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practical principles, there is no fear that it will ever pass the

limits of the schools, or acquire any favour or influence in society

or with the multitude a

Human reason is by nature architectonic. That is to say, it

regards all cognitions as parts of a possible system, and hence

accepts only such principles as at least do not incapacitate a

cognition to which we may have attained from being placed along with

others in a general system. But the propositions of the antithesis are

of a character which renders the completion of an edifice of

cognitions impossible. According to these, beyond one state or epoch

of the world there is always to be found one more ancient; in every

part always other parts themselves divisible; preceding every event

another, the origin of which must itself be sought still higher; and

everything in existence is conditioned, and still not dependent on

an unconditioned and primal existence. As, therefore, the antithesis

will not concede the existence of a first beginning which might be

available as a foundation, a complete edifice of cognition, in the

presence of such hypothesis, is utterly impossible. Thus the

architectonic interest of reason, which requires a unity- not

empirical, but a priori and rational- forms a natural recommendation

for the assertions of the thesis in our antinomy.

But if any one could free himself entirely from all considerations

of interest, and weigh without partiality the assertions of reason,

attending only to their content, irrespective of the consequences

which follow from them; such a person, on the supposition that he knew

no other way out of the confusion than to settle the truth of one or

other of the conflicting doctrines, would live in a state of continual

hesitation. Today, he would feel convinced that the human will is

free; to-morrow, considering the indissoluble chain of nature, he

would look on freedom as a mere illusion and declare nature to be

all-in-all. But, if he were called to action, the play of the merely

speculative reason would disappear like the shapes of a dream, and

practical interest would dictate his choice of principles. But, as

it well befits a reflective and inquiring being to devote certain

periods of time to the examination of its own reason- to divest itself

of all partiality, and frankly to communicate its observations for the

judgement and opinion of others; so no one can be blamed for, much

less prevented from, placing both parties on their trial, with

permission to end themselves, free from intimidation, before

intimidation, before a sworn jury of equal condition with

themselves- the condition of weak and fallible men.

SECTION IV. Of the necessity imposed upon Pure Reason

of presenting a Solution of its Transcendental

Problems.

To avow an ability to solve all problems and to answer all questions

would be a profession certain to convict any philosopher of

extravagant boasting and self-conceit, and at once to destroy the

confidence that might otherwise have been reposed in him. There are,

however, sciences so constituted that every question arising within

their sphere must necessarily be capable of receiving an answer from

the knowledge already possessed, for the answer must be received

from the same sources whence the question arose. In such sciences it

is not allowable to excuse ourselves on the plea of necessary and

unavoidable ignorance; a solution is absolutely requisite. The rule of

right and wrong must help us to the knowledge of what is right or

wrong in all possible cases; otherwise, the idea of obligation or duty

would be utterly null, for we cannot have any obligation to that which

we cannot know. On the other hand, in our investigations of the

phenomena of nature, much must remain uncertain, and many questions

continue insoluble; because what we know of nature is far from being

sufficient to explain all the phenomena that are presented to our

observation. Now the question is: "Whether there is in

transcendental philosophy any question, relating to an object

presented to pure reason, which is unanswerable by this reason; and

whether we must regard the subject of the question as quite uncertain,

so far as our knowledge extends, and must give it a place among

those subjects, of which we have just so much conception as is

sufficient to enable us to raise a question- faculty or materials

failing us, however, when we attempt an answer. the world

Now I maintain that, among all speculative cognition, the

peculiarity of transcendental philosophy is that there is no question,

relating to an object presented to pure reason, which is insoluble

by this reason; and that the profession of unavoidable ignorance-

the problem being alleged to be beyond the reach of our faculties-

cannot free us from the obligation to present a complete and

satisfactory answer. For the very conception which enables us to raise

the question must give us the power of answering it; inasmuch as the

object, as in the case of right and wrong, is not to be discovered out

of the conception.

But, in transcendental philosophy, it is only the cosmological

questions to which we can demand a satisfactory answer in relation

to the constitution of their object; and the philosopher is not

permitted to avail himself of the pretext of necessary ignorance and

impenetrable obscurity. These questions relate solely to the

cosmological ideas. For the object must be given in experience, and

the question relates to the adequateness of the object to an idea.

If the object is transcendental and therefore itself unknown; if the

question, for example, is whether the object- the something, the

phenomenon of which (internal- in ourselves) is thought- that is to

say, the soul, is in itself a simple being; or whether there is a

cause of all things, which is absolutely necessary- in such cases we

are seeking for our idea an object, of which we may confess that it is

unknown to us, though we must not on that account assert that it is

impossible.* The cosmological ideas alone posses the peculiarity

that we can presuppose the object of them and the empirical

synthesis requisite for the conception of that object to be given; and

the question, which arises from these ideas, relates merely to the

progress of this synthesis, in so far as it must contain absolute

totality- which, however, is not empirical, as it cannot be given in

any experience. Now, as the question here is solely in regard to a

thing as the object of a possible experience and not as a thing in

itself, the answer to the transcendental cosmological question need

not be sought out of the idea, for the question does not regard an

object in itself. The question in relation to a possible experience is

not, "What can be given in an experience in concreto" but "what is

contained in the idea, to which the empirical synthesis must

approximate." The question must therefore be capable of solution

from the idea alone. For the idea is a creation of reason itself,

which therefore cannot disclaim the obligation to answer or refer us

to the unknown object.

*The question, "What is the constitution of a transcendental

object?" is unanswerable- we are unable to say what it is; but we

can perceive that the question itself is nothing; because it does

not relate to any object that can be presented to us. For this reason,

we must consider all the questions raised in transcendental psychology

as answerable and as really answered; for they relate to the

transcendental subject of all internal phenomena, which is not

itself phenomenon and consequently not given as an object, in which,

moreover, none of the categories- and it is to them that the

question is properly directed- find any conditions of its application.

Here, therefore, is a case where no answer is the only proper

answer. For a question regarding the constitution of a something which

cannot be cogitated by any determined predicate, being completely

beyond the sphere of objects and experience, is perfectly null and

void.

It is not so extraordinary, as it at first sight appears, that a

science should demand and expect satisfactory answers to all the

questions that may arise within its own sphere (questiones

domesticae), although, up to a certain time, these answers may not

have been discovered. There are, in addition to transcendental

philosophy, only two pure sciences of reason; the one with a

speculative, the other with a practical content- pure mathematics

and pure ethics. Has any one ever heard it alleged that, from our

complete and necessary ignorance of the conditions, it is uncertain

what exact relation the diameter of a circle bears to the circle in

rational or irrational numbers? By the former the sum cannot be

given exactly, by the latter only approximately; and therefore we

decide that the impossibility of a solution of the question is

evident. Lambert presented us with a demonstration of this. In the

general principles of morals there can be nothing uncertain, for the

propositions are either utterly without meaning, or must originate

solely in our rational conceptions. On the other hand, there must be

in physical science an infinite number of conjectures, which can never

become certainties; because the phenomena of nature are not given as

objects dependent on our conceptions. The key to the solution of

such questions cannot, therefore, be found in our conceptions, or in

pure thought, but must lie without us and for that reason is in many

cases not to be discovered; and consequently a satisfactory

explanation cannot be expected. The questions of transcendental

analytic, which relate to the deduction of our pure cognition, are not

to be regarded as of the same kind as those mentioned above; for we

are not at present treating of the certainty of judgements in relation

to the origin of our conceptions, but only of that certainty in

relation to objects.

We cannot, therefore, escape the responsibility of at least a

critical solution of the questions of reason, by complaints of the

limited nature of our faculties, and the seemingly humble confession

that it is beyond the power of our reason to decide, whether the world

has existed from all eternity or had a beginning- whether it is

infinitely extended, or enclosed within certain limits- whether

anything in the world is simple, or whether everything must be capable

of infinite divisibility- whether freedom can originate phenomena,

or whether everything is absolutely dependent on the laws and order of

nature- and, finally, whether there exists a being that is

completely unconditioned and necessary, or whether the existence of

everything is conditioned and consequently dependent on something

external to itself, and therefore in its own nature contingent. For

all these questions relate to an object, which can be given nowhere

else than in thought. This object is the absolutely unconditioned

totality of the synthesis of phenomena. If the conceptions in our

minds do not assist us to some certain result in regard to these

problems, we must not defend ourselves on the plea that the object

itself remains hidden from and unknown to us. For no such thing or

object can be given- it is not to be found out of the idea in our

minds. We must seek the cause of our failure in our idea itself, which

is an insoluble problem and in regard to which we obstinately assume

that there exists a real object corresponding and adequate to it. A

clear explanation of the dialectic which lies in our conception,

will very soon enable us to come to a satisfactory decision in

regard to such a question.

The pretext that we are unable to arrive at certainty in regard to

these problems may be met with this question, which requires at

least a plain answer: "From what source do the ideas originate, the

solution of which involves you in such difficulties? Are you seeking

for an explanation of certain phenomena; and do you expect these ideas

to give you the principles or the rules of this explanation?" Let it

be granted, that all nature was laid open before you; that nothing was

hid from your senses and your consciousness. Still, you could not

cognize in concreto the object of your ideas in any experience. For

what is demanded is not only this full and complete intuition, but

also a complete synthesis and the consciousness of its absolute

totality; and this is not possible by means of any empirical

cognition. It follows that your question- your idea- is by no means

necessary for the explanation of any phenomenon; and the idea cannot

have been in any sense given by the object itself. For such an

object can never be presented to us, because it cannot be given by any

possible experience. Whatever perceptions you may attain to, you are

still surrounded by conditions- in space, or in time- and you cannot

discover anything unconditioned; nor can you decide whether this

unconditioned is to be placed in an absolute beginning of the

synthesis, or in an absolute totality of the series without beginning.

A whole, in the empirical signification of the term, is always

merely comparative. The absolute whole of quantity (the universe),

of division, of derivation, of the condition of existence, with the

question- whether it is to be produced by finite or infinite

synthesis, no possible experience can instruct us concerning. You will

not, for example, be able to explain the phenomena of a body in the

least degree better, whether you believe it to consist of simple, or

of composite parts; for a simple phenomenon- and just as little an

infinite series of composition- can never be presented to your

perception. Phenomena require and admit of explanation, only in so far

as the conditions of that explanation are given in perception; but the

sum total of that which is given in phenomena, considered as an

absolute whole, is itself a perception- and we cannot therefore seek

for explanations of this whole beyond itself, in other perceptions.

The explanation of this whole is the proper object of the