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logical and transcendental procedure of reason, is another of those

questions, the answer to which we must not expect till we arrive at

a more advanced stage in our inquiries. In this cursory and

preliminary view, we have, meanwhile, reached our aim. For we have

dispelled the ambiguity which attached to the transcendental

conceptions of reason, from their being commonly mixed up with other

conceptions in the systems of philosophers, and not properly

distinguished from the conceptions of the understanding; we have

exposed their origin and, thereby, at the same time their

determinate number, and presented them in a systematic connection, and

have thus marked out and enclosed a definite sphere for pure reason.

*The science of Metaphysics has for the proper object of its

inquiries only three grand ideas: GOD, FREEDOM, and IMMORTALITY, and

it aims at showing, that the second conception, conjoined with the

first, must lead to the third, as a necessary conclusion. All the

other subjects with which it occupies itself, are merely means for the

attainment and realization of these ideas. It does not require these

ideas for the construction of a science of nature, but, on the

contrary, for the purpose of passing beyond the sphere of nature. A

complete insight into and comprehension of them would render Theology,

Ethics, and, through the conjunction of both, Religion, solely

dependent on the speculative faculty of reason. In a systematic

representation of these ideas the above-mentioned arrangement- the

synthetical one- would be the most suitable; but in the

investigation which must necessarily precede it, the analytical, which

reverses this arrangement, would be better adapted to our purpose,

as in it we should proceed from that which experience immediately

presents to us- psychology, to cosmology, and thence to theology.

BOOK II.

OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCEDURE OF PURE REASON.

It may be said that the object of a merely transcendental idea is

something of which we have no conception, although the idea may be a

necessary product of reason according to its original laws. For, in

fact, a conception of an object that is adequate to the idea given

by reason, is impossible. For such an object must be capable of

being presented and intuited in a Possible experience. But we should

express our meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood,

if we said that we can have no knowledge of an object, which perfectly

corresponds to an idea, although we may possess a problematical

conception thereof.

Now the transcendental (subjective) reality at least of the pure

conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such

ideas by a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be

syllogisms which contain no empirical premisses, and by means of which

we conclude from something that we do know, to something of which we

do not even possess a conception, to which we, nevertheless, by an

unavoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments are,

as regards their result, rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms,

although indeed, as regards their origin, they are very well

entitled to the latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or

accidental products of reason, but are necessitated by its very

nature. They are sophisms, not of men, but of pure reason herself,

from which the Wisest cannot free himself. After long labour he may be

able to guard against the error, but he can never be thoroughly rid of

the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him.

Of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds,

corresponding to the number of the ideas which their conclusions

present. In the argument or syllogism of the first class, I

conclude, from the transcendental conception of the subject contains

no manifold, the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I

cannot in this manner attain to a conception. This dialectical

argument I shall call the transcendental paralogism. The second

class of sophistical arguments is occupied with the transcendental

conception of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for

a given phenomenon, and I conclude, from the fact that I have always a

self-contradictory conception of the unconditioned synthetical unity

of the series upon one side, the truth of the opposite unity, of which

I have nevertheless no conception. The condition of reason in these

dialectical arguments, I shall term the antinomy of pure reason.

Finally, according to the third kind of sophistical argument, I

conclude, from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in

general, in so far as they can be given, the absolute synthetical

unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general;

that is, from things which I do not know in their mere

transcendental conception, I conclude a being of all beings which I

know still less by means of a transcendental conception, and of

whose unconditioned necessity I can form no conception whatever.

This dialectical argument I shall call the ideal of pure reason.

CHAPTER I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.

The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in

respect of its form, be the content what it may. But a

transcendental paralogism has a transcendental foundation, and

concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexceptionable. In

this manner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human

reason, and is the parent of an unavoidable, though not insoluble,

mental illusion.

We now come to a conception which was not inserted in the general

list of transcendental conceptions. and yet must be reckoned with

them, but at the same time without in the least altering, or

indicating a deficiency in that table. This is the conception, or,

if the term is preferred, the judgement, "I think." But it is

readily perceived that this thought is as it were the vehicle of all

conceptions in general, and consequently of transcendental conceptions

also, and that it is therefore regarded as a transcendental

conception, although it can have no peculiar claim to be so ranked,

inasmuch as its only use is to indicate that all thought is

accompanied by consciousness. At the same time, pure as this

conception is from empirical content (impressions of the senses), it

enables us to distinguish two different kinds of objects. "I," as

thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am called soul. That

which is an object of the external senses is called body. Thus the

expression, "I," as a thinking being, designates the object-matter

of psychology, which may be called "the rational doctrine of the

soul," inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing of the

soul but what, independently of all experience (which determines me in

concreto), may be concluded from this conception "I," in so far as

it appears in all thought.

Now, the rational doctrine of the soul is really an undertaking of

this kind. For if the smallest empirical element of thought, if any

particular perception of my internal state, were to be introduced

among the grounds of cognition of this science, it would not be a

rational, but an empirical doctrine of the soul. We have thus before

us a pretended science, raised upon the single proposition, "I think,"

whose foundation or want of foundation we may very properly, and

agreeably with the nature of a transcendental philosophy, here

examine. It ought not to be objected that in this proposition, which

expresses the perception of one's self, an internal experience is

asserted, and that consequently the rational doctrine of the soul

which is founded upon it, is not pure, but partly founded upon an

empirical principle. For this internal perception is nothing more than

the mere apperception, "I think," which in fact renders all

transcendental conceptions possible, in which we say, "I think

substance, cause, etc." For internal experience in general and its

possibility, or perception in general, and its relation to other

perceptions, unless some particular distinction or determination

thereof is empirically given, cannot be regarded as empirical

cognition, but as cognition of the empirical, and belongs to the

investigation of the possibility of every experience, which is

certainly transcendental. The smallest object of experience (for

example, only pleasure or pain), that should be included in the

general representation of self-consciousness, would immediately change

the rational into an empirical psychology.

"I think" is therefore the only text of rational psychology, from

which it must develop its whole system. It is manifest that this

thought, when applied to an object (myself), can contain nothing but

transcendental predicates thereof; because the least empirical

predicate would destroy the purity of the science and its independence

of all experience.

But we shall have to follow here the guidance of the categories-

only, as in the present case a thing, "I," as thinking being, is at

first given, we shall- not indeed change the order of the categories

as it stands in the table- but begin at the category of substance,

by which at the a thing a thing is represented and proceeds

backwards through the series. The topic of the rational doctrine of

the soul, from which everything else it may contain must be deduced,

is accordingly as follows:

1 2

The Soul is SUBSTANCE As regards its quality

it is SIMPLE

3

As regards the different

times in which it exists,

it is numerically identical,

that is UNITY, not Plurality.

4

It is in relation to possible objects in space*

*The reader, who may not so easily perceive the psychological

sense of these expressions, taken here in their transcendental

abstraction, and cannot guess why the latter attribute of the soul

belongs to the category of existence, will find the expressions

sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel. I have,

moreover, to apologize for the Latin terms which have been

employed,instead of their German synonyms, contrary to the rules of

correct writing. But I judged it better to sacrifice elegance to

perspicuity.

From these elements originate all the conceptions of pure

psychology, by combination alone, without the aid of any other

principle. This substance, merely as an object of the internal

sense, gives the conception of Immateriality; as simple substance,

that of Incorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance,

gives the conception of Personality; all these three together,

Spirituality. Its relation to objects in space gives us the conception

of connection (commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking

substance as the principle of life in matter, that is, as a soul

(anima), and as the ground of Animality; and this, limited and

determined by the conception of spirituality, gives us that of

Immortality.

Now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of a transcendental

psychology, which is falsely held to be a science of pure reason.

touching the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, lay at the

foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself

perfectly contentless representation "I which cannot even be called

a conception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all

conceptions. By this "I," or "He," or "It," who or which thinks,

nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought =

x, which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its

predicates, and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least

conception. Hence in a perpetual circle, inasmuch as we must always

employ it, in order to frame any judgement respecting it. And this

inconvenience we find it impossible to rid ourselves of, because

consciousness in itself is not so much a representation distinguishing

a particular object, as a form of representation in general, in so far

as it may be termed cognition; for in and by cognition alone do I

think anything.

It must, however, appear extraordinary at first sight that the

condition under which I think, and which is consequently a property of

my subject, should be held to be likewise valid for every existence

which thinks, and that we can presume to base upon a seemingly

empirical proposition a judgement which is apodeictic and universal,

to wit, that everything which thinks is constituted as the voice of my

consciousness declares it to be, that is, as a self-conscious being.

The cause of this belief is to be found in the fact that we

necessarily attribute to things a priori all the properties which

constitute conditions under which alone we can cogitate them. Now I

cannot obtain the least representation of a thinking being by means of

external experience, but solely through self-consciousness. Such

objects are consequently nothing more than the transference of this

consciousness of mine to other things which can only thus be

represented as thinking beings. The proposition, "I think," is, in the

present case, understood in a problematical sense, not in so far as it

contains a perception of an existence (like the Cartesian "Cogito,

ergo sum"),* but in regard to its mere possibility- for the purpose of

discovering what properties may be inferred from so simple a

proposition and predicated of the subject of it.

*["I think, therefore I am."]

If at the foundation of our pure rational cognition of thinking

beings there lay more than the mere Cogito- if we could likewise

call in aid observations on the play of our thoughts, and the thence

derived natural laws of the thinking self, there would arise an

empirical psychology which would be a kind of physiology of the

internal sense and might possibly be capable of explaining the

phenomena of that sense. But it could never be available for