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one and the same being, e.g., the human soul, that its will is free,

and yet, at the same time, subject to natural necessity, that is,

not free, without falling into a palpable contradiction, for in both

propositions I should take the soul in the same signification, as a

thing in general, as a thing in itself- as, without previous

criticism, I could not but take it. Suppose now, on the other hand,

that we have undertaken this criticism, and have learnt that an object

may be taken in two senses, first, as a phenomenon, secondly, as a

thing in itself; and that, according to the deduction of the

conceptions of the understanding, the principle of causality has

reference only to things in the first sense. We then see how it does

not involve any contradiction to assert, on the one hand, that the

will, in the phenomenal sphere- in visible action- is necessarily

obedient to the law of nature, and, in so far, not free; and, on the

other hand, that, as belonging to a thing in itself, it is not subject

to that law, and, accordingly, is free. Now, it is true that I cannot,

by means of speculative reason, and still less by empirical

observation, cognize my soul as a thing in itself and consequently,

cannot cognize liberty as the property of a being to which I ascribe

effects in the world of sense. For, to do so, I must cognize this

being as existing, and yet not in time, which- since I cannot

support my conception by any intuition- is impossible. At the same

time, while I cannot cognize, I can quite well think freedom, that

is to say, my representation of it involves at least no contradiction,

if we bear in mind the critical distinction of the two modes of

representation (the sensible and the intellectual) and the

consequent limitation of the conceptions of the pure understanding and

of the principles which flow from them. Suppose now that morality

necessarily presupposed liberty, in the strictest sense, as a property

of our will; suppose that reason contained certain practical, original

principles a priori, which were absolutely impossible without this

presupposition; and suppose, at the same time, that speculative reason

had proved that liberty was incapable of being thought at all. It

would then follow that the moral presupposition must give way to the

speculative affirmation, the opposite of which involves an obvious

contradiction, and that liberty and, with it, morality must yield to

the mechanism of nature; for the negation of morality involves no

contradiction, except on the presupposition of liberty. Now morality

does not require the speculative cognition of liberty; it is enough

that I can think it, that its conception involves no contradiction,

that it does not interfere with the mechanism of nature. But even this

requirement we could not satisfy, if we had not learnt the twofold

sense in which things may be taken; and it is only in this way that

the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are confined

within their proper limits. For this result, then, we are indebted

to a criticism which warns us of our unavoidable ignorance with regard

to things in themselves, and establishes the necessary limitation of

our theoretical cognition to mere phenomena.

*In order to cognize an object, I must be able to prove its

possibility, either from its reality as attested by experience, or a

priori, by means of reason. But I can think what I please, provided

only I do not contradict myself; that is, provided my conception is

a possible thought, though I may be unable to answer for the existence

of a corresponding object in the sum of possibilities. But something

more is required before I can attribute to such a conception objective

validity, that is real possibility- the other possibility being merely

logical. We are not, however, confined to theoretical sources of

cognition for the means of satisfying this additional requirement, but

may derive them from practical sources.

The positive value of the critical principles of pure reason in

relation to the conception of God and of the simple nature of the

soul, admits of a similar exemplification; but on this point I shall

not dwell. I cannot even make the assumption- as the practical

interests of morality require- of God, freedom, and immortality, if

I do not deprive speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent

insight. For to arrive at these, it must make use of principles which,

in fact, extend only to the objects of possible experience, and

which cannot be applied to objects beyond this sphere without

converting them into phenomena, and thus rendering the practical

extension of pure reason impossible. I must, therefore, abolish

knowledge, to make room for belief. The dogmatism of metaphysics, that

is, the presumption that it is possible to advance in metaphysics

without previous criticism, is the true source of the unbelief (always

dogmatic) which militates against morality.

Thus, while it may be no very difficult task to bequeath a legacy to

posterity, in the shape of a system of metaphysics constructed in

accordance with the Critique of Pure Reason, still the value of such a

bequest is not to be depreciated. It will render an important

service to reason, by substituting the certainty of scientific

method for that random groping after results without the guidance of

principles, which has hitherto characterized the pursuit of

metaphysical studies. It will render an important service to the

inquiring mind of youth, by leading the student to apply his powers to

the cultivation of. genuine science, instead of wasting them, as at

present, on speculations which can never lead to any result, or on the

idle attempt to invent new ideas and opinions. But, above all, it will

confer an inestimable benefit on morality and religion, by showing

that all the objections urged against them may be silenced for ever by

the Socratic method, that is to say, by proving the ignorance of the

objector. For, as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never

will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it

is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it

powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error.

This important change in the field of the sciences, this loss of its

fancied possessions, to which speculative reason must submit, does not

prove in any way detrimental to the general interests of humanity. The

advantages which the world has derived from the teachings of pure

reason are not at all impaired. The loss falls, in its whole extent,

on the monopoly of the schools, but does not in the slightest degree

touch the interests of mankind. I appeal to the most obstinate

dogmatist, whether the proof of the continued existence of the soul

after death, derived from the simplicity of its substance; of the

freedom of the will in opposition to the general mechanism of

nature, drawn from the subtle but impotent distinction of subjective

and objective practical necessity; or of the existence of God, deduced

from the conception of an ens realissimum- the contingency of the

changeable, and the necessity of a prime mover, has ever been able

to pass beyond the limits of the schools, to penetrate the public

mind, or to exercise the slightest influence on its convictions. It

must be admitted that this has not been the case and that, owing to

the unfitness of the common understanding for such subtle

speculations, it can never be expected to take place. On the contrary,

it is plain that the hope of a future life arises from the feeling,

which exists in the breast of every man, that the temporal is

inadequate to meet and satisfy the demands of his nature. In like

manner, it cannot be doubted that the clear exhibition of duties in

opposition to all the claims of inclination, gives rise to the

consciousness of freedom, and that the glorious order, beauty, and

providential care, everywhere displayed in nature, give rise to the

belief in a wise and great Author of the Universe. Such is the genesis

of these general convictions of mankind, so far as they depend on

rational grounds; and this public property not only remains

undisturbed, but is even raised to greater importance, by the doctrine

that the schools have no right to arrogate to themselves a more

profound insight into a matter of general human concernment than

that to which the great mass of men, ever held by us in the highest

estimation, can without difficulty attain, and that the schools

should, therefore, confine themselves to the elaboration of these

universally comprehensible and, from a moral point of view, amply

satisfactory proofs. The change, therefore, affects only the

arrogant pretensions of the schools, which would gladly retain, in

their own exclusive possession, the key to the truths which they

impart to the public.

Quod mecum nescit, solus vult scire videri.

At the same time it does not deprive the speculative philosopher of

his just title to be the sole depositor of a science which benefits

the public without its knowledge- I mean, the Critique of Pure Reason.

This can never become popular and, indeed, has no occasion to be so;

for finespun arguments in favour of useful truths make just as

little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle

objections brought against these truths. On the other hand, since both

inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of

speculation, it becomes the manifest duty of the schools to enter upon

a thorough investigation of the rights of speculative reason and,

thus, to prevent the scandal which metaphysical controversies are

sure, sooner or later, to cause even to the masses. It is only by

criticism that metaphysicians (and, as such, theologians too) can be

saved from these controversies and from the consequent perversion of

their doctrines. Criticism alone can strike a blow at the root of

materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and

superstition, which are universally injurious- as well as of

idealism and scepticism, which are dangerous to the schools, but can

scarcely pass over to the public. If governments think proper to

interfere with the affairs of the learned, it would be more consistent

with a wise regard for the interests of science, as well as for

those of society, to favour a criticism of this kind, by which alone

the labours of reason can be established on a firm basis, than to

support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud

cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of

which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss of which,

therefore, it can never feel.

This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of

reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be

dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure

principles a priori- but to dogmatism, that is, to the presumption

that it is possible to make any progress with a pure cognition,

derived from (philosophical) conceptions, according to the

principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing-

without first inquiring in what way and by what right reason has

come into the possession of these principles. Dogmatism is thus the

dogmatic procedure of pure reason without previous criticism of its

own powers, and in opposing this procedure, we must not be supposed to

lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates to

itself the name of popularity, nor yet to scepticism, which makes

short work with the whole science of metaphysics. On the contrary, our

criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific

system of metaphysics which must perform its task entirely a priori,

to the complete satisfaction of speculative reason, and must,

therefore, be treated, not popularly, but scholastically. In

carrying out the plan which the Critique prescribes, that is, in the

future system of metaphysics, we must have recourse to the strict

method of the celebrated Wolf, the greatest of all dogmatic

philosophers. He was the first to point out the necessity of

establishing fixed principles, of clearly defining our conceptions,

and of subjecting our demonstrations to the most severe scrutiny,

instead of rashly jumping at conclusions. The example which he set

served to awaken that spirit of profound and thorough investigation

which is not yet extinct in Germany. He would have been peculiarly

well fitted to give a truly scientific character to metaphysical

studies, had it occurred to him to prepare the field by a criticism of

the organum, that is, of pure reason itself. That be failed to

perceive the necessity of such a procedure must be ascribed to the

dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age, and on this

point the philosophers of his time, as well as of all previous

times, have nothing to reproach each other with. Those who reject at

once the method of Wolf, and of the Critique of Pure Reason, can

have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of science, to change

labour into sport, certainty into opinion, and philosophy into

philodoxy.

In this second edition, I have endeavoured, as far as possible, to

remove the difficulties and obscurity which, without fault of mine

perhaps, have given rise to many misconceptions even among acute

thinkers. In the propositions themselves, and in the demonstrations by

which they are supported, as well as in the form and the entire plan

of the work, I have found nothing to alter; which must be attributed

partly to the long examination to which I had subjected the whole

before offering it to the public and partly to the nature of the case.

For pure speculative reason is an organic structure in which there

is nothing isolated or independent, but every Single part is essential

to all the rest; and hence, the slightest imperfection, whether defect

or positive error, could not fail to betray itself in use. I

venture, further, to hope, that this system will maintain the same

unalterable character for the future. I am led to entertain this

confidence, not by vanity, but by the evidence which the equality of