第 14 页

made by the pure understanding, and to guard it from sophistical

delusion.

Transcendental Logic. FIRST DIVISION.

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC.

SS I.

Transcendental analytic is the dissection of the whole of our a

priori knowledge into the elements of the pure cognition of the

understanding. In order to effect our purpose, it is necessary: (1)

That the conceptions be pure and not empirical; (2) That they belong

not to intuition and sensibility, but to thought and understanding;

(3) That they be elementary conceptions, and as such, quite

different from deduced or compound conceptions; (4) That our table

of these elementary conceptions be complete, and fill up the whole

sphere of the pure understanding. Now this completeness of a science

cannot be accepted with confidence on the guarantee of a mere estimate

of its existence in an aggregate formed only by means of repeated

experiments and attempts. The completeness which we require is

possible only by means of an idea of the totality of the a priori

cognition of the understanding, and through the thereby determined

division of the conceptions which form the said whole; consequently,

only by means of their connection in a system. Pure understanding

distinguishes itself not merely from everything empirical, but also

completely from all sensibility. It is a unity self-subsistent,

self-sufficient, and not to be enlarged by any additions from without.

Hence the sum of its cognition constitutes a system to be determined

by and comprised under an idea; and the completeness and

articulation of this system can at the same time serve as a test of

the correctness and genuineness of all the parts of cognition that

belong to it. The whole of this part of transcendental logic

consists of two books, of which the one contains the conceptions,

and the other the principles of pure understanding.

BOOK I.

Analytic of Conceptions. SS 2

By the term Analytic of Conceptions, I do not understand the

analysis of these, or the usual process in philosophical

investigations of dissecting the conceptions which present themselves,

according to their content, and so making them clear; but I mean the

hitherto little attempted dissection of the faculty of understanding

itself, in order to investigate the possibility of conceptions a

priori, by looking for them in the understanding alone, as their

birthplace, and analysing the pure use of this faculty. For this is

the proper duty of a transcendental philosophy; what remains is the

logical treatment of the conceptions in philosophy in general. We

shall therefore follow up the pure conceptions even to their germs and

beginnings in the human understanding, in which they lie, until they

are developed on occasions presented by experience, and, freed by

the same understanding from the empirical conditions attaching to

them, are set forth in their unalloyed purity.

CHAPTER I. Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure

Conceptions of the Understanding.

Introductory. SS 3

When we call into play a faculty of cognition, different conceptions

manifest themselves according to the different circumstances, and make

known this faculty, and assemble themselves into a more or less

extensive collection, according to the time or penetration that has

been applied to the consideration of them. Where this process,

conducted as it is mechanically, so to speak, will end, cannot be

determined with certainty. Besides, the conceptions which we

discover in this haphazard manner present themselves by no means in

order and systematic unity, but are at last coupled together only

according to resemblances to each other, and arranged in series,

according to the quantity of their content, from the simpler to the

more complex- series which are anything but systematic, though not

altogether without a certain kind of method in their construction.

Transcendental philosophy has the advantage, and moreover the

duty, of searching for its conceptions according to a principle;

because these conceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the

understanding as an absolute unity, and therefore must be connected

with each other according to one conception or idea. A connection of

this kind, however, furnishes us with a ready prepared rule, by

which its proper place may be assigned to every pure conception of the

understanding, and the completeness of the system of all be determined

a priori- both which would otherwise have been dependent on mere

choice or chance.

SECTION 1. Of defined above Use of understanding in General. SS 4

The understanding was defined above only negatively, as a

non-sensuous faculty of cognition. Now, independently of

sensibility, we cannot possibly have any intuition; consequently,

the understanding is no faculty of intuition. But besides intuition

there is no other mode of cognition, except through conceptions;

consequently, the cognition of every, at least of every human,

understanding is a cognition through conceptions- not intuitive, but

discursive. All intuitions, as sensuous, depend on affections;

conceptions, therefore, upon functions. By the word function I

understand the unity of the act of arranging diverse representations

under one common representation. Conceptions, then, are based on the

spontaneity of thought, as sensuous intuitions are on the

receptivity of impressions. Now, the understanding cannot make any

other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them. As no

representation, except an intuition, relates immediately to its

object, a conception never relates immediately to an object, but

only to some other representation thereof, be that an intuition or

itself a conception. A judgement, therefore, is the mediate

cognition of an object, consequently the representation of a

representation of it. In every judgement there is a conception which

applies to, and is valid for many other conceptions, and which among

these comprehends also a given representation, this last being

immediately connected with an object. For example, in the judgement-

"All bodies are divisible," our conception of divisible applies to

various other conceptions; among these, however, it is here

particularly applied to the conception of body, and this conception of

body relates to certain phenomena which occur to us. These objects,

therefore, are mediately represented by the conception of

divisibility. All judgements, accordingly, are functions of unity in

our representations, inasmuch as, instead of an immediate, a higher

representation, which comprises this and various others, is used for

our cognition of the object, and thereby many possible cognitions

are collected into one. But we can reduce all acts of the

understanding to judgements, so that understanding may be

represented as the faculty of judging. For it is, according to what

has been said above, a faculty of thought. Now thought is cognition by

means of conceptions. But conceptions, as predicates of possible

judgements, relate to some representation of a yet undetermined

object. Thus the conception of body indicates something- for

example, metal- which can be cognized by means of that conception.

It is therefore a conception, for the reason alone that other

representations are contained under it, by means of which it can

relate to objects. It is therefore the predicate to a possible

judgement; for example: "Every metal is a body." All the functions

of the understanding therefore can be discovered, when we can

completely exhibit the functions of unity in judgements. And that this

may be effected very easily, the following section will show.

SECTION II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in

Judgements. SS 5

If we abstract all the content of a judgement, and consider only the

intellectual form thereof, we find that the function of thought in a

judgement can be brought under four heads, of which each contains

three momenta. These may be conveniently represented in the

following table:

1

Quantity of judgements

Universal

Particular

Singular

2 3

Quality Relation

Affirmative Categorical

Negative Hypothetical

Infinite Disjunctive

4

Modality

Problematical

Assertorical

Apodeictical

As this division appears to differ in some, though not essential

points, from the usual technique of logicians, the following

observations, for the prevention of otherwise possible

misunderstanding, will not be without their use.

1. Logicians say, with justice, that in the use of judgements in

syllogisms, singular judgements may be treated like universal ones.

For, precisely because a singular judgement has no extent at all,

its predicate cannot refer to a part of that which is contained in the

conception of the subject and be excluded from the rest. The predicate

is valid for the whole conception just as if it were a general

conception, and had extent, to the whole of which the predicate

applied. On the other hand, let us compare a singular with a general

judgement, merely as a cognition, in regard to quantity. The

singular judgement relates to the general one, as unity to infinity,

and is therefore in itself essentially different. Thus, if we estimate

a singular judgement (judicium singulare) not merely according to

its intrinsic validity as a judgement, but also as a cognition

generally, according to its quantity in comparison with that of

other cognitions, it is then entirely different from a general

judgement (judicium commune), and in a complete table of the momenta

of thought deserves a separate place- though, indeed, this would not

be necessary in a logic limited merely to the consideration of the use

of judgements in reference to each other.

2. In like manner, in transcendental logic, infinite must be

distinguished from affirmative judgements, although in general logic

they are rightly enough classed under affirmative. General logic

abstracts all content of the predicate (though it be negative), and

only considers whether the said predicate be affirmed or denied of the

subject. But transcendental logic considers also the worth or

content of this logical affirmation- an affirmation by means of a

merely negative predicate, and inquires how much the sum total of

our cognition gains by this affirmation. For example, if I say of

the soul, "It is not mortal"- by this negative judgement I should at

least ward off error. Now, by the proposition, "The soul is not

mortal," I have, in respect of the logical form, really affirmed,

inasmuch as I thereby place the soul in the unlimited sphere of

immortal beings. Now, because of the whole sphere of possible

existences, the mortal occupies one part, and the immortal the

other, neither more nor less is affirmed by the proposition than

that the soul is one among the infinite multitude of things which

remain over, when I take away the whole mortal part. But by this

proceeding we accomplish only this much, that the infinite sphere of

all possible existences is in so far limited that the mortal is

excluded from it, and the soul is placed in the remaining part of

the extent of this sphere. But this part remains, notwithstanding this

exception, infinite, and more and more parts may be taken away from

the whole sphere, without in the slightest degree thereby augmenting

or affirmatively determining our conception of the soul. These

judgements, therefore, infinite in respect of their logical extent,

are, in respect of the content of their cognition, merely

limitative; and are consequently entitled to a place in our

transcendental table of all the momenta of thought in judgements,

because the function of the understanding exercised by them may

perhaps be of importance in the field of its pure a priori cognition.

3. All relations of thought in judgements are those (a) of the

predicate to the subject; (b) of the principle to its consequence; (c)

of the divided cognition and all the members of the division to each

other. In the first of these three classes, we consider only two

conceptions; in the second, two judgements; in the third, several

judgements in relation to each other. The hypothetical proposition,

"If perfect justice exists, the obstinately wicked are punished,"

contains properly the relation to each other of two propositions,

namely, "Perfect justice exists," and "The obstinately wicked are

punished." Whether these propositions are in themselves true is a

question not here decided. Nothing is cogitated by means of this

judgement except a certain consequence. Finally, the disjunctive

judgement contains a relation of two or more propositions to each

other- a relation not of consequence, but of logical opposition, in so

far as the sphere of the one proposition excludes that of the other.

But it contains at the same time a relation of community, in so far as

all the propositions taken together fill up the sphere of the

cognition. The disjunctive judgement contains, therefore, the relation

of the parts of the whole sphere of a cognition, since the sphere of

each part is a complemental part of the sphere of the other, each

contributing to form the sum total of the divided cognition. Take, for

example, the proposition, "The world exists either through blind

chance, or through internal necessity, or through an external

cause." Each of these propositions embraces a part of the sphere of

our possible cognition as to the existence of a world; all of them