第 72 页

differences of species limit each other, and do not admit of

transition from one to another by a saltus, but only through smaller

degrees of the difference between the one species and the other. In

one word, there are no species or sub-species which (in the view of

reason) are the nearest possible to each other; intermediate species

or sub-species being always possible, the difference of which from

each of the former is always smaller than the difference existing

between these.

The first law, therefore, directs us to avoid the notion that

there exist different primal genera, and enounces the fact of

perfect homogeneity; the second imposes a check upon this tendency

to unity and prescribes the distinction of sub-species, before

proceeding to apply our general conceptions to individuals. The

third unites both the former, by enouncing the fact of homogeneity

as existing even in the most various diversity, by means of the

gradual transition from one species to another. Thus it indicates a

relationship between the different branches or species, in so far as

they all spring from the same stem.

But this logical law of the continuum specierum (formarum logicarum)

presupposes a transcendental principle (lex continui in natura),

without which the understanding might be led into error, by

following the guidance of the former, and thus perhaps pursuing a path

contrary to that prescribed by nature. This law must, consequently, be

based upon pure transcendental, and not upon empirical,

considerations. For, in the latter case, it would come later than

the system; whereas it is really itself the parent of all that is

systematic in our cognition of nature. These principles are not mere

hypotheses employed for the purpose of experimenting upon nature;

although when any such connection is discovered, it forms a solid

ground for regarding the hypothetical unity as valid in the sphere

of nature- and thus they are in this respect not without their use.

But we go farther, and maintain that it is manifest that these

principles of parsimony in fundamental causes, variety in effects, and

affinity in phenomena, are in accordance both with reason and

nature, and that they are not mere methods or plans devised for the

purpose of assisting us in our observation of the external world.

But it is plain that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to

which no adequate object can be discovered in experience. And this for

two reasons. First, because the species in nature are really

divided, and hence form quanta discreta; and, if the gradual

progression through their affinity were continuous, the intermediate

members lying between two given species must be infinite in number,

which is impossible. Secondly, because we cannot make any

determinate empirical use of this law, inasmuch as it does not present

us with any criterion of affinity which could aid us in determining

how far we ought to pursue the graduation of differences: it merely

contains a general indication that it is our duty to seek for and,

if possible, to discover them.

When we arrange these principles of systematic unity in the order

conformable to their employment in experience, they will stand thus:

Variety, Affinity, Unity, each of them, as ideas, being taken in the

highest degree of their completeness. Reason presupposes the existence

of cognitions of the understanding, which have a direct relation to

experience, and aims at the ideal unity of these cognitions- a unity

which far transcends all experience or empirical notions. The affinity

of the diverse, notwithstanding the differences existing between its

parts, has a relation to things, but a still closer one to the mere

properties and powers of things. For example, imperfect experience may

represent the orbits of the planets as circular. But we discover

variations from this course, and we proceed to suppose that the

planets revolve in a path which, if not a circle, is of a character

very similar to it. That is to say, the movements of those planets

which do not form a circle will approximate more or less to the

properties of a circle, and probably form an ellipse. The paths of

comets exhibit still greater variations, for, so far as our

observation extends, they do not return upon their own course in a

circle or ellipse. But we proceed to the conjecture that comets

describe a parabola, a figure which is closely allied to the

ellipse. In fact, a parabola is merely an ellipse, with its longer

axis produced to an indefinite extent. Thus these principles conduct

us to a unity in the genera of the forms of these orbits, and,

proceeding farther, to a unity as regards the cause of the motions

of the heavenly bodies- that is, gravitation. But we go on extending

our conquests over nature, and endeavour to explain all seeming

deviations from these rules, and even make additions to our system

which no experience can ever substantiate- for example, the theory, in

affinity with that of ellipses, of hyperbolic paths of comets,

pursuing which, these bodies leave our solar system and, passing

from sun to sun, unite the most distant parts of the infinite

universe, which is held together by the same moving power.

The most remarkable circumstance connected with these principles

is that they seem to be transcendental, and, although only

containing ideas for the guidance of the empirical exercise of reason,

and although this empirical employment stands to these ideas in an

asymptotic relation alone (to use a mathematical term), that is,

continually approximate, without ever being able to attain to them,

they possess, notwithstanding, as a priori synthetical propositions,

objective though undetermined validity, and are available as rules for

possible experience. In the elaboration of our experience, they may

also be employed with great advantage, as heuristic* principles. A

transcendental deduction of them cannot be made; such a deduction

being always impossible in the case of ideas, as has been already

shown.

*From the Greek, eurhioko.

We distinguished, in the Transcendental Analytic, the dynamical

principles of the understanding, which are regulative principles of

intuition, from the mathematical, which are constitutive principles of

intuition. These dynamical laws are, however, constitutive in relation

to experience, inasmuch as they render the conceptions without which

experience could not exist possible a priori. But the principles of

pure reason cannot be constitutive even in regard to empirical

conceptions, because no sensuous schema corresponding to them can be

discovered, and they cannot therefore have an object in concreto. Now,

if I grant that they cannot be employed in the sphere of experience,

as constitutive principles, how shall I secure for them employment and

objective validity as regulative principles, and in what way can

they be so employed?

The understanding is the object of reason, as sensibility is the

object of the understanding. The production of systematic unity in all

the empirical operations of the understanding is the proper occupation

of reason; just as it is the business of the understanding to

connect the various content of phenomena by means of conceptions,

and subject them to empirical laws. But the operations of the

understanding are, without the schemata of sensibility,

undetermined; and, in the same manner, the unity of reason is

perfectly undetermined as regards the conditions under which, and

the extent to which, the understanding ought to carry the systematic

connection of its conceptions. But, although it is impossible to

discover in intuition a schema for the complete systematic unity of

all the conceptions of the understanding, there must be some

analogon of this schema. This analogon is the idea of the maximum of

the division and the connection of our cognition in one principle. For

we may have a determinate notion of a maximum and an absolutely

perfect, all the restrictive conditions which are connected with an

indeterminate and various content having been abstracted. Thus the

idea of reason is analogous with a sensuous schema, with this

difference, that the application of the categories to the schema of

reason does not present a cognition of any object (as is the case with

the application of the categories to sensuous schemata), but merely

provides us with a rule or principle for the systematic unity of the

exercise of the understanding. Now, as every principle which imposes

upon the exercise of the understanding a priori compliance with the

rule of systematic unity also relates, although only in an indirect

manner, to an object of experience, the principles of pure reason will

also possess objective reality and validity in relation to experience.

But they will not aim at determining our knowledge in regard to any

empirical object; they will merely indicate the procedure, following

which the empirical and determinate exercise of the understanding

may be in complete harmony and connection with itself- a result

which is produced by its being brought into harmony with the principle

of systematic unity, so far as that is possible, and deduced from it.

I term all subjective principles, which are not derived from

observation of the constitution of an object, but from the interest

which Reason has in producing a certain completeness in her

cognition of that object, maxims of reason. Thus there are maxims of

speculative reason, which are based solely upon its speculative

interest, although they appear to be objective principles.

When principles which are really regulative are regarded as

constitutive, and employed as objective principles, contradictions

must arise; but if they are considered as mere maxims, there is no

room for contradictions of any kind, as they then merely indicate

the different interests of reason, which occasion differences in the

mode of thought. In effect, Reason has only one single interest, and

the seeming contradiction existing between her maxims merely indicates

a difference in, and a reciprocal limitation of, the methods by

which this interest is satisfied.

This reasoner has at heart the interest of diversity- in

accordance with the principle of specification; another, the

interest of unity- in accordance with the principle of aggregation.

Each believes that his judgement rests upon a thorough insight into

the subject he is examining, and yet it has been influenced solely

by a greater or less degree of adherence to some one of the two

principles, neither of which are objective, but originate solely

from the interest of reason, and on this account to be termed maxims

rather than principles. When I observe intelligent men disputing about

the distinctive characteristics of men, animals, or plants, and even

of minerals, those on the one side assuming the existence of certain

national characteristics, certain well-defined and hereditary

distinctions of family, race, and so on, while the other side maintain

that nature has endowed all races of men with the same faculties and

dispositions, and that all differences are but the result of

external and accidental circumstances- I have only to consider for a

moment the real nature of the subject of discussion, to arrive at

the conclusion that it is a subject far too deep for us to judge of,

and that there is little probability of either party being able to

speak from a perfect insight into and understanding of the nature of

the subject itself. Both have, in reality, been struggling for the

twofold interest of reason; the one maintaining the one interest,

the other the other. But this difference between the maxims of

diversity and unity may easily be reconciled and adjusted; although,

so long as they are regarded as objective principles, they must

occasion not only contradictions and polemic, but place hinderances in

the way of the advancement of truth, until some means is discovered of

reconciling these conflicting interests, and bringing reason into

union and harmony with itself.

The same is the case with the so-called law discovered by

Leibnitz, and supported with remarkable ability by Bonnet- the law

of the continuous gradation of created beings, which is nothing more

than an inference from the principle of affinity; for observation

and study of the order of nature could never present it to the mind as

an objective truth. The steps of this ladder, as they appear in

experience, are too far apart from each other, and the so-called petty

differences between different kinds of animals are in nature

commonly so wide separations that no confidence can be placed in

such views (particularly when we reflect on the great variety of

things, and the ease with which we can discover resemblances), and

no faith in the laws which are said to express the aims and purposes

of nature. On the other hand, the method of investigating the order of

nature in the light of this principle, and the maxim which requires us

to regard this order- it being still undetermined how far it

extends- as really existing in nature, is beyond doubt a legitimate

and excellent principle of reason- a principle which extends farther

than any experience or observation of ours and which, without giving

us any positive knowledge of anything in the region of experience,

guides us to the goal of systematic unity.

Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason.

The ideas of pure reason cannot be, of themselves and in their own

nature, dialectical; it is from their misemployment alone that

fallacies and illusions arise. For they originate in the nature of

reason itself, and it is impossible that this supreme tribunal for all

the rights and claims of speculation should be itself undeserving of

confidence and promotive of error. It is to be expected, therefore,

that these ideas have a genuine and legitimate aim. It is true, the

mob of sophists raise against reason the cry of inconsistency and

contradiction, and affect to despise the government of that faculty,

because they cannot understand its constitution, while it is to its

beneficial influences alone that they owe the position and the