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and nearer to the greatest possible perfection. For at what precise

degree human nature must stop in its progress, and how wide must be

the chasm which must necessarily exist between the idea and its

realization, are problems which no one can or ought to determine-

and for this reason, that it is the destination of freedom to overstep

all assigned limits between itself and the idea.

But not only in that wherein human reason is a real causal agent and

where ideas are operative causes (of actions and their objects),

that is to say, in the region of ethics, but also in regard to

nature herself, Plato saw clear proofs of an origin from ideas. A

plant, and animal, the regular order of nature- probably also the

disposition of the whole universe- give manifest evidence that they

are possible only by means of and according to ideas; that, indeed, no

one creature, under the individual conditions of its existence,

perfectly harmonizes with the idea of the most perfect of its kind-

just as little as man with the idea of humanity, which nevertheless he

bears in his soul as the archetypal standard of his actions; that,

notwithstanding, these ideas are in the highest sense individually,

unchangeably, and completely determined, and are the original causes

of things; and that the totality of connected objects in the

universe is alone fully adequate to that idea. Setting aside the

exaggerations of expression in the writings of this philosopher, the

mental power exhibited in this ascent from the ectypal mode of

regarding the physical world to the architectonic connection thereof

according to ends, that is, ideas, is an effort which deserves

imitation and claims respect. But as regards the principles of ethics,

of legislation, and of religion, spheres in which ideas alone render

experience possible, although they never attain to full expression

therein, he has vindicated for himself a position of peculiar merit,

which is not appreciated only because it is judged by the very

empirical rules, the validity of which as principles is destroyed by

ideas. For as regards nature, experience presents us with rules and is

the source of truth, but in relation to ethical laws experience is the

parent of illusion, and it is in the highest degree reprehensible to

limit or to deduce the laws which dictate what I ought to do, from

what is done.

We must, however, omit the consideration of these important

subjects, the development of which is in reality the peculiar duty and

dignity of philosophy, and confine ourselves for the present to the

more humble but not less useful task of preparing a firm foundation

for those majestic edifices of moral science. For this foundation

has been hitherto insecure from the many subterranean passages which

reason in its confident but vain search for treasures has made in

all directions. Our present duty is to make ourselves perfectly

acquainted with the transcendental use made of pure reason, its

principles and ideas, that we may be able properly to determine and

value its influence and real worth. But before bringing these

introductory remarks to a close, I beg those who really have

philosophy at heart- and their number is but small- if they shall find

themselves convinced by the considerations following as well as by

those above, to exert themselves to preserve to the expression idea

its original signification, and to take care that it be not lost among

those other expressions by which all sorts of representations are

loosely designated- that the interests of science may not thereby

suffer. We are in no want of words to denominate adequately every mode

of representation, without the necessity of encroaching upon terms

which are proper to others. The following is a graduated list of them.

The genus is representation in general (representation. Under it

stands representation with consciousness (perceptio). A perception

which relates solely to the subject as a modification of its state, is

a sensation (sensatio), an objective perception is a cognition

(cognitio). A cognition is either an intuition or a conception

(intuitus vel conceptus). The former has an immediate relation to

the object and is singular and individual; the latter has but a

mediate relation, by means of a characteristic mark which may be

common to several things. A conception is either empirical or pure.

A pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding

alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image, is called

notio. A conception formed from notions, which transcends the

possibility of experience, is an idea, or a conception of reason. To

one who has accustomed himself to these distinctions, it must be quite

intolerable to hear the representation of the colour red called an

idea. It ought not even to be called a notion or conception of

understanding.

SECTION II. Of Transcendental Ideas.

Transcendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our

cognition can contain the origin of pure conceptions a priori,

conceptions which represent objects antecedently to all experience, or

rather, indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an

empirical cognition of objects. The form of judgements- converted into

a conception of the synthesis of intuitions- produced the categories

which direct the employment of the understanding in experience. This

consideration warrants us to expect that the form of syllogisms,

when applied to synthetical unity of intuitions, following the rule of

the categories, will contain the origin of particular a priori

conceptions, which we may call pure conceptions of reason or

transcendental ideas, and which will determine the use of the

understanding in the totality of experience according to principles.

The function of reason in arguments consists in the universality

of a cognition according to conceptions, and the syllogism itself is a

judgement which is determined a priori in the whole extent of its

condition. The proposition: "Caius is mortal," is one which may be

obtained from experience by the aid of the understanding alone; but my

wish is to find a conception which contains the condition under

which the predicate of this judgement is given- in this case, the

conception of man- and after subsuming under this condition, taken

in its whole extent (all men are mortal), I determine according to

it the cognition of the object thought, and say: "Caius is mortal."

Hence, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a predicate to a

certain object, after having thought it in the major in its whole

extent under a certain condition. This complete quantity of the extent

in relation to such a condition is called universality

(universalitas). To this corresponds totality (universitas) of

conditions in the synthesis of intuitions. The transcendental

conception of reason is therefore nothing else than the conception

of the totality of the conditions of a given conditioned. Now as the

unconditioned alone renders possible totality of conditions, and,

conversely, the totality of conditions is itself always unconditioned;

a pure rational conception in general can be defined and explained

by means of the conception of the unconditioned, in so far as it

contains a basis for the synthesis of the conditioned.

To the number of modes of relation which the understanding cogitates

by means of the categories, the number of pure rational conceptions

will correspond. We must therefore seek for, first, an unconditioned

of the categorical synthesis in a subject; secondly, of the

hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series; thirdly, of the

disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system.

There are exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms, each of

which proceeds through prosyllogisms to the unconditioned- one to

the subject which cannot be employed as predicate, another to the

presupposition which supposes nothing higher than itself, and the

third to an aggregate of the members of the complete division of a

conception. Hence the pure rational conceptions of totality in the

synthesis of conditions have a necessary foundation in the nature of

human reason- at least as modes of elevating the unity of the

understanding to the unconditioned. They may have no valid

application, corresponding to their transcendental employment, in

concreto, and be thus of no greater utility than to direct the

understanding how, while extending them as widely as possible, to

maintain its exercise and application in perfect consistence and

harmony.

But, while speaking here of the totality of conditions and of the

unconditioned as the common title of all conceptions of reason, we

again light upon an expression which we find it impossible to dispense

with, and which nevertheless, owing to the ambiguity attaching to it

from long abuse, we cannot employ with safety. The word absolute is

one of the few words which, in its original signification, was

perfectly adequate to the conception it was intended to convey- a

conception which no other word in the same language exactly suits, and

the loss- or, which is the same thing, the incautious and loose

employment- of which must be followed by the loss of the conception

itself. And, as it is a conception which occupies much of the

attention of reason, its loss would be greatly to the detriment of all

transcendental philosophy. The word absolute is at present

frequently used to denote that something can be predicated of a

thing considered in itself and intrinsically. In this sense absolutely

possible would signify that which is possible in itself (interne)-

which is, in fact, the least that one can predicate of an object. On

the other hand, it is sometimes employed to indicate that a thing is

valid in all respects- for example, absolute sovereignty. Absolutely

possible would in this sense signify that which is possible in all

relations and in every respect; and this is the most that can be

predicated of the possibility of a thing. Now these significations

do in truth frequently coincide. Thus, for example, that which is

intrinsically impossible, is also impossible in all relations, that

is, absolutely impossible. But in most cases they differ from each

other toto caelo, and I can by no means conclude that, because a thing

is in itself possible, it is also possible in all relations, and

therefore absolutely. Nay, more, I shall in the sequel show that

absolute necessity does not by any means depend on internal necessity,

and that, therefore, it must not be considered as synonymous with

it. Of an opposite which is intrinsically impossible, we may affirm

that it is in all respects impossible, and that, consequently, the

thing itself, of which this is the opposite, is absolutely

necessary; but I cannot reason conversely and say, the opposite of

that which is absolutely necessary is intrinsically impossible, that

is, that the absolute necessity of things is an internal necessity.

For this internal necessity is in certain cases a mere empty word with

which the least conception cannot be connected, while the conception

of the necessity of a thing in all relations possesses very peculiar

determinations. Now as the loss of a conception of great utility in

speculative science cannot be a matter of indifference to the

philosopher, I trust that the proper determination and careful

preservation of the expression on which the conception depends will

likewise be not indifferent to him.

In this enlarged signification, then, shall I employ the word

absolute, in opposition to that which is valid only in some particular

respect; for the latter is restricted by conditions, the former is

valid without any restriction whatever.

Now the transcendental conception of reason has for its object

nothing else than absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions and

does not rest satisfied till it has attained to the absolutely, that

is, in all respects and relations, unconditioned. For pure reason

leaves to the understanding everything that immediately relates to the

object of intuition or rather to their synthesis in imagination. The

former restricts itself to the absolute totality in the employment

of the conceptions of the understanding and aims at carrying out the

synthetical unity which is cogitated in the category, even to the

unconditioned. This unity may hence be called the rational unity of

phenomena, as the other, which the category expresses, may be termed

the unity of the understanding. Reason, therefore, has an immediate

relation to the use of the understanding, not indeed in so far as

the latter contains the ground of possible experience (for the

conception of the absolute totality of conditions is not a

conception that can be employed in experience, because no experience

is unconditioned), but solely for the purpose of directing it to a

certain unity, of which the understanding has no conception, and the

aim of which is to collect into an absolute whole all acts of the

understanding. Hence the objective employment of the pure

conceptions of reason is always transcendent, while that of the pure

conceptions of the understanding must, according to their nature, be

always immanent, inasmuch as they are limited to possible experience.

I understand by idea a necessary conception of reason, to which no

corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense.

Accordingly, the pure conceptions of reason at present under

consideration are transcendental ideas. They are conceptions of pure

reason, for they regard all empirical cognition as determined by means

of an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fictions, but

natural and necessary products of reason, and have hence a necessary

relation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the understanding.

And, finally, they are transcendent, and overstep the limits of all

experiences, in which, consequently, no object can ever be presented

that would be perfectly adequate to a transcendental idea. When we use

the word idea, we say, as regards its object (an object of the pure

understanding), a great deal, but as regards its subject (that is,