horrific images of recent actions. Since September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda has festooned
its websites with a string of announcements of an impending "large attack" on US
targets. These warnings have received considerable media coverage, which has helped
to generate a widespread sense of dread and insecurity among audiences throughout
the world and especially within the United States . . .
The Internet has significantly expanded the opportunities for terrorists to secure
publicity. Until the advent of the Internet, terrorists' hopes of winning publicity
for their causes and activities depended on attracting the attention of television,
radio, or the print media. The fact that terrorists themselves have direct control
over the content of their websites offers further opportunities to shape how they
are perceived by different target audiences and to manipulate their image and the
images of their enemies. Most terrorist sites do not celebrate their violent
activities. Instead- regardless of their nature, motives, or location-most terrorist
sites emphasize two issues: the restrictions placed on freedom of expression; and
the plight of their comrades who are now political prisoners. These issues resonate
powerfully with their own supporters and are also calculated to elicit sympathy from
Western audiences that cherish freedom of expression and frown on measures to silence
political opposition . . .
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Terrorists have proven not only skillful at online marketing but also adept at mining
the data offered by the billion-some pages of the World Wide Web. They can learn from
the Internet about the schedules and locations of targets such as transportation
facilities, nuclear power plants, public buildings, airports and ports, and even
counterterrorism measures. According to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, an
al-Qaeda training manual recovered in Afghanistan tells its readers, "Using public
sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at
least 80 percent of all information required about the enemy." One captured al-Qaeda
computer contained engineering and structural architecture features of a dam, which
had been downloaded from the Internet and which would enable al-Qaeda engineers and
planners to simulate catastrophic failures. In other captured computers, U.S.
investigators found evidence that al-Qaeda operators spent time on sites that offer
software and programming instructions for the digital switches that run power, water,
transportation, and communications grids.
Like many other political organizations, terrorist groups use the Internet to raise
funds. Al-Qaeda, for instance, has always depended heavily on donations, and its
global fundraising network is built upon a foundation of charities, nongovernmental
organizations, and other financial institutions that use websites and Internet-based
chat rooms and forums. The fighters in the Russian breakaway republic of Chechnya
have likewise used the Internet to publicize the numbers of bank accounts to which
sympathizers can contribute. And in December 2001, the U.S. government seized the
assets of a Texas-based charity because of its ties to Hamas.
In addition to soliciting financial aid online, terrorists recruit converts by using
the full panoply of website technologies (audio, digital video, etc.) to enhance the
presentation of their message. And like commercial sites that track visitors to
develop consumer profiles, terrorist organizations capture information about the
users who browse their websites. Visitors who seem most inter
ested in the organization's cause or well suited to carrying out its work are then
contacted. Recruiters may also use more interactive Internet technology to roam
online chat rooms and cyber cafes, looking for receptive members of the public,
particularly young people. The SITE Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based terrorism
research group that monitors al-Qaeda's Internet communications, has provided
chilling details ofa high-tech recruitment drive launchedin 2003 to recruit fighters
to travel to Iraq and attack U.S. and coalition forces there. The Internet also grants
terrorists a cheap and efficient means of networking. Many terrorist groups, among
them Hamas and al-Qaeda, have undergone a transformation from strictly hierarchical
organizations with designated leaders to affiliations of semi-independent cells that
have no single commanding hierarchy. Through the Internet, these loosely
interconnected groups are able to maintain contact with one another-and with members
of other terrorist groups. The Internet connects not only members of the same
terrorist organizations but also members of different groups. For instance, dozens
of sites supporting terrorism in the name of jihad permit terrorists in places as
far-removed from one another as Chechnya and Malaysia to exchange ideas and practical
information about how to build bombs, establish terror cells, and carry out
attacks . . . Al-Qaeda operatives relied heavily on the Internet in planning and
coordinating the September 11 attacks.
For all of these reasons we are just at the beginning of understanding the geopolitical
impact of the flattening of the world. On the one hand, failed states and failed
regions are places we have every incentive to avoid today. They offer no economic
opportunity and there is no Soviet Union out there competing with us for influence
over such countries. On the other hand, there may be nothing more dangerous today
than a failed state with broadband capability. That is, even failed states tend to
have telecommunications systems and satellite links, and therefore if a terrorist
group infiltrates a failed state, as al-Qaeda did with Afghanistan, it can amplify
its power enormously. As much as big powers want to stay away
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from such states, they may feel compelled to get even more deeply embroiled in them.
Think of America in Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia in Chechnya, Australia in East Timor.
In the flat world it is much more difficult to hide, but much easier to get connected.
"Think of Mao at the beginning of the Chinese communist revolution," remarked Michael
Mandelbaum, the Johns Hopkins foreign policy specialist. "The Chinese Communists had
to hide in caves in northwest China, but they could move around in whatever territory
they were able to control. Bin Laden, by contrast, can't show his face, but he can
reach every household in the world, thanks to the Internet." Bin Laden cannot capture
any territory but he can capture the imagination of millions of people. And he has,
broadcasting right into American living rooms on the eve of the 2004 presidential
election.
Hell hath no fury like a terrorist with a satellite dish and an interactive Web site.
Too Personally Insecure
In the fall of 2004,1 was invited to speak at a synagogue in Woodstock, New York,
home of the famous Woodstock music festival. I asked my hosts how was it that they
were able to get a synagogue in Woodstock, of all places, big enough to support a
lecture series. Very simple, they said. Since 9/11, Jews, and others, have been moving
from New York City to places like Woodstock, to get away from what they fear will
be the next ground zero. Right now this trend is a trickle, but it would become a
torrent if a nuclear device were detonated in any European or American city.
Since this threat is the mother of all unflatteners, this book would not be complete
without a discussion of it. We can live with a lot. We lived through 9/11. But we
cannot live with nuclear terrorism. That would un-flatten the world permanently.
The only reason that Osama bin Laden did not use a nuclear device on 9/11 was not
that he did not have the intention but that he did not
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have the capability. And since the Dell Theory offers no hope of restraining the
suicide supply chains, the only strategy we have is to limit their worst capabilities.
That means a much more serious global effort to stanch nuclear proliferation by
limiting the supply-to buy up the fissile material that is already out there,
particularly in the former Soviet Union, and prevent more states from going nuclear.
Harvard University international affairs expert Graham Allison, in his book Nuclear
Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, outlines just such a strategy for
denying terrorists access to nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. It can be done,
he insists. It is a challenge to our will and convictions, but not to our capabilities.
Allison proposes a new American-led international security order to deal with this
problem based on what he calls "a doctrine of the Three No's: No loose nukes, No new
nascent nukes, and No new nuclear states." No loose nukes, says Allison, means locking
down all nuclear weapons and all nuclear material from which bombs could be made-in
a much more serious way than we have done up till now. "We don't lose gold from Fort
Knox," says Allison. "Russia doesn't lose treasures from the Kremlin armory. So we
both know how to prevent theft of those things that are super valuable to us if we
are determined to do it." No new nascent nukes means recognizing that there is a group
of actors out there who can and do produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium, which
is nothing more than nuclear bombs just about to hatch. We need a much more credible,
multilateral nonprolif-eration regime that soaks up this fissile material. Finally,
no new nuclear states means "drawing a line under the current eight nuclear powers
and determining that, however unfair and unreasonable it may be, that club will have
no more members than those eight," says Allison, adding that these three steps might
then buy us time to develop a more formal, sustainable, internationally approved
regime.
It would be nice also to be able to deny the Internet to al-Qaeda and its ilk, but
that, alas, is impossible-without undermining ourselves. That is why limiting their
capabilities is necessary but not sufficient. We also have to find a way to get at
their worst intentions. If we are not going to shut down the Internet and all the
other creative and collaborative tools that have flattened the world, and if we can't
restrict access to them,
the only thing we can do is try to influence the imagination and intentions that people
bring to them and draw from them. When I raised this issue, and the broad themes of
this book, with my religious teacher, Rabbi Tzvi Marx from Holland, he surprised me
by saying that the flat world I was describing reminded him of the story of the Tower
of Babel.
How so? I asked. "The reason God banished all the people from the Tower of Babel and
made them all speak different languages was not because he did not want them to
collaborate per se," answered Rabbi Marx. "It was because he was enraged at what they
were collaborating on-an effort to build a tower to the heavens so they could become
God." This was a distortion of the human capacity, so God broke their union and their
ability to communicate with one another. Now, all these years later, humankind has
again created a new platform for more people from more places to communicate and
collaborate with less friction and more ease than ever: the Internet. Would God see
the Internet as heresy?
"Absolutely not," said Marx. "The heresy is not that mankind works together-it is
to what ends. It is essential that we use this new ability to communicate and
collaborate for the right ends-for constructive human aims and not megalomaniacal
ends. Building a tower was megalo-maniacal. Bin Laden's insistence that he has the
truth and can flatten anyone else's tower who doesn't heed him is megalomaniacal.
Collaborating so mankind can achieve its full potential is God's hope."
How we promote more of that kind of collaboration is what the final chapter is all
about.
::::: Conclusion: Imagination
::::: THIRTEEN
11/9 Versus 9/11
Imagination is more important than knowledge.
-Albert Einstein
On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog.
-Two dogs talking to each other, in a New Yorker cartoon by Peter Steiner, July 5,
1993
Reflecting on this past decade and a half, during which the world went flat, it strikes
me that our lives have been powerfully shaped by two dates: 11/9 and 9/11. These two
dates represent the two competing forms of imagination at work in the world today:
the creative imagination of 11/9 and the destructive imagination of 9/11. One brought
down a wall and opened the windows of the world-both the operating system and the
kind we look through. It unlocked half the planet and made the citizens there our
potential partners and competitors. Another brought down the World Trade Center,
closing its Windows on the World restaurant forever and putting up new invisible and
concrete walls among people at a time when we thought 11 The dismantling of the Berlin
Wall on 11/9 was brought about by people who dared to imagine a different, more open
world-one where every human being would be free to realize his or her full potential
- and who then summoned the courage to act on that imagination. Do
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you remember how it happened? It was so simple, really: In July 1989, hundreds of
East Germans sought refuge at the West German embassy in Hungary. In September 1989,
Hungary decided to remove its border restrictions with Austria. That meant that any
East German who got into Hungary could pass through to Austria and the free world.
Sure enough, more than thirteen thousand East Germans escaped through Hungary's back
door. Pressure built up on the East German government. When in November it announced
plans to ease travel restrictions, tens of thousands of East Germans converged on
the Berlin Wall, where, on 11/9/89, border guards just opened the gates.
Someone there in Hungary, maybe it was the prime minister, maybe it was just a
bureaucrat, must have said to himself or herself, "Imagine- imagine what might happen