investigation of their truth and credibility. Its peculiarity in point of fact and of intention, consists in
the acuteness with which the writer extorts something from the records which was not in the
matters recorded. The French have given as much that is profound and judicious in this class of
composition. But they have not endeavoured to pass a merely critical procedure for substantial
history. They have duly presented their judgments in the form of critical treatises. Among us, the
so-called “higher criticism,” which reigns supreme in the domain of philology, has also taken
possession of our historical literature. This “higher criticism” has been the pretext for introducing
all the anti-historical monstrosities that a vain imagination could suggest. Here we have the other
method of making the past a living reality; putting subjective fancies in the place of historical data;
fancies whose merit is measured by their boldness, that is, the scantiness of the particulars on
which they are based, and the peremptoriness with which they contravene the best established
facts of history.
§ 10
4. The last species of Reflective History announces its fragmentary character on the very face of it.
It adopts an abstract position; yet, since it takes general points of view (e.g. as the History of Art,
of Law, of Religion), it forms a transition to the Philosophical History of the World. In our time this
form of the history of ideas has been more developed and brought into notice. Such branches of
national life stand in close relation to the entire complex of a people's annals; and the question of
chief importance in relation to our subject is, whether the connection of the whole is exhibited in its
truth and reality, or referred to merely external relations. In the latter case, these important
phenomena (Art., Law, Religion, &c.) appear as purely accidental national peculiarities. It must be
remarked that, when Reflective History has advanced to the adoption of general points of view, if
the position taken is a true one, these are found to constitute - not merely external thread, a
superficial series - but are the inward guiding soul of the occurrences and actions that occupy a
nation's annals. For, like the soul-conductor Mercury, the Idea is in truth, the leader of peoples
and of the World; and Spirit, the rational and necessitated will of that conductor, is and has been
the director of the events of the World's History. To become acquainted with Spirit in this its office
of guidance, is the object of our present undertaking. This brings us to ...
Philosophic History
III. Philosophic History
i. Reason Governs the World - ii. The Destiny of Reason - iii. World History
§ 11
The third kind of history, — the Philosophical. No explanation was needed of the two previous
classes; their nature was self-evident. It is otherwise with this last, which certainly seems to require
an exposition or justification. The most general definition that can be given, is, that the Philosophy
of History means nothing but the thoughtful consideration of it. Thought is, indeed., essential to
humanity. It is this that distinguishes us from the brutes. In sensations cognition and intellection; in
our instincts and volitions, as far as they are truly human Thought is an invariable element. To insist
upon Thought in this connection with history, may, however, appear unsatisfactory. In this science
it would seem as if Thought must be subordinate to what is given to the realities of fact; that this is
its basis and guide: while Philosophy dwells in the region of self-produced ideas, without reference
to actuality. Approaching history thus prepossessed, Speculation might be expected to treat it as a
mere passive material; and, so far from leaving it in its native truth, to force it into conformity with a
tyrannous idea, and to construe it, as the phrase is, “à priori.” But as it is the business of history
simply to adopt into its records what is and has been, actual occurrences and transactions; and
since it remains true to its character in proportion as it strictly adheres to its data, we seem to have
in Philosophy, a process diametrically opposed to that of the historiographer. This contradiction,
and the charge consequent brought against speculation, shall be explained and confuted. We do
not, however, propose to correct the innumerable special misrepresentations, trite or novel, that
are current respecting the aims, the interests, and the modes of treating history, and its relation to
Philosophy.
§ 12
The only Thought which Philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of History, is the simple
conception of Reason; that Reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world
therefore, presents us with a rational process. This conviction and intuition is a hypothesis in the
domain of history as such. In that of Philosophy it is no hypothesis. It is there proved by
speculative cognition, that Reason — and this term may here suffice us, without investigating the
relation sustained by the Universe to the Divine Being, — is Substance, as well as Infinite Power;
its own Infinite Material underlying all the natural and spiritual life which it originates, as also the
Infinite Form, — that which sets this Material in motion. On the one hand, Reason is the substance
of the Universe; viz. that by which and in which all reality has its being and subsistence. On the
other hand, it is the Infinite Energy of the Universe; since Reason is not so powerless as to be
incapable of producing anything but a mere ideal, a mere intention — having its place outside
reality, nobody knows where; something separate and abstract, in the heads of certain human
beings. It is the infinite complex of things, their entire Essence and Truth. It is its own material
which it commits to its own Active Energy to work up; not needing, as finite action does, the
conditions of an external material of given means from which it may obtain its support, and the
objects of its activity. It supplies its own nourishment and is the object of its own operations.
While it is exclusively its own basis of existence, and absolute final aim, it is also the energising
power realising this aim; developing it not only in the phenomena of the Natural, but also of the
Spiritual Universe — the History of the World. That this “Idea” or “Reason” is the True, the
Eternal, the absolutely powerful essence; that it reveals itself in the World, and that in that World
nothing else is revealed but this and its honour and glory — is the thesis which, as we have said,
has been proved in Philosophy and is here regarded as demonstrated.
§ 13
In those of my hearers who are not acquainted with Philosophy, I may fairly presume, at least, the
existence of a belief in Reason, a desire, a thirst for acquaintance with it, in entering upon this
course of Lectures. It is in fact, the wish for rational insight, not the ambition to amass a mere heap
of acquisitions, that should be presupposed in every case as possessing the mind of the learner in
the study of science. If the clear idea of Reason is not already developed in our minds, in beginning
the study of Universal History, we should at least leave the firm, unconquerable faith that Reason
does exist there; and that the World of intelligence and conscious volition is not abandoned to
chance, but must show itself in the light of the self-cognisant Idea. Yet I am not obliged to make
any such preliminary demand upon your faith. What I have said thus provisionally, and what I shall
have further to say, is, even in reference to our branch of science, not to be regarded as
hypothetical, but as a summary view of the whole; the result of the investigation we are about to
pursue; a result which happens to be known to me, because I have traversed the entire field. It is
only an inference from the history of the World, that its development has been a rational process;
that the history in question has constituted the rational necessary course of the World Spirit — that
Spirit whose nature is always one and the same, but which unfolds this its one nature in the
phenomena of the World's existence. This must, as before stated, present itself as the ultimate
result of History. But we have to take the latter as it is. We must proceed historically —
empirically. Among other precautions we must take care not to be misled by professed historians
who (especially among the Germans, and enjoying a considerable authority), are chargeable with
the very procedure of which they accuse the Philosopher — introducing à priori inventions of
their own into the records of the Past. It is, for example, a widely current fiction, that there was an
original primeval people, taught immediately by God, endowed with perfect insight and wisdom,
possessing a thorough knowledge of all natural laws and spiritual truth; that there have been such
or such sacerdotal peoples; or, to mention a more specific averment, that there was a Roman
Epos, from which the Roman historians derived the early annals of their city, &c. Authorities of
this kind we leave to those talented historians by profession, among whom (in Germany at least)
their use is not uncommon. — We might then announce it as the first condition to be observed, that
we should faithfully adopt all that is historical. But in such general expressions themselves, as
“faithfully” and “adopt,” lies the ambiguity. Even the ordinary, the “impartial” historiographer,
who believes and professes that he maintains a simply receptive attitude; surrendering himself only
to the data supplied him — is by no means passive as regards the exercise of his thinking powers.
He brings his categories with him, and sees the phenomena presented to his mental vision,
exclusively through these media. And, especially in all that pretends to the name of science, it is
indispensable that Reason should not sleep — that reflection should be in full play. To him who
looks upon the world rationally, the world in its turn, presents a rational aspect. The relation is
mutual. But the various exercises of reflection — the different points of view — the modes of
deciding the simple question of the relative importance of events (the first category that occupies
the attention of the historian), do not belong to this place.
§ 14
I will only mention two phases and points of view that concern the generally diffused conviction
that Reason has ruled, and is still ruling in the world, and consequently in the world's history;
because they give us, at the same time, an opportunity for more closely investigating the question
that presents the greatest difficulty, and for indicating a branch of the subject, which will have to be
enlarged on in the sequel.
I. Reason Governs the World
§ 15
One of these points is, that passage in history, which informs us that the Greek Anaxagoras was
the first to enunciate the doctrine that Understanding generally, or Reason, governs the world. It is
not intelligence as self-conscious Reason, — not a Spirit as such that is meant; and we must clearly
distinguish these from each other. The movement of the solar system takes place according to
unchangeable laws. These laws are Reason, implicit in the phenomena in question. But neither the
sun nor the planets, which revolve around it according to these laws, can be said to have any
consciousness of them.
§ 16
A thought of this kind, — that Nature is an embodiment of Reason; that it is unchangeably
subordinate to universal laws, appears nowise striking or strange to us. We are accustomed to
such conceptions, and find nothing extraordinary in them. And I have mentioned this extraordinary
occurrence, partly to show how history teaches, that ideas of this kind, which may seem trivial to
us, have not always been in the world; that on the contrary, such a thought makes an epoch in the
annals of human intelligence. Aristotle says of Anaxagoras, as the originator of the thought in
question, that he appeared as a sober man among the drunken. Socrates adopted the doctrine
from Anaxagoras, and it forthwith became the ruling idea in Philosophy, except in the school of
Epicurus, who ascribed all events to chance. “I was delighted with the sentiment,” — Plato
makes Socrates say — “and hoped I had found a teacher who would show me Nature in harmony
with Reason, who would demonstrate in each particular phenomenon its specific aim, and in the
whole, the grand object of the Universe. I would not have surrendered this hope for a great deal.
But how very much was I disappointed, when, having zealously applied myself to the writings of
Anaxagoras, I found that he adduces only external causes, such as Atmosphere, Ether, Water,
and the like.” It is evident that the defect which Socrates complains of respecting Anaxagoras's
doctrine, does not concern the principle itself, but the shortcoming of the propounder in applying it
to Nature in the concrete. Nature is not deduced from that principle: the latter remains in fact a
mere abstraction, inasmuch as the former is not comprehended and exhibited as a development of
it, — an organisation produced by and from Reason. I wish, at the very outset, to call your
attention to the important difference between a conception, a principle, a truth limited to an
abstract form and its determinate application, and concrete development. This distinction affects
the whole fabric of philosophy; and among other bearings of it there is one to which we shall have
to revert at the close of our view of Universal History, in investigating the aspect of political affairs
in the most recent period.
§ 17
We have next to notice the rise of this idea — that Reason directs the World — in connection with
a further application of it, well known to us, — in the form, viz. of the religious truth, that the
world is not abandoned to chance and external contingent causes, but that a Providence controls
it. I stated above, that I would not make a demand on your faith, in regard to the principle
announced. Yet I might appeal to your belief in it, in this religious aspect, if, as a general rule, the
