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themselves, the proof of the Monadists would be unexceptionable.

The second dialectical assertion possesses the peculiarity of having

opposed to it a dogmatical proposition, which, among all such

sophistical statements, is the only one that undertakes to prove in

the case of an object of experience, that which is properly a

transcendental idea- the absolute simplicity of substance. The

proposition is that the object of the internal sense, the thinking

Ego, is an absolute simple substance. Without at present entering upon

this subject- as it has been considered at length in a former chapter-

I shall merely remark that, if something is cogitated merely as an

object, without the addition of any synthetical determination of its

intuition- as happens in the case of the bare representation, I- it is

certain that no manifold and no composition can be perceived in such a

representation. As, moreover, the predicates whereby I cogitate this

object are merely intuitions of the internal sense, there cannot be

discovered in them anything to prove the existence of a manifold whose

parts are external to each other, and, consequently, nothing to

prove the existence of real composition. Consciousness, therefore,

is so constituted that, inasmuch as the thinking subject is at the

same time its own object, it cannot divide itself- although it can

divide its inhering determinations. For every object in relation to

itself is absolute unity. Nevertheless, if the subject is regarded

externally, as an object of intuition, it must, in its character of

phenomenon, possess the property of composition. And it must always be

regarded in this manner, if we wish to know whether there is or is not

contained in it a manifold whose parts are external to each other.

THIRD CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.

THESIS.

Causality according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality

operating to originate the phenomena of the world. A causality of

freedom is also necessary to account fully for these phenomena.

PROOF.

Let it be supposed, that there is no other kind of causality than

that according to the laws of nature. Consequently, everything that

happens presupposes a previous condition, which it follows with

absolute certainty, in conformity with a rule. But this previous

condition must itself be something that has happened (that has

arisen in time, as it did not exist before), for, if it has always

been in existence, its consequence or effect would not thus

originate for the first time, but would likewise have always

existed. The causality, therefore, of a cause, whereby something

happens, is itself a thing that has happened. Now this again

presupposes, in conformity with the law of nature, a previous

condition and its causality, and this another anterior to the

former, and so on. If, then, everything happens solely in accordance

with the laws of nature, there cannot be any real first beginning of

things, but only a subaltern or comparative beginning. There cannot,

therefore, be a completeness of series on the side of the causes which

originate the one from the other. But the law of nature is that

nothing can happen without a sufficient a priori determined cause. The

proposition therefore- if all causality is possible only in accordance

with the laws of nature- is, when stated in this unlimited and general

manner, self-contradictory. It follows that this cannot be the only

kind of causality.

From what has been said, it follows that a causality must be

admitted, by means of which something happens, without its cause being

determined according to necessary laws by some other cause

preceding. That is to say, there must exist an absolute spontaneity of

cause, which of itself originates a series of phenomena which proceeds

according to natural laws- consequently transcendental freedom,

without which even in the course of nature the succession of phenomena

on the side of causes is never complete.

ANTITHESIS.

There is no such thing as freedom, but everything in the world

happens solely according to the laws of nature.

PROOF.

Granted, that there does exist freedom in the transcendental

sense, as a peculiar kind of causality, operating to produce events in

the world- a faculty, that is to say, of originating a state, and

consequently a series of consequences from that state. In this case,

not only the series originated by this spontaneity, but the

determination of this spontaneity itself to the production of the

series, that is to say, the causality itself must have an absolute

commencement, such that nothing can precede to determine this action

according to unvarying laws. But every beginning of action presupposes

in the acting cause a state of inaction; and a dynamically primal

beginning of action presupposes a state, which has no connection- as

regards causality- with the preceding state of the cause- which does

not, that is, in any wise result from it. Transcendental freedom is

therefore opposed to the natural law of cause and effect, and such a

conjunction of successive states in effective causes is destructive of

the possibility of unity in experience and for that reason not to be

found in experience- is consequently a mere fiction of thought.

We have, therefore, nothing but nature to which we must look for

connection and order in cosmical events. Freedom- independence of

the laws of nature- is certainly a deliverance from restraint, but

it is also a relinquishing of the guidance of law and rule. For it

cannot be alleged that, instead of the laws of nature, laws of freedom

may be introduced into the causality of the course of nature. For,

if freedom were determined according to laws, it would be no longer

freedom, but merely nature. Nature, therefore, and transcendental

freedom are distinguishable as conformity to law and lawlessness.

The former imposes upon understanding the difficulty of seeking the

origin of events ever higher and higher in the series of causes,

inasmuch as causality is always conditioned thereby; while it

compensates this labour by the guarantee of a unity complete and in

conformity with law. The latter, on the contrary, holds out to the

understanding the promise of a point of rest in the chain of causes,

by conducting it to an unconditioned causality, which professes to

have the power of spontaneous origination, but which, in its own utter

blindness, deprives it of the guidance of rules, by which alone a

completely connected experience is possible.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE THIRD ANTINOMY.

ON THE THESIS.

The transcendental idea of freedom is far from constituting the

entire content of the psychological conception so termed, which is for

the most part empirical. It merely presents us with the conception

of spontaneity of action, as the proper ground for imputing freedom to

the cause of a certain class of objects. It is, however, the true

stumbling-stone to philosophy, which meets with unconquerable

difficulties in the way of its admitting this kind of unconditioned

causality. That element in the question of the freedom of the will,

which bas for so long a time placed speculative reason in such

perplexity, is properly only transcendental, and concerns the

question, whether there must be held to exist a faculty of spontaneous

origination of a series of successive things or states. How such a

faculty is possible is not a necessary inquiry; for in the case of

natural causality itself, we are obliged to content ourselves with the

a priori knowledge that such a causality must be presupposed, although

we are quite incapable of comprehending how the being of one thing

is possible through the being of another, but must for this

information look entirely to experience. Now we have demonstrated this

necessity of a free first beginning of a series of phenomena, only

in so far as it is required for the comprehension of an origin of

the world, all following states being regarded as a succession

according to laws of nature alone. But, as there has thus been

proved the existence of a faculty which can of itself originate a

series in time- although we are unable to explain how it can exist- we

feel ourselves authorized to admit, even in the midst of the natural

course of events, a beginning, as regards causality, of different

successions of phenomena, and at the same time to attribute to all

substances a faculty of free action. But we ought in this case not

to allow ourselves to fall into a common misunderstanding, and to

suppose that, because a successive series in the world can only have a

comparatively first beginning- another state or condition of things

always preceding- an absolutely first beginning of a series in the

course of nature is impossible. For we are not speaking here of an

absolutely first beginning in relation to time, but as regards

causality alone. When, for example, I, completely of my own free will,

and independently of the necessarily determinative influence of

natural causes, rise from my chair, there commences with this event,

including its material consequences in infinitum, an absolutely new

series; although, in relation to time, this event is merely the

continuation of a preceding series. For this resolution and act of

mine do not form part of the succession of effects in nature, and

are not mere continuations of it; on the contrary, the determining

causes of nature cease to operate in reference to this event, which

certainly succeeds the acts of nature, but does not proceed from them.

For these reasons, the action of a free agent must be termed, in

regard to causality, if not in relation to time, an absolutely

primal beginning of a series of phenomena.

The justification of this need of reason to rest upon a free act

as the first beginning of the series of natural causes is evident from

the fact, that all philosophers of antiquity (with the exception of

the Epicurean school) felt themselves obliged, when constructing a

theory of the motions of the universe, to accept a prime mover, that

is, a freely acting cause, which spontaneously and prior to all

other causes evolved this series of states. They always felt the

need of going beyond mere nature, for the purpose of making a first

beginning comprehensible.

ON THE ANTITHESIS.

The assertor of the all-sufficiency of nature in regard to causality

(transcendental Physiocracy), in opposition to the doctrine of

freedom, would defend his view of the question somewhat in the

following manner. He would say, in answer to the sophistical arguments

of the opposite party: If you do not accept a mathematical first, in

relation to time, you have no need to seek a dynamical first, in

regard to causality. Who compelled you to imagine an absolutely primal

condition of the world, and therewith an absolute beginning of the

gradually progressing successions of phenomena- and, as some

foundation for this fancy of yours, to set bounds to unlimited nature?

Inasmuch as the substances in the world have always existed- at

least the unity of experience renders such a supposition quite

necessary- there is no difficulty in believing also, that the

changes in the conditions of these substances have always existed;

and, consequently, that a first beginning, mathematical or

dynamical, is by no means required. The possibility of such an

infinite derivation, without any initial member from which all the

others result, is certainly quite incomprehensible. But, if you are

rash enough to deny the enigmatical secrets of nature for this reason,

you will find yourselves obliged to deny also the existence of many

fundamental properties of natural objects (such as fundamental

forces), which you can just as little comprehend; and even the

possibility of so simple a conception as that of change must present

to you insuperable difficulties. For if experience did not teach you

that it was real, you never could conceive a priori the possibility of

this ceaseless sequence of being and non-being.

But if the existence of a transcendental faculty of freedom is

granted- a faculty of originating changes in the world- this faculty

must at least exist out of and apart from the world; although it is

certainly a bold assumption, that, over and above the complete content

of all possible intuitions, there still exists an object which

cannot be presented in any possible perception. But, to attribute to

substances in the world itself such a faculty, is quite

inadmissible; for, in this case; the connection of phenomena

reciprocally determining and determined according to general laws,

which is termed nature, and along with it the criteria of empirical

truth, which enable us to distinguish experience from mere visionary

dreaming, would almost entirely disappear. In proximity with such a

lawless faculty of freedom, a system of nature is hardly cogitable;

for the laws of the latter would be continually subject to the

intrusive influences of the former, and the course of phenomena, which

would otherwise proceed regularly and uniformly, would become

thereby confused and disconnected.

FOURTH CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.

THESIS.

There exists either in, or in connection with the world- either as a

part of it, or as the cause of it-an absolutely necessary being.

PROOF.

The world of sense, as the sum total of all phenomena, contains a

series of changes. For, without such a series, the mental

representation of the series of time itself, as the condition of the

possibility of the sensuous world, could not be presented to us.*

But every change stands under its condition, which precedes it in time

and renders it necessary. Now the existence of a given condition

presupposes a complete series of conditions up to the absolutely

unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. It follows that

something that is absolutely necessary must exist, if change exists as