饭饭TXT > 海外名作 > 《动荡年代/The Age of Turbulence(英文版)》作者:[美]阿伦·格林斯潘【完结】 > The Age of Turbulence .txt

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作者:美-阿伦·格林斯潘 当前章节:15435 字 更新时间:2026-6-19 14:32

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INTRODUCTION

On

On

the afternoon of September 11, 2001, I was flying back to

Washington on Swissair Flight 128, returning home from a routine

international bankers' meeting in Switzerland. I'd been

moving about the cabin when the chief of the security detail that escorted

me on trips abroad, Bob Agnew, stopped me in the aisle. Bob is an ex-Secret

Service man, friendly but not especially talkative. At that moment, he was

looking grim. "Mr. Chairman," he said quietly, "the captain needs to see you

up front. Two planes have flown into the World Trade Center." I must have

had a quizzical look on my face because he added, "I'm not joking."

In the cockpit, the captain appeared quite nervous. He told us there

had been a terrible attack against our country—several airliners had been

hijacked and two flown into the World Trade Center and one into the Pentagon.

Another plane was missing. That was all the information he had, he

said in his slightly accented English. We were returning to Zurich, and he

was not going to announce the reason to the other passengers.

"Do we have to go back?" I asked. "Can we land in Canada?" He said no,

his orders were to head to Zurich.

I went back to my seat as the captain announced that air traffic control

THE AGE OF TURBULENCE

had directed us to Zurich. The phones on the seats immediately became

jammed, and I couldn't get through to the ground. The Federal Reserve

colleagues who had been with me in Switzerland that weekend were already

on other flights. So with no way to know how events were developing,

I had nothing to do but think for the next three and a half hours. I

looked out the window, the work I'd brought along, the piles of memos and

economic reports, forgotten in my bag. Were these attacks the beginning of

some wider conspiracy?

My immediate concern was for my wife—Andrea is NBC's chief foreign

affairs correspondent in Washington. She wasn't in New York, which

was one big relief, and visiting the Pentagon hadn't been on her agenda that

day. I assumed she would be at the NBC bureau in the middle of town,

heavily involved in covering the news. So I wasn't deeply worried, I told

myself... but what if she'd gone on a last-minute visit to some general in

the Pentagon?

I worried about my colleagues at the Federal Reserve. Were they safe?

And their families? The staff would be scrambling to respond to the crisis.

This attack—the first on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor—would throw the

country into turmoil. The question I needed to focus on was whether the

economy would be damaged.

The possible economic crises were all too evident. The worst, which I

thought highly unlikely, would be a collapse of the financial system. The

Federal Reserve is in charge of the electronic payment systems that transfer

more than $4 trillion a day in money and securities between banks all over

the country and much of the rest of the world.

We'd always thought that if you wanted to cripple the U.S. economy,

you'd take out the payment systems. Banks would be forced to fall back on

inefficient physical transfers of money. Businesses would resort to barter

and IOUs; the level of economic activity across the country could drop like

a rock.

During the cold war, as a precaution against nuclear attack, the Federal

Reserve had built a large number of redundancies into the communication

and computer facilities on which the money system relies. We have all sorts

of safeguards so that, for example, the data of one Federal Reserve bank are

backed up at another Federal Reserve bank hundreds of miles away or in

2

I NTRODUCTION

some remote location. In the event of a nuclear attack, we'd be back up and

running in all nonirradiated areas very quickly This system was the one

Roger Ferguson, the vice chairman of the Fed, would be calling on this day

I was confident that he and our colleagues would be taking the necessary

steps to keep the world dollar system flowing.

Yet even as I thought about it, I doubted that physically disrupting the

financial system was what the hijackers had in mind. Much more likely, this

was meant to be a symbolic act of violence against capitalist America—like

the bomb in the parking garage of the World Trade Center eight years earlier.

What worried me was the fear such an attack would create—especially

if there were additional attacks to come. In an economy as sophisticated as

ours, people have to interact and exchange goods and services constantly,

and the division of labor is so finely articulated that every household depends

on commerce simply to survive. If people withdraw from everyday

economic life—if investors dump their stocks, or businesspeople back away

from trades, or citizens stay home for fear of going to malls and being exposed

to suicide bombers—there's a snowball effect. It's the psychology

that leads to panics and recessions. A shock like the one we'd just sustained

could cause a massive withdrawal from, and major contraction in, economic

activity. The misery could multiply.

Long before my flight touched down, I'd concluded that the world was

about to change in ways that I could not yet define. The complacency we

Americans had embraced for the decade following the end of the cold war

had just been shattered.

We finally reached Zurich just after 8:30 p.m. local time—still early

afternoon in the United States. Swiss banking officials met me as I got off

the plane and rushed me to a private room in the departure lounge. They

offered to show videos of the Twin Towers coming down and the fires at

the Pentagon, but I declined. I'd worked in the neighborhood of the World

Trade Center for much of my life and had friends and acquaintances there.

I assumed the death tolls would be horrendous and would include people

I knew. I didn't want to see the destruction. I just wanted a phone that

worked.

I finally reached Andrea on her cell phone a few minutes before nine,

and it was a great relief to hear her voice. Once we'd assured each other we

3

THE AGE OF TURBULENCE

were okay, she told me she had to rush: she was on the set, about to go on

the air with an update of the day's events. I said, "Just tell me quickly

what's happening there."

She was holding the cell phone to one ear while the special-events

producer in New York was on her earpiece in the other ear, almost shouting,

"Andrea, Tom Brokaw is coming to you! Are you ready?" All she had time

to say was, "Listen up." With that, she put the open cell phone on her lap

and addressed the cameras. I heard exactly what America was hearing at

that point—that the missing United Flight 93 had crashed in Pennsylvania.

I was then able to get a call through to Roger Ferguson at the Fed. We

ran through our crisis-management checklist, and just as I'd figured, he had

things well in hand. Then, with all civilian air travel to the United States

shut down, I contacted Andy Card, the White House chief of staff, to request

transportation back to Washington. Finally I went back to the hotel,

escorted by my security detail, to get some sleep and await instructions.

By daybreak I was airborne again, on the flight deck of a United States

Air Force KC-10 tanker—it may have been the only aircraft available. The

crew was used to flying refueling sorties over the North Atlantic. The mood

in the cockpit was somber: "You'll never believe this," the captain said. "Listen."

I put my ear to the headset but couldn't hear anything other than

static. "Normally the North Atlantic is full of radio chatter," he explained.

"This silence is eerie." Apparently nobody else was out there.

As we came down the eastern seaboard and entered prohibited U.S.

airspace, we were met and escorted by a couple of Fl 6 fighters. The captain

got permission to fly over what had been the site of the Twin Towers at the

southern tip of Manhattan, now a smoking ruin. For decades, my offices

had never been more than a few blocks from there; during the late 1960s

and early 1970s I had watched day by day as the Twin Towers went up.

Now, from thirty-five thousand feet, their smoky wreckage was New York's

most visible landmark.

I went straight to the Fed that afternoon, driven with a police escort

through barricaded streets. Then we went to work.

For the most part, the electronic flows of funds were doing fine. But

with civilian air traffic shut down, the transportation and clearing of good

old-fashioned checks were being delayed. That was a technical problem—a

4

I NTRODUCTION

substantial one, but one that the staff and the individual Federal Reserve

banks were entirely capable of handling by temporarily extending additional

credit to commercial banks.

I spent most of my time in the days that followed watching and listening

for signs of a catastrophic economic slowdown. For seven months before

9/11, the economy had been in a very minor recession, still shaking off

the effects of the dot-com crash of 2000. But things had started to turn

around. We had rapidly been lowering interest rates, and the markets were

beginning to stabilize. By late August public interest had shifted from the

economy to Gary Condit, the California congressman whose less-thanforthcoming

statements about a missing young woman dominated the

nightly news. Andrea couldn't get on the air with anything of global significance,

and I remember thinking how incredible that seemed—the world

must be in pretty good shape if the TV news focused mainly on domestic

scandal. Within the Fed, the biggest issue we faced was how far to lower interest

rates.

After 9/11, the reports and statistics streaming in from the Federal Reserve

banks told a very different story. The Federal Reserve System consists

of twelve banks strategically situated around the country Each one lends

money to and regulates the banks in its region. The Federal Reserve banks

also serve as a window on the American economy—officers and staff stay

constantly in touch with bankers and businesspeople in their districts, and

the information they glean about orders and sales beats official published

data by as much as a month.

What they were telling us now was that all across the country people

had stopped spending on everything except items bought in preparation

for possible additional attacks: sales of groceries, security devices, bottled

water, and insurance were up; the whole travel, entertainment, hotel, tourism,

and convention business was down. We knew the shipping of fresh

vegetables from the West Coast to the East Coast would be disrupted by

the suspension of air freight, but we were somewhat surprised by how

quickly many other businesses were hit. For example, the flow of auto parts

from Windsor, Ontario, to Detroit's plants slowed to a crawl at the river

crossings that join the two cities—a factor in the decision by Ford Motor to

shut down temporarily five of its factories. Years earlier, many manufactur

es

THE AGE OF TURBULENCE

ers had shifted to "just-in-time" production—instead of stockpiling parts

and supplies at the plant, they relied on air freight to deliver critical components

as they were needed. The shutdown of the airspace and the tightening

of borders led to shortages, bottlenecks, and canceled shifts.

In the meantime, the U.S. government had gone into high gear. On Friday,

September 14, Congress passed an initial emergency appropriation of

$40 billion and authorized the president to use force against the "nations,

organizations, or persons" who had attacked us. President Bush rallied the

nation with what will likely go down as the most effective speech of his

presidency. "America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest

beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world," he said. "And no one

will keep that light from shining." His approval ratings soared to 86 percent,

and politics, if only for a short period, became bipartisan. Lots of ideas

were being floated on Capitol Hill for helping the nation bounce back.

There were plans that involved pumping funds into airlines, tourism, and

recreation. There was a raft of proposals to extend tax breaks to businesses

in order to encourage capital investment. Terrorism insurance was much

discussed—how do you insure against such catastrophic events, and what

role, if any, does the government have in that?

I thought it urgent to get commercial aircraft flying again, in order to

abort all the negative ripple effects. (Congress quickly passed a $15 billion

air transport rescue bill.) But beyond that, I paid less attention to most of

these debates, because I was intent on getting the larger picture—which

still wasn't clear to me. I was convinced that the answer would not lie in

big, hasty, expensive gestures. It's typical that in times of great national urgency,

every congressman feels he has to put out a bill; presidents feel the

pressure to act too. Under those conditions you can get shortsighted, ineffective,

often counterproductive policies, like the gasoline rationing that

President Nixon imposed during the first OPEC oil shock in 1973. (That

policy caused gas lines in some parts of the country that fall.) But with

fourteen years under my belt as Fed chairman, I'd seen the economy pull

through a lot of crises—including the largest one-day crash in the history of

the stock market, which happened five weeks after I took the job. We'd

survived the real-estate boom and bust of the 1980s, the savings and loan

crisis, and the Asian financial upheavals, not to mention the recession of

6

I NTRODUCTION

1990. We'd enjoyed the longest stock-market boom in history and then

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