
Chinese Defence Industries," The China Quarterly, no. 146 (June 1996): 394-427.
[18-91]Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense
Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 76. See also Frankenstein and Gill,
"Current and Future Challenges Facing Chinese Defence Industries," pp. 394-427.
[18-92]Cheung, Fortifying China, p. 57. 这个时期的大趋势见 pp. 50-77。事实上，对所有这
些活动难以进行监督，尤其对于基层单位，因此并不存在准确的数字。
[18-93]Ezra F. Vogel, One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong under Reform (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1989).
[18-94]Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune, pp. 59-63.
[18-95]Barry Naughton, "The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in China's Interior,"
The China Quarterly, no. 115 (September 1988): 382.
[18-96]Barry Naughton, "The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in China's Interior,"
The China Quarterly, no. 115 (September 1988): 382; Cheung, Fortifying China, pp. 60-63.
[18-97]《邓小平年谱（1975-1997）》，1978 年 6 月 28-29 日，页 334-335。
[18-98]Cheung, Fortifying China, pp. 52-100.
