with matured expression, even under the conditions presented by a people not yet united in a
political combination; since, as remarked above, language attains on its own particular ground a
high intellectual development, prior to the commencement of civilisation.
§ 77
Philosophy also must make its appearance where political life exists; since that in virtue of which
any series of phenomena is reduced within the sphere of culture, as above stated, is the Form
strictly proper to Thought; and thus for philosophy, which is nothing other than the consciousness
of this form itself — the Thinking of Thinking,- the material of which its edifice is to be constructed,
is already prepared by general culture. If in the development of the State itself, periods are
necessitated which impel the soul of nobler natures to seek refuge from the Present in ideal
regions, — in order to find in them that harmony with itself which it can no longer enjoy in the
discordant real world, where the reflective intelligence attacks all that is holy and deep, which had
been spontaneously inwrought into the religion, laws and manners of nations, and brings them
down and attenuates them to abstract godless generalities, — Thought will be compelled to
become Thinking Reason, with the view of effecting in its own element, the restoration of its
principles from the ruin to which they had been brought.
§ 78
We find then, it is true, among all world-historical peoples, poetry, plastic art, science, even
philosophy; but not only is there a diversity in style and bearing generally, but still more remarkably
in subject-matter; and this is a diversity of the most important kind, affecting the rationality of that
subject-matter. It is useless for a pretentious aesthetic criticism to demand that our good pleasure
should not be made the rule for the matter — the substantial part of their contents — and to
maintain that it is the beautiful form as such, the grandeur of the fancy, and so forth, which fine art
aims at, and which must be considered and enjoyed by a liberal taste and cultivated mind. A
healthy intellect does not tolerate such abstractions, and cannot assimilate productions of the kind
above referred to. Granted that the Indian Epopees might be placed on a level with the Homeric,
on account of a number of those qualities of form — grandeur of invention and imaginative power,
liveliness of images and emotions, and beauty of diction; yet the infinite difference of matter
remains; consequently one of substantial importance and involving the interest of Reason which is
immediately concerned with the consciousness of the Idea of Freedom, and its expression in
individuals. There is not only a classical form, but a classical order of subject-matter; and in a
work of art form and subject-matter are so closely united that the former can only be classical to
the extent to which the latter is so. With a fantastic, indeterminate material — the Rule is the
essence of Reason -the form becomes measureless and formless, or mean and contracted. In the
same way, in that comparison of the various systems of philosophy of which we have already
spoken, the only point of importance is overlooked, namely the character of that Unity which is
found alike in the Chinese, the Eleatic, and the Spinozistic philosophy — the distinction between
the recognition of that Unity as abstract and as concrete — concrete to the extent of being a unity
in and by itself — a unity synonymous with Spirit. But that co-ordination proves that it recognises
only such an abstract unity; so that while it gives judgment respecting philosophy it is ignorant of
that very point which constitutes the interest of philosophy.
§ 79
But there are also spheres which, amid all the variety that is presented in the substantial content of
a particular form of culture, remain the same. The difference above mentioned in art, science,
philosophy, concerns the thinking Reason and Freedom, which is the self-consciousness of the
former, and which has the same one root with Thought. As it is not the brute, but only the man that
thinks, he only — and only because he is a thinking being — has Freedom. His consciousness
imports this, that the individual comprehends itself as a person, that is, recognises itself in its single
existence as possessing universality, — as capable of abstraction from, and of surrendering all
speciality; and, therefore, as inherently infinite. Consequently those spheres of intelligence which lie
beyond the limits of this consciousness are a common ground among those substantial distinctions.
Even morality, which is so intimately connected with the consciousness of freedom, can be very
pure while that consciousness is still wanting; as far, that is to say, as it expresses duties and rights
only as objective commands; or even as far as it remains satisfied with the merely formal elevation
of the soul — the surrender of the sensual, and of all sensual motives — in a purely negative,
self-denying fashion. The Chinese morality — since Europeans have become acquainted with it
and with the writings of Confucius — has obtained the greatest praise and proportionate attention
from those who are familiar with the Christian morality. There is a similar acknowledgment of the
sublimity with which the Indian religion and poetry, (a statement that must, however, be limited to
the higher kind), but especially the Indian philosophy, expatiate upon and demand the removal and
sacrifice of sensuality. Yet both these nations are, it must be confessed, entirely wanting in the
essential consciousness of the Idea of Freedom. To the Chinese their moral laws are just like
natural laws, — external, positive commands, — claims established by force, — compulsory duties
or rules of courtesy towards each other. Freedom, through which alone the essential,
determinations of Reason become moral sentiments, is wanting. Morality is a political affair, and its
laws are administered by officers of government and legal tribunals. Their treatises upon it (which
are not law books, but are certainly addressed to the subjective will and individual disposition)
read, — as do the moral writings of the Stoics — like a string of commands stated as necessary for
realising the goal of happiness; so that it seems to be left free to men, on their part, to adopt such
commands, — to observe them or not; while the conception of an abstract subject, “a wise man”
[Sapiens] forms the culminating point among the Chinese, as also among the Stoic moralists. Also
in the Indian doctrine of the renunciation of the sensuality of desires and earthly interests, positive
moral freedom is not the object and end, but the annihilation of consciousness — spiritual and even
physical privation of life.
§ 80
It is the concrete spirit of a people which we have distinctly to recognise, and since it is Spirit it
can only be comprehended spiritually, that is, by thought. It is this alone which takes the lead in all
the deeds and tendencies of that people, and which is occupied in realising itself, — in satisfying its
ideal and becoming self-conscious, — for its great business is self-production. But for spirit, the
highest attainment is self-knowledge; an advance not only to the intuition, but to the thought —
the clear conception of itself. This it must and is also destined to accomplish; but the
accomplishment is at the same time its dissolution., and the rise of another spirit, another
world-historical people, another epoch of Universal History. This transition and connection leads
us to the connection of the whole — the idea of the World's History as such — which we have now
to consider more closely, and of which we have to give a representation.
§ 81
History in general is therefore the development of Spirit in Time, as Nature is the development of
the Idea in Space.
§ 82
If then we cast a glance over the World's History generally, we see a vast picture of changes and
transactions; of infinitely manifold forms of peoples, states, individuals, in unresting succession.
Everything that can enter into and interest the soul of man — all our sensibility to goodness,
beauty, and greatness — is called into play. On every hand aims are adopted and pursued, which
we recognise, whose accomplishment we desire — we hope and fear for them. In all these
occurrences and changes we behold human action and suffering predominant; everywhere
something akin to ourselves, and therefore everywhere something that excites our interest for or
against. Sometimes it attracts us by beauty, freedom, and rich variety, sometimes by energy such
as enables even vice to make itself interesting. Sometimes we see the more comprehensive mass
of some general interest advancing with comparative slowness and subsequently sacrificed to an
infinite complication of trifling circumstances, and so dissipated into atoms. Then, again, with a vast
expenditure of power a trivial result is produced; while from what appears unimportant a
tremendous issue proceeds. On every hand there is the motliest throng of events drawing us within
the circle of its interest, and when one combination vanishes another immediately appears in its
place.
§ 83
The general thought — the category which first presents itself in this restless mutation of individuals
and peoples, existing for a time and then vanishing — is that of change at large. The sight of the
ruins of some ancient sovereignty directly leads us to contemplate this thought of change in its
negative aspect. What traveller among the ruins of Carthage, of Palmyra, Persepolis, or Rome, has
not been stimulated by reflections on the transience of kingdoms and men, and to sadness at the
thought of a vigorous and rich life now departed — a sadness which does not expend itself on
personal losses and the uncertainty of one's own undertakings, but is a disinterested sorrow at the
decay of a splendid and highly cultured national life! But the next consideration which allies itself
with that of change, is, that chance while it imports dissolution, involves at the same time the rise of
a new life — that while death is the issue of life, life is also the issue of death. This is a grand
conception; one which the Oriental thinkers attained and which is perhaps the highest in their
metaphysics. In the Idea of Metempsychosis we find it evolved in its relation to individual
existence; but a myth more generally known, is that of the Phoenix as a type of the Life of
Nature; eternally preparing for itself its funeral pile, and consuming itself upon it; but so that from
its ashes is produced the new, renovated, fresh life. But this image is only Asiatic; oriental not
occidental. Spirit — consuming the envelope of its existence — does not merely pass into another
envelope, nor rise rejuvenescent from the ashes of its previous form; it comes forth exalted,
glorified, a purer spirit. It certainly makes war upon itself — consumes its own existence; but in this
very destruction it works up with existence into a new form, and each successive phase becomes
in its turn a material, working on which it exalts itself to a new grade.
§ 84
If we consider Spirit in this aspect — regarding its changes not merely as rejuvenescent transitions,
i.e., returns to the same form, but rather as manipulations of itself, by which it multiplies the
material for future endeavours — we see it exerting itself in a variety of modes and directions;
developing its powers and gratifying its desires in a variety which is inexhaustible; because every
one of its creations, in which it has already found gratification, meets it anew as material, and is a
new stimulus to plastic activity. The abstract conception of mere change gives place to the thought
of Spirit manifesting, developing, and perfecting its powers in every direction which its manifold
nature can follow. What powers it inherently possesses we learn from the variety of products and
formations which it originates. In this pleasurable activity, it has to do only with itself. As involved
with the conditions of mere nature — internal and external — it will indeed meet in these not only
opposition and hindrance, but will often see its endeavours thereby fail; often sink under the
complications in which it is entangled either by Nature or by itself. But in such case it perishes in
fulfilling its own destiny and proper function, and even thus exhibits the spectacle of
self-demonstration as spiritual activity.
§ 85
The very essence of Spirit is activity; it realises its potentiality — makes itself its own deeds its own
work — and thus it becomes an object to itself; contemplates itself as an objective existence. Thus
is it with the Spirit of a people: it is a Spirit having strictly defined characteristics., which erects
itself into an objective world, that exists and persists in a particular religious form of worship,
customs, constitution and political laws, — in the whole complex of its institutions, — in the events
and transactions that make up its history. That is its work — that is what this particular Nation is.
Nations are what their deeds are. Every Englishman will say: We are the men who navigate the
ocean, and have the commerce of the world; to whom the East Indies belong and their riches; who
have a parliament, juries, &c.- The relation of the individual to that Spirit is that he appropriates to
himself this substantial existence; that it becomes his character and capability, enabling him to have
a definite place in the world — to be something. For he finds the being of the people to which he
belongs an already established, firm world — objectively present to him — with which he has to
incorporate himself. In this its work, therefore — its world — the Spirit of the people enjoys its
existence and finds its satisfaction. — A Nation is moral — virtuous — vigorous — while it is
engaged in realising its grand objects, and defends its work against external violence during the
process of giving to its purposes an objective existence. The contradiction between its potential,
