nature of philosophical science allowed it to attach authority to presuppositions. To put it in
another shape, — this appeal is forbidden, because the science of which we have to treat,
proposes itself to furnish the proof (not indeed of the abstract Truth of the doctrine, but) of its
correctness as compared with facts. The truth, then, that a Providence (that of God) presides over
the events of the World — consorts with the proposition in question; for Divine Providence is
Wisdom, endowed with an infinite Power which realises its aim, viz. the absolute rational-design of
the World. Reason is Thought conditioning itself with perfect freedom. But a difference — rather a
contradiction — will manifest itself, between this belief and our principle, just as was the case in
reference to the demand made by Socrates in the case of Anaxagoras's dictum. For that belief is
similarly indefinite; it is what is called a belief in a general Providence, and is not followed out into
definite application, or displayed in its bearing on the grand total — the entire course of human
history. But to explain History is to depict the passions of mankind, the genius, the active powers,
that play their part on the great stage; and the providentially determined process which these
exhibit, constitutes what is generally called the “plan” of Providence. Yet it is this very plan which
is supposed to be concealed from our view: which it is deemed presumption, even to wish to
recognise. The ignorance of Anaxagoras, as to how intelligence reveals itself in actual existence,
was ingenuous. Neither in his consciousness, nor in that of Greece at large, had that thought been
further expanded. He had not attained the power to apply his general principle to the concrete, so
as to deduce the latter from the former. It was Socrates who took the first step in comprehending
the union of the Concrete with the Universal. Anaxagoras, then, did not take up a hostile position
towards such an application. The common belief in Providence does; at least it opposes the use of
the principle on the large scale, and denies the possibility of discerning the plan of Providence. In
isolated cases this plan is supposed to be manifest. Pious persons are encouraged to recognise in
particular circumstances, something more than mere chance; to acknowledge the guiding hand of
God; e.g. when help has unexpectedly come to an individual in great perplexity and need. But
these instances. of providential design are of a limited kind, and concern the accomplishment of
nothing more than the desires of the individual in question. But in the history of the World, the
Individuals we have to do with are Peoples; Totalities that are States. We cannot, therefore, be
satisfied with what we may call this “peddling” view of Providence, to which the belief alluded to
limits itself. Equally unsatisfactory is the merely abstract, undefined belief in a Providence, when
that belief is not brought to bear upon the details of the process which it conducts. On the contrary
our earnest endeavour must be directed to the recognition of the ways of Providence, the means it
uses, and the historical phenomena in which it manifests itself; and we must show their connection
with the general principle above mentioned. But in noticing the recognition of the plan of Divine
Providence generally, I have implicitly touched upon a prominent question of the day; viz. that of
the possibility of knowing God: or rather — since public opinion has ceased to allow it to be a
matter of question — the doctrine that it is impossible to know God. In direct contravention of
what is commanded in holy Scripture as the highest duty, — that we should not merely love, but
know God, — the prevalent dogma involves the denial of what is there said; viz. that it is the Spirit
(der Geist) that leads into Truth, knows all things, penetrates even into the deep things of the
Godhead. While the Divine Being is thus placed beyond our knowledge, and outside the limit of all
human things, we have the convenient licence of wandering as far as we list, in the direction of our
own fancies. We are freed from the obligation to refer our knowledge to the Divine and True. On
the other hand, the vanity and egotism which characterise it find, in this false position, ample
justification and the pious modesty which puts far from it the knowledge of God, can well estimate
how much furtherance thereby accrues to its own wayward and vain strivings. I have been
unwilling to leave out of sight the connection between our thesis - that Reason governs and has
governed the World — and the question of the possibility of a Knowledge of God, chiefly that I
might not lose the opportunity of mentioning the imputation against Philosophy of being shy of
noticing religious truths, or of having occasion to be so in which is insinuated the suspicion that it
has anything but a clear conscience in the presence of these truths. So far from this being the case,
the fact is, that in recent times Philosophy has been obliged to defend the domain of religion
against the attacks of several theological systems. In the Christian religion God has revealed
Himself, — that is, he has given us to understand what He is; so that He is no longer a concealed
or secret existence. And this possibility of knowing Him, thus afforded us, renders such
knowledge a duty. God wishes no narrow-hearted souls or empty heads for his children; but those
whose spirit is of itself indeed, poor, but rich in the knowledge of Him; and who regard this
knowledge of God as the only valuable possession. That development of the thinking spirit, which
has resulted from the revelation of the Divine Being as its original basis, must ultimately advance to
the intellectual comprehension of what was presented in the first instance, to feeling and
imagination. The time must eventually come for understanding that rich product of active Reason,
which the History of the World offers to us. It was for a while the fashion to profess admiration for
the wisdom of God, as displayed in animals, plants, and isolated occurrences. But, if it be allowed
that Providence manifests itself in such objects and forms of existence, why not also in Universal
History? This is deemed too great a matter to be thus regarded. But Divine Wisdom, i.e. Reason.,
is one and the same in the great as in the little; and we must not imagine God to be too weak to
exercise his wisdom on the grand scale. Our intellectual striving aims at realising the conviction that
what was intended by eternal wisdom, is actually accomplished in the domain of existent, active
Spirit, as well as in that of mere Nature. Our mode of treating the subject is, in this aspect, a
Theodicaea, — a justification of the ways of God, — which Leibnitz attempted metaphysically in
his method, i.e. in indefinite abstract categories, — so that the ill that is found in the World may be
comprehended, and the thinking Spirit reconciled with the fact of the existence of evil. Indeed,
nowhere is such a harmonising view more pressingly demanded than in Universal History; and it
can be attained only by recognising the positive existence, in which that negative element is a
subordinate, and vanquished nullity. On the one hand. the ultimate design of the World must be
perceived; and, on the other hand, the fact that this design has been actually, realised in it, and that
evil has not been able permanently to assert a competing position. But this conviction involves
much more than the mere belief in a superintending or in “Providence.” “Reason,” whose
sovereignty over the World has been maintained, is as indefinite a term as “Providence,”
supposing the term to be used by those who are unable to characterise it distinctly, — to show
wherein it consists, so as to enable us to decide whether a thing is rational or irrational. An
adequate definition of Reason is the first desideratum; and whatever boast may be made of strict
adherence to it in explaining phenomena, — without such a definition we get no farther than mere
words. With these observations we may proceed to the second point of view that has to be
considered in this Introduction.
II. Essential destiny of Reason
§ 18
The enquiry into the essential destiny of Reason — as far as it is considered in reference to the
World — is identical with the question, what is the ultimate design of the World? And the
expression implies that that design is destined to be realised. Two points of consideration suggest
themselves: first, the import of this design — its abstract definition; and secondly, its realisation.
§ 19
It must be observed at the outset, that the phenomenon we investigate — Universal History —
belongs to the realm of Spirit. The term “World,” includes both physical and psychical Nature.
Physical Nature also plays its part in the World's History, — and attention will have to be paid to
the fundamental natural relations thus involved. But Spirit, and the course of its development, is our
substantial object. Our task does not require us to contemplate Nature as a Rational System in
itself — though in its own proper domain it proves itself such — but simply in its relation to Spirit.
On the stage on which we are observing it, — Universal History — Spirit displays itself in its most
concrete reality. Notwithstanding this (or rather for the very purpose of comprehending the
general principles which this, its form of concrete reality, embodies) we must premise some
abstract characteristics of the nature of spirit. Such an explanation, however, cannot be given
here under any other form than that of bare assertion. The present is not the occasion for unfolding
the idea of Spirit speculatively; for whatever has a place in an Introduction, must, as already
observed, be taken as simply historical; something assumed as having been explained and proved
elsewhere; or whose demonstration awaits the sequel of the Science of History itself.
§ 20
We have therefore to mention here:
(1) The abstract characteristics of the nature of Spirit.
(2) What means Spirit uses in order to realise its Idea.
(3) Lastly, we must consider the shape which the perfect embodiment of Spirit assumes-the State.
(1) The Abstract Characteristics of the Nature of Spirit
§ 21
The nature of Spirit may be understood by a glance at its direct opposite — Matter. As the
essence of Matter is Gravity, so, on the other hand, we may affirm that the substance, the essence
of Spirit is Freedom. All will readily assent to the doctrine that Spirit, among other properties, is
also endowed with Freedom; but philosophy teaches that all the qualities of Spirit exist only
through Freedom; that all are but means for attaining Freedom; that all seek and produce this and
this alone. It is a result of speculative Philosophy, that Freedom is the sole truth of Spirit. Matter
possesses gravity in virtue of its tendency towards a central point. It is essentially composite;
consisting of parts that exclude each other. It seeks its Unity; and therefore exhibits itself as
self-destructive, as verging towards its opposite [an indivisible point]. If it could attain this, it would
be Matter no longer, it would have perished. It strives after the realisation of its Idea; for in Unity it
exists ideally. Spirit, on the contrary, may be defined as that which has its centre in itself. It has
not a unity outside itself, but has already found it; it exists in and with itself. Matter has its essence
out of itself; Spirit is self-contained existence (Bei-sich-selbst-seyn). Now this is Freedom,
exactly. For if I am dependent, my being is referred to something else which I am not; I cannot
exist independently of something external. I am free on the contrary, when my existence depends
upon myself. This self-contained existence of Spirit is none other than self-consciousness —
consciousness of one's own being. Two things must be distinguished in consciousness; first, the
fact that I know; secondly, what I know. In self consciousness these are merged in one; for
Spirit knows itself. It involves an appreciation of its own nature, as also an energy enabling it to
realise itself; to make itself actually that which it is potentially. According to this abstract definition
it may be said of Universal History, that it is the exhibition of Spirit in the process of working out
the knowledge of that which it is potentially. And as the germ bears in itself the whole nature of the
tree, and the taste and form of its fruits, so do the first traces of Spirit virtually contain the whole of
that History. The Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit — Man as such — is free;
and because they do not know this they are not free. They only know that one is free. But on this
very account, the freedom of that one is only caprice; ferocity — brutal recklessness or passion, or
a mildness and tameness of the desires, which is itself only an accident of Nature — mere caprice
like the former. — That one is therefore only a Despot; not a free man. The consciousness of
Freedom first arose among the Greeks, and therefore they were free; but they, and the Romans
likewise, knew only that some are free, — not man as such. Even Plato and Aristotle did not know
this. The Greeks, therefore, had slaves; and their whole life and the maintenance of their splendid
liberty, was implicated with the institution of slavery: a fact moreover, which made that liberty on
the one hand only an accidental, transient and limited growth; on the other hand, constituted it a
rigorous thraldom of our common nature — of the Human. The German nations, under the
influence of Christianity, were the first to attain the consciousness, that man, as man, is free: that it
is the freedom of Spirit which constitutes its essence. This consciousness arose first in religion, the
inmost region of Spirit; but to introduce the principle into the various relations of the actual world,
involves a more extensive problem than its simple implantation; a problem whose solution and
application require a severe and lengthened process of culture. In proof of this, we may note that
slavery did not cease immediately on the reception of Christianity. Still less did liberty predominate
