possession of a history. The rapid growth of language, and the progress and dispersion of
Nations, assume importance and interest for concrete Reason, only when they have come in
contact with States, or begin to form political constitutions themselves.
§ 71
After these remarks, relating to the form of the commencement of the World's History, and to
that ante-historical period which must be excluded from it, we have to state the direction of its
course: though here only formally. The further definition of the subject in the concrete, comes
under the head of arrangement.
§ 72
Universal history — as already demonstrated — shows the development of the consciousness of
Freedom on the part of Spirit, and of the consequent realisation of that Freedom. This
development implies a gradation — a series of increasingly adequate expressions or manifestations
of Freedom, which result from its Idea. The logical, and — as still more prominent — the
dialectical nature of the Idea in general, viz. that it is self-determined — that it assumes successive
forms which it successively transcends; and by this very process of transcending its earlier stages,
gains an affirmative, and, in fact, a richer and more concrete shape; — this necessity of its nature,
and the necessary series of pure abstract forms which the Idea successively assumes — is
exhibited in the department of Logic. Here we need adopt only one of its results, viz. that every
step in the process, as differing from any other, has its determinate peculiar principle. In history this
principle is idiosyncrasy of Spirit — peculiar National Genius. It is within the limitations of this
idiosyncrasy that the spirit of the nation, concretely manifested, expresses every aspect of its
consciousness and will — the whole cycle of its realisation. Its religion, its polity, its ethics, its
legislation, and even its science, art, and mechanical skill, all bear its stamp. These special
peculiarities find their key in that common peculiarity, — the particular principle that characterises a
people; as, on the other hand, in the facts which History presents in detail, that common
characteristic principle may be detected. That such or such a specific quality constitutes the
peculiar genius of a people, is the element of our inquiry which must be derived from experience,
and historically proved. To accomplish this, presupposes not only a disciplined faculty of
abstraction, but an intimate acquaintance with the Idea. The investigator must be familiar à priori
(if we like to call it so), with the whole circle of conceptions to which the principles in question
belong — just as Kepler (to name the most illustrious example in this mode of philosophising) must
have been familiar à priori with ellipses, with cubes and squares, and with ideas of their relations
before be could discover, from the empirical data, those immortal “Laws” of his, which are none
other than forms of thought pertaining to those classes of conceptions. He who is unfamiliar with
the science that embraces these abstract elementary conceptions, is as little capable — though he
may have gazed on the firmament and the motions of the celestial bodies for a life-time — of
understanding those Laws, as of discovering them. From this want of acquaintance with the
ideas that relate to the development of Freedom, proceed a part of those objections which are
brought against the philosophical consideration of a science usually regarded as one of mere
experience; the so-called à priori method, and the attempt to insinuate ideas into the empirical
data of history, being the chief points in the indictment. Where this deficiency exists, such
conceptions appear alien — not lying within the object of investigation. To minds whose training
has been narrow and merely subjective, — which have not an acquaintance and familiarity with
ideas, — they are something strange — not embraced in the notion and conception of the subject
which their limited intellect forms. Hence the statement that Philosophy does not understand such
sciences. It must, indeed, allow that it has not that kind of Understanding which is the prevailing
one in the domain of those sciences that it does not proceed according to the categories of such
Understanding, but according to the categories of Reason - though at the same time recognising
that Understanding, and its true value and position. It must be observed that in this very process of
scientific Understanding, it is of importance that the essential should be distinguished and brought
into relief in contrast with the so-called non-essential. But in order to render this possible, we must
know what is essential; and that is — in view of the History of the World in general — the
Consciousness of Freedom, and the phases which this consciousness assumes in developing itself.
The bearing of historical facts on this category, is their bearing on the truly Essential. Of the
difficulties stated, and the opposition exhibited to comprehensive conceptions in science, part must
be referred to the inability to grasp and understand Ideas. If in Natural History some monstrous
hybrid growth is alleged as an objection to the recognition of clear and indubitable classes or
species, a sufficient reply is furnished by a sentiment often vaguely urged, — that “the exception
confirms the rule;” i.e., that it is the part of a well-defined rule, to hew the conditions in which it
applies, or the deficiency or hybridism of cases that are abnormal. Mere Nature is too weak to
keep its genera and species pure, when conflicting with alien elementary influences. If, e.g., on
considering the human organisation in its concrete aspect, we assert that brain, heart, and so forth
are essential to its organic life, some miserable abortion may be adduced, which has on the whole
the human form, or parts of it, — which has been conceived in a human body and has breathed
after birth therefrom, — in which nevertheless no brain and no heart is found. If such an instance is
quoted against the general conception of a human being — the objector persisting in using the
name, coupled with a superficial idea respecting it — it can be proved that a real, concrete human
being, is a truly different object; that such a being must have a brain in its bead, and a heart in its
breast.
§ 73
A similar process of reasoning is adopted, in reference to the correct assertion that genius, talent,
moral virtues, and sentiments, and piety, may be found in every zone, under all political
constitutions and conditions; in confirmation of which examples are forthcoming in abundance. If in
this assertion, the accompanying distinctions are intended to be repudiated as unimportant or
non-essential, reflection evidently limits itself to abstract categories; and ignores the specialities of
the object in question, which certainly fall under no principle recognised by such categories. That
intellectual position which adopts such merely formal points of view, presents a vast field for
ingenious questions, erudite views, and striking comparisons; for profound seeming reflections and
declamations, which may be rendered so much the more brilliant in proportion as the subject they
refer to is indefinite, and are susceptible of new and varied forms in inverse proportion to the
importance of the results that can be gained from them, and the certainly and rationality of their
issues. Under such an aspect the well known Indian Epopees may be compared with the Homeric;
perhaps — since it is the vastness of the imagination by which poetical genius proves itself —
preferred to them; as, on account of the similarity of single strokes of imagination in the attributes
of the divinities, it has been contended that Greek mythological forms may be recognised in those
of India. Similarly the Chinese philosophy, as adopting the One as its basis, has been alleged to be
the same as at a later period appeared as Eleatic philosophy and as the Spinozistic System; while
in virtue of its expressing itself also in abstract numbers and lines, Pythagorean and Christian
principles have been supposed to be detected in it. Instances of bravery and indomitable courage,
— traits of magnanimity, of self-denial, and self-sacrifice, which are found among the most savage
and the most pusillanimous nations, — are regarded as sufficient to support the view that in these
nations as much of social virtue and morality may be found as in the most civilised Christian states,
or even more. And on this ground a doubt has been suggested whether in the progress of history
and of general culture mankind have become better; whether their morality has been increased, —
morality being regarded in a subjective aspect and view, as founded on what the agent holds to be
right and wrong, good and evil; not on a principle which is considered to be in and for itself right
and good, or a crime and evil, or on a particular religion believed to be the true one.
§ 74
We may fairly decline on this occasion the task of tracing the formalism and error of such a view,
and establishing the true principles of morality, or rather of social virtue in opposition to false
morality. For the History of the World occupies a higher ground than that on which morality has
properly its position, which is personal character — the conscience of individuals, — their particular
will and mode of action; these have a value, imputation, reward or, punishment proper to
themselves. What the absolute aim of Spirit requires and accomplishes, — what Providence does,
— transcends the obligations, and the liability to imputation and the ascription of good or bad
motives, which attach to individuality in virtue of its social relations. They who on moral grounds,
and consequently with noble intention, have resisted that which the advance of the Spiritual Idea
makes necessary, stand higher in moral worth than those whose crimes have been turned into the
means — under the direction of a superior principle — of realising the purposes of that principle.
But in such revolutions both parties generally stand within the limits of the same circle of transient
and corruptible existence. Consequently it is only a formal rectitude — deserted by the living Spirit
and by God — which those who stand upon ancient right and order maintain. The deeds of great
men, who are the Individuals of the World's History, thus appear not only justified in view of that
intrinsic result of which they were not conscious, but also from the point of view occupied by the
secular moralist. But looked at from this point, moral claims that are irrelevant, must not be
brought into collision with world-historical deeds and their accomplishment. The Litany of private
virtues — modesty, humility, philanthropy and forbearance — must not be raised against them. The
History of the World might, on principle, entirely ignore the circle within which morality and the so
much talked of distinction between the moral and the politic lies — not only in abstaining from
judgments, for the principles involved, and the necessary reference of the deeds in question to
those principles, are a sufficient judgment of them — but in leaving Individuals quite out of view
and unmentioned. What it has to record is the activity of the Spirit of Peoples, so that the
individual forms which that spirit has assumed in the sphere of outward reality, might be left to the
delineation of special histories.
§ 75
The same kind of formalism avails itself in its peculiar manner of the indefiniteness attaching to
genius, poetry, and even philosophy; thinks equally that it finds these everywhere. We have here
products of reflective thought; and it is familiarity with those general conceptions which single out
and name real distinctions without fathoming the true depth of the matter, — that we call Culture. It
is something merely formal, inasmuch as it aims at nothing more than the analysis of the subject,
whatever it be, into its constituent parts, and the comprehension of these in their logical definitions
and forms. It is not the free universality of conception necessary for making an abstract principle
the object of consciousness. Such a consciousness of Thought itself, and of its forms isolated from
a particular object, is Philosophy. This has, indeed, the condition of its existence in culture; that
condition being the taking up of the object of thought, and at the same time clothing it with the
form of universality, in such a way that the material content and the form given by the intellect are
held in an inseparable state; — inseparable to such a degree that the object in question -which, by
the analysis of one conception into a multitude of conceptions, is enlarged to an incalculable
treasure of thought — is regarded as a merely empirical datum in whose formation thought has bad
no share.
§ 76
But it is quite as much an act of Thought — of the Understanding in particular — to embrace in one
simple conception object which of itself comprehends a concrete and large significance (as Earth,
Man, -Alexander or Caesar) and to designate it by one word, — as to resolve such a conception
— duly to isolate in idea the conceptions which it contains, and to give them particular names. And
in reference to the view which gave occasion to what has just been said, thus much will be clear,
— that as reflection produces what we include under the general terms Genius, Talent, Art,
Science, — formal culture on every grade of intellectual development, not only can, but must grow,
and attain a mature bloom, while the grade in question is developing itself to a State, and on this
basis of civilisation is advancing to intelligent reflection and to general forms of thought, — as in
laws, so in regard to all else. In the very association of men in a state, lies the necessity of formal
culture — consequently of the rise of the sciences and of a cultivated poetry and art generally. The
arts designated “plastic,” require besides, even in their technical aspect, the civilised association
of men. The poetic art — which has less need of external requirements and means, and which has
the element of immediate existence, the voice, as its material — steps forth with great boldness and
