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of our knowledge, and by a desire commensurate therewith- remains to

humanity, even after the theoretical cognition of ourselves bas failed

to establish the necessity of an existence after death.

Conclusion of the Solution of the

Psychological Paralogism.

The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from our

confounding an idea of reason (of a pure intelligence) with the

conception- in every respect undetermined- of a thinking being in

general. I cogitate myself in behalf of a possible experience, at

the same time making abstraction of all actual experience; and infer

therefrom that I can be conscious of myself apart from experience

and its empirical conditions. I consequently confound the possible

abstraction of my empirically determined existence with the supposed

consciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self;

and I believe that I cognize what is substantial in myself as a

transcendental subject, when I have nothing more in thought than the

unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of all determination

of cognition.

The task of explaining the community of the soul with the body

does not properly belong to the psychology of which we are here

speaking; because it proposes to prove the personality of the soul

apart from this communion (after death), and is therefore transcendent

in the proper sense of the word, although occupying itself with an

object of experience- only in so far, however, as it ceases to be an

object of experience. But a sufficient answer may be found to the

question in our system. The difficulty which lies in the execution

of this task consists, as is well known, in the presupposed

heterogeneity of the object of the internal sense (the soul) and the

objects of the external senses; inasmuch as the formal condition of

the intuition of the one is time, and of that of the other space also.

But if we consider that both kinds of objects do not differ

internally, but only in so far as the one appears externally to the

other- consequently, that what lies at the basis of phenomena, as a

thing in itself, may not be heterogeneous; this difficulty disappears.

There then remains no other difficulty than is to be found in the

question- how a community of substances is possible; a question

which lies out of the region of psychology, and which the reader,

after what in our analytic has been said of primitive forces and

faculties, will easily judge to be also beyond the region of human

cognition.

GENERAL REMARK

On the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology.

The proposition, "I think," or, "I exist thinking," is an

empirical proposition. But such a proposition must be based on

empirical intuition, and the object cogitated as a phenomenon; and

thus our theory appears to maintain that the soul, even in thought, is

merely a phenomenon; and in this way our consciousness itself, in

fact, abuts upon nothing.

Thought, per se, is merely the purely spontaneous logical function

which operates to connect the manifold of a possible intuition; and it

does not represent the subject of consciousness as a phenomenon- for

this reason alone, that it pays no attention to the question whether

the mode of intuiting it is sensuous or intellectual. I therefore do

not represent myself in thought either as I am, or as I appear to

myself; I merely cogitate myself as an object in general, of the

mode of intuiting which I make abstraction. When I represent myself as

the subject of thought, or as the ground of thought, these modes of

representation are not related to the categories of substance or of

cause; for these are functions of thought applicable only to our

sensuous intuition. The application of these categories to the Ego

would, however, be necessary, if I wished to make myself an object

of knowledge. But I wish to be conscious of myself only as thinking;

in what mode my Self is given in intuition, I do not consider, and

it may be that I, who think, am a phenomenon- although not in so far

as I am a thinking being; but in the consciousness of myself in mere

thought I am a being, though this consciousness does not present to me

any property of this being as material for thought.

But the proposition, "I think," in so far as it declares, "I exist

thinking," is not the mere representation of a logical function. It

determines the subject (which is in this case an object also) in

relation to existence; and it cannot be given without the aid of the

internal sense, whose intuition presents to us an object, not as a

thing in itself, but always as a phenomenon. In this proposition there

is therefore something more to be found than the mere spontaneity of

thought; there is also the receptivity of intuition, that is, my

thought of myself applied to the empirical intuition of myself. Now,

in this intuition the thinking self must seek the conditions of the

employment of its logical functions as categories of substance, cause,

and so forth; not merely for the purpose of distinguishing itself as

an object in itself by means of the representation "I," but also for

the purpose of determining the mode of its existence, that is, of

cognizing itself as noumenon. But this is impossible, for the internal

empirical intuition is sensuous, and presents us with nothing but

phenomenal data, which do not assist the object of pure

consciousness in its attempt to cognize itself as a separate

existence, but are useful only as contributions to experience.

But, let it be granted that we could discover, not in experience,

but in certain firmly-established a priori laws of the use of pure

reason- laws relating to our existence, authority to consider

ourselves as legislating a priori in relation to our own existence and

as determining this existence; we should, on this supposition, find

ourselves possessed of a spontaneity, by which our actual existence

would be determinable, without the aid of the conditions of

empirical intuition. We should also become aware that in the

consciousness of our existence there was an a priori content, which

would serve to determine our own existence- an existence only

sensuously determinable- relatively, however, to a certain internal

faculty in relation to an intelligible world.

But this would not give the least help to the attempts of rational

psychology. For this wonderful faculty, which the consciousness of the

moral law in me reveals, would present me with a principle of the

determination of my own existence which is purely intellectual- but by

what predicates? By none other than those which are given in

sensuous intuition. Thus I should find myself in the same position

in rational psychology which I formerly occupied, that is to say, I

should find myself still in need of sensuous intuitions, in order to

give significance to my conceptions of substance and cause, by means

of which alone I can possess a knowledge of myself: but these

intuitions can never raise me above the sphere of experience. I should

be justified, however, in applying these conceptions, in regard to

their practical use, which is always directed to objects of

experience- in conformity with their analogical significance when

employed theoretically- to freedom and its subject. At the same

time, I should understand by them merely the logical functions of

subject and predicate, of principle and consequence, in conformity

with which all actions are so determined, that they are capable of

being explained along with the laws of nature, conformably to the

categories of substance and cause, although they originate from a very

different principle. We have made these observations for the purpose

of guarding against misunderstanding, to which the doctrine of our

intuition of self as a phenomenon is exposed. We shall have occasion

to perceive their utility in the sequel.

CHAPTER II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason.

We showed in the introduction to this part of our work, that all

transcendental illusion of pure reason arose from dialectical

arguments, the schema of which logic gives us in its three formal

species of syllogisms- just as the categories find their logical

schema in the four functions of all judgements. The first kind of

these sophistical arguments related to the unconditioned unity of

the subjective conditions of all representations in general (of the

subject or soul), in correspondence with the categorical syllogisms,

the major of which, as the principle, enounces the relation of a

predicate to a subject. The second kind of dialectical argument will

therefore be concerned, following the analogy with hypothetical

syllogisms, with the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions

in the phenomenon; and, in this way, the theme of the third kind to be

treated of in the following chapter will be the unconditioned unity of

the objective conditions of the possibility of objects in general.

But it is worthy of remark that the transcendental paralogism

produced in the mind only a one-third illusion, in regard to the

idea of the subject of our thought; and the conceptions of reason gave

no ground to maintain the contrary proposition. The advantage is

completely on the side of Pneumatism; although this theory itself

passes into naught, in the crucible of pure reason.

Very different is the case when we apply reason to the objective

synthesis of phenomena. Here, certainly, reason establishes, with much

plausibility, its principle of unconditioned unity; but it very soon

falls into such contradictions that it is compelled, in relation to

cosmology, to renounce its pretensions.

For here a new phenomenon of human reason meets us- a perfectly

natural antithetic, which does not require to be sought for by

subtle sophistry, but into which reason of itself unavoidably falls.

It is thereby preserved, to be sure, from the slumber of a fancied

conviction- which a merely one-sided illusion produces; but it is at

the same time compelled, either, on the one hand, to abandon itself to

a despairing scepticism, or, on the other, to assume a dogmatical

confidence and obstinate persistence in certain assertions, without

granting a fair hearing to the other side of the question. Either is

the death of a sound philosophy, although the former might perhaps

deserve the title of the euthanasia of pure reason.

Before entering this region of discord and confusion, which the

conflict of the laws of pure reason (antinomy) produces, we shall

present the reader with some considerations, in explanation and

justification of the method we intend to follow in our treatment of

this subject. I term all transcendental ideas, in so far as they

relate to the absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena,

cosmical conceptions; partly on account of this unconditioned

totality, on which the conception of the world-whole is based- a

conception, which is itself an idea- partly because they relate solely

to the synthesis of phenomena- the empirical synthesis; while, on

the other hand, the absolute totality in the synthesis of the

conditions of all possible things gives rise to an ideal of pure

reason, which is quite distinct from the cosmical conception, although

it stands in relation with it. Hence, as the paralogisms of pure

reason laid the foundation for a dialectical psychology, the

antinomy of pure reason will present us with the transcendental

principles of a pretended pure (rational) cosmology- not, however,

to declare it valid and to appropriate it, but- as the very term of

a conflict of reason sufficiently indicates, to present it as an

idea which cannot be reconciled with phenomena and experience.

SECTION I. System of Cosmological Ideas.

That We may be able to enumerate with systematic precision these

ideas according to a principle, we must remark, in the first place,

that it is from the understanding alone that pure and transcendental

conceptions take their origin; that the reason does not properly

give birth to any conception, but only frees the conception of the

understanding from the unavoidable limitation of a possible

experience, and thus endeavours to raise it above the empirical,

though it must still be in connection with it. This happens from the

fact that, for a given conditioned, reason demands absolute totality

on the side of the conditions (to which the understanding submits

all phenomena), and thus makes of the category a transcendental

idea. This it does that it may be able to give absolute completeness

to the empirical synthesis, by continuing it to the unconditioned

(which is not to be found in experience, but only in the idea). Reason

requires this according to the principle: If the conditioned is

given the whole of the conditions, and consequently the absolutely

unconditioned, is also given, whereby alone the former was possible.

First, then, the transcendental ideas are properly nothing but

categories elevated to the unconditioned; and they may be arranged

in a table according to the titles of the latter. But, secondly, all

the categories are not available for this purpose, but only those in

which the synthesis constitutes a series- of conditions subordinated

to, not co-ordinated with, each other. Absolute totality is required

of reason only in so far as concerns the ascending series of the

conditions of a conditioned; not, consequently, when the question

relates to the descending series of consequences, or to the

aggregate of the co-ordinated conditions of these consequences. For,

in relation to a given conditioned, conditions are presupposed and

considered to be given along with it. On the other hand, as the

consequences do not render possible their conditions, but rather

presuppose them- in the consideration of the procession of

consequences (or in the descent from the given condition to the

conditioned), we may be quite unconcerned whether the series ceases or

not; and their totality is not a necessary demand of reason.

Thus we cogitate- and necessarily- a given time completely elapsed