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validity is limited, and that room is therefore left for another

kind of intuition, and thus also for things that may be objects of it.

But in this sense the conception of a noumenon is problematical,

that is to say, it is the notion of that it that it is possible, nor

that it is impossible, inasmuch as we do not know of any mode of

intuition besides the sensuous, or of any other sort of conceptions

than the categories- a mode of intuition and a kind of conception

neither of which is applicable to a non-sensuous object. We are on

this account incompetent to extend the sphere of our objects of

thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, and to assume the

existence of objects of pure thought, that is, of noumena, inasmuch as

these have no true positive signification. For it must be confessed of

the categories that they are not of themselves sufficient for the

cognition of things in themselves and, without the data of

sensibility, are mere subjective forms of the unity of the

understanding. Thought is certainly not a product of the senses, and

in so far is not limited by them, but it does not therefore follow

that it may be employed purely and without the intervention of

sensibility, for it would then be without reference to an object.

And we cannot call a noumenon an object of pure thought; for the

representation thereof is but the problematical conception of an

object for a perfectly different intuition and a perfectly different

understanding from ours, both of which are consequently themselves

problematical. The conception of a noumenon is therefore not the

conception of an object, but merely a problematical conception

inseparably connected with the limitation of our sensibility. That

is to say, this conception contains the answer to the question: "Are

there objects quite unconnected with, and independent of, our

intuition?"- a question to which only an indeterminate answer can be

given. That answer is: "Inasmuch as sensuous intuition does not

apply to all things without distinction, there remains room for

other and different objects." The existence of these problematical

objects is therefore not absolutely denied, in the absence of a

determinate conception of them, but, as no category is valid in

respect of them, neither must they be admitted as objects for our

understanding.

Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, without at the same

time enlarging its own field. While, moreover, it forbids

sensibility to apply its forms and modes to things in themselves and

restricts it to the sphere of phenomena, it cogitates an object in

itself, only, however, as a transcendental object, which is the

cause of a phenomenon (consequently not itself a phenomenon), and

which cannot be thought either as a quantity or as reality, or as

substance (because these conceptions always require sensuous forms

in which to determine an object)- an object, therefore, of which we

are quite unable to say whether it can be met with in ourselves or out

of us, whether it would be annihilated together with sensibility,

or, if this were taken away, would continue to exist. If we wish to

call this object a noumenon, because the representation of it is

non-sensuous, we are at liberty to do so. But as we can apply to it

none of the conceptions of our understanding, the representation is

for us quite void, and is available only for the indication of the

limits of our sensuous intuition, thereby leaving at the same time

an empty space, which we are competent to fill by the aid neither of

possible experience, nor of the pure understanding.

The critique of the pure understanding, accordingly, does not permit

us to create for ourselves a new field of objects beyond those which

are presented to us as phenomena, and to stray into intelligible

worlds; nay, it does not even allow us to endeavour to form so much as

a conception of them. The specious error which leads to this- and

which is a perfectly excusable one- lies in the fact that the

employment of the understanding, contrary to its proper purpose and

destination, is made transcendental, and objects, that is, possible

intuitions, are made to regulate themselves according to

conceptions, instead of the conceptions arranging themselves according

to the intuitions, on which alone their own objective validity

rests. Now the reason of this again is that apperception, and with

it thought, antecedes all possible determinate arrangement of

representations. Accordingly we think something in general and

determine it on the one hand sensuously, but, on the other,

distinguish the general and in abstracto represented object from

this particular mode of intuiting it. In this case there remains a

mode of determining the object by mere thought, which is really but

a logical form without content, which, however, seems to us to be a

mode of the existence of the object in itself (noumenon), without

regard to intuition which is limited to our senses.

Before ending this transcendental analytic, we must make an

addition, which, although in itself of no particular importance, seems

to be necessary to the completeness of the system. The highest

conception, with which a transcendental philosophy commonly begins, is

the division into possible and impossible. But as all division

presupposes a divided conception, a still higher one must exist, and

this is the conception of an object in general- problematically

understood and without its being decided whether it is something or

nothing. As the categories are the only conceptions which apply to

objects in general, the distinguishing of an object, whether it is

something or nothing, must proceed according to the order and

direction of the categories.

1. To the categories of quantity, that is, the conceptions of all,

many, and one, the conception which annihilates all, that is, the

conception of none, is opposed. And thus the object of a conception,

to which no intuition can be found to correspond, is = nothing. That

is, it is a conception without an object (ens rationis), like noumena,

which cannot be considered possible in the sphere of reality, though

they must not therefore be held to be impossible- or like certain

new fundamental forces in matter, the existence of which is

cogitable without contradiction, though, as examples from experience

are not forthcoming, they must not be regarded as possible.

2. Reality is something; negation is nothing, that is, a

conception of the absence of an object, as cold, a shadow (nihil

privativum).

3. The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no

object, but the merely formal condition of an object (as

phenomenon), as pure space and pure time. These are certainly

something, as forms of intuition, but are not themselves objects which

are intuited (ens imaginarium).

4. The object of a conception which is self-contradictory, is

nothing, because the conception is nothing- is impossible, as a figure

composed of two straight lines (nihil negativum).

The table of this division of the conception of nothing (the

corresponding division of the conception of something does not require

special description) must therefore be arranged as follows:

NOTHING

AS

1

As Empty Conception

without object,

ens rationis

2 3

Empty object of Empty intuition

a conception, without object,

nihil privativum ens imaginarium

4

Empty object

without conception,

nihil negativum

We see that the ens rationis is distinguished from the nihil

negativum or pure nothing by the consideration that the former must

not be reckoned among possibilities, because it is a mere fiction-

though not self-contradictory, while the latter is completely

opposed to all possibility, inasmuch as the conception annihilates

itself. Both, however, are empty conceptions. On the other hand,

the nihil privativum and ens imaginarium are empty data for

conceptions. If light be not given to the senses, we cannot

represent to ourselves darkness, and if extended objects are not

perceived, we cannot represent space. Neither the negation, nor the

mere form of intuition can, without something real, be an object.

INTRO

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. SECOND DIVISION.

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. INTRODUCTION.

I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.

We termed dialectic in general a logic of appearance. This does

not signify a doctrine of probability; for probability is truth,

only cognized upon insufficient grounds, and though the information it

gives us is imperfect, it is not therefore deceitful. Hence it must

not be separated from the analytical part of logic. Still less must

phenomenon and appearance be held to be identical. For truth or

illusory appearance does not reside in the object, in so far as it

is intuited, but in the judgement upon the object, in so far as it

is thought. It is, therefore, quite correct to say that the senses

do not err, not because they always judge correctly, but because

they do not judge at all. Hence truth and error, consequently also,

illusory appearance as the cause of error, are only to be found in a

judgement, that is, in the relation of an object to our understanding.

In a cognition which completely harmonizes with the laws of the

understanding, no error can exist. In a representation of the

senses- as not containing any judgement- there is also no error. But

no power of nature can of itself deviate from its own laws. Hence

neither the understanding per se (without the influence of another

cause), nor the senses per se, would fall into error; the former could

not, because, if it acts only according to its own laws, the effect

(the judgement) must necessarily accord with these laws. But in

accordance with the laws of the understanding consists the formal

element in all truth. In the senses there is no judgement- neither a

true nor a false one. But, as we have no source of cognition besides

these two, it follows that error is caused solely by the unobserved

influence of the sensibility upon the understanding. And thus it

happens that the subjective grounds of a judgement and are

confounded with the objective, and cause them to deviate from their

proper determination,* just as a body in motion would always of itself

proceed in a straight line, but if another impetus gives to it a

different direction, it will then start off into a curvilinear line of

motion. To distinguish the peculiar action of the understanding from

the power which mingles with it, it is necessary to consider an

erroneous judgement as the diagonal between two forces, that determine

the judgement in two different directions, which, as it were, form

an angle, and to resolve this composite operation into the simple ones

of the understanding and the sensibility. In pure a priori

judgements this must be done by means of transcendental reflection,

whereby, as has been already shown, each representation has its

place appointed in the corresponding faculty of cognition, and

consequently the influence of the one faculty upon the other is made

apparent.

*Sensibility, subjected to the understanding, as the object upon

which the understanding employs its functions, is the source of real

cognitions. But, in so far as it exercises an influence upon the

action of the understanding and determines it to judgement,

sensibility is itself the cause of error.

It is not at present our business to treat of empirical illusory

appearance (for example, optical illusion), which occurs in the

empirical application of otherwise correct rules of the understanding,

and in which the judgement is misled by the influence of

imagination. Our purpose is to speak of transcendental illusory

appearance, which influences principles- that are not even applied

to experience, for in this case we should possess a sure test of their

correctness- but which leads us, in disregard of all the warnings of

criticism, completely beyond the empirical employment of the

categories and deludes us with the chimera of an extension of the

sphere of the pure understanding. We shall term those principles the

application of which is confined entirely within the limits of

possible experience, immanent; those, on the other hand, which

transgress these limits, we shall call transcendent principles. But by

these latter I do not understand principles of the transcendental

use or misuse of the categories, which is in reality a mere fault of

the judgement when not under due restraint from criticism, and

therefore not paying sufficient attention to the limits of the

sphere in which the pure understanding is allowed to exercise its

functions; but real principles which exhort us to break down all those

barriers, and to lay claim to a perfectly new field of cognition,

which recognizes no line of demarcation. Thus transcendental and

transcendent are not identical terms. The principles of the pure

understanding, which we have already propounded, ought to be of

empirical and not of transcendental use, that is, they are not

applicable to any object beyond the sphere of experience. A

principle which removes these limits, nay, which authorizes us to

overstep them, is called transcendent. If our criticism can succeed in

exposing the illusion in these pretended principles, those which are

limited in their employment to the sphere of experience may be called,

in opposition to the others, immanent principles of the pure

understanding.

Logical illusion, which consists merely in the imitation of the form

of reason (the illusion in sophistical syllogisms), arises entirely

from a want of due attention to logical rules. So soon as the

attention is awakened to the case before us, this illusion totally

disappears. Transcendental illusion, on the contrary, does not cease