promised of your unwillingness to leave me? And that is what I am now
going to tell you, sweet son of Cleinias and Dinomache. The explanation
is, that all these designs of yours cannot be accomplished by you without
my help; so great is the power which I believe myself to have over you and
your concerns; and this I conceive to be the reason why the God has
hitherto forbidden me to converse with you, and I have been long expecting
his permission. For, as you hope to prove your own great value to the
state, and having proved it, to attain at once to absolute power, so do I
indulge a hope that I shall be the supreme power over you, if I am able to
prove my own great value to you, and to show you that neither guardian, nor
kinsman, nor any one is able to deliver into your hands the power which you
desire, but I only, God being my helper. When you were young (compare
Symp.) and your hopes were not yet matured, I should have wasted my time,
and therefore, as I conceive, the God forbade me to converse with you; but
now, having his permission, I will speak, for now you will listen to me.
ALCIBIADES: Your silence, Socrates, was always a surprise to me. I never
could understand why you followed me about, and now that you have begun to
speak again, I am still more amazed. Whether I think all this or not, is a
matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind, and
therefore my denial will have no effect upon you. But granting, if I must,
that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is your assistance
necessary to the attainment of them? Can you tell me why?
SOCRATES: You want to know whether I can make a long speech, such as you
are in the habit of hearing; but that is not my way. I think, however,
that I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying, if you will grant me
one little favour.
ALCIBIADES: Yes, if the favour which you mean be not a troublesome one.
SOCRATES: Will you be troubled at having questions to answer?
ALCIBIADES: Not at all.
SOCRATES: Then please to answer.
ALCIBIADES: Ask me.
SOCRATES: Have you not the intention which I attribute to you?
ALCIBIADES: I will grant anything you like, in the hope of hearing what
more you have to say.
SOCRATES: You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little
while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And suppose that
when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve and say,
Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians--do you know the
matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than they?--How
would you answer?
ALCIBIADES: I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a matter
which I do know better than they.
SOCRATES: Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or
found out yourself?
ALCIBIADES: That is all.
SOCRATES: And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you
had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself?
ALCIBIADES: I should not.
SOCRATES: And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you
supposed that you knew?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know
what you are now supposed to know?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: I think that I know tolerably well the extent of your
acquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according to
my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the lyre,
and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum of your
accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in secret; and I
think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not have come out of
your door, either by day or night, without my seeing you.
ALCIBIADES: Yes, that was the whole of my schooling.
SOCRATES: And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give
them advice about writing?
ALCIBIADES: No, indeed.
SOCRATES: Or about the touch of the lyre?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling,
in the assembly?
ALCIBIADES: Hardly.
SOCRATES: Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise
them? Surely not about building?
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: For the builder will advise better than you will about that?
ALCIBIADES: He will.
SOCRATES: Nor about divination?
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: About that again the diviner will advise better than you will?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: Whether he be little or great, good or ill-looking, noble or
ignoble--makes no difference.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has
riches, but because he has knowledge?
ALCIBIADES: Assuredly.
SOCRATES: Whether their counsellor is rich or poor, is not a matter which
will make any difference to the Athenians when they are deliberating about
the health of the citizens; they only require that he should be a
physician.
ALCIBIADES: Of course.
SOCRATES: Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you
will be justified in getting up and advising them?
ALCIBIADES: About their own concerns, Socrates.
SOCRATES: You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is
what sort of ships they ought to build?
ALCIBIADES: No, I should not advise them about that.
SOCRATES: I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding:--is that
the reason?
ALCIBIADES: It is.
SOCRATES: Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them?
ALCIBIADES: About war, Socrates, or about peace, or about any other
concerns of the state.
SOCRATES: You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make
peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better
to go to war?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And when it is better?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And for as long a time as is better?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought to
close in wrestling, and whom they should grasp by the hand, would you, or
the master of gymnastics, be a better adviser of them?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly, the master of gymnastics.
SOCRATES: And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics
would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and how?
To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with those
against whom it is best to wrestle?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And as much as is best?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And at such times as are best?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and dance?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: When it is well to do so?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And as much as is well?
ALCIBIADES: Just so.
SOCRATES: And as you speak of an excellence or art of the best in
wrestling, and of an excellence in playing the lyre, I wish you would tell
me what this latter is;--the excellence of wrestling I call gymnastic, and
I want to know what you call the other.
ALCIBIADES: I do not understand you.
SOCRATES: Then try to do as I do; for the answer which I gave is
universally right, and when I say right, I mean according to rule.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic?
ALCIBIADES: You did.
SOCRATES: And I was right?
ALCIBIADES: I think that you were.
SOCRATES: Well, now,--for you should learn to argue prettily--let me ask
you in return to tell me, first, what is that art of which playing and
singing, and stepping properly in the dance, are parts,--what is the name
of the whole? I think that by this time you must be able to tell.
ALCIBIADES: Indeed I cannot.
SOCRATES: Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you call the
Goddesses who are the patronesses of art?
ALCIBIADES: The Muses do you mean, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name of the art which is called after
them?
ALCIBIADES: I suppose that you mean music.
SOCRATES: Yes, that is my meaning; and what is the excellence of the art
of music, as I told you truly that the excellence of wrestling was
gymnastic--what is the excellence of music--to be what?
ALCIBIADES: To be musical, I suppose.
SOCRATES: Very good; and now please to tell me what is the excellence of
war and peace; as the more musical was the more excellent, or the more
gymnastical was the more excellent, tell me, what name do you give to the
more excellent in war and peace?
ALCIBIADES: But I really cannot tell you.
SOCRATES: But if you were offering advice to another and said to him--This
food is better than that, at this time and in this quantity, and he said to
you--What do you mean, Alcibiades, by the word 'better'? you would have no
difficulty in replying that you meant 'more wholesome,' although you do not
profess to be a physician: and when the subject is one of which you
profess to have knowledge, and about which you are ready to get up and
advise as if you knew, are you not ashamed, when you are asked, not to be
able to answer the question? Is it not disgraceful?
ALCIBIADES: Very.
SOCRATES: Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaning of
'better,' in the matter of making peace and going to war with those against
whom you ought to go to war? To what does the word refer?
ALCIBIADES: I am thinking, and I cannot tell.
SOCRATES: But you surely know what are the charges which we bring against
one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and what name we
give them?
ALCIBIADES: Yes, certainly; we say that deceit or violence has been
employed, or that we have been defrauded.
SOCRATES: And how does this happen? Will you tell me how? For there may
be a difference in the manner.
ALCIBIADES: Do you mean by 'how,' Socrates, whether we suffered these
things justly or unjustly?
SOCRATES: Exactly.
ALCIBIADES: There can be no greater difference than between just and
unjust.
SOCRATES: And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or
with the unjust?
ALCIBIADES: That is an awkward question; for certainly, even if a person
did intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they were
just.
SOCRATES: He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful?
ALCIBIADES: Neither lawful nor honourable.
SOCRATES: Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, in
going to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or ought
not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly.
SOCRATES: But how is this, friend Alcibiades? Have you forgotten that you
do not know this, or have you been to the schoolmaster without my
knowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust? Who
is he? I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him--you shall
introduce me.
ALCIBIADES: You are mocking, Socrates.
SOCRATES: No, indeed; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is the
God of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I am
not; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists.
ALCIBIADES: But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the
knowledge of just and unjust in some other way?
SOCRATES: Yes; if you have discovered them.
ALCIBIADES: But do you not think that I could discover them?
SOCRATES: I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them.
ALCIBIADES: And do you not think that I would enquire?
SOCRATES: Yes; if you thought that you did not know them.
ALCIBIADES: And was there not a time when I did so think?
SOCRATES: Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since you thought
that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust? What do you
say to a year ago? Were you then in a state of conscious ignorance and
enquiry? Or did you think that you knew? And please to answer truly, that
our discussion may not be in vain.
ALCIBIADES: Well, I thought that I knew.
SOCRATES: And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, you
knew all the same?
ALCIBIADES: I did.
SOCRATES: And more than four years ago you were a child--were you not?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And then I am quite sure that you thought you knew.
ALCIBIADES: Why are you so sure?
SOCRATES: Because I often heard you when a child, in your teacher's house,
or elsewhere, playing at dice or some other game with the boys, not
hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust; but very
confident--crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and a
cheat, and had been cheating. Is it not true?
ALCIBIADES: But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me?
SOCRATES: And how can you say, 'What was I to do'? if at the time you did
not know whether you were wronged or not?
ALCIBIADES: To be sure I knew; I was quite aware that I was being cheated.
SOCRATES: Then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known the
nature of just and unjust?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly; and I did know then.
SOCRATES: And when did you discover them--not, surely, at the time when
you thought that you knew them?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And when did you think that you were ignorant--if you consider,
you will find that there never was such a time?
ALCIBIADES: Really, Socrates, I cannot say.
SOCRATES: Then you did not learn them by discovering them?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly not.
SOCRATES: But just before you said that you did not know them by learning;
now, if you have neither discovered nor learned them, how and whence do you
