EUTHYPHRO: Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of
justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice
which attends to men.
SOCRATES: That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little point about
which I should like to have further information, What is the meaning of
'attention'? For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when
applied to the gods as when applied to other things. For instance, horses
are said to require attention, and not every person is able to attend to
them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is it not so?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of
attending to horses?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the
huntsman?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the
art of attending to dogs?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen?
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the
gods?--that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of
that to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses, you may
observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and
improved, are they not?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen by
the art of the oxherd, and all other things are tended or attended for
their good and not for their hurt?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly, not for their hurt.
SOCRATES: But for their good?
EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
SOCRATES: And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the art
of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say that when
you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?
EUTHYPHRO: No, no; that was certainly not what I meant.
SOCRATES: And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. I asked you the
question about the nature of the attention, because I thought that you did
not.
EUTHYPHRO: You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of attention
which I mean.
SOCRATES: Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods
which is called piety?
EUTHYPHRO: It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters.
SOCRATES: I understand--a sort of ministration to the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in
view the attainment of some object--would you not say of health?
EUTHYPHRO: I should.
SOCRATES: Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder with
a view to the attainment of some result?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship.
SOCRATES: As there is an art which ministers to the house-builder with a
view to the building of a house?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers
to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? For you must surely
know if, as you say, you are of all men living the one who is best
instructed in religion.
EUTHYPHRO: And I speak the truth, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Tell me then, oh tell me--what is that fair work which the gods
do by the help of our ministrations?
EUTHYPHRO: Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do.
SOCRATES: Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But the chief of
them is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of
them?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not
mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the earth?
EUTHYPHRO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the
chief or principal one?
EUTHYPHRO: I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these
things accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety or
holiness is learning how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers
and sacrifices. Such piety is the salvation of families and states, just
as the impious, which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and
destruction.
SOCRATES: I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the
chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see
plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me--clearly not: else why,
when we reached the point, did you turn aside? Had you only answered me I
should have truly learned of you by this time the nature of piety. Now, as
the asker of a question is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither
he leads I must follow; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and what
is piety? Do you mean that they are a sort of science of praying and
sacrificing?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of
the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and giving?
EUTHYPHRO: You understand me capitally, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Yes, my friend; the reason is that I am a votary of your
science, and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say will
be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this
service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to
them?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And the right way of giving is to give to them in return what
they want of us. There would be no meaning in an art which gives to any
one that which he does not want.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of
doing business with one another?
EUTHYPHRO: That is an expression which you may use, if you like.
SOCRATES: But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth. I
wish, however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from
our gifts. There is no doubt about what they give to us; for there is no
good thing which they do not give; but how we can give any good thing to
them in return is far from being equally clear. If they give everything
and we give nothing, that must be an affair of business in which we have
very greatly the advantage of them.
EUTHYPHRO: And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the
gods from our gifts?
SOCRATES: But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are
conferred by us upon the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now
saying, what pleases them?
SOCRATES: Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear
to them?
EUTHYPHRO: I should say that nothing could be dearer.
SOCRATES: Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to
the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing
firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes
them walk away, not perceiving that there is another and far greater artist
than Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and he is yourself; for
the argument, as you will perceive, comes round to the same point. Were we
not saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved
of the gods? Have you forgotten?
EUTHYPHRO: I quite remember.
SOCRATES: And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy;
and is not this the same as what is dear to them--do you see?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: Then either we were wrong in our former assertion; or, if we
were right then, we are wrong now.
EUTHYPHRO: One of the two must be true.
SOCRATES: Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? That is an
enquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and
I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and
tell me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must
detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not certainly known
the nature of piety and impiety, I am confident that you would never, on
behalf of a serf, have charged your aged father with murder. You would not
have run such a risk of doing wrong in the sight of the gods, and you would
have had too much respect for the opinions of men. I am sure, therefore,
that you know the nature of piety and impiety. Speak out then, my dear
Euthyphro, and do not hide your knowledge.
EUTHYPHRO: Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and must go now.
SOCRATES: Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? I was
hoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety; and
then I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. I would
have told him that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had given up
rash innovations and speculations, in which I indulged only through
ignorance, and that now I am about to lead a better life.
