fact that we have made our position unassailable.
12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a
general: (1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;
["Bravery without forethought," as Ts`ao Kung analyzes it,
which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad
bull. Such an opponent, says Chang Yu, "must not be encountered
with brute force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain."
Cf. Wu Tzu, chap. IV. ad init.: "In estimating the character of
a general, men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his
courage, forgetting that courage is only one out of many
qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave man
is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly,
without any perception of what is expedient, must be condemned."
Ssu-ma Fa, too, make the incisive remark: "Simply going to one's
death does not bring about victory."]
(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;
[Ts`ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as
"cowardice" as being of the man "whom timidity prevents from
advancing to seize an advantage," and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick
to flee at the sight of danger." Meng Shih gives the closer
paraphrase "he who is bent on returning alive," this is, the man
who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzu knew, nothing is to
be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks. T`ai
Kung said: "He who lets an advantage slip will subsequently
bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 A.D., Liu Yu pursued
the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle
with him at the island of Ch`eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered
only a few thousands, while their opponents were in great force.
But Huan Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him
should be be overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of
his war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary, at a
moment's notice. The natural result was that the fighting spirit
of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made
an attack from windward with fireships, all striving with the
utmost ardor to be first in the fray, Huan Hsuan's forces were
routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled for two days and
nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a somewhat similar story
of Chao Ying-ch`i, a general of the Chin State who during a
battle with the army of Ch`u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in
readiness for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be
the first to get across.]
(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by
Huang Mei, Teng Ch`iang and others shut himself up behind his
walls and refused to fight. Teng Ch`iang said: "Our adversary
is of a choleric temper and easily provoked; let us make constant
sallies and break down his walls, then he will grow angry and
come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to
be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to
fight, was lured as far as San-yuan by the enemy's pretended
flight, and finally attacked and slain.]
(4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
[This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honor is
really a defect in a general. What Sun Tzu condemns is rather an
exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned
man who is stung by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-
ch`en truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: "The seek
after glory should be careless of public opinion."]
(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry
and trouble.
[Here again, Sun Tzu does not mean that the general is to be
careless of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to
emphasize is the danger of sacrificing any important military
advantage to the immediate comfort of his men. This is a
shortsighted policy, because in the long run the troops will
suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the
war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity
will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered city, or to
reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his military
instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated
efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so
many strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And
in the end, relief came through the very man who started out with
the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of
the whole to sentiment in favor of a part. An old soldier of one
of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried
once, I remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was
always "so good to his men." By this plea, had he but known it,
he was only condemning him out of Sun Tzu's mouth.]
13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous
to the conduct of war.
14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the
cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults.
Let them be a subject of meditation.
[1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50.
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IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH
[The contents of this interesting chapter are better
indicated in ss. 1 than by this heading.]
1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping
the army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over
mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys.
[The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to
keep close to supplies of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 3:
"Abide not in natural ovens," i.e. "the openings of valleys."
Chang Yu tells the following anecdote: Wu-tu Ch`iang was a
robber captain in the time of the Later Han, and Ma Yuan was sent
to exterminate his gang. Ch`iang having found a refuge in the
hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but seized all
the favorable positions commanding supplies of water and forage.
Ch`iang was soon in such a desperate plight for want of
provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender. He did
not know the advantage of keeping in the neighborhood of
valleys."]
2. Camp in high places,
[Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above
the surrounding country.]
facing the sun.
[Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch`en Hao
"facing east." Cf. infra, SS. 11, 13.
Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain
warfare.
3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it.
["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according
to Ts`ao Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be
impeded in your evolutions." The T`UNG TIEN reads, "If THE ENEMY
crosses a river," etc. But in view of the next sentence, this is
almost certainly an interpolation.]
4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward
march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best
to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack.
[Li Ch`uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over
Lung Chu at the Wei River. Turning to the CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch.
34, fol. 6 verso, we find the battle described as follows: "The
two armies were drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the
night, Han Hsin ordered his men to take some ten thousand sacks
filled with sand and construct a dam higher up. Then, leading
half his army across, he attacked Lung Chu; but after a time,
pretending to have failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to
the other bank. Lung Chu was much elated by this unlooked-for
success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han Hsin was really a
coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river in his turn.
Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus
releasing a great volume of water, which swept down and prevented
the greater portion of Lung Chu's army from getting across. He
then turned upon the force which had been cut off, and
annihilated it, Lung Chu himself being amongst the slain. The
rest of the army, on the further bank, also scattered and fled in
all directions.]
5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet
the invader near a river which he has to cross.
[For fear of preventing his crossing.]
6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the
sun.
[See supra, ss. 2. The repetition of these words in
connection with water is very awkward. Chang Yu has the note:
"Said either of troops marshaled on the river-bank, or of boats
anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is essential to
be higher than the enemy and facing the sun." The other
commentators are not at all explicit.]
Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.
[Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch
our camp on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy
should open the sluices and sweep us away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu-
hou has remarked that 'in river warfare we must not advance
against the stream,' which is as much as to say that our fleet
must not be anchored below that of the enemy, for then they would
be able to take advantage of the current and make short work of
us." There is also the danger, noted by other commentators, that
the enemy may throw poison on the water to be carried down to
us.]
So much for river warfare.
7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to
get over them quickly, without any delay.
[Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the
herbage, and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and
exposed to attack.]
8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have
water and grass near you, and get your back to a clump of trees.
[Li Ch`uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be
treacherous where there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they
will serve to protect the rear.]
So much for operations in salt-marches.
9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible
position with rising ground to your right and on your rear,
[Tu Mu quotes T`ai Kung as saying: "An army should have a
stream or a marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its
right."]
so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So
much for campaigning in flat country.
10. These are the four useful branches of military
knowledge
[Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers,
(3) marshes, and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon's "Military
Maxims," no. 1.]
which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several
sovereigns.
[Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-ch`en asks, with
some plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as
nothing is known of Huang Ti having conquered four other
Emperors. The SHIH CHI (ch. 1 ad init.) speaks only of his
victories over Yen Ti and Ch`ih Yu. In the LIU T`AO it is
mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified the
Empire." Ts`ao Kung's explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor
was the first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes,
each of whom (to the number of four) originally bore the title of
Emperor. Li Ch`uan tells us that the art of war originated under
Huang Ti, who received it from his Minister Feng Hou.]
11. All armies prefer high ground to low.
["High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch`en, "is not only more
agreement and salubrious, but more convenient from a military
point of view; low ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but
also disadvantageous for fighting."]
and sunny places to dark.
12. If you are careful of your men,
[Ts`ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where
you can turn out your animals to graze."]
and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of
every kind,
[Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent
the outbreak of illness."]
and this will spell victory.
13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny
side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once
act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural
advantages of the ground.
14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river
which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must
wait until it subsides.
15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with
torrents running between, deep natural hollows,
[The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by
steep banks, with pools of water at the bottom.]
confined places,
[Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded
by precipices on three sides--easy to get into, but hard to get
out of."]
tangled thickets,
[Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that
spears cannot be used."]
quagmires
[Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be
impassable for chariots and horsemen."]
and crevasses,
[Defined by Mei Yao-ch`en as "a narrow difficult way between
beetling cliffs." Tu Mu's note is "ground covered with trees and
rocks, and intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This
is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a
defile or narrow pass, and Chang Yu takes much the same view. On
the whole, the weight of the commentators certainly inclines to
the rendering "defile." But the ordinary meaning of the Chinese
in one place is "a crack or fissure" and the fact that the
meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the sentence indicates
