第 38 页

thing is never presented to me otherwise than as a phenomenon.

I must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other conceptions

of reflection. Matter is substantia phaenomenon. That in it which is

internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies,

and in all the functions and operations it performs, and which are

indeed never anything but phenomena of the external sense. I cannot

therefore find anything that is absolutely, but only what is

comparatively internal, and which itself consists of external

relations. The absolutely internal in matter, and as it should be

according to the pure understanding, is a mere chimera, for matter

is not an object for the pure understanding. But the transcendental

object, which is the foundation of the phenomenon which we call

matter, is a mere nescio quid, the nature of which we could not

understand, even though someone were found able to tell us. For we can

understand nothing that does not bring with it something in

intuition corresponding to the expressions employed. If, by the

complaint of being unable to perceive the internal nature of things,

it is meant that we do not comprehend by the pure understanding what

the things which appear to us may be in themselves, it is a silly

and unreasonable complaint; for those who talk thus really desire that

we should be able to cognize, consequently to intuite, things

without senses, and therefore wish that we possessed a faculty of

cognition perfectly different from the human faculty, not merely in

degree, but even as regards intuition and the mode thereof, so that

thus we should not be men, but belong to a class of beings, the

possibility of whose existence, much less their nature and

constitution, we have no means of cognizing. By observation and

analysis of phenomena we penetrate into the interior of nature, and no

one can say what progress this knowledge may make in time. But those

transcendental questions which pass beyond the limits of nature, we

could never answer, even although all nature were laid open to us,

because we have not the power of observing our own mind with any other

intuition than that of our internal sense. For herein lies the mystery

of the origin and source of our faculty of sensibility. Its

application to an object, and the transcendental ground of this

unity of subjective and objective, lie too deeply concealed for us,

who cognize ourselves only through the internal sense, consequently as

phenomena, to be able to discover in our existence anything but

phenomena, the non-sensuous cause of which we at the same time

earnestly desire to penetrate to.

The great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at by

the processes of mere reflection consists in its clear demonstration

of the nullity of all conclusions respecting objects which are

compared with each other in the understanding alone, while it at the

same time confirms what we particularly insisted on, namely, that,

although phenomena are not included as things in themselves among

the objects of the pure understanding, they are nevertheless the

only things by which our cognition can possess objective reality, that

is to say, which give us intuitions to correspond with our

conceptions.

When we reflect in a purely logical manner, we do nothing more

than compare conceptions in our understanding, to discover whether

both have the same content, whether they are self-contradictory or

not, whether anything is contained in either conception, which of

the two is given, and which is merely a mode of thinking that given.

But if I apply these conceptions to an object in general (in the

transcendental sense), without first determining whether it is an

object of sensuous or intellectual intuition, certain limitations

present themselves, which forbid us to pass beyond the conceptions and

render all empirical use of them impossible. And thus these

limitations prove that the representation of an object as a thing in

general is not only insufficient, but, without sensuous

determination and independently of empirical conditions,

self-contradictory; that we must therefore make abstraction of all

objects, as in logic, or, admitting them, must think them under

conditions of sensuous intuition; that, consequently, the intelligible

requires an altogether peculiar intuition, which we do not possess,

and in the absence of which it is for us nothing; while, on the

other hand phenomena cannot be objects in themselves. For, when I

merely think things in general, the difference in their external

relations cannot constitute a difference in the things themselves;

on the contrary, the former presupposes the latter, and if the

conception of one of two things is not internally different from

that of the other, I am merely thinking the same thing in different

relations. Further, by the addition of one affirmation (reality) to

the other, the positive therein is really augmented, and nothing is

abstracted or withdrawn from it; hence the real in things cannot be in

contradiction with or opposition to itself- and so on.

The true use of the conceptions of reflection in the employment of

the understanding has, as we have shown, been so misconceived by

Leibnitz, one of the most acute philosophers of either ancient or

modern times, that he has been misled into the construction of a

baseless system of intellectual cognition, which professes to

determine its objects without the intervention of the senses. For this

reason, the exposition of the cause of the amphiboly of these

conceptions, as the origin of these false principles, is of great

utility in determining with certainty the proper limits of the

understanding.

It is right to say whatever is affirmed or denied of the whole of

a conception can be affirmed or denied of any part of it (dictum de

omni et nullo); but it would be absurd so to alter this logical

proposition as to say whatever is not contained in a general

conception is likewise not contained in the particular conceptions

which rank under it; for the latter are particular conceptions, for

the very reason that their content is greater than that which is

cogitated in the general conception. And yet the whole intellectual

system of Leibnitz is based upon this false principle, and with it

must necessarily fall to the ground, together with all the ambiguous

principles in reference to the employment of the understanding which

have thence originated.

Leibnitz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles or

indistinguishables is really based on the presupposition that, if in

the conception of a thing a certain distinction is not to be found, it

is also not to be met with in things themselves; that, consequently,

all things are completely identical (numero eadem) which are not

distinguishable from each other (as to quality or quantity) in our

conceptions of them. But, as in the mere conception of anything

abstraction has been made of many necessary conditions of intuition,

that of which abstraction has been made is rashly held to be

non-existent, and nothing is attributed to the thing but what is

contained in its conception.

The conception of a cubic foot of space, however I may think it,

is in itself completely identical. But two cubic feet in space are

nevertheless distinct from each other from the sole fact of their

being in different places (they are numero diversa); and these

places are conditions of intuition, wherein the object of this

conception is given, and which do not belong to the conception, but to

the faculty of sensibility. In like manner, there is in the conception

of a thing no contradiction when a negative is not connected with an

affirmative; and merely affirmative conceptions cannot, in

conjunction, produce any negation. But in sensuous intuition,

wherein reality (take for example, motion) is given, we find

conditions (opposite directions)- of which abstraction has been made

in the conception of motion in general- which render possible a

contradiction or opposition (not indeed of a logical kind)- and

which from pure positives produce zero = 0. We are therefore not

justified in saying that all reality is in perfect agreement and

harmony, because no contradiction is discoverable among its

conceptions.* According to mere conceptions, that which is internal is

the substratum of all relations or external determinations. When,

therefore, I abstract all conditions of intuition, and confine

myself solely to the conception of a thing in general, I can make

abstraction of all external relations, and there must nevertheless

remain a conception of that which indicates no relation, but merely

internal determinations. Now it seems to follow that in everything

(substance) there is something which is absolutely internal and

which antecedes all external determinations, inasmuch as it renders

them possible; and that therefore this substratum is something which

does not contain any external relations and is consequently simple

(for corporeal things are never anything but relations, at least of

their parts external to each other); and, inasmuch as we know of no

other absolutely internal determinations than those of the internal

sense, this substratum is not only simple, but also, analogously

with our internal sense, determined through representations, that is

to say, all things are properly monads, or simple beings endowed

with the power of representation. Now all this would be perfectly

correct, if the conception of a thing were the only necessary

condition of the presentation of objects of external intuition. It is,

on the contrary, manifest that a permanent phenomenon in space

(impenetrable extension) can contain mere relations, and nothing

that is absolutely internal, and yet be the primary substratum of

all external perception. By mere conceptions I cannot think anything

external, without, at the same time, thinking something internal,

for the reason that conceptions of relations presuppose given

things, and without these are impossible. But, as an intuition there

is something (that is, space, which, with all it contains, consists of

purely formal, or, indeed, real relations) which is not found in the

mere conception of a thing in general, and this presents to us the

substratum which could not be cognized through conceptions alone, I

cannot say: because a thing cannot be represented by mere

conceptions without something absolutely internal, there is also, in

the things themselves which are contained under these conceptions, and

in their intuition nothing external to which something absolutely

internal does not serve as the foundation. For, when we have made

abstraction of all the conditions of intuition, there certainly

remains in the mere conception nothing but the internal in general,

through which alone the external is possible. But this necessity,

which is grounded upon abstraction alone, does not obtain in the

case of things themselves, in so far as they are given in intuition

with such determinations as express mere relations, without having

anything internal as their foundation; for they are not things of a

thing of which we can neither for they are not things in themselves,

but only phenomena. What we cognize in matter is nothing but relations

(what we call its internal determinations are but comparatively

internal). But there are some self-subsistent and permanent, through

which a determined object is given. That I, when abstraction is made

of these relations, have nothing more to think, does not destroy the

conception of a thing as phenomenon, nor the conception of an object

in abstracto, but it does away with the possibility of an object

that is determinable according to mere conceptions, that is, of a

noumenon. It is certainly startling to hear that a thing consists

solely of relations; but this thing is simply a phenomenon, and cannot

be cogitated by means of the mere categories: it does itself consist

in the mere relation of something in general to the senses. In the

same way, we cannot cogitate relations of things in abstracto, if we

commence with conceptions alone, in any other manner than that one

is the cause of determinations in the other; for that is itself the

conception of the understanding or category of relation. But, as in

this case we make abstraction of all intuition, we lose altogether the

mode in which the manifold determines to each of its parts its

place, that is, the form of sensibility (space); and yet this mode

antecedes all empirical causality.

*If any one wishes here to have recourse to the usual subterfuge,

and to say, that at least realitates noumena cannot be in opposition

to each other, it will be requisite for him to adduce an example of

this pure and non-sensuous reality, that it may be understood

whether the notion represents something or nothing. But an example

cannot be found except in experience, which never presents to us

anything more than phenomena; and thus the proposition means nothing

more than that the conception which contains only affirmatives does

not contain anything negative- a proposition nobody ever doubted.

If by intelligible objects we understand things which can be thought

by means of the pure categories, without the need of the schemata of

sensibility, such objects are impossible. For the condition of the

objective use of all our conceptions of understanding is the mode of

our sensuous intuition, whereby objects are given; and, if we make

abstraction of the latter, the former can have no relation to an

object. And even if we should suppose a different kind of intuition

from our own, still our functions of thought would have no use or

signification in respect thereof. But if we understand by the term,

objects of a non-sensuous intuition, in respect of which our

categories are not valid, and of which we can accordingly have no

knowledge (neither intuition nor conception), in this merely

negative sense noumena must be admitted. For this is no more than

saying that our mode of intuition is not applicable to all things, but

only to objects of our senses, that consequently its objective