第 16 页

I. This table, which contains four classes of conceptions of the

understanding, may, in the first instance, be divided into two

classes, the first of which relates to objects of intuition- pure as

well as empirical; the second, to the existence of these objects,

either in relation to one another, or to the understanding.

The former of these classes of categories I would entitle the

mathematical, and the latter the dynamical categories. The former,

as we see, has no correlates; these are only to be found in the second

class. This difference must have a ground in the nature of the human

understanding.

II. The number of the categories in each class is always the same,

namely, three- a fact which also demands some consideration, because

in all other cases division a priori through conceptions is

necessarily dichotomy. It is to be added, that the third category in

each triad always arises from the combination of the second with the

first.

Thus totality is nothing else but plurality contemplated as unity;

limitation is merely reality conjoined with negation; community is the

causality of a substance, reciprocally determining, and determined

by other substances; and finally, necessity is nothing but

existence, which is given through the possibility itself. Let it not

be supposed, however, that the third category is merely a deduced, and

not a primitive conception of the pure understanding. For the

conjunction of the first and second, in order to produce the third

conception, requires a particular function of the understanding, which

is by no means identical with those which are exercised in the first

and second. Thus, the conception of a number (which belongs to the

category of totality) is not always possible, where the conceptions of

multitude and unity exist (for example, in the representation of the

infinite). Or, if I conjoin the conception of a cause with that of a

substance, it does not follow that the conception of influence, that

is, how one substance can be the cause of something in another

substance, will be understood from that. Thus it is evident that a

particular act of the understanding is here necessary; and so in the

other instances.

III. With respect to one category, namely, that of community,

which is found in the third class, it is not so easy as with the

others to detect its accordance with the form of the disjunctive

judgement which corresponds to it in the table of the logical

functions.

In order to assure ourselves of this accordance, we must observe

that in every disjunctive judgement, the sphere of the judgement (that

is, the complex of all that is contained in it) is represented as a

whole divided into parts; and, since one part cannot be contained in

the other, they are cogitated as co-ordinated with, not subordinated

to each other, so that they do not determine each other

unilaterally, as in a linear series, but reciprocally, as in an

aggregate- (if one member of the division is posited, all the rest are

excluded; and conversely).

Now a like connection is cogitated in a whole of things; for one

thing is not subordinated, as effect, to another as cause of its

existence, but, on the contrary, is co-ordinated contemporaneously and

reciprocally, as a cause in relation to the determination of the

others (for example, in a body- the parts of which mutually attract

and repel each other). And this is an entirely different kind of

connection from that which we find in the mere relation of the cause

to the effect (the principle to the consequence), for in such a

connection the consequence does not in its turn determine the

principle, and therefore does not constitute, with the latter, a

whole- just as the Creator does not with the world make up a whole.

The process of understanding by which it represents to itself the

sphere of a divided conception, is employed also when we think of a

thing as divisible; and in the same manner as the members of the

division in the former exclude one another, and yet are connected in

one sphere, so the understanding represents to itself the parts of the

latter, as having- each of them- an existence (as substances),

independently of the others, and yet as united in one whole.

SS 8

In the transcendental philosophy of the ancients there exists one

more leading division, which contains pure conceptions of the

understanding, and which, although not numbered among the

categories, ought, according to them, as conceptions a priori, to be

valid of objects. But in this case they would augment the number of

the categories; which cannot be. These are set forth in the

proposition, so renowned among the schoolmen- "Quodlibet ens est UNUM,

VERUM, BONUM." Now, though the inferences from this principle were

mere tautological propositions, and though it is allowed only by

courtesy to retain a place in modern metaphysics, yet a thought

which maintained itself for such a length of time, however empty it

seems to be, deserves an investigation of its origin, and justifies

the conjecture that it must be grounded in some law of the

understanding, which, as is often the case, has only been

erroneously interpreted. These pretended transcendental predicates

are, in fact, nothing but logical requisites and criteria of all

cognition of objects, and they employ, as the basis for this

cognition, the categories of quantity, namely, unity, plurality, and

totality. But these, which must be taken as material conditions,

that is, as belonging to the possibility of things themselves, they

employed merely in a formal signification, as belonging to the logical

requisites of all cognition, and yet most unguardedly changed these

criteria of thought into properties of objects, as things in

themselves. Now, in every cognition of an object, there is unity of

conception, which may be called qualitative unity, so far as by this

term we understand only the unity in our connection of the manifold;

for example, unity of the theme in a play, an oration, or a story.

Secondly, there is truth in respect of the deductions from it. The

more true deductions we have from a given conception, the more

criteria of its objective reality. This we might call the

qualitative plurality of characteristic marks, which belong to a

conception as to a common foundation, but are not cogitated as a

quantity in it. Thirdly, there is perfection- which consists in

this, that the plurality falls back upon the unity of the

conception, and accords completely with that conception and with no

other. This we may denominate qualitative completeness. Hence it is

evident that these logical criteria of the possibility of cognition

are merely the three categories of quantity modified and transformed

to suit an unauthorized manner of applying them. That is to say, the

three categories, in which the unity in the production of the

quantum must be homogeneous throughout, are transformed solely with

a view to the connection of heterogeneous parts of cognition in one

act of consciousness, by means of the quality of the cognition,

which is the principle of that connection. Thus the criterion of the

possibility of a conception (not of its object) is the definition of

it, in which the unity of the conception, the truth of all that may be

immediately deduced from it, and finally, the completeness of what has

been thus deduced, constitute the requisites for the reproduction of

the whole conception. Thus also, the criterion or test of an

hypothesis is the intelligibility of the received principle of

explanation, or its unity (without help from any subsidiary

hypothesis)- the truth of our deductions from it (consistency with

each other and with experience)- and lastly, the completeness of the

principle of the explanation of these deductions, which refer to

neither more nor less than what was admitted in the hypothesis,

restoring analytically and a posteriori, what was cogitated

synthetically and a priori. By the conceptions, therefore, of unity,

truth, and perfection, we have made no addition to the

transcendental table of the categories, which is complete without

them. We have, on the contrary, merely employed the three categories

of quantity, setting aside their application to objects of experience,

as general logical laws of the consistency of cognition with itself.

CHAPTER II Of the Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the

Understanding.

SECTION I Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction

in general. SS 9

Teachers of jurisprudence, when speaking of rights and claims,

distinguish in a cause the question of right (quid juris) from the

question of fact (quid facti), and while they demand proof of both,

they give to the proof of the former, which goes to establish right or

claim in law, the name of deduction. Now we make use of a great number

of empirical conceptions, without opposition from any one; and

consider ourselves, even without any attempt at deduction, justified

in attaching to them a sense, and a supposititious signification,

because we have always experience at hand to demonstrate their

objective reality. There exist also, however, usurped conceptions,

such as fortune, fate, which circulate with almost universal

indulgence, and yet are occasionally challenged by the question, "quid

juris?" In such cases, we have great difficulty in discovering any

deduction for these terms, inasmuch as we cannot produce any

manifest ground of right, either from experience or from reason, on

which the claim to employ them can be founded.

Among the many conceptions, which make up the very variegated web of

human cognition, some are destined for pure use a priori,

independent of all experience; and their title to be so employed

always requires a deduction, inasmuch as, to justify such use of them,

proofs from experience are not sufficient; but it is necessary to know

how these conceptions can apply to objects without being derived

from experience. I term, therefore, an examination of the manner in

which conceptions can apply a priori to objects, the transcendental

deduction of conceptions, and I distinguish it from the empirical

deduction, which indicates the mode in which conception is obtained

through experience and reflection thereon; consequently, does not

concern itself with the right, but only with the fact of our obtaining

conceptions in such and such a manner. We have already seen that we

are in possession of two perfectly different kinds of conceptions,

which nevertheless agree with each other in this, that they both apply

to objects completely a priori. These are the conceptions of space and

time as forms of sensibility, and the categories as pure conceptions

of the understanding. To attempt an empirical deduction of either of

these classes would be labour in vain, because the distinguishing

characteristic of their nature consists in this, that they apply to

their objects, without having borrowed anything from experience

towards the representation of them. Consequently, if a deduction of

these conceptions is necessary, it must always be transcendental.

Meanwhile, with respect to these conceptions, as with respect to all

our cognition, we certainly may discover in experience, if not the

principle of their possibility, yet the occasioning causes of their

production. It will be found that the impressions of sense give the

first occasion for bringing into action the whole faculty of

cognition, and for the production of experience, which contains two

very dissimilar elements, namely, a matter for cognition, given by the

senses, and a certain form for the arrangement of this matter, arising

out of the inner fountain of pure intuition and thought; and these, on

occasion given by sensuous impressions, are called into exercise and

produce conceptions. Such an investigation into the first efforts of

our faculty of cognition to mount from particular perceptions to

general conceptions is undoubtedly of great utility; and we have to

thank the celebrated Locke for having first opened the way for this

inquiry. But a deduction of the pure a priori conceptions of course

never can be made in this way, seeing that, in regard to their

future employment, which must be entirely independent of experience,

they must have a far different certificate of birth to show from

that of a descent from experience. This attempted physiological

derivation, which cannot properly be called deduction, because it

relates merely to a quaestio facti, I shall entitle an explanation

of the possession of a pure cognition. It is therefore manifest that

there can only be a transcendental deduction of these conceptions

and by no means an empirical one; also, that all attempts at an

empirical deduction, in regard to pure a priori conceptions, are vain,

and can only be made by one who does not understand the altogether

peculiar nature of these cognitions.

But although it is admitted that the only possible deduction of pure

a priori cognition is a transcendental deduction, it is not, for

that reason, perfectly manifest that such a deduction is absolutely

necessary. We have already traced to their sources the conceptions

of space and time, by means of a transcendental deduction, and we have

explained and determined their objective validity a priori.

Geometry, nevertheless, advances steadily and securely in the province

of pure a priori cognitions, without needing to ask from philosophy

any certificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its

fundamental conception of space. But the use of the conception in this

science extends only to the external world of sense, the pure form

of the intuition of which is space; and in this world, therefore,

all geometrical cognition, because it is founded upon a priori

intuition, possesses immediate evidence, and the objects of this

cognition are given a priori (as regards their form) in intuition by

and through the cognition itself. With the pure conceptions of

understanding, on the contrary, commences the absolute necessity of