饭饭TXT > 海外名作 > 《动荡年代/The Age of Turbulence(英文版)》作者:[美]阿伦·格林斯潘【完结】 > The Age of Turbulence .txt

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作者:美-阿伦·格林斯潘 当前章节:15423 字 更新时间:2026-6-19 14:32

occasion—a cut-velvet burgundy and black Badgley Mischka—and looked

ravishing, even though she'd been working at her usual intense pace and

had the flu.

The Millennium Dinner filled both the East Room and the State Dining

Room, which, as a reporter gushed the next day, "were transformed into

a fantasy of white and silver, with white orchids and roses set atop silver

velvet tablecloths." I don't have much of an eye for such things. But as we

nibbled beluga caviar and sipped champagne, what did strike me was that

both host and hostess seemed genuinely pleased—he rounding out his second

term as president, she preparing to launch her political career with a

run for the U.S. Senate. The president toasted the guests: "I cannot help but

think how different America is, how different history is, and how much

better, because those of you in this room and those you represent were able

to imagine, to invent, to aspire." After seven years in the White House—after

the trials of Bosnia, the sleaze of Monicagate, and a historic economic

and financial boom—this was the Clintons' Camelot moment.

The dinner broke up a little after nine, and the crowd moved to the

buses that were to take us to the Lincoln Memorial. But Andrea and I

peeled off We had another millennium gathering to attend—at the Fed,

where a sizable team was poised to work through the night to monitor the

transition of the nation's financial systems.

The Fed had devoted years of effort to ensure that the turn of the millennium

would not be a disaster. The threat was from obsolete software—

the Y2K bug, it was called—embedded in computers all over the world. In

order to save precious computer storage capacity, programmers in decades

past had routinely used only two digits instead of four to represent the year,

203

THE AGE OF TURBULENCE

so for example "1974" would show up simply as "74." As I wrote programs

using punchcards in the 1970s (I'd used this technique myself, writing programs

on punchcards at Townsend-Greenspan. It had never entered my

mind that such programs, extensively patched, might still be in use at the

end of the century and I never bothered to document the work.) There was

understandably widespread concern that the shift from 1999 to 2000 might

cause such software to go haywire. This potential glitch was often devilishly

hard to detect and costly to fix. But in Y2K doomsday scenarios, the consequences

of failing to do so were dire: vital civilian and military networks

would crash, causing electricity to go out, phones to fail, credit cards to

stop working, airplanes to collide, and worse. To prevent chaos from breaking

out in the financial system, Fed governor Mike Kelley had spearheaded

a massive two-and-a-half-year drive to modernize the computers of America's

banks and of the Fed itself. The Fed had worked hard to mobilize other

central banks around the world to do the same.

Tonight we were to learn whether all those precautions had paid off.

Mike and his team had sacrificed their holiday to man a command post on

the terrace level of the Fed's William McChesney Martin Building, where

they'd fitted out a big room near the cafeteria with phones and screens and

televisions and workspaces for about a hundred people. The kitchen was

open; there was no champagne but plenty of nonalcoholic sparkling cider.

When Andrea and I stopped in, the team had already been there all day,

watching celebration after celebration on TV as the millennium made its way

around the globe. First the New Year had come to Australia, then Japan, then

the rest of Asia, then Europe. In each of those places, the TV coverage would

show the fireworks, of course, but what Mike and his team were really watching

was the city lights in the background to see if they were still on.

I felt out of place walking into this scene in black tie; most everybody

else had on a red T-shirt bearing a patch emblazoned with an eagle on a red,

white, and blue shield and the words "Federal Reserve Board" and "Y2K."

Mike, who had been keeping me up-to-date, said things were still going remarkably

well. Britain had just entered the twenty-first century apparently

without problems. We were now in the hiatus as midnight crossed the Atlantic.

The United States would be the last major economy to go, which

added to the suspense, because after all our poking and prodding of other

204

M I LLE N N I UM FEVER

nations, it would have been an embarrassment to have our systems fail. But

we were extremely well prepared: the U.S. financial industry had spent

many billions of dollars replacing and updating old systems and programs;

crisis-management teams stood ready in every Federal Reserve district and

in every major bank. The FOMC had released billions of dollars of liquidity

into the financial system, using options and other innovative techniques.

And in the event America's credit card system or ATM networks broke

down, the Fed had even positioned stockpiles of extra cash at ninety locations

around the United States. Having had a hand in creating the problem,

there was no way I could have shown up at the office on January 3 without

having visited the troops in the trenches on the eve of potential

catastrophe.*

From there, Andrea and I headed home. It was only 10:30, but we felt

strangely as though we'd already seen the new millennium come and go. By

the time midnight finally reached Washington—and began to cross the

United States without incident—we were tucked snugly in bed.

*We didn't know it then, but the huge investments directed at clarifying and rationalizing all

the undocumented pre-Y2K programs greatly enhanced the flexibility and resilience of America's

business and government infrastructure. There were no more undocumented "black boxes"

to try to puzzle out when something went wrong. I suspect a good part of the surge in productivity

in the years immediately following was owed to those precautionary Y2K investments.

205

TEN

DOWNTURN

M

M

y first meeting with President-elect Bush took place on December

18, 2000, less than a week after the Supreme Court decision

that enabled him to claim his election victory. We met

at the Madison, the hotel about five blocks from the White House, where

he and his team had set up shop. This was his first trip to Washington as

president-elect; we'd met a few times over the years but had spoken at

length only once before, on the dais at a banquet that spring.

The breakfast at the Madison included Vice President-elect Cheney;

Bush's chief of staff, Andy Card; and a couple of aides. The situation had a

familiar feel: I'd briefed five previous incoming presidents on the state of

the economy, including, of course, the president-elect's father.

In this instance, I was obliged to report that the short-term outlook was

not good. For the first time in years, we seemed to be faced with the real

possibility of recession.

The deflation of the tech-stock bubble had been the great financial

drama of the preceding months. The NASDAQ lost a stunning 50 percent

of its value between March and year-end. The broader markets declined far

DOWNTU RN

less—the S&P 500 was down by 14 percent, and the Dow by 3 percent. But

while the total losses were small in comparison with the paper wealth that

the bull market had created, these were significant declines, and the Wall

Street outlook remained gloomy, putting a damper on public confidence.

Of greater concern was the overall state of the economy. For much of

the year, we'd appeared to be entering a mild cyclical slowdown; this was

to be expected as businesses and consumers adjusted to the effects of so

many boom years, so much technological change, and the deflation of the

bubble in stocks. Indeed, to foster this adjustment process, the Fed had

tightened interest rates in a series of steps from July 1999 to June 2000. We

were hoping we might achieve another soft landing.

But in the past couple of weeks, I said, the numbers had slipped badly.

There had been production slowdowns among automakers and other manufacturers,

lowered estimates of corporate profits, swelling inventories in

many industries, a marked rise in initial unemployment claims, and a weakening

of consumer confidence. Energy was putting a drag on the economy

too: oil had spiked up to more than $30 a barrel earlier in the year, and natural

gas prices were up. Then there was the anecdotal evidence. Wal-Mart

had told the Fed that it was cutting back its expectations for holiday sales,

and FedEx reported to us that shipments were below predictions. You can't

judge the health of the economy by the length of the lines to visit Santa at

Macy's, but it was mid-December and anyone who had gone Christmas

shopping knew that the stores were eerily quiet.

Despite all this, I told the president-elect, the economy's long-term

potential remained strong. Inflation was low and stable, long-term interest

rates were trending down, and productivity was still on the rise. And of

course the federal government was running a surplus for the fourth straight

year. The latest forecast for the 2001 fiscal year, which had just begun in

October, had the surplus at nearly $270 billion.

As breakfast ended, Bush asked me aside for a private word. "I want you

to know," he said, "that I have full confidence in the Federal Reserve and we

will not be second-guessing your decisions." I thanked him. We chatted a bit

more. Then it was time for him to leave for meetings on Capitol Hill.

There were cameras and reporters waiting as we walked out of the hotel.

207

THE AGE OF TURBULENCE

I assumed that the president-elect would just go up to the microphones,

but instead he put his arm around my shoulders and brought me along. An

Associated Press photo from that morning shows me smiling broadly, as if

I'd just gotten good news. Indeed I had. He'd zeroed in on the issue of most

pressing importance to the Fed: our autonomy. I wasn't yet sure what to

think about George W. Bush; but I felt inclined to believe him when he said

we weren't going to have fights about monetary policy.

I

I

felt relieved that the election crisis had been resolved. In unprecedented

circumstances, after thirty-six days of hanging chads, recounts, lawsuits,

and bitter allegations of vote tampering and fraud that in other countries

would have caused rioting in the streets, we'd at least achieved a civil conclusion.

Though I'm a lifelong libertarian Republican, I have close friends

on both sides of the political aisle, and I thought I understood the Democrats'

dismay at seeing George W. Bush take the White House. But it is

worth focusing on how rare it is in world politics for a bitter political brawl

to end up with the opposing candidates wishing each other well. Al Gore's

concession speech ending the presidential race was the most gracious I'd

ever heard. "Almost a century and a half ago," he said, "Senator Stephen

Douglas told Abraham Lincoln, who had just defeated him for the Presidency:

'Partisan feeling must yield to patriotism. I'm with you, Mr. President,

and God bless you.' Well, in that same spirit, I say to President-elect

Bush that what remains of partisan rancor must now be put aside, and may

God bless his stewardship of this country."

While I did not know where George W. Bush would lead us, I had confidence

in the team that was taking shape. People wisecracked that America

was witnessing the second coming of the Ford administration, but what was

just a witticism to them meant a great deal to me. I'd started my public service

in the Ford White House, and looked back to those years as something

special. Gerald Ford was a very decent man, thrust into a presidency that

he had never sought and that he probably would never have been able to

win on his own. As he showed in his race against Jimmy Carter in 1976, he

was not very good at the bare-knuckle politicking of a presidential campaign;

his dream had been to serve as Speaker of the House of Representa

208

DOWNTU RN

tives. Yet in the turmoil of a president resigning in disgrace, he'd proclaimed,

"Our long national nightmare is over," and gathered around him as talented

a group of people to run government as I have ever witnessed.

And now, in December 2000, George W. Bush was staffing the core of

his government with Ford administration stalwarts, a lot older and far more

experienced. The new secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, had been

Ford's first White House chief of staff. Under Ford, Rumsfeld had proved

exceptionally effective. Called back by the president from his assignment

as ambassador to NATO, he had quickly organized the Ford White House

and ruled over it with great skill until Ford appointed him to his first turn

as secretary of defense in 1975. After he returned to the private sector,

Rumsfeld took the reins of a faltering G. D. Searle, a worldwide pharmaceutical

company. I was brought on as the company's outside economic

consultant and was fascinated to see this former U.S. Navy flight instructor,

congressman, and government official fit so easily into the business world.

Another stalwart from the Ford administration was the new secretary

of the treasury, my friend Paul O'Neill. Paul had impressed everybody as

Gerald Ford's deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget.

His had been a midlevel job, yet we'd pulled Paul in for all the important

meetings because he was one of the few with full command of the details

of the budget. Leaving the government to join the business world, he'd

risen to become CEO of Alcoa—I was on the board of directors that hired

him. In twelve years in that job, he'd been a great success. But he was ready

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