shared in by the community at large. Passion is in the first instance the subjective, and therefore
the formal side of energy, will, and activity — leaving the object or aim still undetermined. And
there is a similar relation of formality to reality in merely individual conviction, individual views,
individual conscience. It is always a question, of essential importance, what is the purport of my
conviction, what the object of my passion, in deciding whether the one or the other is of a true and
substantial nature. Conversely, if it is so, it will inevitably attain actual existence — be realised.
§ 27
From this comment on the second essential element in the historical embodiment of an aim, we
infer — glancing at the institution of the State in passing — that a State is then well constituted and
internally powerful, when the private interest of its citizens is one with the common interest of the
State; when the one finds its gratification and realisation in the other, — a proposition in itself very
important. But in a State many institutions must be adopted, much political machinery invented,
accompanied by appropriate political arrangements, — necessitating long struggles of the
understanding before what is really appropriate can be discovered, — involving, moreover,
contentions with private interest and passions, and a tedious discipline of these latter, in order to
bring about the desired harmony. The epoch when a State attains this harmonious condition,
marks the period of its bloom, its virtue, its vigour, and its prosperity. But the history of mankind
does not begin with a conscious aim of any kind, as it is the case with the particular circles into
which men form themselves of set purpose. The mere social instinct implies a conscious purpose
of security for life and property; and when society has been constituted, this purpose becomes
more comprehensive. The History of the World begins with its general aim — the realisation of the
Idea of Spirit — only in an implicit form (an sich) that is, as Nature; a hidden, most profoundly
hidden, unconscious instinct; and the whole process of History (as already observed), is directed
to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one. Thus appearing in the form of merely
natural existence, natural will — that which has been called the subjective side, — physical craving,
instinct, passion, private interest, as also opinion and subjective conception, — spontaneously
present themselves at the very commencement. This vast congeries of volitions, interests and
activities, constitute the instruments and means of the World-Spirit for attaining its object; bringing
it to consciousness, and realising it. And this aim is none other than finding itself — coming to itself
— and contemplating itself in concrete actuality. But that those manifestations of vitality on the part
of individuals and peoples, in which they seek and satisfy their own purposes, are, at the same
time, the means and instruments of a higher and broader purpose of which they know nothing, —
which they realise unconsciously, - might be made a matter of question; rather has been
questioned, and in every variety of form negatived, decried and contemned as mere dreaming and
“Philosophy.” But on this point I announced my view at the very outset, and asserted our
hypothesis, — which, however, will appear in the sequel, in the form of a legitimate inference, —
and our belief, that Reason governs the world, and has consequently governed its history. In
relation to this independently universal and substantial existence — all else is subordinate,
subservient to it, and the means for its development. — The Union of Universal Abstract Existence
generally with the Individual, - the Subjective — that this alone is Truth, belongs to the department
of speculation, and is treated in this general form in Logic. — But in the process of the World's
History itself, — as still incomplete, — the abstract final aim of history is not yet made the distinct
object of desire and interest. While these limited sentiments are still unconscious of the purpose
they are fulfilling, the universal principle is implicit in them, and is realising itself through them. The
question also assumes the form of the union of Freedom and Necessity; the latent abstract
process of Spirit being regarded as Necessity, while that which exhibits itself in the conscious will
of men, as their interest, belongs to the domain of Freedom. As the metaphysical connection (i.e.
the connection in the Idea) of these forms of thought, belongs to Logic, it would be out of place to
analyse it here. The chief and cardinal points only shall be mentioned.
§ 28
Philosophy shows that the Idea advances to an infinite antithesis; that, viz. between the Idea in its
free, universal form — in which it exists for itself — and the contrasted form of abstract
introversion, reflection on itself, which is formal existence-for-self, personality, formal freedom,
such as belongs to Spirit only. The universal Idea exists thus as the substantial totality of things on
the one side, and as the abstract essence of free volition on the other side. This reflection of the
mind on itself is individual self-consciousness — the polar opposite of the Idea in its general form,
and therefore existing in absolute Limitation. This polar opposite is consequently limitation,
particularisation, for the universal absolute being; it is the side of its definite existence; the sphere
of its formal reality, the sphere of the reverence paid to God. — To comprehend the absolute
connection of this antithesis, is the profound task of metaphysics. This Limitation originates all
forms of particularity of whatever kind. The formal volition [of which we have spoken] wills itself;
desires to make its own personality valid in all that it purposes and does: even the pious individual
wishes to be saved and happy. This pole of the antithesis, existing for itself, is — in contrast with
the Absolute Universal Being — a special separate existence, taking cognisance of speciality only,
and willing that alone. In short it plays its part in the region of mere phenomena. This is the sphere
of particular purposes, in effecting which individuals exert themselves on behalf of their individuality
— give it full play and objective realisation. This is also the sphere of happiness and its opposite.
He is happy who finds his condition suited to his special character, will, and fancy, and so enjoys
himself in that condition. The History of the World is not the theatre of happiness. Periods of
happiness are blank pages in it, for they are periods of harmony, — periods when the antithesis is
in abeyance. Reflection on self, — the Freedom above described — is abstractly defined as the
formal element of the activity of the absolute Idea. The realising activity of which we have spoken
is the middle term of the Syllogism, one of whose extremes is the Universal essence, the Idea,
which reposes in the penetralia of Spirit; and the other, the complex of external things, objective
matter. That activity is the medium by which the universal latent principle is translated into the
domain of objectivity.
§ 29
I will endeavour to make what has been said more vivid and clear by examples.
The building of a house is, in the first instance, a subjective aim and design. On the other hand we
have, as means, the several substances required for the work, — Iron, Wood, Stones. The
elements are made use of in working up this material: fire to melt the iron, wind to blow the fire,
water to set wheels in motion, in order to cut the wood, &c. The result is, that the wind, which has
helped to build the house, is shut out by the house; so also are the violence of rains and floods,
and the destructive powers of fire, so far as the house is made fire-proof. The stones and beams
obey the law of gravity, — press downwards, — and so high walls are carried up. Thus the
elements are made use of in accordance with their nature, and yet to co-operate for a product, by
which their operation is limited. Thus the passions of men are gratified; they develop themselves
and their aims in accordance with their natural tendencies, and build up the edifice of human
society; thus fortifying a position for Right and Order against themselves.
§ 30
The connection of events above indicated, involves also the fact, that in history an additional result
is commonly produced by human actions beyond that which they aim at and obtain — that which
they immediately recognise and desire. They gratify their own interest; but something farther is
thereby accomplished, latent in the actions in question, though not present to their consciousness,
and not included in their design. An analogous example is offered in the case of a man who, from a
feeling of revenge, — perhaps not an unjust one, but produced by injury on the other's part, —
burns that other man's house. A connection is immediately established between the deed itself and
a train of circumstances not directly included in it, taken abstractedly. In itself it consisted in merely
presenting a small flame to a small portion of a beam. Events not involved in that simple act follow
of themselves. The part of the beam which was set fire to is connected with its remote portions;
the beam itself is united with the woodwork of the house generally, and this with other houses; so
that a wide conflagration ensues, which destroys the goods and chattels of many other persons
besides his against whom the act of revenge was first directed; perhaps even costs not a few men
their lives. This lay neither in the deed abstractedly, nor in the design of the man who committed it.
But the action has a further general bearing. In the design of the doer it was only revenge executed
against an individual in the destruction of his property, but it is moreover a crime, and that involves
punishment also. This may not have been present to the mind of the perpetrator, still less in his
intention; but his deed itself, the general principles it calls into play, its substantial content entails it.
By this example I wish only to impress on you the consideration, that in a simple act, something
farther may be implicated than lies in the intention and consciousness of the agent. The example
before us involves, however, this additional consideration, that the substance of the act,
consequently we may say the act itself, recoils upon the perpetrator, — reacts upon him with
destructive tendency. This union of the two extremes — the embodiment of a general idea in the
form of direct reality, and the elevation of a speciality into connection with universal truth — is
brought to pass, at first sight, under the conditions of an utter diversity of nature between the two,
and an indifference of the one extreme towards the other. The aims which the agent set before
them are limited and special; but it must be remarked that the agents themselves are intelligent
thinking beings. The purport of their desires is interwoven with general, essential considerations
of justice, good, duty, &c; for mere desire — volition in its rough and savage forms — falls not
within the scene and sphere of Universal History. Those general considerations, which form at the
same time a norm for directing aims and actions, have determinate purport; for such an abstraction
as “good for its own sake,” has no place in living reality. If men are to act, they must not only
intend the Good, but must have decided for themselves whether this or that particular thing is a
Good. What special course of action, however, is good or not, is determined, as regards the
ordinary contingencies of private life, by the laws and customs of a State; and here no great
difficulty is presented. Each individual has his position; he knows on the whole what a just,
honourable course of conduct is. As to ordinary, private relations, the assertion that it is difficult to
choose the right and good, — the regarding it as the mark of an exalted morality to find difficulties
and raise scruples on that score — may be set down to an evil or perverse will, which seeks to
evade duties not in themselves of a perplexing nature; or, at any rate, to an idly reflective habit of
mind — where a feeble will affords no sufficient exercise to the faculties, — leaving them therefore
to find occupation within themselves, and to expend themselves on moral self-adulation.
§ 31
It is quite otherwise with the comprehensive relations that History has to do with. In this sphere are
presented those momentous collisions between existing, acknowledged duties, laws, and rights,
and those contingencies which are adverse to this fixed system; — which assail and even destroy
its foundations and existence; whose tenor may nevertheless seem good,- on the large scale
advantageous, — yes, even indispensable and necessary. These contingencies realise themselves in
History: they involve a general principle of a different order from that on which depends the
permanence of a people or a State. This principle is an essential phase in the development of the
creating Idea, of Truth striving and urging towards [consciousness of] itself. Historical men -
World-Historical Individuals - are those in whose aims such a general principle lies.
§ 32
Caesar, in danger of losing a position, not perhaps at that time of superiority, yet at least of
equality with the others who were at the head of the State, and of succumbing to those who were
just on the point of becoming his enemies, - belongs essentially to this category. These enemies —
who were at the same time pursuing their personal aims — had the form of the constitution, and
the power conferred by an appearance of justice, on their side. Caesar was contending for the
maintenance of his position, honour, and safety; and, since the power of his opponents included
the sovereignty over the provinces of the Roman Empire, his victory secured for him the conquest
of that entire Empire: and he thus became — though leaving the form of the constitution — the
Autocrat of the State. That which secured for him the execution of a design, which in the first
instance was of negative import — the Autocracy of Rome, — was, however, at the same time an
