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Aesthetic.) Therefore is unity of the synthesis of the manifold

without or within us, consequently also a conjunction to which all

that is to be represented as determined in space or time must

correspond, given a priori along with (not in) these intuitions, as

the condition of the synthesis of all apprehension of them. But this

synthetical unity can be no other than that of the conjunction of

the manifold of a given intuition in general, in a primitive act of

consciousness, according to the categories, but applied to our

sensuous intuition. Consequently all synthesis, whereby alone is

even perception possible, is subject to the categories. And, as

experience is cognition by means of conjoined perceptions, the

categories are conditions of the possibility of experience and are

therefore valid a priori for all objects of experience.

*Space represented as an object (as geometry really requires it to

be) contains more than the mere form of the intuition; namely, a

combination of the manifold given according to the form of sensibility

into a representation that can be intuited; so that the form of the

intuition gives us merely the manifold, but the formal intuition gives

unity of representation. In the aesthetic, I regarded this unity as

belonging entirely to sensibility, for the purpose of indicating

that it antecedes all conceptions, although it presupposes a synthesis

which does not belong to sense, through which alone, however, all

our conceptions of space and time are possible. For as by means of

this unity alone (the understanding determining the sensibility) space

and time are given as intuitions, it follows that the unity of this

intuition a priori belongs to space and time, and not to the

conception of the understanding (SS 20).

When, then, for example, I make the empirical intuition of a house

by apprehension of the manifold contained therein into a perception,

the necessary unity of space and of my external sensuous intuition

lies at the foundation of this act, and I, as it were, draw the form

of the house conformably to this synthetical unity of the manifold

in space. But this very synthetical unity remains, even when I

abstract the form of space, and has its seat in the understanding, and

is in fact the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an

intuition; that is to say, the category of quantity, to which the

aforesaid synthesis of apprehension, that is, the perception, must

be completely conformable.*

*In this manner it is proved, that the synthesis of apprehension,

which is empirical, must necessarily be conformable to the synthesis

of apperception, which is intellectual, and contained a priori in

the category. It is one and the same spontaneity which at one time,

under the name of imagination, at another under that of understanding,

produces conjunction in the manifold of intuition.

To take another example, when I perceive the freezing of water, I

apprehend two states (fluidity and solidity), which, as such, stand

toward each other mutually in a relation of time. But in the time,

which I place as an internal intuition, at the foundation of this

phenomenon, I represent to myself synthetical unity of the manifold,

without which the aforesaid relation could not be given in an

intuition as determined (in regard to the succession of time). Now

this synthetical unity, as the a priori condition under which I

conjoin the manifold of an intuition, is, if I make abstraction of the

permanent form of my internal intuition (that is to say, of time), the

category of cause, by means of which, when applied to my

sensibility, I determine everything that occurs according to relations

of time. Consequently apprehension in such an event, and the event

itself, as far as regards the possibility of its perception, stands

under the conception of the relation of cause and effect: and so in

all other cases.

Categories are conceptions which prescribe laws a priori to

phenomena, consequently to nature as the complex of all phenomena

(natura materialiter spectata). And now the question arises-

inasmuch as these categories are not derived from nature, and do not

regulate themselves according to her as their model (for in that

case they would be empirical)- how it is conceivable that nature

must regulate herself according to them, in other words, how the

categories can determine a priori the synthesis of the manifold of

nature, and yet not derive their origin from her. The following is the

solution of this enigma.

It is not in the least more difficult to conceive how the laws of

the phenomena of nature must harmonize with the understanding and with

its a priori form- that is, its faculty of conjoining the manifold-

than it is to understand how the phenomena themselves must

correspond with the a priori form of our sensuous intuition. For

laws do not exist in the phenomena any more than the phenomena exist

as things in themselves. Laws do not exist except by relation to the

subject in which the phenomena inhere, in so far as it possesses

understanding, just as phenomena have no existence except by

relation to the same existing subject in so far as it has senses. To

things as things in themselves, conformability to law must necessarily

belong independently of an understanding to cognize them. But

phenomena are only representations of things which are utterly unknown

in respect to what they are in themselves. But as mere

representations, they stand under no law of conjunction except that

which the conjoining faculty prescribes. Now that which conjoins the

manifold of sensuous intuition is imagination, a mental act to which

understanding contributes unity of intellectual synthesis, and

sensibility, manifoldness of apprehension. Now as all possible

perception depends on the synthesis of apprehension, and this

empirical synthesis itself on the transcendental, consequently on

the categories, it is evident that all possible perceptions, and

therefore everything that can attain to empirical consciousness,

that is, all phenomena of nature, must, as regards their

conjunction, be subject to the categories. And nature (considered

merely as nature in general) is dependent on them. as the original

ground of her necessary conformability to law (as natura formaliter

spectata). But the pure faculty (of the understanding) of

prescribing laws a priori to phenomena by means of mere categories, is

not competent to enounce other or more laws than those on which a

nature in general, as a conformability to law of phenomena of space

and time, depends. Particular laws, inasmuch as they concern

empirically determined phenomena, cannot be entirely deduced from pure

laws, although they all stand under them. Experience must be

superadded in order to know these particular laws; but in regard to

experience in general, and everything that can be cognized as an

object thereof, these a priori laws are our only rule and guide.

Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the

Understanding. SS 23

We cannot think any object except by means of the categories; we

cannot cognize any thought except by means of intuitions corresponding

to these conceptions. Now all our intuitions are sensuous, and our

cognition, in so far as the object of it is given, is empirical. But

empirical cognition is experience; consequently no a priori

cognition is possible for us, except of objects of possible

experience.*

*Lest my readers should stumble at this assertion, and the

conclusions that may be too rashly drawn from it, I must remind them

that the categories in the act of thought are by no means limited by

the conditions of our sensuous intuition, but have an unbounded sphere

of action. It is only the cognition of the object of thought, the

determining of the object, which requires intuition. In the absence of

intuition, our thought of an object may still have true and useful

consequences in regard to the exercise of reason by the subject. But

as this exercise of reason is not always directed on the determination

of the object, in other words, on cognition thereof, but also on the

determination of the subject and its volition, I do not intend to

treat of it in this place.

But this cognition, which is limited to objects of experience, is

not for that reason derived entirely, from, experience, but- and

this is asserted of the pure intuitions and the pure conceptions of

the understanding- there are, unquestionably, elements of cognition,

which exist in the mind a priori. Now there are only two ways in which

a necessary harmony of experience with the conceptions of its

objects can be cogitated. Either experience makes these conceptions

possible, or the conceptions make experience possible. The former of

these statements will not bold good with respect to the categories

(nor in regard to pure sensuous intuition), for they are a priori

conceptions, and therefore independent of experience. The assertion of

an empirical origin would attribute to them a sort of generatio

aequivoca. Consequently, nothing remains but to adopt the second

alternative (which presents us with a system, as it were, of the

epigenesis of pure reason), namely, that on the part of the

understanding the categories do contain the grounds of the possibility

of all experience. But with respect to the questions how they make

experience possible, and what are the principles of the possibility

thereof with which they present us in their application to

phenomena, the following section on the transcendental exercise of the

faculty of judgement will inform the reader.

It is quite possible that someone may propose a species of

preformation-system of pure reason- a middle way between the two- to

wit, that the categories are neither innate and first a priori

principles of cognition, nor derived from experience, but are merely

subjective aptitudes for thought implanted in us contemporaneously

with our existence, which were so ordered and disposed by our Creator,

that their exercise perfectly harmonizes with the laws of nature which

regulate experience. Now, not to mention that with such an

hypothesis it is impossible to say at what point we must stop in the

employment of predetermined aptitudes, the fact that the categories

would in this case entirely lose that character of necessity which

is essentially involved in the very conception of them, is a

conclusive objection to it. The conception of cause, for example,

which expresses the necessity of an effect under a presupposed

condition, would be false, if it rested only upon such an arbitrary

subjective necessity of uniting certain empirical representations

according to such a rule of relation. I could not then say- "The

effect is connected with its cause in the object (that is,

necessarily)," but only, "I am so constituted that I can think this

representation as so connected, and not otherwise." Now this is just

what the sceptic wants. For in this case, all our knowledge, depending

on the supposed objective validity of our judgement, is nothing but

mere illusion; nor would there be wanting people who would deny any

such subjective necessity in respect to themselves, though they must

feel it. At all events, we could not dispute with any one on that

which merely depends on the manner in which his subject is organized.

Short view of the above Deduction.

The foregoing deduction is an exposition of the pure conceptions

of the understanding (and with them of all theoretical a priori

cognition), as principles of the possibility of experience, but of

experience as the determination of all phenomena in space and time

in general- of experience, finally, from the principle of the original

synthetical unity of apperception, as the form of the understanding in

relation to time and space as original forms of sensibility.

I consider the division by paragraphs to be necessary only up to

this point, because we had to treat of the elementary conceptions.

As we now proceed to the exposition of the employment of these, I

shall not designate the chapters in this manner any further.

BOOK II.

Analytic of Principles.

General logic is constructed upon a plan which coincides exactly

with the division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are,

understanding, judgement, and reason. This science, accordingly,

treats in its analytic of conceptions, judgements, and conclusions

in exact correspondence with the functions and order of those mental

powers which we include generally under the generic denomination of

understanding.

As this merely formal logic makes abstraction of all content of

cognition, whether pure or empirical, and occupies itself with the

mere form of thought (discursive cognition), it must contain in its

analytic a canon for reason. For the form of reason has its law,

which, without taking into consideration the particular nature of

the cognition about which it is employed, can be discovered a

priori, by the simple analysis of the action of reason into its

momenta.

Transcendental logic, limited as it is to a determinate content,

that of pure a priori cognitions, to wit, cannot imitate general logic

in this division. For it is evident that the transcendental employment

of reason is not objectively valid, and therefore does not belong to

the logic of truth (that is, to analytic), but as a logic of illusion,

occupies a particular department in the scholastic system under the

name of transcendental dialectic.

Understanding and judgement accordingly possess in transcendental

logic a canon of objectively valid, and therefore true exercise, and

are comprehended in the analytical department of that logic. But

reason, in her endeavours to arrive by a priori means at some true

statement concerning objects and to extend cognition beyond the bounds

of possible experience, is altogether dialectic, and her illusory

assertions cannot be constructed into a canon such as an analytic

ought to contain.

Accordingly, the analytic of principles will be merely a canon for