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least conception of this being, or of its absolute necessity.

And now we can clearly perceive the result of our transcendental

dialectic, and the proper aim of the ideas of pure reason- which

become dialectical solely from misunderstanding and inconsiderateness.

Pure reason is, in fact, occupied with itself, and not with any

object. Objects are not presented to it to be embraced in the unity of

an empirical conception; it is only the cognitions of the

understanding that are presented to it, for the purpose of receiving

the unity of a rational conception, that is, of being connected

according to a principle. The unity of reason is the unity of

system; and this systematic unity is not an objective principle,

extending its dominion over objects, but a subjective maxim, extending

its authority over the empirical cognition of objects. The

systematic connection which reason gives to the empirical employment

of the understanding not only advances the extension of that

employment, but ensures its correctness, and thus the principle of a

systematic unity of this nature is also objective, although only in an

indefinite respect (principium vagum). It is not, however, a

constitutive principle, determining an object to which it directly

relates; it is merely a regulative principle or maxim, advancing and

strengthening the empirical exercise of reason, by the opening up of

new paths of which the understanding is ignorant, while it never

conflicts with the laws of its exercise in the sphere of experience.

But reason cannot cogitate this systematic unity, without at the

same time cogitating an object of the idea- an object that cannot be

presented in any experience, which contains no concrete example of a

complete systematic unity. This being (ens rationis ratiocinatae) is

therefore a mere idea and is not assumed to be a thing which is real

absolutely and in itself. On the contrary, it forms merely the

problematical foundation of the connection which the mind introduces

among the phenomena of the sensuous world. We look upon this

connection, in the light of the above-mentioned idea, as if it drew

its origin from the supposed being which corresponds to the idea.

And yet all we aim at is the possession of this idea as a secure

foundation for the systematic unity of experience- a unity

indispensable to reason, advantageous to the understanding, and

promotive of the interests of empirical cognition.

We mistake the true meaning of this idea when we regard it as an

enouncement, or even as a hypothetical declaration of the existence of

a real thing, which we are to regard as the origin or ground of a

systematic constitution of the universe. On the contrary, it is left

completely undetermined what the nature or properties of this

so-called ground may be. The idea is merely to be adopted as a point

of view, from which this unity, so essential to reason and so

beneficial to the understanding, may be regarded as radiating. In

one word, this transcendental thing is merely the schema of a

regulative principle, by means of which Reason, so far as in her lies,

extends the dominion of systematic unity over the whole sphere of

experience.

The first object of an idea of this kind is the ego, considered

merely as a thinking nature or soul. If I wish to investigate the

properties of a thinking being, I must interrogate experience. But I

find that I can apply none of the categories to this object, the

schema of these categories, which is the condition of their

application, being given only in sensuous intuition. But I cannot thus

attain to the cognition of a systematic unity of all the phenomena

of the internal sense. Instead, therefore, of an empirical

conception of what the soul really is, reason takes the conception

of the empirical unity of all thought, and, by cogitating this unity

as unconditioned and primitive, constructs the rational conception

or idea of a simple substance which is in itself unchangeable,

possessing personal identity, and in connection with other real things

external to it; in one word, it constructs the idea of a simple

self-subsistent intelligence. But the real aim of reason in this

procedure is the attainment of principles of systematic unity for

the explanation of the phenomena of the soul. That is, reason

desires to be able to represent all the determinations of the internal

sense as existing in one subject, all powers as deduced from one

fundamental power, all changes as mere varieties in the condition of a

being which is permanent and always the same, and all phenomena in

space as entirely different in their nature from the procedure of

thought. Essential simplicity (with the other attributes predicated of

the ego) is regarded as the mere schema of this regulative

principle; it is not assumed that it is the actual ground of the

properties of the soul. For these properties may rest upon quite

different grounds, of which we are completely ignorant; just as the

above predicates could not give us any knowledge of the soul as it

is in itself, even if we regarded them as valid in respect of it,

inasmuch as they constitute a mere idea, which cannot be represented

in concreto. Nothing but good can result from a psychological idea

of this kind, if we only take proper care not to consider it as more

than an idea; that is, if we regard it as valid merely in relation

to the employment of reason, in the sphere of the phenomena of the

soul. Under the guidance of this idea, or principle, no empirical laws

of corporeal phenomena are called in to explain that which is a

phenomenon of the internal sense alone; no windy hypotheses of the

generation, annihilation, and palingenesis of souls are admitted. Thus

the consideration of this object of the internal sense is kept pure,

and unmixed with heterogeneous elements; while the investigation of

reason aims at reducing all the grounds of explanation employed in

this sphere of knowledge to a single principle. All this is best

effected, nay, cannot be effected otherwise than by means of such a

schema, which requires us to regard this ideal thing as an actual

existence. The psychological idea is, therefore, meaningless and

inapplicable, except as the schema of a regulative conception. For, if

I ask whether the soul is not really of a spiritual nature- it is a

question which has no meaning. From such a conception has been

abstracted, not merely all corporeal nature, but all nature, that

is, all the predicates of a possible experience; and consequently, all

the conditions which enable us to cogitate an object to this

conception have disappeared. But, if these conditions are absent, it

is evident that the conception is meaningless.

The second regulative idea of speculative reason is the conception

of the universe. For nature is properly the only object presented to

us, in regard to which reason requires regulative principles. Nature

is twofold- thinking and corporeal nature. To cogitate the latter in

regard to its internal possibility, that is, to determine the

application of the categories to it, no idea is required- no

representation which transcends experience. In this sphere, therefore,

an idea is impossible, sensuous intuition being our only guide; while,

in the sphere of psychology, we require the fundamental idea (I),

which contains a priori a certain form of thought namely, the unity of

the ego. Pure reason has, therefore, nothing left but nature in

general, and the completeness of conditions in nature in accordance

with some principle. The absolute totality of the series of these

conditions is an idea, which can never be fully realized in the

empirical exercise of reason, while it is serviceable as a rule for

the procedure of reason in relation to that totality. It requires

us, in the explanation of given phenomena (in the regress or ascent in

the series), to proceed as if the series were infinite in itself, that

is, were prolonged in indefinitum,; while on the other hand, where

reason is regarded as itself the determining cause (in the region of

freedom), we are required to proceed as if we had not before us an

object of sense, but of the pure understanding. In this latter case,

the conditions do not exist in the series of phenomena, but may be

placed quite out of and beyond it, and the series of conditions may be

regarded as if it had an absolute beginning from an intelligible

cause. All this proves that the cosmological ideas are nothing but

regulative principles, and not constitutive; and that their aim is not

to realize an actual totality in such series. The full discussion of

this subject will be found in its proper place in the chapter on the

antinomy of pure reason.

The third idea of pure reason, containing the hypothesis of a

being which is valid merely as a relative hypothesis, is that of the

one and all-sufficient cause of all cosmological series, in other

words, the idea of God. We have not the slightest ground absolutely to

admit the existence of an object corresponding to this idea; for

what can empower or authorize us to affirm the existence of a being of

the highest perfection- a being whose existence is absolutely

necessary- merely because we possess the conception of such a being?

The answer is: It is the existence of the world which renders this

hypothesis necessary. But this answer makes it perfectly evident

that the idea of this being, like all other speculative ideas, is

essentially nothing more than a demand upon reason that it shall

regulate the connection which it and its subordinate faculties

introduce into the phenomena of the world by principles of

systematic unity and, consequently, that it shall regard all phenomena

as originating from one all-embracing being, as the supreme and

all-sufficient cause. From this it is plain that the only aim of

reason in this procedure is the establishment of its own formal rule

for the extension of its dominion in the world of experience; that

it does not aim at an extension of its cognition beyond the limits

of experience; and that, consequently, this idea does not contain

any constitutive principle.

The highest formal unity, which is based upon ideas alone, is the

unity of all things- a unity in accordance with an aim or purpose; and

the speculative interest of reason renders it necessary to regard

all order in the world as if it originated from the intention and

design of a supreme reason. This principle unfolds to the view of

reason in the sphere of experience new and enlarged prospects, and

invites it to connect the phenomena of the world according to

teleological laws, and in this way to attain to the highest possible

degree of systematic unity. The hypothesis of a supreme

intelligence, as the sole cause of the universe- an intelligence which

has for us no more than an ideal existence- is accordingly always of

the greatest service to reason. Thus, if we presuppose, in relation to

the figure of the earth (which is round, but somewhat flattened at the

poles),* or that of mountains or seas, wise designs on the part of

an author of the universe, we cannot fail to make, by the light of

this supposition, a great number of interesting discoveries. If we

keep to this hypothesis, as a principle which is purely regulative,

even error cannot be very detrimental. For, in this case, error can

have no more serious consequences than that, where we expected to

discover a teleological connection (nexus finalis), only a

mechanical or physical connection appears. In such a case, we merely

fail to find the additional form of unity we expected, but we do not

lose the rational unity which the mind requires in its procedure in

experience. But even a miscarriage of this sort cannot affect the

law in its general and teleological relations. For although we may

convict an anatomist of an error, when he connects the limb of some

animal with a certain purpose, it is quite impossible to prove in a

single case that any arrangement of nature, be it what it may, is

entirely without aim or design. And thus medical physiology, by the

aid of a principle presented to it by pure reason, extends its very

limited empirical knowledge of the purposes of the different parts

of an organized body so far that it may be asserted with the utmost

confidence, and with the approbation of all reflecting men, that every

organ or bodily part of an animal has its use and answers a certain

design. Now, this is a supposition which, if regarded as of a

constitutive character, goes much farther than any experience or

observation of ours can justify. Hence it is evident that it is

nothing more than a regulative principle of reason, which aims at

the highest degree of systematic unity, by the aid of the idea of a

causality according to design in a supreme cause- a cause which it

regards as the highest intelligence.

*The advantages which a circular form, in the case of the earth, has

over every other, are well known. But few are aware that the slight

flattening at the poles, which gives it the figure of a spheroid, is

the only cause which prevents the elevations of continents or even

of mountains, perhaps thrown up by some internal convulsion, from

continually altering the position of the axis of the earth- and that

to some considerable degree in a short time. The great protuberance of

the earth under the Equator serves to overbalance the impetus of all

other masses of earth, and thus to preserve the axis of the earth,

so far as we can observe, in its present position. And yet this wise

arrangement has been unthinkingly explained from the equilibrium of

the formerly fluid mass.

If, however, we neglect this restriction of the idea to a purely

regulative influence, reason is betrayed into numerous errors. For

it has then left the ground of experience, in which alone are to be

found the criteria of truth, and has ventured into the region of the

incomprehensible and unsearchable, on the heights of which it loses

its power and collectedness, because it has completely severed its

connection with experience.

The first error which arises from our employing the idea of a