第 46 页

Now we can cogitate all the powers and faculties of the soul- even

that of consciousness- as diminished by one half, the substance

still remaining. In the same way we can represent to ourselves without

contradiction, this obliterated half as preserved, not in the soul,

but without it; and we can believe that, as in this case every.

thing that is real in the soul, and has a degree- consequently its

entire existence- has been halved, a particular substance would

arise out of the soul. For the multiplicity, which has been divided,

formerly existed, but not as a multiplicity of substances, but of

every reality as the quantum of existence in it; and the unity of

substance was merely a mode of existence, which by this division alone

has been transformed into a plurality of subsistence. In the same

manner several simple substances might coalesce into one, without

anything being lost except the plurality of subsistence, inasmuch as

the one substance would contain the degree of reality of all the

former substances. Perhaps, indeed, the simple substances, which

appear under the form of matter, might (not indeed by a mechanical

or chemical influence upon each other, but by an unknown influence, of

which the former would be but the phenomenal appearance), by means

of such a dynamical division of the parent-souls, as intensive

quantities, produce other souls, while the former repaired the loss

thus sustained with new matter of the same sort. I am far from

allowing any value to such chimeras; and the principles of our

analytic have clearly proved that no other than an empirical use of

the categories- that of substance, for example- is possible. But if

the rationalist is bold enough to construct, on the mere authority

of the faculty of thought- without any intuition, whereby an object is

given- a self-subsistent being, merely because the unity of

apperception in thought cannot allow him to believe it a composite

being, instead of declaring, as he ought to do, that he is unable to

explain the possibility of a thinking nature; what ought to hinder the

materialist, with as complete an independence of experience, to employ

the principle of the rationalist in a directly opposite manner-

still preserving the formal unity required by his opponent?

If, now, we take the above propositions- as they must be accepted as

valid for all thinking beings in the system of rational psychology- in

synthetical connection, and proceed, from the category of relation,

with the proposition: "All thinking beings are, as such,

substances," backwards through the series, till the circle is

completed; we come at last to their existence, of which, in this

system of rational psychology, substances are held to be conscious,

independently of external things; nay, it is asserted that, in

relation to the permanence which is a necessary characteristic of

substance, they can of themselves determine external things. It

follows that idealism- at least problematical idealism, is perfectly

unavoidable in this rationalistic system. And, if the existence of

outward things is not held to be requisite to the determination of the

existence of a substance in time, the existence of these outward

things at all, is a gratuitous assumption which remains without the

possibility of a proof.

But if we proceed analytically- the "I think" as a proposition

containing in itself an existence as given, consequently modality

being the principle- and dissect this proposition, in order to

ascertain its content, and discover whether and how this Ego

determines its existence in time and space without the aid of anything

external; the propositions of rationalistic psychology would not begin

with the conception of a thinking being, but with a reality, and the

properties of a thinking being in general would be deduced from the

mode in which this reality is cogitated, after everything empirical

had been abstracted; as is shown in the following table:

1

I think,

2 3

as Subject, as simple Subject,

4

as identical Subject,

in every state of my thought.

Now, inasmuch as it is not determined in this second proposition,

whether I can exist and be cogitated only as subject, and not also

as a predicate of another being, the conception of a subject is here

taken in a merely logical sense; and it remains undetermined,

whether substance is to be cogitated under the conception or not.

But in the third proposition, the absolute unity of apperception-

the simple Ego in the representation to which all connection and

separation, which constitute thought, relate, is of itself

important; even although it presents us with no information about

the constitution or subsistence of the subject. Apperception is

something real, and the simplicity of its nature is given in the

very fact of its possibility. Now in space there is nothing real

that is at the same time simple; for points, which are the only simple

things in space, are merely limits, but not constituent parts of

space. From this follows the impossibility of a definition on the

basis of materialism of the constitution of my Ego as a merely

thinking subject. But, because my existence is considered in the first

proposition as given, for it does not mean, "Every thinking being

exists" (for this would be predicating of them absolute necessity),

but only, "I exist thinking"; the proposition is quite empirical,

and contains the determinability of my existence merely in relation to

my representations in time. But as I require for this purpose

something that is permanent, such as is not given in internal

intuition; the mode of my existence, whether as substance or as

accident, cannot be determined by means of this simple

self-consciousness. Thus, if materialism is inadequate to explain

the mode in which I exist, spiritualism is likewise as insufficient;

and the conclusion is that we are utterly unable to attain to any

knowledge of the constitution of the soul, in so far as relates to the

possibility of its existence apart from external objects.

And, indeed, how should it be possible, merely by the aid of the

unity of consciousness- which we cognize only for the reason that it

is indispensable to the possibility of experience- to pass the

bounds of experience (our existence in this life); and to extend our

cognition to the nature of all thinking beings by means of the

empirical- but in relation to every sort of intuition, perfectly

undetermined- proposition, "I think"?

There does not then exist any rational psychology as a doctrine

furnishing any addition to our knowledge of ourselves. It is nothing

more than a discipline, which sets impassable limits to speculative

reason in this region of thought, to prevent it, on the one hand, from

throwing itself into the arms of a soulless materialism, and, on the

other, from losing itself in the mazes of a baseless spiritualism.

It teaches us to consider this refusal of our reason to give any

satisfactory answer to questions which reach beyond the limits of this

our human life, as a hint to abandon fruitless speculation; and to

direct, to a practical use, our knowledge of ourselves- which,

although applicable only to objects of experience, receives its

principles from a higher source, and regulates its procedure as if our

destiny reached far beyond the boundaries of experience and life.

From all this it is evident that rational psychology has its

origin in a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which

lies at the basis of the categories, is considered to be an

intuition of the subject as an object; and the category of substance

is applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than the

unity in thought, by which no object is given; to which therefore

the category of substance- which always presupposes a given intuition-

cannot be applied. Consequently, the subject cannot be cognized. The

subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very reason

that it cogitates these, frame any conception of itself as an object

of the categories; for, to cogitate these, it must lay at the

foundation its own pure self-consciousness- the very thing that it

wishes to explain and describe. In like manner, the subject, in

which the representation of time has its basis, cannot determine,

for this very reason, its own existence in time. Now, if the latter is

impossible, the former, as an attempt to determine itself by means

of the categories as a thinking being in general, is no less so.*

*The "I think" is, as has been already stated, an empirical

proposition, and contains the proposition, "I exist." But I cannot

say, "Everything, which thinks, exists"; for in this case the property

of thought would constitute all beings possessing it, necessary

being Hence my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the

proposition, "I think," as Descartes maintained- because in this

case the major premiss, "Everything, which thinks, exists," must

precede- but the two propositions are identical. The proposition, "I

think," expresses an undetermined empirical intuition, that perception

(proving consequently that sensation, which must belong to

sensibility, lies at the foundation of this proposition); but it

precedes experience, whose province it is to determine an object of

perception by means of the categories in relation to time; and

existence in this proposition is not a category, as it does not

apply to an undetermined given object, but only to one of which we

have a conception, and about which we wish to know whether it does

or does not exist, out of, and apart from this conception. An

undetermined perception signifies here merely something real that

has been given, only, however, to thought in general- but not as a

phenomenon, nor as a thing in itself (noumenon), but only as something

that really exists, and is designated as such in the proposition, "I

think." For it must be remarked that, when I call the proposition,

"I think," an empirical proposition, I do not thereby mean that the

Ego in the proposition is an empirical representation; on the

contrary, it is purely intellectual, because it belongs to thought

in general. But without some empirical representation, which

presents to the mind material for thought, the mental act, "I

think," would not take place; and the empirical is only the

condition of the application or employment of the pure intellectual

faculty.

Thus, then, appears the vanity of the hope of establishing a

cognition which is to extend its rule beyond the limits of experience-

a cognition which is one of the highest interests of humanity; and

thus is proved the futility of the attempt of speculative philosophy

in this region of thought. But, in this interest of thought, the

severity of criticism has rendered to reason a not unimportant

service, by the demonstration of the impossibility of making any

dogmatical affirmation concerning an object of experience beyond the

boundaries of experience. She has thus fortified reason against all

affirmations of the contrary. Now, this can be accomplished in only

two ways. Either our proposition must be proved apodeictically; or, if

this is unsuccessful, the sources of this inability must be sought

for, and, if these are discovered to exist in the natural and

necessary limitation of our reason, our opponents must submit to the

same law of renunciation and refrain from advancing claims to dogmatic

assertion.

But the right, say rather the necessity to admit a future life, upon

principles of the practical conjoined with the speculative use of

reason, has lost nothing by this renunciation; for the merely

speculative proof has never had any influence upon the common reason

of men. It stands upon the point of a hair, so that even the schools

have been able to preserve it from falling only by incessantly

discussing it and spinning it like a top; and even in their eyes it

has never been able to present any safe foundation for the erection of

a theory. The proofs which have been current among men, preserve their

value undiminished; nay, rather gain in clearness and

unsophisticated power, by the rejection of the dogmatical

assumptions of speculative reason. For reason is thus confined

within her own peculiar province- the arrangement of ends or aims,

which is at the same time the arrangement of nature; and, as a

practical faculty, without limiting itself to the latter, it is

justified in extending the former, and with it our own existence,

beyond the boundaries of experience and life. If we turn our attention

to the analogy of the nature of living beings in this world, in the

consideration of which reason is obliged to accept as a principle that

no organ, no faculty, no appetite is useless, and that nothing is

superfluous, nothing disproportionate to its use, nothing unsuited

to its end; but that, on the contrary, everything is perfectly

conformed to its destination in life- we shall find that man, who

alone is the final end and aim of this order, is still the only animal

that seems to be excepted from it. For his natural gifts- not merely

as regards the talents and motives that may incite him to employ them,

but especially the moral law in him- stretch so far beyond all mere

earthly utility and advantage, that he feels himself bound to prize

the mere consciousness of probity, apart from all advantageous

consequences- even the shadowy gift of posthumous fame- above

everything; and he is conscious of an inward call to constitute

himself, by his conduct in this world- without regard to mere

sublunary interests- the citizen of a better. This mighty,

irresistible proof- accompanied by an ever-increasing knowledge of the

conformability to a purpose in everything we see around us, by the

conviction of the boundless immensity of creation, by the

consciousness of a certain illimitableness in the possible extension