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intelligence which enable them to criticize and to blame its

procedure.

We cannot employ an a priori conception with certainty, until we

have made a transcendental deduction therefore. The ideas of pure

reason do not admit of the same kind of deduction as the categories.

But if they are to possess the least objective validity, and to

represent anything but mere creations of thought (entia rationis

ratiocinantis), a deduction of them must be possible. This deduction

will complete the critical task imposed upon pure reason; and it is to

this part Of our labours that we now proceed.

There is a great difference between a thing's being presented to the

mind as an object in an absolute sense, or merely as an ideal

object. In the former case I employ my conceptions to determine the

object; in the latter case nothing is present to the mind but a mere

schema, which does not relate directly to an object, not even in a

hypothetical sense, but which is useful only for the purpose of

representing other objects to the mind, in a mediate and indirect

manner, by means of their relation to the idea in the intellect.

Thus I say the conception of a supreme intelligence is a mere idea;

that is to say, its objective reality does not consist in the fact

that it has an immediate relation to an object (for in this sense we

have no means of establishing its objective validity), it is merely

a schema constructed according to the necessary conditions of the

unity of reason- the schema of a thing in general, which is useful

towards the production of the highest degree of systematic unity in

the empirical exercise of reason, in which we deduce this or that

object of experience from the imaginary object of this idea, as the

ground or cause of the said object of experience. In this way, the

idea is properly a heuristic, and not an ostensive, conception; it

does not give us any information respecting the constitution of an

object, it merely indicates how, under the guidance of the idea, we

ought to investigate the constitution and the relations of objects

in the world of experience. Now, if it can be shown that the three

kinds of transcendental ideas (psychological, cosmological, and

theological), although not relating directly to any object nor

determining it, do nevertheless, on the supposition of the existence

of an ideal object, produce systematic unity in the laws of the

empirical employment of the reason, and extend our empirical

cognition, without ever being inconsistent or in opposition with it-

it must be a necessary maxim of reason to regulate its procedure

according to these ideas. And this forms the transcendental

deduction of all speculative ideas, not as constitutive principles

of the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of our experience,

but as regulative principles of the systematic unity of empirical

cognition, which is by the aid of these ideas arranged and emended

within its own proper limits, to an extent unattainable by the

operation of the principles of the understanding alone.

I shall make this plainer. Guided by the principles involved in

these ideas, we must, in the first place, so connect all the

phenomena, actions, and feelings of the mind, as if it were a simple

substance, which, endowed with personal identity, possesses a

permanent existence (in this life at least), while its states, among

which those of the body are to be included as external conditions, are

in continual change. Secondly, in cosmology, we must investigate the

conditions of all natural phenomena, internal as well as external,

as if they belonged to a chain infinite and without any prime or

supreme member, while we do not, on this account, deny the existence

of intelligible grounds of these phenomena, although we never employ

them to explain phenomena, for the simple reason that they are not

objects of our cognition. Thirdly, in the sphere of theology, we

must regard the whole system of possible experience as forming an

absolute, but dependent and sensuously-conditioned unity, and at the

same time as based upon a sole, supreme, and all-sufficient ground

existing apart from the world itself- a ground which is a

self-subsistent, primeval and creative reason, in relation to which we

so employ our reason in the field of experience, as if all objects

drew their origin from that archetype of all reason. In other words,

we ought not to deduce the internal phenomena of the mind from a

simple thinking substance, but deduce them from each other under the

guidance of the regulative idea of a simple being; we ought not to

deduce the phenomena, order, and unity of the universe from a

supreme intelligence, but merely draw from this idea of a supremely

wise cause the rules which must guide reason in its connection of

causes and effects.

Now there is nothing to hinder us from admitting these ideas to

possess an objective and hyperbolic existence, except the cosmological

ideas, which lead reason into an antinomy: the psychological and

theological ideas are not antinomial. They contain no contradiction;

and how, then, can any one dispute their objective reality, since he

who denies it knows as little about their possibility as we who

affirm? And yet, when we wish to admit the existence of a thing, it is

not sufficient to convince ourselves that there is no positive

obstacle in the way; for it cannot be allowable to regard mere

creations of thought, which transcend, though they do not

contradict, all our conceptions, as real and determinate objects,

solely upon the authority of a speculative reason striving to

compass its own aims. They cannot, therefore, be admitted to be real

in themselves; they can only possess a comparative reality- that of

a schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all

cognition. They are to be regarded not as actual things, but as in

some measure analogous to them. We abstract from the object of the

idea all the conditions which limit the exercise of our understanding,

but which, on the other hand, are the sole conditions of our

possessing a determinate conception of any given thing. And thus we

cogitate a something, of the real nature of which we have not the

least conception, but which we represent to ourselves as standing in a

relation to the whole system of phenomena, analogous to that in

which phenomena stand to each other.

By admitting these ideal beings, we do not really extend our

cognitions beyond the objects of possible experience; we extend merely

the empirical unity of our experience, by the aid of systematic unity,

the schema of which is furnished by the idea, which is therefore

valid- not as a constitutive, but as a regulative principle. For

although we posit a thing corresponding to the idea- a something, an

actual existence- we do not on that account aim at the extension of

our cognition by means of transcendent conceptions. This existence

is purely ideal, and not objective; it is the mere expression of the

systematic unity which is to be the guide of reason in the field of

experience. There are no attempts made at deciding what the ground

of this unity may be, or what the real nature of this imaginary being.

Thus the transcendental and only determinate conception of God,

which is presented to us by speculative reason, is in the strictest

sense deistic. In other words, reason does not assure us of the

objective validity of the conception; it merely gives us the idea of

something, on which the supreme and necessary unity of all

experience is based. This something we cannot, following the analogy

of a real substance, cogitate otherwise than as the cause of all

things operating in accordance with rational laws, if we regard it

as an individual object; although we should rest contented with the

idea alone as a regulative principle of reason, and make no attempt at

completing the sum of the conditions imposed by thought. This

attempt is, indeed, inconsistent with the grand aim of complete

systematic unity in the sphere of cognition- a unity to which no

bounds are set by reason.

Hence it happens that, admitting a divine being, I can have no

conception of the internal possibility of its perfection, or of the

necessity of its existence. The only advantage of this admission is

that it enables me to answer all other questions relating to the

contingent, and to give reason the most complete satisfaction as

regards the unity which it aims at attaining in the world of

experience. But I cannot satisfy reason with regard to this hypothesis

itself; and this proves that it is not its intelligence and insight

into the subject, but its speculative interest alone which induces

it to proceed from a point lying far beyond the sphere of our

cognition, for the purpose of being able to consider all objects as

parts of a systematic whole.

Here a distinction presents itself, in regard to the way in which we

may cogitate a presupposition- a distinction which is somewhat subtle,

but of great importance in transcendental philosophy. I may have

sufficient grounds to admit something, or the existence of

something, in a relative point of view (suppositio relativa),

without being justified in admitting it in an absolute sense

(suppositio absoluta). This distinction is undoubtedly requisite, in

the case of a regulative principle, the necessity of which we

recognize, though we are ignorant of the source and cause of that

necessity, and which we assume to be based upon some ultimate

ground, for the purpose of being able to cogitate the universality

of the principle in a more determinate way. For example, I cogitate

the existence of a being corresponding to a pure transcendental

idea. But I cannot admit that this being exists absolutely and in

itself, because all of the conceptions by which I can cogitate an

object in a determinate manner fall short of assuring me of its

existence; nay, the conditions of the objective validity of my

conceptions are excluded by the idea- by the very fact of its being an

idea. The conceptions of reality, substance, causality, nay, even that

of necessity in existence, have no significance out of the sphere of

empirical cognition, and cannot, beyond that sphere, determine any

object. They may, accordingly, be employed to explain the

possibility of things in the world of sense, but they are utterly

inadequate to explain the possibility of the universe itself

considered as a whole; because in this case the ground of

explanation must lie out of and beyond the world, and cannot,

therefore, be an object of possible experience. Now, I may admit the

existence of an incomprehensible being of this nature- the object of a

mere idea, relatively to the world of sense; although I have no ground

to admit its existence absolutely and in itself. For if an idea

(that of a systematic and complete unity, of which I shall presently

speak more particularly) lies at the foundation of the most extended

empirical employment of reason, and if this idea cannot be

adequately represented in concreto, although it is indispensably

necessary for the approximation of empirical unity to the highest

possible degree- I am not only authorized, but compelled, to realize

this idea, that is, to posit a real object corresponding thereto.

But I cannot profess to know this object; it is to me merely a

something, to which, as the ground of systematic unity in cognition, I

attribute such properties as are analogous to the conceptions employed

by the understanding in the sphere of experience. Following the

analogy of the notions of reality, substance, causality, and

necessity, I cogitate a being, which possesses all these attributes in

the highest degree; and, as this idea is the offspring of my reason

alone, I cogitate this being as self-subsistent reason, and as the

cause of the universe operating by means of ideas of the greatest

possible harmony and unity. Thus I abstract all conditions that

would limit my idea, solely for the purpose of rendering systematic

unity possible in the world of empirical diversity, and thus

securing the widest possible extension for the exercise of reason in

that sphere. This I am enabled to do, by regarding all connections and

relations in the world of sense, as if they were the dispositions of a

supreme reason, of which our reason is but a faint image. I then

proceed to cogitate this Supreme Being by conceptions which have,

properly, no meaning or application, except in the world of sense. But

as I am authorized to employ the transcendental hypothesis of such a

being in a relative respect alone, that is, as the substratum of the

greatest possible unity in experience- I may attribute to a being

which I regard as distinct from the world, such properties as belong

solely to the sphere of sense and experience. For I do not desire, and

am not justified in desiring, to cognize this object of my idea, as it

exists in itself; for I possess no conceptions sufficient for or task,

those of reality, substance, causality, nay, even that of necessity in

existence, losing all significance, and becoming merely the signs of

conceptions, without content and without applicability, when I attempt

to carry them beyond the limits of the world of sense. I cogitate

merely the relation of a perfectly unknown being to the greatest

possible systematic unity of experience, solely for the purpose of

employing it as the schema of the regulative principle which directs

reason in its empirical exercise.

It is evident, at the first view, that we cannot presuppose the

reality of this transcendental object, by means of the conceptions

of reality, substance, causality, and so on, because these conceptions

cannot be applied to anything that is distinct from the world of

sense. Thus the supposition of a Supreme Being or cause is purely

relative; it is cogitated only in behalf of the systematic unity of

experience; such a being is but a something, of whose existence in

itself we have not the least conception. Thus, too, it becomes

sufficiently manifest why we required the idea of a necessary being in

relation to objects given by sense, although we can never have the