with some regions still having symmetry between the different forces. Such a model of the universe would not
correspond to what we see.
In October 1981, I went to Moscow for a conference on quantum gravity. After the conference I gave a seminar on
the inflationary model and its problems at the Sternberg Astronomical Institute. Before this, I had got someone else
to give my lectures for me, because most people could not understand my voice. But there was not time to prepare
this seminar, so I gave it myself, with one of my graduate students repeating my words. It worked well, and gave me
much more contact with my audience. In the audience was a young Russian, Andrei Linde, from the Lebedev
Institute in Moscow. He said that the difficulty with the bubbles not joining up could be avoided if the bubbles were so
big that our region of the universe is all contained inside a single bubble. In order for this to work, the change from
symmetry to broken symmetry must have taken place very slowly inside the bubble, but this is quite possible
according to grand unified theories. Linde’s idea of a slow breaking of symmetry was very good, but I later realized
that his bubbles would have to have been bigger than the size of the universe at the time! I showed that instead the
symmetry would have broken everywhere at the same time, rather than just inside bubbles. This would lead to a
uniform universe, as we observe. I was very excited by this idea and discussed it with one of my students, Ian Moss.
As a friend of Linde’s, I was rather embarrassed, however, when I was later sent his paper by a scientific journal and
asked whether it was suitable for publication. I replied that there was this flaw about the bubbles being bigger than
the universe, but that the basic idea of a slow breaking of symmetry was very good. I recommended that the paper .
published as it was because it would take Linde several months to correct it, since anything he sent to the West
would have to be passed by Soviet censorship, which was neither very skillful nor very quick with scientific papers.
Instead, I wrote a short paper with Ian Moss in the same journal in which we pointed out this problem with the bubble
and showed how it could be resolved.
The day after I got back from Moscow I set out for Philadelphia, where I was due to receive a medal from the
Franklin Institute. My secretary, Judy Fella, had used her not inconsiderable charm to persuade British Airways to
give herself and me free seats on a Concorde as a publicity venture. However, I .was held up on my way to the
airport by heavy rain and I missed the plane. Nevertheless, I got to Philadelphia in the end and received my medal. I
was then asked to give a seminar on the inflationary universe at Drexel University in Philadelphia. I gave the same
seminar about the problems of the inflationary universe, just as in Moscow.
A very similar idea to Linde’s was put forth independently a few months later by Paul Steinhardt and Andreas
Albrecht of the University of Pennsylvania. They are now given joint credit with Linde for what is called “the new
inflationary model,” based on the idea of a slow breaking of symmetry. (The old inflationary model was Guth’s
original suggestion of fast symmetry breaking with the formation of bubbles.)
The new inflationary model was a good attempt to explain why the universe is the way it is. However, I and several
other people showed that, at least in its original form, it predicted much greater variations in the temperature of the
microwave background radiation than are observed. Later work has also cast doubt on whether there could be a
phase transition in the very early universe of the kind required. In my personal opinion, the new inflationary model is
now dead as a scientific theory, although a lot of people do not seem to have heard of its demise and are still writing
papers as if it were viable. A better model, called the chaotic inflationary model, was put forward by Linde in 1983. In
this there is no phase transition or supercooling. Instead, there is a spin 0 field, which, because of quantum
fluctuations, would have large values in some regions of the early universe. The energy of the field in those regions
would behave like a cosmological constant. It would have a repulsive gravitational effect, and thus make those
regions expand in an inflationary manner. As they expanded, the energy of the field in them would slowly decrease
until the inflationary expansion changed to an expansion like that in the hot big bang model. One of these regions
would become what we now see as the observable universe. This model has all the advantages of the earlier
inflationary models, but it does not depend on a dubious phase transition, and it can moreover give a reasonable size
for the fluctuations in the temperature of the microwave background that agrees with observation.
This work on inflationary models showed that the present state of the universe could have arisen from quite a large
number of different initial configurations. This is important, because it shows that the initial state of the part of the
universe that we inhabit did not have to be chosen with great care. So we may, if we wish, use the weak anthropic
principle to explain why the universe looks the way it does now. It cannot be the case, however, that every initial
configuration would have led to a universe like the one we observe. One can show this by considering a very
different state for the universe at the present time, say, a very lumpy and irregular one. One could use the laws of
science to evolve the universe back in time to determine its configuration at earlier times. According to the singularity
theorems of classical general relativity, there would still have been a big bang singularity. If you evolve such a
universe forward in time according to the laws of science, you will end up with the lumpy and irregular state you
started with. Thus there must have been initial configurations that would not have given rise to a universe like the
one we see today. So even the inflationary model does not tell us why the initial configuration was not such as to
produce something very different from what we observe. Must we turn to the anthropic principle for an explanation?
Was it all just a lucky chance? That would seem a counsel of despair, a negation of all our hopes of understanding
the underlying order of the universe.
In order to predict how the universe should have started off, one needs laws that hold at the beginning of time. If the
classical theory of general relativity was correct, the singularity theorems that Roger Penrose and I proved show that
the beginning of time would have been a point of infinite density and infinite curvature of space-time. All the known
laws of science would break down at such a point. One might suppose that there were new laws that held at
singularities, but it would be very difficult even to formulate such laws at such badly behaved points, and we would
have no guide from observations as to what those laws might be. However, what the singularity theorems really
indicate is that the gravitational field becomes so strong that quantum gravitational effects become important:
classical theory is no longer a good description of the universe. So one has to use a quantum theory of gravity to
discuss the very early stages of the universe. As we shall see, it is possible in the quantum theory for the ordinary
laws of science to hold everywhere, including at the beginning of time: it is not necessary to postulate new laws for
singularities, because there need not be any singularities in the quantum theory.
We don’t yet have a complete and consistent theory that combines quantum mechanics and gravity. However, we
are fairly certain of some features that such a unified theory should have. One is that it should incorporate
Feynman’s proposal to formulate quantum theory in terms of a sum over histories. In this approach, a particle does
not have just a single history, as it would in a classical theory. Instead, it is supposed to follow every possible path in
space-time, and with each of these histories there are associated a couple of numbers, one represent-ing the size of
a wave and the other representing its position in the cycle (its phase). The probability that the particle, say, passes
through some particular point is found by adding up the waves associated with every possible history that passes
through that point. When one actually tries to perform these sums, however, one runs into severe technical
problems. The only way around these is the following peculiar prescription: one must add up the waves for particle
histories that are not in the “real” time that you and I experience but take place in what is called imaginary time.
Imaginary time may sound like science fiction but it is in fact a well-defined mathematical concept. If we take any
ordinary (or “real”) number and multiply it by itself, the result is a positive number. (For example, 2 times 2 is 4, but
so is – 2 times – 2.) There are, however, special numbers (called imaginary numbers) that give negative numbers
when multiplied by themselves. (The one called i, when multiplied by itself, gives – 1, 2i multiplied by itself gives – 4,
and so on.)
One can picture real and imaginary numbers in the following way: The real numbers can be represented by a line
going from left to right, with zero in the middle, negative numbers like – 1, – 2, etc. on the left, and positive numbers,
1, 2, etc. on the right. Then imaginary numbers are represented by a line going up and down the page, with i, 2i, etc.
above the middle, and – i, – 2i, etc. below. Thus imaginary numbers are in a sense numbers at right angles to
ordinary real numbers.
To avoid the technical difficulties with Feynman’s sum over histories, one must use imaginary time. That is to say, for
the purposes of the calculation one must measure time using imaginary numbers, rather than real ones. This has an
interesting effect on space-time: the distinction between time and space disappears completely. A space-time in
which events have imaginary values of the time coordinate is said to be Euclidean, after the ancient Greek Euclid,
who founded the study of the geometry of two-dimensional surfaces. What we now call Euclidean space-time is very
similar except that it has four dimensions instead of two. In Euclidean space-time there is no difference between the
time direction and directions in space. On the other hand, in real space-time, in which events are labeled by ordinary,
real values of the time coordinate, it is easy to tell the difference – the time direction at all points lies within the light
cone, and space directions lie outside. In any case, as far as everyday quantum mechanics is concerned, we may
regard our use of imaginary time and Euclidean space-time as merely a mathematical device (or trick) to calculate
answers about real space-time.
A second feature that we believe must be part of any ultimate theory is Einstein’s idea that the gravitational field is
represented by curved space-time: particles try to follow the nearest thing to a straight path in a curved space, but
because space-time is not flat their paths appear to be bent, as if by a gravitational field. When we apply Feynman’s
sum over histories to Einstein’s view of gravity, the analogue of the history of a particle is now a complete curved
space-time that represents the history of the whole universe. To avoid the technical difficulties in actually performing
the sum over histories, these curved space-times must be taken to be Euclidean. That is, time is imaginary and is
indistinguishable from directions in space. To calculate the probability of finding a real space-time with some certain
property, such as looking the same at every point and in every direction, one adds up the waves associated with all
the histories that have that property.
In the classical theory of general relativity, there are many different possible curved space-times, each corresponding
to a different initial state of the universe. If we knew the initial state of our universe, we would know its entire history.
Similarly, in the quantum theory of gravity, there are many different possible quantum states for the universe. Again,
if we knew how the Euclidean curved space-times in the sum over histories behaved at early times, we would know
the quantum state of the universe.
In the classical theory of gravity, which is based on real space-time, there are only two possible ways the universe
can behave: either it has existed for an infinite time, or else it had a beginning at a singularity at some finite time in
the past. In the quantum theory of gravity, on the other hand, a third possibility arises. Because one is using
Euclidean space-times, in which the time direction is on the same footing as directions in space, it is possible for
space-time to be finite in extent and yet to have no singularities that formed a boundary or edge. Space-time would
be like the surface of the earth, only with two more dimensions. The surface of the earth is finite in extent but it
doesn’t have a boundary or edge: if you sail off into the sunset, you don’t fall off the edge or run into a singularity. (I
know, because I have been round the world!)
If Euclidean space-time stretches back to infinite imaginary time, or else starts at a singularity in imaginary time, we
have the same problem as in the classical theory of specifying the initial state of the universe: God may know how
the universe began, but we cannot give any particular reason for thinking it began one way rather than another. On
the other hand, the quantum theory of gravity has opened up a new possibility, in which there would be no boundary
to space-time and so there would be no need to specify the behavior at the boundary. There would be no
singularities at which the laws of science broke down, and no edge of space-time at which one would have to appeal
to God or some new law to set the boundary conditions for space-time. One could say: “The boundary condition of
the universe is that it has no boundary.” The universe would be completely self-contained and not affected by
anything outside itself. It would neither be created nor destroyed, It would just BE.
It was at the conference in the Vatican mentioned earlier that I first put forward the suggestion that maybe time and
