in States; or Governments and Constitutions adopt a rational organisation, or recognise freedom
as their basis. That application of the principle to political relations; the thorough moulding and
interpenetration of the constitution of society by it, is a process identical with history itself. I have
already directed attention to the distinction here involved, between a principle as such, and
its-application; i.e. its introduction and carrying out in the actual phenomena of Spirit and Life.
This is a point of fundamental importance in our science, and one which must be constantly
respected as essential. And in the same way as this distinction has attracted attention in view of the
Christian principle of self-consciousness — Freedom; it also shows itself as an essential one, in
view of the principle of Freedom generally. The History of the world is none other than the
progress of the consciousness of Freedom; a progress whose development according to the
necessity of its nature, it is our business to investigate.
§ 22
The general statement given above, of the various grades in the consciousness of Freedom — and
which we applied in the first instance to the fact that the Eastern nations knew only that one is free;
the Greek and Roman world only that some are free; whilst we know that all men absolutely (man
as man) are free, — supplies us with the natural division of Universal History, and suggests the
mode of its discussion. This is remarked, however, only incidentally and anticipatively; some other
ideas must be first explained.
§ 23
The destiny of the spiritual World, and, — since this is the substantial World, while the physical
remains subordinate to it, or, in the language of speculation, has no truth as against the spiritual,
— the final cause of the World at large, we allege to be the consciousness of its own freedom on
the part of Spirit, and ipso facto, the reality of that freedom. But that this term “Freedom,”
without further qualification, is an indefinite, and incalculable ambiguous term; and that while that
which it represents is the ne plus ultra of attainment, it is liable to an infinity of misunderstandings,
confusions and errors, and to become the occasion for all imaginable excesses, — has never been
more clearly known and felt than in modern times. Yet, for the present, we must content ourselves
with the term itself without farther definition. Attention was also directed to the importance of the
infinite difference between a principle in the abstract, and its realisation in the concrete. In the
process before us, the essential nature of freedom - which involves in it absolute necessity, — is to
be displayed as coming to a consciousness of itself (for it is in its very nature, self-consciousness)
and thereby realising its existence. Itself is its own object of attainment, and the sole aim of Spirit.
This result it is, at which the process of the World's History has been continually aiming; and to
which the sacrifices that have ever and anon been laid on the vast altar of the earth, through the
long lapse of ages, have been offered. This is the only aim that sees itself realised and fulfilled; the
only pole of repose amid the ceaseless change of events and conditions, and the sole efficient
principle that pervades them. This final aim is God's purpose with the world; but God is the
absolutely perfect Being, and can, therefore, will nothing other than himself — his own Will. The
Nature of His Will — that is, His Nature itself — is what we here call the Idea of Freedom;
translating the language of Religion into that of Thought. The question, then, which we may next
put, is: What means does this principle of Freedom use for its realisation? This is the second point
we have to consider.
(2) The Means Spirit Uses to Realise Its Idea
§ 24
The question of the means by which Freedom develops itself to a World, conducts us to the
phenomenon of History itself. Although Freedom is, primarily, an undeveloped idea, the means it
uses are external and phenomenal; presenting themselves in History to our sensuous vision. The
first glance at History convinces us that the actions of men proceed from their needs, their
passions, their characters and talents; and impresses us with the belief that such needs, passions
and interests are the sole springs of action — the efficient agents in this scene of activity. Among
these may, perhaps, be found aims of a liberal or universal kind — benevolence it may be, or noble
patriotism; but such virtues and general views are but insignificant as compared with the World
and its doings. We may perhaps see the Ideal of Reason actualised in those who adopt such aims,
and within the sphere of their influence; but they bear only a trifling proportion to the mass of the
human race; and the extent of that influence is limited accordingly. Passions, private aims, and the
satisfaction of selfish desires, are on the other hand, most effective springs of action. Their power
lies in the fact that they respect none of the limitations which justice and morality would impose on
them; and that these natural impulses have a more direct influence over man than the artificial and
tedious discipline that tends to order and self-restraint, law and morality. When we look at this
display of passions, and the consequences of their violence; the Unreason which is associated not
,only with them, but even (rather we might say especially) with good designs and righteous aims;
when we see the evil, the vice, the ruin that has befallen the most flourishing kingdoms which the
mind of man ever created, we can scarce avoid being filled with sorrow at this universal taint of
corruption: and, since this decay is not the work of mere Nature, but of the Human Will — a moral
embitterment — a revolt of the Good Spirit (if it have a place within us) may well be the result of
our reflections. Without rhetorical exaggeration, a simply truthful combination of the miseries that
have overwhelmed the noblest of nations and polities, and the finest exemplars of private virtue, —
forms a picture of most fearful aspect, and excites emotions of the profoundest and most hopeless
sadness, counter-balanced by no consolatory result. We endure in beholding it a mental torture,
allowing no defence or escape but the consideration that what has happened could not be
otherwise; that it is a fatality which no intervention could alter. And at last we draw back from the
intolerable disgust with which these sorrowful reflections threaten us, into the more agreeable
environment of our individual life — the Present formed by our private aims and interests. In short
we retreat into the selfishness that stands on the quiet shore, and thence enjoy in safety the distant
spectacle of “wrecks confusedly hurled.” But even regarding History as the slaughter-bench at
which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals have been
victimised — the question involuntarily arises — to what principle, to what final aim these enormous
sacrifices have been offered. From this point the investigation usually proceeds to that which we
have made the general commencement of our enquiry. Starting from this we pointed out those
phenomena which made up a picture so suggestive of gloomy emotions and thoughtful reflections
— as the very field which we, for our part, regard as exhibiting only the means for realising what
we assert to be the essential destiny — the absolute aim, or — which comes to the same thing —
the true result of the World's History. We have all along purposely eschewed “moral reflections”
as a method of rising from the scene of historical specialties to the general principles which they
embody. Besides, it is not the interest of such sentimentalities, really to rise above those depressing
emotions; and to solve the enigmas of Providence which the considerations that occasioned them,
present. It is essential to their character to find a gloomy satisfaction in the empty and fruitless
sublimities of that negative result. We return then to the point of view which we have adopted;
observing that the successive steps (Momente) of the analysis to which it will lead us, will also
evolve the conditions requisite for answering the enquiries suggested by the panorama of sin and
suffering that history unfolds.
§ 25
The first remark we have to make, and which - though already presented more than once —
cannot be too often repeated when the occasion seems to call for it, — is that what we call the
principle, aim, destiny, or the nature and idea of Spirit, is something merely general and abstract.
Principle — Plan of Existence — Law — is a hidden, undeveloped essence, which as such —
however true in itself — is not completely real. Aims, principles, &c., have a place in our thoughts,
in our subjective design only; but not yet in the sphere of reality. That which exists for itself only, is
a possibility, a potentiality; but has not yet emerged into Existence. A second element must be
introduced in order to produce actuality — viz. actuation, realisation; and whose motive power is
the Will — the activity of man in the widest sense. It is only by this activity that that Idea as well as
abstract characteristics generally, are realised, actualised; for of themselves they are powerless.
The motive power that puts them in operation, and gives them determinate existence, is the need,
instinct, inclination, and passion of man. That some conception of mine should be developed into
act and existence, is my earnest desire: I wish to assert my personality in connection with it: I wish
to be satisfied by its execution. If I am to exert myself for any object, it must in some way or other
be my object. In the accomplishment of such or such designs I must at the same time find my
satisfaction; although the purpose for which I exert myself includes a complication of results, many
of which have no interest for me. This is the absolute right of personal existence — to find itself
satisfied in its activity and labour. If men are to interest themselves for anything, they must (so to
speak) have part of their existence involved in it; find their individuality gratified by its attainment.
Here a mistake must be avoided. We intend blame, and justly impute it as a fault, when we say of
an individual, that he is “interested” (in taking part in such or such transactions) that is, seeks
only his private advantage. In reprehending this we find fault with him for furthering his personal
aims without any regard to a more comprehensive design; of which he takes advantage to promote
his own interest, or which he even sacrifices with this view. But he who is active in promoting an
object, is not simply “interested,” but interested in that object itself. Language faithfully
expresses this distinction. — Nothing therefore happens, nothing is accomplished, unless the
individuals concerned, seek their own satisfaction in the issue. They are particular units of society;
i.e. they have special needs, instincts, and interests generally, peculiar to themselves. Among these
needs are not only such as we usually call necessities — the stimuli of individual desire and volition
— but also those connected with individual views and convictions; or — to use a term expressing
less decision — leanings of opinion; supposing the impulses of reflection, understanding, and
reason, to have been awakened. In these cases people demand, if they are to exert themselves in
any direction, that the object should commend itself to them; that in point of opinion, — whether as
to its goodness, justice, advantage, profit, — they should be able to “enter into it” (dabei seyn).
This is a consideration of especial importance in our age, when people are less than formerly
influenced by reliance on others, and by authority; when, on the contrary, they devote their
activities to a cause on the ground of their own understanding, their independent conviction and
opinion.
§ 26
We assert then that nothing has been accomplished without interest on the part of the actors; and
— if interest be called passion, inasmuch as the whole individuality, to the neglect of all other actual
or possible interests and claims, is devoted to an object with every fibre of volition, concentrating
all its desires and powers upon it — we may affirm absolutely that nothing great in the World has
been accomplished without passion. Two elements, therefore, enter into the object of our
investigation; the first the Idea, the second the complex of human passions; the one the warp, the
other the woof of the vast arras-web of Universal History. The concrete mean and union of the
two is Liberty, under the conditions of morality in a State. We have spoken of the Idea of
Freedom as the nature of Spirit, and the absolute goal of History. Passion is regarded as a thing of
sinister aspect, as more or less immoral. Man is required to have no passions. Passion, it is true, is
not quite the suitable word for what I wish to express. I mean here nothing more than human
activity as resulting from private interests — special, or if you will, self-seeking designs — with this
qualification, that the whole energy of will and character is devoted to their attainment; that other
interests (which would in themselves constitute attractive aims), or rather all things else, are
sacrificed to them. The object in question is so bound up with the man's will, that it entirely and
alone determines the “hue of resolution” and is inseparable from it. It has become the very
essence of his volition. For a person is a specific existence; not man in general (a term to which no
real existence corresponds), but a particular human being. The term “character” likewise
expresses this idiosyncrasy of Will and Intelligence. But Character comprehends all peculiarities
whatever; the way in which a person conducts himself in private relations, &c., and is not limited
to his idiosyncrasy in its practical and active phase. I shall, therefore, use the term “passion;”
understanding thereby the particular bent of character, as far as the peculiarities of volition are not
limited to private interest, but supply the impelling and actuating force for accomplishing deeds
