model for universal reality; just as universal law is not designed for the units of the mass. These as
such may, in fact, find their interests decidedly thrust into the background. But by the term
“Ideal,” we also understand the ideal of Reason, of the Good, of the True. Poets, as e.g.
Schiller, have painted such ideals touchingly and with strong emotion, and with the deeply
melancholy conviction that they could not be realised. In affirming, on the contrary that the
Universal Reason does realise itself, we leave indeed nothing to do with the individual empirically
regarded. That admits of degrees of better and worse, since here chance and speciality have
received authority from the Idea to exercise their monstrous power. Much, therefore, in particular
aspects of the grand phenomenon might be found fault with. This subjective fault-finding, — which,
however, only keeps in view the individual and its deficiency, without taking notice of Reason
pervading the whole, — is easy; and inasmuch as it asserts an excellent intention with regard to the
good of the whole, and seems to result from a kindly heart, it feels authorised to give itself airs and
assume great consequence. It is easier to discover a deficiency in individuals, in states, and in
Providence, than to see their real import and value. For in this merely negative fault-finding a
proud position is taken, — one which overlooks the object, without having entered into it, —
without having comprehended its positive aspect. Age generally makes men more tolerant; youth is
always discontented. The tolerance of age is the result of the ripeness of a judgment which, - not
merely as the result of indifference, is satisfied even with what is inferior; but, more deeply taught
by the grave experience of life, has been led to perceive the substantial, solid worth of the object
in question. The insight then to which — in contradistinction from those ideals — philosophy is to
lead us, is, that the real world is as it ought to be — that the truly good — the universal divine
reason — is not a mere abstraction, but a vital principle capable of realising itself. This Good, this
Reason, in its most concrete form, is God. God governs the world; the actual working of his
government — the carrying out of his plan — is the History of the World. This plan philosophy
strives to comprehend; for only that which has been developed as the result of it, possesses bona
fide reality. That which does not accord with it, is negative, worthless existence. Before the pure
light of this divine Idea — which is no mere Idea - the phantom of a world whose events are an
incoherent concourse of fortuitous circumstances, utterly vanishes. Philosophy wishes to discover
the substantial purport, the real side of the divine idea and to justify the so much despised Reality
of things; for Reason is the comprehension of the Divine work. But as to what concerns the
perversion, corruption, and ruin of religious, ethical and moral purposes, and states of society
generally, it must be affirmed, that in their essence these are infinite and eternal; but that the forms
they assume may be of a limited orders and consequently belong to the domain of mere nature,
and be subject to the sway of chance. They are therefore perishable, and exposed to decay and
corruption. Religion and morality — in the same way as inherently universal essences — have the
peculiarity of being present in the individual soul, in the full extent of their Idea, and therefore truly
and really; although they may not manifest themselves in it in extenso, and are not applied to fully
developed relations. The religion, the morality of a limited sphere of life — that of a shepherd or a
peasant, e.g. — in its intensive concentration and limitation to a few perfectly simple relations of
life, — has infinite worth; the same worth as the religion and morality of extensive knowledge, and
of an existence rich in the compass of its relations and actions. This inner focus — this simple
region of the claims of subjective freedom, — the home of volition, resolution, and action, — the
abstract sphere of conscience, — that which comprises the responsibility and moral value of the
individual, remains untouched; and is quite shut out from the noisy din of the World's History —
including not merely external and temporal changes, but also those entailed by the absolute
necessity inseparable from the realisation of the Idea of Freedom itself. But as a general truth this
must be regarded as settled, that whatever in the world possesses claims as noble and glorious,
has nevertheless a higher existence above it. The claim of the World-Spirit rises above all special
claims.
§ 39
These observations may suffice in reference to the means which the World-Spirit uses for realising
its Idea. Stated simply and abstractly, this mediation involves the activity of personal existences in
whom Reason is present as their absolute substantial being; but a basis, in the first instance, still
obscure and unknown to them. But the subject becomes more complicated and difficult when we
regard individuals not merely in their aspect of activity, but more concretely, in conjunction with a
particular manifestation of that activity in their religion and morality, — forms of existence which are
intimately connected with Reason, and share in its absolute claims. Here the relation of mere
means of an end disappears, and the chief hearings of this seeming difficulty in reference to the
absolute aim of Spirit, have been briefly considered.
III. Philosophic History
ii. The Essential Destiny of Reason
(3) The Embodiment Spirit Assumes — the State
§ 40
The third point to be analysed is, therefore - what is the object to be realised by these means; i.e.
what is the form it assumes in the realm of reality. We have spoken of means; but in the carrying
out of a subjective, limited aim, we have also to take into consideration the element of a material,
either already present or which has to be procured. Thus the question would arise: What is the
material in which the Ideal of Reason is wrought out? The primary answer would be, - Personality
itself - human desires - Subjectivity generally. In human knowledge and volition, as its material
element, Reason attains positive existence. We have considered subjective volition where it has an
object which is the truth and essence of a reality, viz. where it constitutes a great world-historical
passion. As a subjective will, occupied with limited passions, it is dependent, and can gratify its
desires only within the limits of this dependence. But the subjective will has also a substantial life -
a reality, - in which it moves in the region of essential being and has the essential itself as the
object of its existence. This essential being is the union of the subjective with the rational Will: it
is the moral Whole, the State, which is that form of reality in which the individual has and enjoys
his freedom; but on the condition of his recognition, believing in and willing that which is common
to the Whole. And this must not be understood as if the subjective will of the social unit attained its
gratification and enjoyment through that common Will; as if this were a means provided for its
benefit; as if the individual, in his relations to other individuals, thus limited his freedom, in order
that this universal limitation - the mutual constraint of all - might secure a small space of liberty for
each. Rather, we affirm, are Law, Morality, Government, and they alone, the positive reality and
completion of Freedom. Freedom of a low and limited order, is mere caprice; which finds its
exercise in the sphere of particular and limited desires.
§ 41
Subjective volition - Passion - is that which sets men in activity, that which effects "practical"
realisation. The Idea is the inner spring of action; the State is the actually, existing, realised moral
life. For it is the Unity of the universal, essential Will, with that of the individual; and this is
"Morality." The Individual living in this unity has a moral life; possesses a value that consists in this
substantiality alone. Sophocles in his Antigone, says, "The divine commands are not of yesterday,
nor of today; no, they have an infinite existence, and no one could say whence they came." The
laws of morality are not accidental, but are the essentially Rational. It is the very object of the
State that what is essential in the practical activity of men, and in their dispositions, should be duly
recognised; that it should have a manifest existence, and maintain its position. It is the absolute
interest of Reason that this moral Whole should exist; and herein lies the justification and merit of
heroes who have founded states, - however rude these may have been. In the history of the
World., only those peoples can come under our notice which form a state. For it must be
understood that this latter is the realisation of Freedom, i.e. of the absolute final aim, and that it
exists for its own sake. It must further be understood that all the worth which the human being
possesses - all spiritual reality, he possesses only through the State. For his spiritual reality consists
in this, that his own essence - Reason - is objectively present to him, that it possesses objective
immediate existence for him. Thus only is he fully conscious; thus only is he a partaker of morality -
of a just and moral social and political life. For Truth is the Unity of the universal and subjective
Will; and the Universal is to be found in the State, in its laws, its universal and rational
arrangements. The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on Earth. We have in it, therefore, the
object of History in a more definite shape than before; that in which Freedom obtains objectivity,
and lives in the enjoyment of this objectivity. For Law is the objectivity of Spirit; volition in its true
form. Only that will which obeys law, is free; for it obeys itself - it is independent and so free.
When the State or our country constitutes a community of existence; when the subjective will of
man submits to laws, - the contradiction between Liberty and Necessity vanishes. The Rational
has necessary existence as being the reality and substance of things, and we are free in recognising
it as law, and following it as the substance of our own being. The objective and the subjective will
are then reconciled, and present one identical homogeneous whole. For the morality (Sittlichkeit)
of the State is not of that ethical (moralische) reflective kind, in which one's own conviction bears
sway; this latter is rather the peculiarity of the modern time, while the true antique morality is based
on the principle of abiding by one's duty [to the state at large]. An Athenian citizen did what was
required of him, as it were from instinct; but if I reflect on the object of nay activity, I must have
the consciousness that my will has been called into exercise. But morality is Duty - substantial
Right - a "second nature" as it has been justly called; for the first nature of man is his primary
merely animal existence.
§ 42
The development in extenso of the Idea of the State belongs to the Philosophy of Right; but it
must be observed that in the theories of our time various errors are current respecting it, which
pass for established truths, and have become fixed prejudices. We will mention only a few of
them, giving prominence to such as have a reference to the object of our history. The error which
first meets us is the direct contradictory of our principle that the state presents the realisation of
Freedom; the opinion, viz., that man is free by nature, but that in society, in the State - to which
nevertheless he is irresistibly impelled - he must limit this natural freedom. That man is free by
Nature is quite correct in one sense; viz., that he is so according to the Idea of Humanity; but we
imply thereby that lie is such only in virtue of his destiny - that he has an undeveloped power to
become such; for the "Nature" of an object is exactly synonymous with its "Idea." But the view in
question imports more than this. When man is spoken of as "free by Nature," the mode of his
existence as well as his destiny is implied. His merely natural and primary condition is intended. In
this sense a "state of Nature" is assumed in which mankind at large are in the possession of their
natural rights with the unconstrained exercise and enjoyment of their freedom. This assumption is
not indeed raised to the dignity of the historical fact; it would indeed be difficult, were the attempt
seriously made, to point out any such condition as actually existing, or as having ever occurred.
Examples of a savage state of life can be pointed out, but they are marked by brutal passions and
deeds of violence; while, however rude and simple their conditions, they involve social
arrangements which (to use the common phrase) restrain freedom. That assumption is one of
those nebulous images which theory produces; an idea which it cannot avoid originating, but which
it fathers upon real existence, without sufficient historical justification.
§ 43
What we find such a state of Nature to be in actual experience, answers exactly to the Idea of a
merely natural condition. Freedom as the ideal of that which is original and natural, does not exist
as original and natural. Rather must it be first sought out and won; and that by an incalculable
medial discipline of the intellectual and moral powers. The state of Nature is, therefore,
predominantly that of injustice and violence, of untamed natural impulses, of inhuman deeds and
feelings. Limitation is certainty produced by Society and the State, but it is a limitation of the mere
brute emotions and rude instincts; as also, in a more advanced stage of culture, of the
premeditated self-will of caprice and passion. This kind of constraint is part of the instrumentality
by which only, the consciousness of Freedom and the desire for its attainment, in its true - that is
Rational and Ideal form - can be obtained. To the Ideal of Freedom, Law and Morality are
