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The reader must be careful to remark that my intention in the

above remarks has not been to prove the actual existence of freedom,

as a faculty in which resides the cause of certain sensuous phenomena.

For, not to mention that such an argument would not have a

transcendental character, nor have been limited to the discussion of

pure conceptions- all attempts at inferring from experience what

cannot be cogitated in accordance with its laws, must ever be

unsuccessful. Nay, more, I have not even aimed at demonstrating the

possibility of freedom; for this too would have been a vain endeavour,

inasmuch as it is beyond the power of the mind to cognize the

possibility of a reality or of a causal power by the aid of mere a

priori conceptions. Freedom has been considered in the foregoing

remarks only as a transcendental idea, by means of which reason aims

at originating a series of conditions in the world of phenomena with

the help of that which is sensuously unconditioned, involving

itself, however, in an antinomy with the laws which itself

prescribes for the conduct of the understanding. That this antinomy is

based upon a mere illusion, and that nature and freedom are at least

not opposed- this was the only thing in our power to prove, and the

question which it was our task to solve.

IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of

the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences.

In the preceding remarks, we considered the changes in the world

of sense as constituting a dynamical series, in which each member is

subordinated to another- as its cause. Our present purpose is to avail

ourselves of this series of states or conditions as a guide to an

existence which may be the highest condition of all changeable

phenomena, that is, to a necessary being. Our endeavour to reach,

not the unconditioned causality, but the unconditioned existence, of

substance. The series before us is therefore a series of

conceptions, and not of intuitions (in which the one intuition is

the condition of the other).

But it is evident that, as all phenomena are subject to change and

conditioned in their existence, the series of dependent existences

cannot embrace an unconditioned member, the existence of which would

be absolutely necessary. It follows that, if phenomena were things

in themselves, and- as an immediate consequence from this supposition-

condition and conditioned belonged to the same series of phenomena,

the existence of a necessary being, as the condition of the

existence of sensuous phenomena, would be perfectly impossible.

An important distinction, however, exists between the dynamical

and the mathematical regress. The latter is engaged solely with the

combination of parts into a whole, or with the division of a whole

into its parts; and therefore are the conditions of its series parts

of the series, and to be consequently regarded as homogeneous, and for

this reason, as consisting, without exception, of phenomena. If the

former regress, on the contrary, the aim of which is not to

establish the possibility of an unconditioned whole consisting of

given parts, or of an unconditioned part of a given whole, but to

demonstrate the possibility of the deduction of a certain state from

its cause, or of the contingent existence of substance from that which

exists necessarily, it is not requisite that the condition should form

part of an empirical series along with the conditioned.

In the case of the apparent antinomy with which we are at present

dealing, there exists a way of escape from the difficulty; for it is

not impossible that both of the contradictory statements may be true

in different relations. All sensuous phenomena may be contingent,

and consequently possess only an empirically conditioned existence,

and yet there may also exist a non-empirical condition of the whole

series, or, in other words, a necessary being. For this necessary

being, as an intelligible condition, would not form a member- not even

the highest member- of the series; the whole world of sense would be

left in its empirically determined existence uninterfered with and

uninfluenced. This would also form a ground of distinction between the

modes of solution employed for the third and fourth antinomies. For,

while in the consideration of freedom in the former antinomy, the

thing itself- the cause (substantia phaenomenon)- was regarded as

belonging to the series of conditions, and only its causality to the

intelligible world- we are obliged in the present case to cogitate

this necessary being as purely intelligible and as existing entirely

apart from the world of sense (as an ens extramundanum); for otherwise

it would be subject to the phenomenal law of contingency and

dependence.

In relation to the present problem, therefore, the regulative

principle of reason is that everything in the sensuous world possesses

an empirically conditioned existence- that no property of the sensuous

world possesses unconditioned necessity- that we are bound to

expect, and, so far as is possible, to seek for the empirical

condition of every member in the series of conditions- and that

there is no sufficient reason to justify us in deducing any

existence from a condition which lies out of and beyond the

empirical series, or in regarding any existence as independent and

self-subsistent; although this should not prevent us from

recognizing the possibility of the whole series being based upon a

being which is intelligible, and for this reason free from all

empirical conditions.

But it has been far from my intention, in these remarks, to prove

the existence of this unconditioned and necessary being, or even to

evidence the possibility of a purely intelligible condition of the

existence or all sensuous phenomena. As bounds were set to reason,

to prevent it from leaving the guiding thread of empirical

conditions and losing itself in transcendent theories which are

incapable of concrete presentation; so it was my purpose, on the other

band, to set bounds to the law of the purely empirical

understanding, and to protest against any attempts on its part at

deciding on the possibility of things, or declaring the existence of

the intelligible to be impossible, merely on the ground that it is not

available for the explanation and exposition of phenomena. It has been

shown, at the same time, that the contingency of all the phenomena

of nature and their empirical conditions is quite consistent with

the arbitrary hypothesis of a necessary, although purely

intelligible condition, that no real contradiction exists between them

and that, consequently, both may be true. The existence of such an

absolutely necessary being may be impossible; but this can never be

demonstrated from the universal contingency and dependence of sensuous

phenomena, nor from the principle which forbids us to discontinue

the series at some member of it, or to seek for its cause in some

sphere of existence beyond the world of nature. Reason goes its way in

the empirical world, and follows, too, its peculiar path in the sphere

of the transcendental.

The sensuous world contains nothing but phenomena, which are mere

representations, and always sensuously conditioned; things in

themselves are not, and cannot be, objects to us. It is not to be

wondered at, therefore, that we are not justified in leaping from some

member of an empirical series beyond the world of sense, as if

empirical representations were things in themselves, existing apart

from their transcendental ground in the human mind, and the cause of

whose existence may be sought out of the empirical series. This

would certainly be the case with contingent things; but it cannot be

with mere representations of things, the contingency of which is

itself merely a phenomenon and can relate to no other regress than

that which determines phenomena, that is, the empirical. But to

cogitate an intelligible ground of phenomena, as free, moreover,

from the contingency of the latter, conflicts neither with the

unlimited nature of the empirical regress, nor with the complete

contingency of phenomena. And the demonstration of this was the only

thing necessary for the solution of this apparent antinomy. For if the

condition of every conditioned- as regards its existence- is sensuous,

and for this reason a part of the same series, it must be itself

conditioned, as was shown in the antithesis of the fourth antinomy.

The embarrassments into which a reason, which postulates the

unconditioned, necessarily falls, must, therefore, continue to

exist; or the unconditioned must be placed in the sphere of the

intelligible. In this way, its necessity does not require, nor does it

even permit, the presence of an empirical condition: and it is,

consequently, unconditionally necessary.

The empirical employment of reason is not affected by the assumption

of a purely intelligible being; it continues its operations on the

principle of the contingency of all phenomena, proceeding from

empirical conditions to still higher and higher conditions, themselves

empirical. just as little does this regulative principle exclude the

assumption of an intelligible cause, when the question regards

merely the pure employment of reason- in relation to ends or aims.

For, in this case, an intelligible cause signifies merely the

transcendental and to us unknown ground of the possibility of sensuous

phenomena, and its existence, necessary and independent of all

sensuous conditions, is not inconsistent with the contingency of

phenomena, or with the unlimited possibility of regress which exists

in the series of empirical conditions.

Concluding Remarks on the Antinomy of Pure Reason.

So long as the object of our rational conceptions is the totality of

conditions in the world of phenomena, and the satisfaction, from

this source, of the requirements of reason, so long are our ideas

transcendental and cosmological. But when we set the unconditioned-

which is the aim of all our inquiries- in a sphere which lies out of

the world of sense and possible experience, our ideas become

transcendent. They are then not merely serviceable towards the

completion of the exercise of reason (which remains an idea, never

executed, but always to be pursued); they detach themselves completely

from experience and construct for themselves objects, the material

of which has not been presented by experience, and the objective

reality of which is not based upon the completion of the empirical

series, but upon pure a priori conceptions. The intelligible object of

these transcendent ideas may be conceded, as a transcendental

object. But we cannot cogitate it as a thing determinable by certain

distinct predicates relating to its internal nature, for it has no

connection with empirical conceptions; nor are we justified in

affirming the existence of any such object. It is, consequently, a

mere product of the mind alone. Of all the cosmological ideas,

however, it is that occasioning the fourth antinomy which compels us

to venture upon this step. For the existence of phenomena, always

conditioned and never self-subsistent, requires us to look for an

object different from phenomena- an intelligible object, with which

all contingency must cease. But, as we have allowed ourselves to

assume the existence of a self-subsistent reality out of the field

of experience, and are therefore obliged to regard phenomena as merely

a contingent mode of representing intelligible objects employed by

beings which are themselves intelligences- no other course remains for

us than to follow an alogy and employ the same mode in forming some

conception of intelligible things, of which we have not the least

knowledge, which nature taught us to use in the formation of empirical

conceptions. Experience made us acquainted with the contingent. But we

are at present engaged in the discussion of things which are not

objects of experience; and must, therefore, deduce our knowledge of

them from that which is necessary absolutely and in itself, that is,

from pure conceptions. Hence the first step which we take out of the

world of sense obliges us to begin our system of new cognition with

the investigation of a necessary being, and to deduce from our

conceptions of it all our conceptions of intelligible things. This

we propose to attempt in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III. The Ideal of Pure Reason.

SECTION I. Of the Ideal in General.

We have seen that pure conceptions do not present objects to the

mind, except under sensuous conditions; because the conditions of

objective reality do not exist in these conceptions, which contain, in

fact, nothing but the mere form of thought. They may, however, when

applied to phenomena, be presented in concreto; for it is phenomena

that present to them the materials for the formation of empirical

conceptions, which are nothing more than concrete forms of the

conceptions of the understanding. But ideas are still further

removed from objective reality than categories; for no phenomenon

can ever present them to the human mind in concreto. They contain a

certain perfection, attainable by no possible empirical cognition; and

they give to reason a systematic unity, to which the unity of

experience attempts to approximate, but can never completely attain.

But still further removed than the idea from objective reality is

the Ideal, by which term I understand the idea, not in concreto, but

in individuo- as an individual thing, determinable or determined by

the idea alone. The idea of humanity in its complete perfection

supposes not only the advancement of all the powers and faculties,

which constitute our conception of human nature, to a complete

attainment of their final aims, but also everything which is requisite

for the complete determination of the idea; for of all contradictory

predicates, only one can conform with the idea of the perfect man.

What I have termed an ideal was in Plato's philosophy an idea of the

divine mind- an individual object present to its pure intuition, the