第 12 页

in the mind, lies at the foundation of them, contains relations of the

successive, the coexistent, and of that which always must be

coexistent with succession, the permanent. Now that which, as

representation, can antecede every exercise of thought (of an object),

is intuition; and when it contains nothing but relations, it is the

form of the intuition, which, as it presents us with no

representation, except in so far as something is placed in the mind,

can be nothing else than the mode in which the mind is affected by its

own activity, to wit- its presenting to itself representations,

consequently the mode in which the mind is affected by itself; that

is, it can be nothing but an internal sense in respect to its form.

Everything that is represented through the medium of sense is so far

phenomenal; consequently, we must either refuse altogether to admit an

internal sense, or the subject, which is the object of that sense,

could only be represented by it as phenomenon, and not as it would

judge of itself, if its intuition were pure spontaneous activity, that

is, were intellectual. The difficulty here lies wholly in the

question: How can the subject have an internal intuition of itself?

But this difficulty is common to every theory. The consciousness of

self (apperception) is the simple representation of the "ego"; and

if by means of that representation alone, all the manifold

representations in the subject were spontaneously given, then our

internal intuition would be intellectual. This consciousness in man

requires an internal perception of the manifold representations

which are previously given in the subject; and the manner in which

these representations are given in the mind without spontaneity, must,

on account of this difference (the want of spontaneity), be called

sensibility. If the faculty of self-consciousness is to apprehend what

lies in the mind, it must all act that and can in this way alone

produce an intuition of self. But the form of this intuition, which

lies in the original constitution of the mind, determines, in the

representation of time, the manner in which the manifold

representations are to combine themselves in the mind; since the

subject intuites itself, not as it would represent itself

immediately and spontaneously, but according to the manner in which

the mind is internally affected, consequently, as it appears, and

not as it is.

III. When we say that the intuition of external objects, and also

the self-intuition of the subject, represent both, objects and

subject, in space and time, as they affect our senses, that is, as

they appear- this is by no means equivalent to asserting that these

objects are mere illusory appearances. For when we speak of things

as phenomena, the objects, nay, even the properties which we ascribe

to them, are looked upon as really given; only that, in so far as this

or that property depends upon the mode of intuition of the subject, in

the relation of the given object to the subject, the object as

phenomenon is to be distinguished from the object as a thing in

itself. Thus I do not say that bodies seem or appear to be external to

me, or that my soul seems merely to be given in my self-consciousness,

although I maintain that the properties of space and time, in

conformity to which I set both, as the condition of their existence,

abide in my mode of intuition, and not in the objects in themselves.

It would be my own fault, if out of that which I should reckon as

phenomenon, I made mere illusory appearance.* But this will not

happen, because of our principle of the ideality of all sensuous

intuitions. On the contrary, if we ascribe objective reality to

these forms of representation, it becomes impossible to avoid changing

everything into mere appearance. For if we regard space and time as

properties, which must be found in objects as things in themselves, as

sine quibus non of the possibility of their existence, and reflect

on the absurdities in which we then find ourselves involved,

inasmuch as we are compelled to admit the existence of two infinite

things, which are nevertheless not substances, nor anything really

inhering in substances, nay, to admit that they are the necessary

conditions of the existence of all things, and moreover, that they

must continue to exist, although all existing things were annihilated-

we cannot blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere

illusory appearances. Nay, even our own existence, which would in this

case depend upon the self-existent reality of such a mere nonentity as

time, would necessarily be changed with it into mere appearance- an

absurdity which no one has as yet been guilty of.

*The predicates of the phenomenon can be affixed to the object

itself in relation to our sensuous faculty; for example, the red

colour or the perfume to the rose. But (illusory) appearance never can

be attributed as a predicate to an object, for this very reason,

that it attributes to this object in itself that which belongs to it

only in relation to our sensuous faculty, or to the subject in

general, e.g., the two handles which were formerly ascribed to Saturn.

That which is never to be found in the object itself, but always in

the relation of the object to the subject, and which moreover is

inseparable from our representation of the object, we denominate

phenomenon. Thus the predicates of space and time are rightly

attributed to objects of the senses as such, and in this there is no

illusion. On the contrary, if I ascribe redness of the rose as a thing

in itself, or to Saturn his handles, or extension to all external

objects, considered as things in themselves, without regarding the

determinate relation of these objects to the subject, and without

limiting my judgement to that relation- then, and then only, arises

illusion.

IV. In natural theology, where we think of an object- God- which

never can be an object of intuition to us, and even to himself can

never be an object of sensuous intuition, we carefully avoid

attributing to his intuition the conditions of space and time- and

intuition all his cognition must be, and not thought, which always

includes limitation. But with what right can we do this if we make

them forms of objects as things in themselves, and such, moreover,

as would continue to exist as a priori conditions of the existence

of things, even though the things themselves were annihilated? For

as conditions of all existence in general, space and time must be

conditions of the existence of the Supreme Being also. But if we do

not thus make them objective forms of all things, there is no other

way left than to make them subjective forms of our mode of

intuition- external and internal; which is called sensuous, because it

is not primitive, that is, is not such as gives in itself the

existence of the object of the intuition (a mode of intuition which,

so far as we can judge, can belong only to the Creator), but is

dependent on the existence of the object, is possible, therefore, only

on condition that the representative faculty of the subject is

affected by the object.

It is, moreover, not necessary that we should limit the mode of

intuition in space and time to the sensuous faculty of man. It may

well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily in this

respect agree with man (though as to this we cannot decide), but

sensibility does not on account of this universality cease to be

sensibility, for this very reason, that it is a deduced (intuitus

derivativus), and not an original (intuitus originarius), consequently

not an intellectual intuition, and this intuition, as such, for

reasons above mentioned, seems to belong solely to the Supreme

Being, but never to a being dependent, quoad its existence, as well as

its intuition (which its existence determines and limits relatively to

given objects). This latter remark, however, must be taken only as

an illustration, and not as any proof of the truth of our

aesthetical theory.

SS 10 Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic.

We have now completely before us one part of the solution of the

grand general problem of transcendental philosophy, namely, the

question: "How are synthetical propositions a priori possible?" That

is to say, we have shown that we are in possession of pure a priori

intuitions, namely, space and time, in which we find, when in a

judgement a priori we pass out beyond the given conception,

something which is not discoverable in that conception, but is

certainly found a priori in the intuition which corresponds to the

conception, and can be united synthetically with it. But the

judgements which these pure intuitions enable us to make, never

reach farther than to objects of the senses, and are valid only for

objects of possible experience.

INTRO

SECOND PART. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

INTRODUCTION. Idea of a Transcendental Logic.

I. Of Logic in General.

Our knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, first of

which is the faculty or power of receiving representations

(receptivity for impressions); the second is the power of cognizing by

means of these representations (spontaneity in the production of

conceptions). Through the first an object is given to us; through

the second, it is, in relation to the representation (which is a

mere determination of the mind), thought. Intuition and conceptions

constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that

neither conceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding

to them, nor intuition without conceptions, can afford us a cognition.

Both are either pure or empirical. They are. empirical, when sensation

(which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained

in them; and pure, when no sensation is mixed with the representation.

Sensations we may call the matter of sensuous cognition. Pure

intuition consequently contains merely the form under which

something is intuited, and pure conception only the form of the

thought of an object. Only pure intuitions and pure conceptions are

possible a priori; the empirical only a posteriori.

We apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for

impressions, in so far as it is in some way affected; and, on the

other hand, we call the faculty of spontaneously producing

representations, or the spontaneity of cognition, understanding. Our

nature is so constituted that intuition with us never can be other

than sensuous, that is, it contains only the mode in which we are

affected by objects. On the other hand, the faculty of thinking the

object of sensuous intuition is the understanding. Neither of these

faculties has a preference over the other. Without the sensuous

faculty no object would be given to us, and without the

understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are

void; intuitions without conceptions, blind. Hence it is as

necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous (that is, to

join to them the object in intuition), as to make its intuitions

intelligible (that is, to bring them under conceptions). Neither of

these faculties can exchange its proper function. Understanding cannot

intuite, and the sensuous faculty cannot think. in no other way than

from the united operation of both, can knowledge arise. But no one

ought, on this account, to overlook the difference of the elements

contributed by each; we have rather great reason carefully to separate

and distinguish them. We therefore distinguish the science of the laws

of sensibility, that is, aesthetic, from the science of the laws of

the understanding, that is, logic.

Now, logic in its turn may be considered as twofold- namely, as

logic of the general, or of the particular use of the understanding.

The first contains the absolutely necessary laws of thought, without

which no use whatsoever of the understanding is possible, and gives

laws therefore to the understanding, without regard to the

difference of objects on which it may be employed. The logic of the

particular use of the understanding contains the laws of correct

thinking upon a particular class of objects. The former may be

called elemental logic- the latter, the organon of this or that

particular science. The latter is for the most part employed in the

schools, as a propaedeutic to the sciences, although, indeed,

according to the course of human reason, it is the last thing we

arrive at, when the science has been already matured, and needs only

the finishing touches towards its correction and completion; for our

knowledge of the objects of our attempted science must be tolerably

extensive and complete before we can indicate the laws by which a

science of these objects can be established.

General logic is again either pure or applied. In the former, we

abstract all the empirical conditions under which the understanding is

exercised; for example, the influence of the senses, the play of the

fantasy or imagination, the laws of the memory, the force of habit, of

inclination, etc., consequently also, the sources of prejudice- in a

word, we abstract all causes from which particular cognitions arise,

because these causes regard the understanding under certain

circumstances of its application, and, to the knowledge of them

experience is required. Pure general logic has to do, therefore,

merely with pure a priori principles, and is a canon of

understanding and reason, but only in respect of the formal part of

their use, be the content what it may, empirical or transcendental.

General logic is called applied, when it is directed to the laws of

the use of the understanding, under the subjective empirical

conditions which psychology teaches us. It has therefore empirical

principles, although, at the same time, it is in so far general,

that it applies to the exercise of the understanding, without regard

to the difference of objects. On this account, moreover, it is neither

a canon of the understanding in general, nor an organon of a

particular science, but merely a cathartic of the human understanding.