第 66 页

conception (which is merely a determination of my mental state),

although this objective reality- this existence- apart from my

conceptions, does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid

hundred dollars.

By whatever and by whatever number of predicates- even to the

complete determination of it- I may cogitate a thing, I do not in

the least augment the object of my conception by the addition of the

statement: This thing exists. Otherwise, not exactly the same, but

something more than what was cogitated in my conception, would

exist, and I could not affirm that the exact object of my conception

had real existence. If I cogitate a thing as containing all modes of

reality except one, the mode of reality which is absent is not added

to the conception of the thing by the affirmation that the thing

exists; on the contrary, the thing exists- if it exist at all- with

the same defect as that cogitated in its conception; otherwise not

that which was cogitated, but something different, exists. Now, if I

cogitate a being as the highest reality, without defect or

imperfection, the question still remains- whether this being exists or

not? For, although no element is wanting in the possible real

content of my conception, there is a defect in its relation to my

mental state, that is, I am ignorant whether the cognition of the

object indicated by the conception is possible a posteriori. And

here the cause of the present difficulty becomes apparent. If the

question regarded an object of sense merely, it would be impossible

for me to confound the conception with the existence of a thing. For

the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according

with the general conditions of experience; while the existence of

the object permits me to cogitate it as contained in the sphere of

actual experience. At the same time, this connection with the world of

experience does not in the least augment the conception, although a

possible perception has been added to the experience of the mind.

But if we cogitate existence by the pure category alone, it is not

to be wondered at, that we should find ourselves unable to present any

criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility.

Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is

necessary to go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the

object. In the case of sensuous objects, this is attained by their

connection according to empirical laws with some one of my

perceptions; but there is no means of cognizing the existence of

objects of pure thought, because it must be cognized completely a

priori. But all our knowledge of existence (be it immediately by

perception, or by inferences connecting some object with a perception)

belongs entirely to the sphere of experience- which is in perfect

unity with itself; and although an existence out of this sphere cannot

be absolutely declared to be impossible, it is a hypothesis the

truth of which we have no means of ascertaining.

The notion of a Supreme Being is in many respects a highly useful

idea; but for the very reason that it is an idea, it is incapable of

enlarging our cognition with regard to the existence of things. It

is not even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being

which we do not know to exist. The analytical criterion of

possibility, which consists in the absence of contradiction in

propositions, cannot be denied it. But the connection of real

properties in a thing is a synthesis of the possibility of which an

a priori judgement cannot be formed, because these realities are not

presented to us specifically; and even if this were to happen, a

judgement would still be impossible, because the criterion of the

possibility of synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the

world of experience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong. And

thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in his attempt to

establish upon a priori grounds the possibility of this sublime

ideal being.

The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence

of a Supreme Being is therefore insufficient; and we may as well

hope to increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as

the merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his

cash account.

SECTION V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof

of the Existence of God.

It was by no means a natural course of proceeding, but, on the

contrary, an invention entirely due to the subtlety of the schools, to

attempt to draw from a mere idea a proof of the existence of an object

corresponding to it. Such a course would never have been pursued, were

it not for that need of reason which requires it to suppose the

existence of a necessary being as a basis for the empirical regress,

and that, as this necessity must be unconditioned and a priori, reason

is bound to discover a conception which shall satisfy, if possible,

this requirement, and enable us to attain to the a priori cognition of

such a being. This conception was thought to be found in the idea of

an ens realissimum, and thus this idea was employed for the attainment

of a better defined knowledge of a necessary being, of the existence

of which we were convinced, or persuaded, on other grounds. Thus

reason was seduced from her natural courage; and, instead of

concluding with the conception of an ens realissimum, an attempt was

made to begin with it, for the purpose of inferring from it that

idea of a necessary existence which it was in fact called in to

complete. Thus arose that unfortunate ontological argument, which

neither satisfies the healthy common sense of humanity, nor sustains

the scientific examination of the philosopher.

The cosmological proof, which we are about to examine, retains the

connection between absolute necessity and the highest reality; but,

instead of reasoning from this highest reality to a necessary

existence, like the preceding argument, it concludes from the given.

unconditioned necessity of some being its unlimited reality. The track

it pursues, whether rational or sophistical, is at least natural,

and not only goes far to persuade the common understanding, but

shows itself deserving of respect from the speculative intellect;

while it contains, at the same time, the outlines of all the arguments

employed in natural theology- arguments which always have been, and

still will be, in use and authority. These, however adorned, and hid

under whatever embellishments of rhetoric and sentiment, are at bottom

identical with the arguments we are at present to discuss. This proof,

termed by Leibnitz the argumentum a contingentia mundi, I shall now

lay before the reader, and subject to a strict examination.

It is framed in the following manner: If something exists, an

absolutely necessary being must likewise exist. Now I, at least,

exist. Consequently, there exists an absolutely necessary being. The

minor contains an experience, the major reasons from a general

experience to the existence of a necessary being.* Thus this

argument really begins at experience, and is not completely a

priori, or ontological. The object of all possible experience being

the world, it is called the cosmological proof. It contains no

reference to any peculiar property of sensuous objects, by which

this world of sense might be distinguished from other possible worlds;

and in this respect it differs from the physico-theological proof,

which is based upon the consideration of the peculiar constitution

of our sensuous world.

*This inference is too well known to require more detailed

discussion. It is based upon the spurious transcendental law of

causality, that everything which is contingent has a cause, which,

if itself contingent, must also have a cause; and so on, till the

series of subordinated causes must end with an absolutely necessary

cause, without which it would not possess completeness.

The proof proceeds thus: A necessary being can be determined only in

one way, that is, it can be determined by only one of all possible

opposed predicates; consequently, it must be completely determined

in and by its conception. But there is only a single conception of a

thing possible, which completely determines the thing a priori: that

is, the conception of the ens realissimum. It follows that the

conception of the ens realissimum is the only conception by and in

which we can cogitate a necessary being. Consequently, a Supreme Being

necessarily exists.

In this cosmological argument are assembled so many sophistical

propositions that speculative reason seems to have exerted in it all

her dialectical skill to produce a transcendental illusion of the most

extreme character. We shall postpone an investigation of this argument

for the present, and confine ourselves to exposing the stratagem by

which it imposes upon us an old argument in a new dress, and appeals

to the agreement of two witnesses, the one with the credentials of

pure reason, and the other with those of empiricism; while, in fact,

it is only the former who has changed his dress and voice, for the

purpose of passing himself off for an additional witness. That it

may possess a secure foundation, it bases its conclusions upon

experience, and thus appears to be completely distinct from the

ontological argument, which places its confidence entirely in pure a

priori conceptions. But this experience merely aids reason in making

one step- to the existence of a necessary being. What the properties

of this being are cannot be learned from experience; and therefore

reason abandons it altogether, and pursues its inquiries in the sphere

of pure conception, for the purpose of discovering what the properties

of an absolutely necessary being ought to be, that is, what among

all possible things contain the conditions (requisita) of absolute

necessity. Reason believes that it has discovered these requisites

in the conception of an ens realissimum- and in it alone, and hence

concludes: The ens realissimum is an absolutely necessary being. But

it is evident that reason has here presupposed that the conception

of an ens realissimum is perfectly adequate to the conception of a

being of absolute necessity, that is, that we may infer the

existence of the latter from that of the former- a proposition which

formed the basis of the ontological argument, and which is now

employed in the support of the cosmological argument, contrary to

the wish and professions of its inventors. For the existence of an

absolutely necessary being is given in conceptions alone. But if I

say: "The conception of the ens realissimum is a conception of this

kind, and in fact the only conception which is adequate to our idea of

a necessary being," I am obliged to admit, that the latter may be

inferred from the former. Thus it is properly the ontological argument

which figures in the cosmological, and constitutes the whole

strength of the latter; while the spurious basis of experience has

been of no further use than to conduct us to the conception of

absolute necessity, being utterly insufficient to demonstrate the

presence of this attribute in any determinate existence or thing.

For when we propose to ourselves an aim of this character, we must

abandon the sphere of experience, and rise to that of pure

conceptions, which we examine with the purpose of discovering

whether any one contains the conditions of the possibility of an

absolutely necessary being. But if the possibility of such a being

is thus demonstrated, its existence is also proved; for we may then

assert that, of all possible beings there is one which possesses the

attribute of necessity- in other words, this being possesses an

absolutely necessary existence.

All illusions in an argument are more easily detected when they

are presented in the formal manner employed by the schools, which we

now proceed to do.

If the proposition: "Every absolutely necessary being is likewise an

ens realissimum," is correct (and it is this which constitutes the

nervus probandi of the cosmological argument), it must, like all

affirmative judgements, be capable of conversion- the conversio per

accidens, at least. It follows, then, that some entia realissima are

absolutely necessary beings. But no ens realissimum is in any

respect different from another, and what is valid of some is valid

of all. In this present case, therefore, I may employ simple

conversion, and say: "Every ens realissimum is a necessary being." But

as this proposition is determined a priori by the conceptions

contained in it, the mere conception of an ens realissimum must

possess the additional attribute of absolute necessity. But this is

exactly what was maintained in the ontological argument, and not

recognized by the cosmological, although it formed the real ground

of its disguised and illusory reasoning.

Thus the second mode employed by speculative reason of demonstrating

the existence of a Supreme Being, is not only, like the first,

illusory and inadequate, but possesses the additional blemish of an

ignoratio elenchi- professing to conduct us by a new road to the

desired goal, but bringing us back, after a short circuit, to the

old path which we had deserted at its call.

I mentioned above that this cosmological argument contains a perfect

nest of dialectical assumptions, which transcendental criticism does

not find it difficult to expose and to dissipate. I shall merely

enumerate these, leaving it to the reader, who must by this time be

well practised in such matters, to investigate the fallacies

residing therein.

The following fallacies, for example, are discoverable in this

mode of proof: 1. The transcendental principle: "Everything that is

contingent must have a cause"- a principle without significance,

except in the sensuous world. For the purely intellectual conception

of the contingent cannot produce any synthetical proposition, like

that of causality, which is itself without significance or

distinguishing characteristic except in the phenomenal world. But in