not mere triflers when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who
passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will live in a
slough, but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification
will dwell with the gods. For "many," as they say in the mysteries, "are
the thyrsus bearers, but few are the mystics," -- meaning, as I
interpret the words, the true philosophers. In the number of whom I have
been seeking, according to my ability, to find a place during my whole
life; whether I have sought in a right way or not, and whether I have
succeeded or not, I shall truly know in a little while, if God will,
when I myself arrive in the other world: that is my belief. And now,
Simmias and Cebes, I have answered those who charge me with not grieving
or repining at parting from you and my masters in this world; and I am
right in not repining, for I believe that I shall find other masters and
friends who are as good in the world below. But all men cannot believe
this, and I shall be glad if my words have any more success with you
than with the judges of the Athenians.
Cebes answered: I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you say.
But in what relates to the soul, men are apt to be incredulous; they
fear that when she leaves the body her place may be nowhere, and that on
the very day of death she may be destroyed and perish -- immediately on
her release from the body, issuing forth like smoke or air and vanishing
away into nothingness. For if she could only hold together and be
herself after she was released from the evils of the body, there would
be good reason to hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But much
persuasion and many arguments are required in order to prove that when
the man is dead the soul yet exists, and has any force of intelligence.
True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we talk a little of
the probabilities of these things?
I am sure, said Cebes, that I should gready like to know your opinion
about them.
I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not even if he
were one of my old enemies, the comic poets, could accuse me of idle
talking about matters in which I have no concern. Let us, then, if you
please, proceed with the inquiry.
Whether the souls of men after death are or are not in the world below,
is a question which may be argued in this manner: The ancient doctrine
of which I have been speaking affirms that they go from this into the
other world, and return hither, and are born from the dead. Now if this
be true, and the living come from the dead, then our souls must be in
the other world, for if not, how could they be born again? And this
would be conclusive, if there were any real evidence that the living are
only born from the dead; but if there is no evidence of this, then other
arguments will have to be adduced.
That is very true, replied Cebes.
Then let us consider this question, not in relation to man only, but in
relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything of which
there is generation, and the proof will be easier. Are not all things
which have opposites generated out of their opposites? I mean such
things as good and evil, just and unjust -- and there are innumerable
other opposites which are generated out of opposites. And I want to show
that this holds universally of all opposites; I mean to say, for
example, that anything which becomes greater must become greater after
being less.
True.
And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then become
less.
Yes.
And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the
slower.
Very true.
And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more
unjust.
Of course.
And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them
are generated out of opposites?
Yes.
And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two
intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other,
and back again; where there is a greater and a less there is also an
intermediate process of increase and diminution, and that which grows is
said to wax, and that which decays to wane?
Yes, he said.
And there are many other processes, such as division and composition,
cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one
another. And this holds of all opposites, even though not always
expressed in words -- they are generated out of one another, and there
is a passing or process from one to the other of them?
Very true, he replied.
Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of
waking?
True, he said.
And what is that?
Death, he answered.
And these, then, are generated, if they are opposites, the one from the
other, and have there their two intermediate processes also?
Of course.
Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites
which I have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and
you shall analyze the other to me. The state of sleep is opposed to the
state of waking, and out of sleeping waking is generated, and out of
waking, sleeping, and the process of generation is in the one case
falling asleep, and in the other waking up. Are you agreed about that?
Quite agreed.
Then suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the same manner.
Is not death opposed to life?
Yes.
And they are generated one from the other?
Yes.
What is generated from life?
Death.
And what from death?
I can only say in answer -- life.
Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from
the dead?
That is clear, he replied.
Then the inference is, that our souls are in the world below?
That is true.
And one of the two processes or generations is visible -- for surely the
act of dying is visible?
Surely, he said.
And may not the other be inferred as the complement of nature, who is
not to be supposed to go on one leg only? And if not, a corresponding
process of generation in death must also be assigned to her?
Certainly, he replied.
And what is that process?
Revival.
And revival, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead into the
world of the living?
Quite true.
Then there is a new way in which we arrive at the inference that the
living come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living; and if
this is true, then the souls of the dead must be in some place out of
which they come again. And this, as I think, has been satisfactorily
proved.
Yes, Socrates, he said; all this seems to flow necessarily out of our
previous admissions.
And that these admissions are not unfair, Cebes, he said, may be shown,
as I think, in this way: If generation were in a straight line only, and
there were no compensation or circle in nature, no turn or return into
one another, then you know that all things would at last have the same
form and pass into the same state, and there would be no more generation
of them.
What do you mean? he said.
A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case of sleep, he
replied. You know that if there were no compensation of sleeping and
waking, the story of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no
meaning, because all other things would be asleep, too, and he would not
be thought of. Or if there were composition only, and no division of
substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come again. And in like
manner, my dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were to die,
and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and did not come
to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be alive -- how
could this be otherwise? For if the living spring from any others who
are not the dead, and they die, must not all things at last be swallowed
up in death?
There is no escape from that, Socrates, said Cebes; and I think that
what you say is entirely true.
Yes, he said, Cebes, I entirely think so, too; and we are not walking in
a vain imagination; but I am confident in the belief that there truly is
such a thing as living again, and that the living spring from the dead,
and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls
have a better portion than the evil.
Cebes added: Your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply
recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which
we learned that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible
unless our soul was in some place before existing in the human form;
here, then, is another argument of the soul's immortality.
But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias, interposing, what proofs are given of
this doctrine of recollection? I am not very sure at this moment that I
remember them.
One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If you put a
question to a person in a right way, he will give a true answer of
himself; but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right
reason already in him? And this is most clearly shown when he is taken
to a diagram or to anything of that sort.
But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I would ask
you whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter in
another way; I mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether
knowledge is recollection.
Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have this doctrine of
recollection brought to my own recollection, and, from what Cebes has
said, I am beginning to recollect and be convinced; but I should still
like to hear what more you have to say.
This is what I would say, he replied: We should agree, if I am not
mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have known at some previous
time.
Very true.
And what is the nature of this recollection? And, in asking this, I mean
to ask whether, when a person has already seen or heard or in any way
perceived anything, and he knows not only that, but something else of
which he has not the same, but another knowledge, we may not fairly say
that he recollects that which comes into his mind. Are we agreed about
that?
What do you mean?
I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance: The knowledge of
a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man?
True.
And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or a
garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of
using? Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind's eye an
image of the youth to whom the lyre belongs? And this is recollection:
and in the same way anyone who sees Simmias may remember Cebes; and
there are endless other things of the same nature.
Yes, indeed, there are -- endless, replied Simmias.
And this sort of thing, he said, is recollection, and is most commonly a
process of recovering that which has been forgotten through time and
inattention.
Very true, he said.
Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre
remember a man? and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to
remember Cebes?
True.
Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself?
True, he said.
And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things
either like or unlike?
That is true.
And when the recollection is derived from like things, then there is
sure to be another question, which is, whether the likeness of that
which is recollected is in any way defective or not.
Very true, he said.
And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a
thing as equality, not of wood with wood, or of stone with stone, but
that, over and above this, there is equality in the abstract? Shall we
affirm this?
Affirm, yes, and swear to it, replied Simmias, with all the confidence
in life.
And do we know the nature of this abstract essence?
To be sure, he said.
And whence did we obtain this knowledge? Did we not see equalities of
material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them
the idea of an equality which is different from them? -- you will admit
that? Or look at the matter again in this way: Do not the same pieces of
wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another time unequal?
That is certain.
But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality ever
inequality?
That surely was never yet known, Socrates.
Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of
equality?
I should say, clearly not, Socrates.
And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality,
you conceived and attained that idea?
Very true, he said.
Which might be like, or might be unlike them?
Yes.
But that makes no difference; whenever from seeing one thing you
conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been
an act of recollection?
Very true.
But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other
material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they
equals in the same sense as absolute equality? or do they fall short of
this in a measure?
Yes, he said, in a very great measure, too.
And must we not allow that when I or anyone look at any object, and
perceive that the object aims at being some other thing, but falls short
of, and cannot attain to it -- he who makes this observation must have
had previous knowledge of that to which, as he says, the other, although
similar, was inferior?
Certainly.
And has not this been our case in the matter of equals and of absolute
equality?
Precisely.
Then we must have known absolute equality previously to the time when we
first saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent
equals aim at this absolute equality, but fall short of it?
That is true.
And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known,
and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some
other sense. And this I would affirm of all such conceptions.
Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the
