第 53 页

at the same time provides it with the most excellent materials for

supporting its investigations, in so far as their nature admits, by

adequate and accordant intuitions.

Unfortunately for speculation- but perhaps fortunately for the

practical interests of humanity- reason, in the midst of her highest

anticipations, finds herself hemmed in by a press of opposite and

contradictory conclusions, from which neither her honour nor her

safety will permit her to draw back. Nor can she regard these

conflicting trains of reasoning with indifference as mere passages

at arms, still less can she command peace; for in the subject of the

conflict she has a deep interest. There is no other course left open

to her than to reflect with herself upon the origin of this disunion

in reason- whether it may not arise from a mere misunderstanding.

After such an inquiry, arrogant claims would have to be given up on

both sides; but the sovereignty of reason over understanding and sense

would be based upon a sure foundation.

We shall at present defer this radical inquiry and, in the meantime,

consider for a little what side in the controversy we should most

willingly take, if we were obliged to become partisans at all. As,

in this case, we leave out of sight altogether the logical criterion

of truth, and merely consult our own interest in reference to the

question, these considerations, although inadequate to settle the

question of right in either party, will enable us to comprehend how

those who have taken part in the struggle, adopt the one view rather

than the other- no special insight into the subject, however, having

influenced their choice. They will, at the same time, explain to us

many other things by the way- for example, the fiery zeal on the one

side and the cold maintenance of their cause on the other; why the one

party has met with the warmest approbations, and the other has

always been repulsed by irreconcilable prejudices.

There is one thing, however, that determines the proper point of

view, from which alone this preliminary inquiry can be instituted

and carried on with the proper completeness- and that is the

comparison of the principles from which both sides, thesis and

antithesis, proceed. My readers would remark in the propositions of

the antithesis a complete uniformity in the mode of thought and a

perfect unity of principle. Its principle was that of pure empiricism,

not only in the explication of the phenomena in the world, but also in

the solution of the transcendental ideas, even of that of the universe

itself. The affirmations of the thesis, on the contrary, were based,

in addition to the empirical mode of explanation employed in the

series of phenomena, on intellectual propositions; and its

principles were in so far not simple. I shall term the thesis, in view

of its essential characteristic, the dogmatism of pure reason.

On the side of Dogmatism, or of the thesis, therefore, in the

determination of the cosmological ideas, we find:

1. A practical interest, which must be very dear to every

right-thinking man. That the word has a beginning- that the nature

of my thinking self is simple, and therefore indestructible- that I am

a free agent, and raised above the compulsion of nature and her

laws- and, finally, that the entire order of things, which form the

world, is dependent upon a Supreme Being, from whom the whole receives

unity and connection- these are so many foundation-stones of

morality and religion. The antithesis deprives us of all these

supports- or, at least, seems so to deprive us.

2. A speculative interest of reason manifests itself on this side.

For, if we take the transcendental ideas and employ them in the manner

which the thesis directs, we can exhibit completely a priori the

entire chain of conditions, and understand the derivation of the

conditioned- beginning from the unconditioned. This the antithesis

does not do; and for this reason does not meet with so welcome a

reception. For it can give no answer to our question respecting the

conditions of its synthesis- except such as must be supplemented by

another question, and so on to infinity. According to it, we must rise

from a given beginning to one still higher; every part conducts us

to a still smaller one; every event is preceded by another event which

is its cause; and the conditions of existence rest always upon other

and still higher conditions, and find neither end nor basis in some

self-subsistent thing as the primal being.

3. This side has also the advantage of popularity; and this

constitutes no small part of its claim to favour. The common

understanding does not find the least difficulty in the idea of the

unconditioned beginning of all synthesis- accustomed, as it is, rather

to follow our consequences than to seek for a proper basis for

cognition. In the conception of an absolute first, moreover- the

possibility of which it does not inquire into- it is highly

gratified to find a firmly-established point of departure for its

attempts at theory; while in the restless and continuous ascent from

the conditioned to the condition, always with one foot in the air,

it can find no satisfaction.

On the side of the antithesis, or Empiricism, in the determination

of the cosmological ideas:

1. We cannot discover any such practical interest arising from

pure principles of reason as morality and religion present. On the

contrary, pure empiricism seems to empty them of all their power and

influence. If there does not exist a Supreme Being distinct from the

world- if the world is without beginning, consequently without a

Creator- if our wills are not free, and the soul is divisible and

subject to corruption just like matter- the ideas and principles of

morality lose all validity and fall with the transcendental ideas

which constituted their theoretical support.

2. But empiricism, in compensation, holds out to reason, in its

speculative interests, certain important advantages, far exceeding any

that the dogmatist can promise us. For, when employed by the

empiricist, understanding is always upon its proper ground of

investigation- the field of possible experience, the laws of which

it can explore, and thus extend its cognition securely and with

clear intelligence without being stopped by limits in any direction.

Here can it and ought it to find and present to intuition its proper

object- not only in itself, but in all its relations; or, if it employ

conceptions, upon this ground it can always present the

corresponding images in clear and unmistakable intuitions. It is quite

unnecessary for it to renounce the guidance of nature, to attach

itself to ideas, the objects of which it cannot know; because, as mere

intellectual entities, they cannot be presented in any intuition. On

the contrary, it is not even permitted to abandon its proper

occupation, under the pretence that it has been brought to a

conclusion (for it never can be), and to pass into the region of

idealizing reason and transcendent conceptions, which it is not

required to observe and explore the laws of nature, but merely to

think and to imagine- secure from being contradicted by facts, because

they have not been called as witnesses, but passed by, or perhaps

subordinated to the so-called higher interests and considerations of

pure reason.

Hence the empiricist will never allow himself to accept any epoch of

nature for the first- the absolutely primal state; he will not believe

that there can be limits to his outlook into her wide domains, nor

pass from the objects of nature, which he can satisfactorily explain

by means of observation and mathematical thought- which he can

determine synthetically in intuition, to those which neither sense nor

imagination can ever present in concreto; he will not concede the

existence of a faculty in nature, operating independently of the

laws of nature- a concession which would introduce uncertainty into

the procedure of the understanding, which is guided by necessary

laws to the observation of phenomena; nor, finally, will he permit

himself to seek a cause beyond nature, inasmuch as we know nothing but

it, and from it alone receive an objective basis for all our

conceptions and instruction in the unvarying laws of things.

In truth, if the empirical philosopher had no other purpose in the

establishment of his antithesis than to check the presumption of a

reason which mistakes its true destination, which boasts of its

insight and its knowledge, just where all insight and knowledge

cease to exist, and regards that which is valid only in relation to

a practical interest, as an advancement of the speculative interests

of the mind (in order, when it is convenient for itself, to break

the thread of our physical investigations, and, under pretence of

extending our cognition, connect them with transcendental ideas, by

means of which we really know only that we know nothing)- if, I say,

the empiricist rested satisfied with this benefit, the principle

advanced by him would be a maxim recommending moderation in the

pretensions of reason and modesty in its affirmations, and at the same

time would direct us to the right mode of extending the province of

the understanding, by the help of the only true teacher, experience.

In obedience to this advice, intellectual hypotheses and faith would

not be called in aid of our practical interests; nor should we

introduce them under the pompous titles of science and insight. For

speculative cognition cannot find an objective basis any other where

than in experience; and, when we overstep its limits our synthesis,

which requires ever new cognitions independent of experience, has no

substratum of intuition upon which to build.

But if- as often happens- empiricism, in relation to ideas,

becomes itself dogmatic and boldly denies that which is above the

sphere of its phenomenal cognition, it falls itself into the error

of intemperance- an error which is here all the more reprehensible, as

thereby the practical interest of reason receives an irreparable

injury.

And this constitutes the opposition between Epicureanism* and

Platonism.

*It is, however, still a matter of doubt whether Epicurus ever

propounded these principles as directions for the objective employment

of the understanding. If, indeed, they were nothing more than maxims

for the speculative exercise of reason, he gives evidence therein a

more genuine philosophic spirit than any of the philosophers of

antiquity. That, in the explanation of phenomena, we must proceed as

if the field of inquiry had neither limits in space nor commencement

in time; that we must be satisfied with the teaching of experience

in reference to the material of which the world is posed; that we must

not look for any other mode of the origination of events than that

which is determined by the unalterable laws of nature; and finally,

that we not employ the hypothesis of a cause distinct from the world

to account for a phenomenon or for the world itself- are principles

for the extension of speculative philosophy, and the discovery of

the true sources of the principles of morals, which, however little

conformed to in the present day, are undoubtedly correct. At the

same time, any one desirous of ignoring, in mere speculation, these

dogmatical propositions, need not for that reason be accused of

denying them.

Both Epicurus and Plato assert more in their systems than they know.

The former encourages and advances science- although to the

prejudice of the practical; the latter presents us with excellent

principles for the investigation of the practical, but, in relation to

everything regarding which we can attain to speculative cognition,

permits reason to append idealistic explanations of natural phenomena,

to the great injury of physical investigation.

3. In regard to the third motive for the preliminary choice of a

party in this war of assertions, it seems very extraordinary that

empiricism should be utterly unpopular. We should be inclined to

believe that the common understanding would receive it with

pleasure- promising as it does to satisfy it without passing the

bounds of experience and its connected order; while transcendental

dogmatism obliges it to rise to conceptions which far surpass the

intelligence and ability of the most practised thinkers. But in

this, in truth, is to be found its real motive. For the common

understanding thus finds itself in a situation where not even the most

learned can have the advantage of it. If it understands little or

nothing about these transcendental conceptions, no one can boast of

understanding any more; and although it may not express itself in so

scholastically correct a manner as others, it can busy itself with

reasoning and arguments without end, wandering among mere ideas, about

which one can always be very eloquent, because we know nothing about

them; while, in the observation and investigation of nature, it

would be forced to remain dumb and to confess its utter ignorance.

Thus indolence and vanity form of themselves strong recommendations of

these principles. Besides, although it is a hard thing for a

philosopher to assume a principle, of which he can give to himself

no reasonable account, and still more to employ conceptions, the

objective reality of which cannot be established, nothing is more

usual with the common understanding. It wants something which will

allow it to go to work with confidence. The difficulty of even

comprehending a supposition does not disquiet it, because- not knowing

what comprehending means- it never even thinks of the supposition it

may be adopting as a principle; and regards as known that with which

it has become familiar from constant use. And, at last, all

speculative interests disappear before the practical interests which

it holds dear; and it fancies that it understands and knows what its

necessities and hopes incite it to assume or to believe. Thus the

empiricism of transcendentally idealizing reason is robbed of all

popularity; and, however prejudicial it may be to the highest