饭饭TXT > 海外名作 > 《纯粹理性批判THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON》作者:Immanuel Kant伊曼纽尔 > 纯粹理性批判THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.txt

第 52 页

作者:Immanuel Kant伊曼纽尔 当前章节:15366 字 更新时间:2026-6-22 23:19

its consequence. But this necessary thing itself belongs to the

sensuous world. For suppose it to exist out of and apart from it,

the series of cosmical changes would receive from it a beginning,

and yet this necessary cause would not itself belong to the world of

sense. But this is impossible. For, as the beginning of a series in

time is determined only by that which precedes it in time, the supreme

condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the

time in which this series itself did not exist; for a beginning

supposes a time preceding, in which the thing that begins to be was

not in existence. The causality of the necessary cause of changes, and

consequently the cause itself, must for these reasons belong to

time- and to phenomena, time being possible only as the form of

phenomena. Consequently, it cannot be cogitated as separated from

the world of sense- the sum total of all phenomena. There is,

therefore, contained in the world, something that is absolutely

necessary- whether it be the whole cosmical series itself, or only a

part of it.

*Objectively, time, as the formal condition of the possibility of

change, precedes all changes; but subjectively, and in

consciousness, the representation of time, like every other, is

given solely by occasion of perception.

ANTITHESIS.

An absolutely necessary being does not exist, either in the world,

or out of it- as its cause.

PROOF.

Grant that either the world itself is necessary, or that there is

contained in it a necessary existence. Two cases are possible.

First, there must either be in the series of cosmical changes a

beginning, which is unconditionally necessary, and therefore uncaused-

which is at variance with the dynamical law of the determination of

all phenomena in time; or, secondly, the series itself is without

beginning, and, although contingent and conditioned in all its

parts, is nevertheless absolutely necessary and unconditioned as a

whole- which is self-contradictory. For the existence of an

aggregate cannot be necessary, if no single part of it possesses

necessary existence.

Grant, on the other band, that an absolutely necessary cause

exists out of and apart from the world. This cause, as the highest

member in the series of the causes of cosmical changes, must originate

or begin* the existence of the latter and their series. In this case

it must also begin to act, and its causality would therefore belong to

time, and consequently to the sum total of phenomena, that is, to

the world. It follows that the cause cannot be out of the world; which

is contradictory to the hypothesis. Therefore, neither in the world,

nor out of it (but in causal connection with it), does there exist any

absolutely necessary being.

*The word begin is taken in two senses. The first is active- the

cause being regarded as beginning a series of conditions as its effect

(infit). The second is passive- the causality in the cause itself

beginning to operate (fit). I reason here from the first to the

second.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOURTH ANTINOMY.

ON THE THESIS.

To demonstrate the existence of a necessary being, I cannot be

permitted in this place to employ any other than the cosmological

argument, which ascends from the conditioned in phenomena to the

unconditioned in conception- the unconditioned being considered the

necessary condition of the absolute totality of the series. The proof,

from the mere idea of a supreme being, belongs to another principle of

reason and requires separate discussion.

The pure cosmological proof demonstrates the existence of a

necessary being, but at the same time leaves it quite unsettled,

whether this being is the world itself, or quite distinct from it.

To establish the truth of the latter view, principles are requisite,

which are not cosmological and do not proceed in the series of

phenomena. We should require to introduce into our proof conceptions

of contingent beings- regarded merely as objects of the understanding,

and also a principle which enables us to connect these, by means of

mere conceptions, with a necessary being. But the proper place for all

such arguments is a transcendent philosophy, which has unhappily not

yet been established.

But, if we begin our proof cosmologically, by laying at the

foundation of it the series of phenomena, and the regress in it

according to empirical laws of causality, we are not at liberty to

break off from this mode of demonstration and to pass over to

something which is not itself a member of the series. The condition

must be taken in exactly the same signification as the relation of the

conditioned to its condition in the series has been taken, for the

series must conduct us in an unbroken regress to this supreme

condition. But if this relation is sensuous, and belongs to the

possible empirical employment of understanding, the supreme

condition or cause must close the regressive series according to the

laws of sensibility and consequently, must belong to the series of

time. It follows that this necessary existence must be regarded as the

highest member of the cosmical series.

Certain philosophers have, nevertheless, allowed themselves the

liberty of making such a saltus (metabasis eis allo gonos). From the

changes in the world they have concluded their empirical

contingency, that is, their dependence on empirically-determined

causes, and they thus admitted an ascending series of empirical

conditions: and in this they are quite right. But as they could not

find in this series any primal beginning or any highest member, they

passed suddenly from the empirical conception of contingency to the

pure category, which presents us with a series- not sensuous, but

intellectual- whose completeness does certainly rest upon the

existence of an absolutely necessary cause. Nay, more, this

intellectual series is not tied to any sensuous conditions; and is

therefore free from the condition of time, which requires it

spontaneously to begin its causality in time. But such a procedure

is perfectly inadmissible, as will be made plain from what follows.

In the pure sense of the categories, that is contingent the

contradictory opposite of which is possible. Now we cannot reason from

empirical contingency to intellectual. The opposite of that which is

changed- the opposite of its state- is actual at another time, and

is therefore possible. Consequently, it is not the contradictory

opposite of the former state. To be that, it is necessary that, in the

same time in which the preceding state existed, its opposite could

have existed in its place; but such a cognition is not given us in the

mere phenomenon of change. A body that was in motion = A, comes into a

state of rest = non-A. Now it cannot be concluded from the fact that a

state opposite to the state A follows it, that the contradictory

opposite of A is possible; and that A is therefore contingent. To

prove this, we should require to know that the state of rest could

have existed in the very same time in which the motion took place. Now

we know nothing more than that the state of rest was actual in the

time that followed the state of motion; consequently, that it was also

possible. But motion at one time, and rest at another time, are not

contradictorily opposed to each other. It follows from what has been

said that the succession of opposite determinations, that is,

change, does not demonstrate the fact of contingency as represented in

the conceptions of the pure understanding; and that it cannot,

therefore, conduct us to the fact of the existence of a necessary

being. Change proves merely empirical contingency, that is to say,

that the new state could not have existed without a cause, which

belongs to the preceding time. This cause- even although it is

regarded as absolutely necessary- must be presented to us in time, and

must belong to the series of phenomena.

ON THE ANTITHESIS.

The difficulties which meet us, in our attempt to rise through the

series of phenomena to the existence of an absolutely necessary

supreme cause, must not originate from our inability to establish

the truth of our mere conceptions of the necessary existence of a

thing. That is to say, our objections not be ontological, but must

be directed against the causal connection with a series of phenomena

of a condition which is itself unconditioned. In one word, they must

be cosmological and relate to empirical laws. We must show that the

regress in the series of causes (in the world of sense) cannot

conclude with an empirically unconditioned condition, and that the

cosmological argument from the contingency of the cosmical state- a

contingency alleged to arise from change- does not justify us in

accepting a first cause, that is, a prime originator of the cosmical

series.

The reader will observe in this antinomy a very remarkable contrast.

The very same grounds of proof which established in the thesis the

existence of a supreme being, demonstrated in the antithesis- and with

equal strictness- the non-existence of such a being. We found,

first, that a necessary being exists, because the whole time past

contains the series of all conditions, and with it, therefore, the

unconditioned (the necessary); secondly, that there does not exist any

necessary being, for the same reason, that the whole time past

contains the series of all conditions- which are themselves,

therefore, in the aggregate, conditioned. The cause of this seeming

incongruity is as follows. We attend, in the first argument, solely to

the absolute totality of the series of conditions, the one of which

determines the other in time, and thus arrive at a necessary

unconditioned. In the second, we consider, on the contrary, the

contingency of everything that is determined in the series of time-

for every event is preceded by a time, in which the condition itself

must be determined as conditioned- and thus everything that is

unconditioned or absolutely necessary disappears. In both, the mode of

proof is quite in accordance with the common procedure of human

reason, which often falls into discord with itself, from considering

an object from two different points of view. Herr von Mairan

regarded the controversy between two celebrated astronomers, which

arose from a similar difficulty as to the choice of a proper

standpoint, as a phenomenon of sufficient importance to warrant a

separate treatise on the subject. The one concluded: the moon revolves

on its own axis, because it constantly presents the same side to the

earth; the other declared that the moon does not revolve on its own

axis, for the same reason. Both conclusions were perfectly correct,

according to the point of view from which the motions of the moon were

considered.

SECTION III. Of the Interest of Reason in these

Self-contradictions.

We have thus completely before us the dialectical procedure of the

cosmological ideas. No possible experience can present us with an

object adequate to them in extent. Nay, more, reason itself cannot

cogitate them as according with the general laws of experience. And

yet they are not arbitrary fictions of thought. On the contrary,

reason, in its uninterrupted progress in the empirical synthesis, is

necessarily conducted to them, when it endeavours to free from all

conditions and to comprehend in its unconditioned totality that

which can only be determined conditionally in accordance with the laws

of experience. These dialectical propositions are so many attempts

to solve four natural and unavoidable problems of reason. There are

neither more, nor can there be less, than this number, because there

are no other series of synthetical hypotheses, limiting a priori the

empirical synthesis.

The brilliant claims of reason striving to extend its dominion

beyond the limits of experience, have been represented above only in

dry formulae, which contain merely the grounds of its pretensions.

They have, besides, in conformity with the character of a

transcendental philosophy, been freed from every empirical element;

although the full splendour of the promises they hold out, and the

anticipations they excite, manifests itself only when in connection

with empirical cognitions. In the application of them, however, and in

the advancing enlargement of the employment of reason, while

struggling to rise from the region of experience and to soar to

those sublime ideas, philosophy discovers a value and a dignity,

which, if it could but make good its assertions, would raise it far

above all other departments of human knowledge- professing, as it

does, to present a sure foundation for our highest hopes and the

ultimate aims of all the exertions of reason. The questions: whether

the world has a beginning and a limit to its extension in space;

whether there exists anywhere, or perhaps, in my own thinking Self, an

indivisible and indestructible unity- or whether nothing but what is

divisible and transitory exists; whether I am a free agent, or, like

other beings, am bound in the chains of nature and fate; whether,

finally, there is a supreme cause of the world, or all our thought and

speculation must end with nature and the order of external things- are

questions for the solution of which the mathematician would

willingly exchange his whole science; for in it there is no

satisfaction for the highest aspirations and most ardent desires of

humanity. Nay, it may even be said that the true value of mathematics-

that pride of human reason- consists in this: that she guides reason

to the knowledge of nature- in her greater as well as in her less

manifestations- in her beautiful order and regularity- guides her,

moreover, to an insight into the wonderful unity of the moving

forces in the operations of nature, far beyond the expectations of a

philosophy building only on experience; and that she thus encourages

philosophy to extend the province of reason beyond all experience, and

目录
设置
设置
阅读主题
字体风格
雅黑 宋体 楷书 卡通
字体大小
适中 偏大 超大
保存设置
恢复默认
手机
手机阅读
扫码获取链接,使用浏览器打开
书架同步,随时随地,手机阅读
首 页 < 上一章 章节列表 下一章 > 尾 页