satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel,
when we do quarrel? (Compare Alcib.)
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we
quarrel is such as you describe.
SOCRATES: And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur,
are of a like nature?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly they are.
SOCRATES: They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and
evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would have been
no quarrels among them, if there had been no such differences--would there
now?
EUTHYPHRO: You are quite right.
SOCRATES: Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and
good, and hate the opposite of them?
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and
others as unjust,--about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and
fightings among them.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the
gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and
also impious?
EUTHYPHRO: So I should suppose.
SOCRATES: Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not
answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to
tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that
what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro,
in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is
agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is
acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other
gods who have similar differences of opinion.
EUTHYPHRO: But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as
to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of
opinion about that.
SOCRATES: Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one
arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off?
EUTHYPHRO: I should rather say that these are the questions which they are
always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts of
crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their own
defence.
SOCRATES: But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they
ought not to be punished?
EUTHYPHRO: No; they do not.
SOCRATES: Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and
do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished,
but they deny their guilt, do they not?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be
punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what
he did and when?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel
about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that
injustice is done among them. For surely neither God nor man will ever
venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished?
EUTHYPHRO: That is true, Socrates, in the main.
SOCRATES: But they join issue about the particulars--gods and men alike;
and, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called in
question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust.
Is not that true?
EUTHYPHRO: Quite true.
SOCRATES: Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better
instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of all
the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the
master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who
bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do
with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to
proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. How would you show
that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me
that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.
EUTHYPHRO: It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter very
clear indeed to you.
SOCRATES: I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of
apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that the
act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.
SOCRATES: But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good
speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were
speaking; I said to myself: 'Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me
that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know
anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? for granting that this
action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not
adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the
gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them.' And therefore,
Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like,
that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend
the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and
what they love pious or holy; and what some of them love and others hate is
both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety?
EUTHYPHRO: Why not, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, there
is no reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist you
in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to
consider.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and
holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.
SOCRATES: Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply
to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What
do you say?
EUTHYPHRO: We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand
the test of enquiry.
SOCRATES: We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The
point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy
is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of
the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.
SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of carrying and we speak
of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You
know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in
what the difference lies?
EUTHYPHRO: I think that I understand.
SOCRATES: And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of
carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?
EUTHYPHRO: No; that is the reason.
SOCRATES: And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely,
visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the state
of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but
the converse of this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be
intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion
implies previous action or passion. It does not become because it is
becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; neither does
it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of
suffering because it suffers. Do you not agree?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or
suffering?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of
being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state.
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety,
according to your definition, loved by all the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?
EUTHYPHRO: No, that is the reason.
SOCRATES: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a
state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor
is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two
different things.
EUTHYPHRO: How do you mean, Socrates?
SOCRATES: I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to be
loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is
loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with
that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which
is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that
which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which
is holy would have been holy because loved by him. But now you see that
the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from one
another. For one (theophiles) is of a kind to be loved cause it is loved,
and the other (osion) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved. Thus
you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of
holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence--the attribute of
being loved by all the gods. But you still refuse to explain to me the
nature of holiness. And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to
hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what holiness or piety really
is, whether dear to the gods or not (for that is a matter about which we
will not quarrel); and what is impiety?
EUTHYPHRO: I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean.
For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem
to turn round and walk away from us.
SOCRATES: Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancestor
Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say that
my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where they are placed
because I am a descendant of his. But now, since these notions are your
own, you must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself
allow, show an inclination to be on the move.
EUTHYPHRO: Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus who
sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, but you make them move or go
round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am concerned.
SOCRATES: Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: for whereas he only
made his own inventions to move, I move those of other people as well. And
the beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the wisdom
of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain them and keep
them fixed. But enough of this. As I perceive that you are lazy, I will
myself endeavour to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of
piety; and I hope that you will not grudge your labour. Tell me, then--Is
not that which is pious necessarily just?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is
pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious?
EUTHYPHRO: I do not understand you, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are
younger. But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your
wisdom makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no real
difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an
illustration of what I do not mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings--
'Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things,
You will not tell: for where there is fear there is also reverence.'
Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?
EUTHYPHRO: By all means.
SOCRATES: I should not say that where there is fear there is also
reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and
the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of
their fear.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a feeling
of reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears and is
afraid of an ill reputation.
EUTHYPHRO: No doubt.
SOCRATES: Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there is
also reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there is also
fear. But there is not always reverence where there is fear; for fear is a
more extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a
part of number, and number is a more extended notion than the odd. I
suppose that you follow me now?
EUTHYPHRO: Quite well.
SOCRATES: That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I
asked whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the just;
and whether there may not be justice where there is not piety; for justice
is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part. Do you dissent?
EUTHYPHRO: No, I think that you are quite right.
SOCRATES: Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should
enquire what part? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases;
for instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what part of
number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a number
which represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you not agree?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I quite agree.
SOCRATES: In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is
piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me
injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed by
you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.
