form of which ‘faith’ comes to it. Modern men, with their
obtuseness as regards all Christian nomenclature, have no
longer the sense for the terribly superlative conception
which was implied to an antique taste by the paradox of
the formula, ‘God on the Cross". Hitherto there had never
and nowhere been such boldness in inversion, nor
anything at once so dreadful, questioning, and
questionable as this formula: it promised a transvaluation
of all ancient values—It was the Orient, the
PROFOUND Orient, it was the Oriental slave who thus
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took revenge on Rome and its noble, light-minded
toleration, on the Roman ‘Catholicism’ of non-faith, and
it was always not the faith, but the freedom from the faith,
the half-stoical and smiling indifference to the seriousness
of the faith, which made the slaves indignant at their
masters and revolt against them. ‘Enlightenment’ causes
revolt, for the slave desires the unconditioned, he
understands nothing but the tyrannous, even in morals, he
loves as he hates, without NUANCE, to the very depths,
to the point of pain, to the point of sickness—his many
HIDDEN sufferings make him revolt against the noble
taste which seems to DENY suffering. The skepticism
with regard to suffering, fundamentally only an attitude of
aristocratic morality, was not the least of the causes, also,
of the last great slave-insurrection which began with the
French Revolution.
47. Wherever the religious neurosis has appeared on
the earth so far, we find it connected with three dangerous
prescriptions as to regimen: solitude, fasting, and sexual
abstinence—but without its being possible to determine
with certainty which is cause and which is effect, or IF any
relation at all of cause and effect exists there. This latter
doubt is justified by the fact that one of the most regular
symptoms among savage as well as among civilized peoples
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is the most sudden and excessive sensuality, which then
with equal suddenness transforms into penitential
paroxysms, world-renunciation, and will-renunciation,
both symptoms perhaps explainable as disguised epilepsy?
But nowhere is it MORE obligatory to put aside
explanations around no other type has there grown such a
mass of absurdity and superstition, no other type seems to
have been more interesting to men and even to
philosophers—perhaps it is time to become just a little
indifferent here, to learn caution, or, better still, to look
AWAY, TO GO AWAY—Yet in the background of the
most recent philosophy, that of Schopenhauer, we find
almost as the problem in itself, this terrible note of
interrogation of the religious crisis and awakening. How is
the negation of will POSSIBLE? how is the saint
possible?—that seems to have been the very question with
which Schopenhauer made a start and became a
philosopher. And thus it was a genuine Schopenhauerian
consequence, that his most convinced adherent (perhaps
also his last, as far as Germany is concerned), namely,
Richard Wagner, should bring his own life- work to an
end just here, and should finally put that terrible and
eternal type upon the stage as Kundry, type vecu, and as it
loved and lived, at the very time that the mad-doctors in
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almost all European countries had an opportunity to study
the type close at hand, wherever the religious neurosis—or
as I call it, ‘the religious mood’—made its latest epidemical
outbreak and display as the ‘Salvation Army’—If it be a
question, however, as to what has been so extremely
interesting to men of all sorts in all ages, and even to
philosophers, in the whole phenomenon of the saint, it is
undoubtedly the appearance of the miraculous therein—
namely, the immediate SUCCESSION OF OPPOSITES,
of states of the soul regarded as morally antithetical: it was
believed here to be self-evident that a ‘bad man’ was all at
once turned into a ‘saint,’ a good man. The hitherto
existing psychology was wrecked at this point, is it not
possible it may have happened principally because
psychology had placed itself under the dominion of
morals, because it BELIEVED in oppositions of moral
values, and saw, read, and INTERPRETED these
oppositions into the text and facts of the case? What?
‘Miracle’ only an error of interpretation? A lack of
philology?
48. It seems that the Latin races are far more deeply
attached to their Catholicism than we Northerners are to
Christianity generally, and that consequently unbelief in
Catholic countries means something quite different from
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what it does among Protestants—namely, a sort of revolt
against the spirit of the race, while with us it is rather a
return to the spirit (or non- spirit) of the race.
We Northerners undoubtedly derive our origin from
barbarous races, even as regards our talents for religion—
we have POOR talents for it. One may make an
exception in the case of the Celts, who have theretofore
furnished also the best soil for Christian infection in the
North: the Christian ideal blossomed forth in France as
much as ever the pale sun of the north would allow it.
How strangely pious for our taste are still these later
French skeptics, whenever there is any Celtic blood in
their origin! How Catholic, how un-German does
Auguste Comte’s Sociology seem to us, with the Roman
logic of its instincts! How Jesuitical, that amiable and
shrewd cicerone of Port Royal, Sainte-Beuve, in spite of
all his hostility to Jesuits! And even Ernest Renan: how
inaccessible to us Northerners does the language of such a
Renan appear, in whom every instant the merest touch of
religious thrill throws his refined voluptuous and
comfortably couching soul off its balance! Let us repeat
after him these fine sentences—and what wickedness and
haughtiness is immediately aroused by way of answer in
our probably less beautiful but harder souls, that is to say,
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in our more German souls!—‘DISONS DONC
HARDIMENT QUE LA RELIGION EST UN
PRODUIT DE L’HOMME NORMAL, QUE
L’HOMME EST LE PLUS DANS LE VRAI QUANT
IL EST LE PLUS RELIGIEUX ET LE PLUS ASSURE
D’UNE DESTINEE INFINIE…. C’EST QUAND IL
EST BON QU’IL VEUT QUE LA VIRTU
CORRESPONDE A UN ORDER ETERNAL, C’EST
QUAND IL CONTEMPLE LES CHOSES D’UNE
MANIERE DESINTERESSEE QU’IL TROUVE LA
MORT REVOLTANTE ET ABSURDE. COMMENT
NE PAS SUPPOSER QUE C’EST DANS CES
MOMENTS-LA, QUE L’HOMME VOIT LE MIEUX?’
… These sentences are so extremely ANTIPODAL to my
ears and habits of thought, that in my first impulse of rage
on finding them, I wrote on the margin, ‘LA NIAISERIE
RELIGIEUSE PAR EXCELLENCE!’—until in my later
rage I even took a fancy to them, these sentences with
their truth absolutely inverted! It is so nice and such a
distinction to have one’s own antipodes!
49. That which is so astonishing in the religious life of
the ancient Greeks is the irrestrainable stream of
GRATITUDE which it pours forth—it is a very superior
kind of man who takes SUCH an attitude towards nature
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and life.—Later on, when the populace got the upper
hand in Greece, FEAR became rampant also in religion;
and Christianity was preparing itself.
50. The passion for God: there are churlish, honest-
hearted, and importunate kinds of it, like that of Luther—
the whole of Protestantism lacks the southern
DELICATEZZA. There is an Oriental exaltation of the
mind in it, like that of an undeservedly favoured or
elevated slave, as in the case of St. Augustine, for instance,
who lacks in an offensive manner, all nobility in bearing
and desires. There is a feminine tenderness and sensuality
in it, which modestly and unconsciously longs for a
UNIO MYSTICA ET PHYSICA, as in the case of
Madame de Guyon. In many cases it appears, curiously
enough, as the disguise of a girl’s or youth’s puberty; here
and there even as the hysteria of an old maid, also as her
last ambition. The Church has frequently canonized the
woman in such a case.
51. The mightiest men have hitherto always bowed
reverently before the saint, as the enigma of self-
subjugation and utter voluntary privation—why did they
thus bow? They divined in him— and as it were behind
the questionableness of his frail and wretched
appearance—the superior force which wished to test itself
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by such a subjugation; the strength of will, in which they
recognized their own strength and love of power, and
knew how to honour it: they honoured something in
themselves when they honoured the saint. In addition to
this, the contemplation of the saint suggested to them a
suspicion: such an enormity of self- negation and anti-
naturalness will not have been coveted for nothing—they
have said, inquiringly. There is perhaps a reason for it,
some very great danger, about which the ascetic might
wish to be more accurately informed through his secret
interlocutors and visitors? In a word, the mighty ones of
the world learned to have a new fear before him, they
divined a new power, a strange, still unconquered
enemy:—it was the ‘Will to Power’ which obliged them
to halt before the saint. They had to question him.
52. In the Jewish ‘Old Testament,’ the book of divine
justice, there are men, things, and sayings on such an
immense scale, that Greek and Indian literature has
nothing to compare with it. One stands with fear and
reverence before those stupendous remains of what man
was formerly, and one has sad thoughts about old Asia and
its little out-pushed peninsula Europe, which would like,
by all means, to figure before Asia as the ‘Progress of
Mankind.’ To be sure, he who is himself only a slender,
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tame house-animal, and knows only the wants of a house-
animal (like our cultured people of today, including the
Christians of ‘cultured’ Christianity), need neither be
amazed nor even sad amid those ruins—the taste for the
Old Testament is a touchstone with respect to ‘great’ and
‘small": perhaps he will find that the New Testament, the
book of grace, still appeals more to his heart (there is
much of the odour of the genuine, tender, stupid
beadsman and petty soul in it). To have bound up this
New Testament (a kind of ROCOCO of taste in every
respect) along with the Old Testament into one book, as
the ‘Bible,’ as ‘The Book in Itself,’ is perhaps the greatest
audacity and ‘sin against the Spirit’ which literary Europe
has upon its conscience.
53. Why Atheism nowadays? ‘The father’ in God is
thoroughly refuted; equally so ‘the judge,’ ‘the rewarder.’
Also his ‘free will": he does not hear—and even if he did,
he would not know how to help. The worst is that he
seems incapable of communicating himself clearly; is he
uncertain?—This is what I have made out (by questioning
and listening at a variety of conversations) to be the cause
of the decline of European theism; it appears to me that
though the religious instinct is in vigorous growth,—it
rejects the theistic satisfaction with profound distrust.
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54. What does all modern philosophy mainly do? Since
Descartes— and indeed more in defiance of him than on
the basis of his procedure—an ATTENTAT has been
made on the part of all philosophers on the old conception
of the soul, under the guise of a criticism of the subject
and predicate conception—that is to say, an ATTENTAT
on the fundamental presupposition of Christian doctrine.
Modern philosophy, as epistemological skepticism, is
secretly or openly ANTI-CHRISTIAN, although (for
keener ears, be it said) by no means anti-religious.
Formerly, in effect, one believed in ‘the soul’ as one
believed in grammar and the grammatical subject: one
said, ‘I’ is the condition, ‘think’ is the predicate and is
conditioned—to think is an activity for which one MUST
suppose a subject as cause. The attempt was then made,
with marvelous tenacity and subtlety, to see if one could
not get out of this net,—to see if the opposite was not
perhaps true: ‘think’ the condition, and ‘I’ the
conditioned; ‘I,’ therefore, only a synthesis which has been
MADE by thinking itself. KANT really wished to prove
that, starting from the subject, the subject could not be
proved—nor the object either: the possibility of an
APPARENT EXISTENCE of the subject, and therefore
of ‘the soul,’ may not always have been strange to him,—
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the thought which once had an immense power on earth
as the Vedanta philosophy.
55. There is a great ladder of religious cruelty, with
many rounds; but three of these are the most important.
Once on a time men sacrificed human beings to their
God, and perhaps just those they loved the best—to this
category belong the firstling sacrifices of all primitive
religions, and also the sacrifice of the Emperor Tiberius in
the Mithra-Grotto on the Island of Capri, that most
terrible of all Roman anachronisms. Then, during the
moral epoch of mankind, they sacrificed to their God the
strongest instincts they possessed, their ‘nature"; THIS
festal joy shines in the cruel glances of ascetics and ‘anti-
natural’ fanatics. Finally, what still remained to be
sacrificed? Was it not necessary in the end for men to
sacrifice everything comforting, holy, healing, all hope, all
faith in hidden harmonies, in future blessedness and
justice? Was it not necessary to sacrifice God himself, and
out of cruelty to themselves to worship stone, stupidity,
gravity, fate, nothingness? To sacrifice God for
nothingness—this paradoxical mystery of the ultimate
cruelty has been reserved for the rising generation; we all
