第 60 页

as the complete and unbroken connection of phenomena is an unalterable

law of nature, freedom is impossible- on the supposition that

phenomena are absolutely real. Hence those philosophers who adhere

to the common opinion on this subject can never succeed in reconciling

the ideas of nature and freedom.

Possibility of Freedom in Harmony with the Universal Law

of Natural Necessity.

That element in a sensuous object which is not itself sensuous, I

may be allowed to term intelligible. If, accordingly, an object

which must be regarded as a sensuous phenomenon possesses a faculty

which is not an object of sensuous intuition, but by means of which it

is capable of being the cause of phenomena, the causality of an object

or existence of this kind may be regarded from two different points of

view. It may be considered to be intelligible, as regards its

action- the action of a thing which is a thing in itself, and

sensuous, as regards its effects- the effects of a phenomenon

belonging to the sensuous world. We should accordingly, have to form

both an empirical and an intellectual conception of the causality of

such a faculty or power- both, however, having reference to the same

effect. This twofold manner of cogitating a power residing in a

sensuous object does not run counter to any of the conceptions which

we ought to form of the world of phenomena or of a possible

experience. Phenomena- not being things in themselves- must have a

transcendental object as a foundation, which determines them as mere

representations; and there seems to be no reason why we should not

ascribe to this transcendental object, in addition to the property

of self-phenomenization, a causality whose effects are to be met

with in the world of phenomena, although it is not itself a

phenomenon. But every effective cause must possess a character, that

is to say, a law of its causality, without which it would cease to

be a cause. In the above case, then, every sensuous object would

possess an empirical character, which guaranteed that its actions,

as phenomena, stand in complete and harmonious connection, conformably

to unvarying natural laws, with all other phenomena, and can be

deduced from these, as conditions, and that they do thus, in

connection with these, constitute a series in the order of nature.

This sensuous object must, in the second place, possess an

intelligible character, which guarantees it to be the cause of those

actions, as phenomena, although it is not itself a phenomenon nor

subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense. The former may be

termed the character of the thing as a phenomenon, the latter the

character of the thing as a thing in itself.

Now this active subject would, in its character of intelligible

subject, be subordinate to no conditions of time, for time is only a

condition of phenomena, and not of things in themselves. No action

would begin or cease to be in this subject; it would consequently be

free from the law of all determination of time- the law of change,

namely, that everything which happens must have a cause in the

phenomena of a preceding state. In one word, the causality of the

subject, in so far as it is intelligible, would not form part of the

series of empirical conditions which determine and necessitate an

event in the world of sense. Again, this intelligible character of a

thing cannot be immediately cognized, because we can perceive

nothing but phenomena, but it must be capable of being cogitated in

harmony with the empirical character; for we always find ourselves

compelled to place, in thought, a transcendental object at the basis

of phenomena although we can never know what this object is in itself.

In virtue of its empirical character, this subject would at the same

time be subordinate to all the empirical laws of causality, and, as

a phenomenon and member of the sensuous world, its effects would

have to be accounted for by a reference to preceding phenomena.

Eternal phenomena must be capable of influencing it; and its

actions, in accordance with natural laws, must explain to us how its

empirical character, that is, the law of its causality, is to be

cognized in and by means of experience. In a word, all requisites

for a complete and necessary determination of these actions must be

presented to us by experience.

In virtue of its intelligible character, on the other hand (although

we possess only a general conception of this character), the subject

must be regarded as free from all sensuous influences, and from all

phenomenal determination. Moreover, as nothing happens in this

subject- for it is a noumenon, and there does not consequently exist

in it any change, demanding the dynamical determination of time, and

for the same reason no connection with phenomena as causes- this

active existence must in its actions be free from and independent of

natural necessity, for or necessity exists only in the world of

phenomena. It would be quite correct to say that it originates or

begins its effects in the world of sense from itself, although the

action productive of these effects does not begin in itself. We should

not be in this case affirming that these sensuous effects began to

exist of themselves, because they are always determined by prior

empirical conditions- by virtue of the empirical character, which is

the phenomenon of the intelligible character- and are possible only as

constituting a continuation of the series of natural causes. And

thus nature and freedom, each in the complete and absolute

signification of these terms, can exist, without contradiction or

disagreement, in the same action to

Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Harmony

with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity.

I have thought it advisable to lay before the reader at first merely

a sketch of the solution of this transcendental problem, in order to

enable him to form with greater ease a clear conception of the

course which reason must adopt in the solution. I shall now proceed to

exhibit the several momenta of this solution, and to consider them

in their order.

The natural law that everything which happens must have a cause,

that the causality of this cause, that is, the action of the cause

(which cannot always have existed, but must be itself an event, for it

precedes in time some effect which it has originated), must have

itself a phenomenal cause, by which it is determined and, and,

consequently, all events are empirically determined in an order of

nature- this law, I say, which lies at the foundation of the

possibility of experience, and of a connected system of phenomena or

nature is a law of the understanding, from which no departure, and

to which no exception, can be admitted. For to except even a single

phenomenon from its operation is to exclude it from the sphere of

possible experience and thus to admit it to be a mere fiction of

thought or phantom of the brain.

Thus we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of

causes, in which, however, absolute totality cannot be found. But we

need not detain ourselves with this question, for it has already

been sufficiently answered in our discussion of the antinomies into

which reason falls, when it attempts to reach the unconditioned in the

series of phenomena. If we permit ourselves to be deceived by the

illusion of transcendental idealism, we shall find that neither nature

nor freedom exists. Now the question is: "Whether, admitting the

existence of natural necessity in the world of phenomena, it is

possible to consider an effect as at the same time an effect of nature

and an effect of freedom- or, whether these two modes of causality are

contradictory and incompatible?"

No phenomenal cause can absolutely and of itself begin a series.

Every action, in so far as it is productive of an event, is itself

an event or occurrence, and presupposes another preceding state, in

which its cause existed. Thus everything that happens is but a

continuation of a series, and an absolute beginning is impossible in

the sensuous world. The actions of natural causes are, accordingly,

themselves effects, and presuppose causes preceding them in time. A

primal action which forms an absolute beginning, is beyond the

causal power of phenomena.

Now, is it absolutely necessary that, granting that all effects

are phenomena, the causality of the cause of these effects must also

be a phenomenon and belong to the empirical world? Is it not rather

possible that, although every effect in the phenomenal world must be

connected with an empirical cause, according to the universal law of

nature, this empirical causality may be itself the effect of a

non-empirical and intelligible causality- its connection with

natural causes remaining nevertheless intact? Such a causality would

be considered, in reference to phenomena, as the primal action of a

cause, which is in so far, therefore, not phenomenal, but, by reason

of this faculty or power, intelligible; although it must, at the

same time, as a link in the chain of nature, be regarded as

belonging to the sensuous world.

A belief in the reciprocal causality of phenomena is necessary, if

we are required to look for and to present the natural conditions of

natural events, that is to say, their causes. This being admitted as

unexceptionably valid, the requirements of the understanding, which

recognizes nothing but nature in the region of phenomena, are

satisfied, and our physical explanations of physical phenomena may

proceed in their regular course, without hindrance and without

opposition. But it is no stumbling-block in the way, even assuming the

idea to be a pure fiction, to admit that there are some natural causes

in the possession of a faculty which is not empirical, but

intelligible, inasmuch as it is not determined to action by

empirical conditions, but purely and solely upon grounds brought

forward by the understanding- this action being still, when the

cause is phenomenized, in perfect accordance with the laws of

empirical causality. Thus the acting subject, as a causal

phenomenon, would continue to preserve a complete connection with

nature and natural conditions; and the phenomenon only of the

subject (with all its phenomenal causality) would contain certain

conditions, which, if we ascend from the empirical to the

transcendental object, must necessarily be regarded as intelligible.

For, if we attend, in our inquiries with regard to causes in the world

of phenomena, to the directions of nature alone, we need not trouble

ourselves about the relation in which the transcendental subject,

which is completely unknown to us, stands to these phenomena and their

connection in nature. The intelligible ground of phenomena in this

subject does not concern empirical questions. It has to do only with

pure thought; and, although the effects of this thought and action

of the pure understanding are discoverable in phenomena, these

phenomena must nevertheless be capable of a full and complete

explanation, upon purely physical grounds and in accordance with

natural laws. And in this case we attend solely to their empirical and

omit all consideration of their intelligible character (which is the

transcendental cause of the former) as completely unknown, except in

so far as it is exhibited by the latter as its empirical symbol. Now

let us apply this to experience. Man is a phenomenon of the sensuous

world and, at the same time, therefore, a natural cause, the causality

of which must be regulated by empirical laws. As such, he must possess

an empirical character, like all other natural phenomena. We remark

this empirical character in his actions, which reveal the presence

of certain powers and faculties. If we consider inanimate or merely

animal nature, we can discover no reason for ascribing to ourselves

any other than a faculty which is determined in a purely sensuous

manner. But man, to whom nature reveals herself only through sense,

cognizes himself not only by his senses, but also through pure

apperception; and this in actions and internal determinations, which

he cannot regard as sensuous impressions. He is thus to himself, on

the one hand, a phenomenon, but on the other hand, in respect of

certain faculties, a purely intelligible object- intelligible, because

its action cannot be ascribed to sensuous receptivity. These faculties

are understanding and reason. The latter, especially, is in a peculiar

manner distinct from all empirically-conditioned faculties, for it

employs ideas alone in the consideration of its objects, and by

means of these determines the understanding, which then proceeds to

make an empirical use of its own conceptions, which, like the ideas of

reason, are pure and non-empirical.

That reason possesses the faculty of causality, or that at least

we are compelled so to represent it, is evident from the

imperatives, which in the sphere of the practical we impose on many of

our executive powers. The words I ought express a species of

necessity, and imply a connection with grounds which nature does not

and cannot present to the mind of man. Understanding knows nothing

in nature but that which is, or has been, or will be. It would be

absurd to say that anything in nature ought to be other than it is

in the relations of time in which it stands; indeed, the ought, when

we consider merely the course of nature, bas neither application nor

meaning. The question, "What ought to happen in the sphere of nature?"

is just as absurd as the question, "What ought to be the properties of

a circle?" All that we are entitled to ask is, "What takes place in

nature?" or, in the latter case, "What are the properties of a

circle?"

But the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action, the

ground of which is a pure conception; while the ground of a merely

natural action is, on the contrary, always a phenomenon. This action

must certainly be possible under physical conditions, if it is

prescribed by the moral imperative ought; but these physical or