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brain-cobweb of obscure speculatists. For, if they reflect upon and

examine their own arguments, they will find that, after following

for some time the path of nature and experience, and discovering

themselves no nearer their object, they suddenly leave this path and

pass into the region of pure possibility, where they hope to reach

upon the wings of ideas what had eluded all their empirical

investigations. Gaining, as they think, a firm footing after this

immense leap, they extend their determinate conception- into the

possession of which they have come, they know not how- over the

whole sphere of creation, and explain their ideal, which is entirely a

product of pure reason, by illustrations drawn from experience- though

in a degree miserably unworthy of the grandeur of the object, while

they refuse to acknowledge that they have arrived at this cognition or

hypothesis by a very different road from that of experience.

Thus the physico-theological is based upon the cosmological, and

this upon the ontological proof of the existence of a Supreme Being;

and as besides these three there is no other path open to

speculative reason, the ontological proof, on the ground of pure

conceptions of reason, is the only possible one, if any proof of a

proposition so far transcending the empirical exercise of the

understanding is possible at all.

SECTION VII. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative

Principles of Reason.

If by the term theology I understand the cognition of a primal

being, that cognition is based either upon reason alone (theologia

rationalis) or upon revelation (theologia revelata). The former

cogitates its object either by means of pure transcendental

conceptions, as an ens originarium, realissimum, ens entium, and is

termed transcendental theology; or, by means of a conception derived

from the nature of our own mind, as a supreme intelligence, and must

then be entitled natural theology. The person who believes in a

transcendental theology alone, is termed a deist; he who

acknowledges the possibility of a natural theology also, a theist. The

former admits that we can cognize by pure reason alone the existence

of a Supreme Being, but at the same time maintains that our conception

of this being is purely transcendental, and that all we can say of

it is that it possesses all reality, without being able to define it

more closely. The second asserts that reason is capable of

presenting us, from the analogy with nature, with a more definite

conception of this being, and that its operations, as the cause of all

things, are the results of intelligence and free will. The former

regards the Supreme Being as the cause of the world- whether by the

necessity of his nature, or as a free agent, is left undetermined; the

latter considers this being as the author of the world.

Transcendental theology aims either at inferring the existence of

a Supreme Being from a general experience, without any closer

reference to the world to which this experience belongs, and in this

case it is called cosmotheology; or it endeavours to cognize the

existence of such a being, through mere conceptions, without the aid

of experience, and is then termed ontotheology.

Natural theology infers the attributes and the existence of an

author of the world, from the constitution of, the order and unity

observable in, the world, in which two modes of causality must be

admitted to exist- those of nature and freedom. Thus it rises from

this world to a supreme intelligence, either as the principle of all

natural, or of all moral order and perfection. In the former case it

is termed physico-theology, in the latter, ethical or moral-theology.*

*Not theological ethics; for this science contains ethical laws,

which presuppose the existence of a Supreme Governor of the world;

while moral-theology, on the contrary, is the expression of a

conviction of the existence of a Supreme Being, founded upon ethical

laws.

As we are wont to understand by the term God not merely an eternal

nature, the operations of which are insensate and blind, but a Supreme

Being, who is the free and intelligent author of all things, and as it

is this latter view alone that can be of interest to humanity, we

might, in strict rigour, deny to the deist any belief in God at all,

and regard him merely as a maintainer of the existence of a primal

being or thing- the supreme cause of all other things. But, as no

one ought to be blamed, merely because he does not feel himself

justified in maintaining a certain opinion, as if he altogether denied

its truth and asserted the opposite, it is more correct- as it is less

harsh- to say, the deist believes in a God, the theist in a living God

(summa intelligentia). We shall now proceed to investigate the sources

of all these attempts of reason to establish the existence of a

Supreme Being.

It may be sufficient in this place to define theoretical knowledge

or cognition as knowledge of that which is, and practical knowledge as

knowledge of that which ought to be. In this view, the theoretical

employment of reason is that by which I cognize a priori (as

necessary) that something is, while the practical is that by which I

cognize a priori what ought to happen. Now, if it is an indubitably

certain, though at the same time an entirely conditioned truth, that

something is, or ought to happen, either a certain determinate

condition of this truth is absolutely necessary, or such a condition

may be arbitrarily presupposed. In the former case the condition is

postulated (per thesin), in the latter supposed (per hypothesin).

There are certain practical laws- those of morality- which are

absolutely necessary. Now, if these laws necessarily presuppose the

existence of some being, as the condition of the possibility of

their obligatory power, this being must be postulated, because the

conditioned, from which we reason to this determinate condition, is

itself cognized a priori as absolutely necessary. We shall at some

future time show that the moral laws not merely presuppose the

existence of a Supreme Being, but also, as themselves absolutely

necessary in a different relation, demand or postulate it- although

only from a practical point of view. The discussion of this argument

we postpone for the present.

When the question relates merely to that which is, not to that which

ought to be, the conditioned which is presented in experience is

always cogitated as contingent. For this reason its condition cannot

be regarded as absolutely necessary, but merely as relatively

necessary, or rather as needful; the condition is in itself and a

priori a mere arbitrary presupposition in aid of the cognition, by

reason, of the conditioned. If, then, we are to possess a

theoretical cognition of the absolute necessity of a thing, we

cannot attain to this cognition otherwise than a priori by means of

conceptions; while it is impossible in this way to cognize the

existence of a cause which bears any relation to an existence given in

experience.

Theoretical cognition is speculative when it relates to an object or

certain conceptions of an object which is not given and cannot be

discovered by means of experience. It is opposed to the cognition of

nature, which concerns only those objects or predicates which can be

presented in a possible experience.

The principle that everything which happens (the empirically

contingent) must have a cause, is a principle of the cognition of

nature, but not of speculative cognition. For, if we change it into an

abstract principle, and deprive it of its reference to experience

and the empirical, we shall find that it cannot with justice be

regarded any longer as a synthetical proposition, and that it is

impossible to discover any mode of transition from that which exists

to something entirely different- termed cause. Nay, more, the

conception of a cause likewise that of the contingent- loses, in

this speculative mode of employing it, all significance, for its

objective reality and meaning are comprehensible from experience

alone.

When from the existence of the universe and the things in it the

existence of a cause of the universe is inferred, reason is proceeding

not in the natural, but in the speculative method. For the principle

of the former enounces, not that things themselves or substances,

but only that which happens or their states- as empirically

contingent, have a cause: the assertion that the existence of

substance itself is contingent is not justified by experience, it is

the assertion of a reason employing its principles in a speculative

manner. If, again, I infer from the form of the universe, from the way

in which all things are connected and act and react upon each other,

the existence of a cause entirely distinct from the universe- this

would again be a judgement of purely speculative reason; because the

object in this case- the cause- can never be an object of possible

experience. In both these cases the principle of causality, which is

valid only in the field of experience- useless and even meaningless

beyond this region, would be diverted from its proper destination.

Now I maintain that all attempts of reason to establish a theology

by the aid of speculation alone are fruitless, that the principles

of reason as applied to nature do not conduct us to any theological

truths, and, consequently, that a rational theology can have no

existence, unless it is founded upon the laws of morality. For all

synthetical principles of the understanding are valid only as immanent

in experience; while the cognition of a Supreme Being necessitates

their being employed transcendentally, and of this the understanding

is quite incapable. If the empirical law of causality is to conduct us

to a Supreme Being, this being must belong to the chain of empirical

objects- in which case it would be, like all phenomena, itself

conditioned. If the possibility of passing the limits of experience be

admitted, by means of the dynamical law of the relation of an effect

to its cause, what kind of conception shall we obtain by this

procedure? Certainly not the conception of a Supreme Being, because

experience never presents us with the greatest of all possible

effects, and it is only an effect of this character that could witness

to the existence of a corresponding cause. If, for the purpose of

fully satisfying the requirements of Reason, we recognize her right to

assert the existence of a perfect and absolutely necessary being, this

can be admitted only from favour, and cannot be regarded as the result

or irresistible demonstration. The physico-theological proof may add

weight to others- if other proofs there are- by connecting speculation

with experience; but in itself it rather prepares the mind for

theological cognition, and gives it a right and natural direction,

than establishes a sure foundation for theology.

It is now perfectly evident that transcendental questions admit only

of transcendental answers- those presented a priori by pure

conceptions without the least empirical admixture. But the question in

the present case is evidently synthetical- it aims at the extension of

our cognition beyond the bounds of experience- it requires an

assurance respecting the existence of a being corresponding with the

idea in our minds, to which no experience can ever be adequate. Now it

has been abundantly proved that all a priori synthetical cognition

is possible only as the expression of the formal conditions of a

possible experience; and that the validity of all principles depends

upon their immanence in the field of experience, that is, their

relation to objects of empirical cognition or phenomena. Thus all

transcendental procedure in reference to speculative theology is

without result.

If any one prefers doubting the conclusiveness of the proofs of

our analytic to losing the persuasion of the validity of these old and

time honoured arguments, he at least cannot decline answering the

question- how he can pass the limits of all possible experience by the

help of mere ideas. If he talks of new arguments, or of improvements

upon old arguments, I request him to spare me. There is certainly no

great choice in this sphere of discussion, as all speculative

arguments must at last look for support to the ontological, and I

have, therefore, very little to fear from the argumentative

fecundity of the dogmatical defenders of a non-sensuous reason.

Without looking upon myself as a remarkably combative person, I

shall not decline the challenge to detect the fallacy and destroy

the pretensions of every attempt of speculative theology. And yet

the hope of better fortune never deserts those who are accustomed to

the dogmatical mode of procedure. I shall, therefore, restrict

myself to the simple and equitable demand that such reasoners will

demonstrate, from the nature of the human mind as well as from that of

the other sources of knowledge, how we are to proceed to extend our

cognition completely a priori, and to carry it to that point where

experience abandons us, and no means exist of guaranteeing the

objective reality of our conceptions. In whatever way the

understanding may have attained to a conception, the existence of

the object of the conception cannot be discovered in it by analysis,

because the cognition of the existence of the object depends upon

the object's being posited and given in itself apart from the

conception. But it is utterly impossible to go beyond our

conception, without the aid of experience- which presents to the

mind nothing but phenomena, or to attain by the help of mere

conceptions to a conviction of the existence of new kinds of objects

or supernatural beings.

But although pure speculative reason is far from sufficient to

demonstrate the existence of a Supreme Being, it is of the highest

utility in correcting our conception of this being- on the supposition

that we can attain to the cognition of it by some other means- in

making it consistent with itself and with all other conceptions of