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more certain the validity of your idea. But, as the whole aim of

this regulative principle was the discovery of a necessary and

systematic unity in nature, we have, in so far as we attain this, to

attribute our success to the idea of a Supreme Being; while, at the

same time, we cannot, without involving ourselves in contradictions,

overlook the general laws of nature, as it was in reference to them

alone that this idea was employed. We cannot, I say, overlook the

general laws of nature, and regard this conformity to aims

observable in nature as contingent or hyperphysical in its origin;

inasmuch as there is no ground which can justify us in the admission

of a being with such properties distinct from and above nature. All

that we are authorized to assert is that this idea may be employed

as a principle, and that the properties of the being which is

assumed to correspond to it may be regarded as systematically

connected in analogy with the causal determination of phenomena.

For the same reasons we are justified in introducing into the idea

of the supreme cause other anthropomorphic elements (for without these

we could not predicate anything of it); we may regard it as

allowable to cogitate this cause as a being with understanding, the

feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and faculties of desire and will

corresponding to these. At the same time, we may attribute to this

being infinite perfection- a perfection which necessarily transcends

that which our knowledge of the order and design in the world

authorize us to predicate of it. For the regulative law of

systematic unity requires us to study nature on the supposition that

systematic and final unity in infinitum is everywhere discoverable,

even in the highest diversity. For, although we may discover little of

this cosmical perfection, it belongs to the legislative prerogative of

reason to require us always to seek for and to expect it; while it

must always be beneficial to institute all inquiries into nature in

accordance with this principle. But it is evident that, by this idea

of a supreme author of all, which I place as the foundation of all

inquiries into nature, I do not mean to assert the existence of such a

being, or that I have any knowledge of its existence; and,

consequently, I do not really deduce anything from the existence of

this being, but merely from its idea, that is to say, from the

nature of things in this world, in accordance with this idea. A

certain dim consciousness of the true use of this idea seems to have

dictated to the philosophers of all times the moderate language used

by them regarding the cause of the world. We find them employing the

expressions wisdom and care of nature, and divine wisdom, as

synonymous- nay, in purely speculative discussions, preferring the

former, because it does not carry the appearance of greater

pretensions than such as we are entitled to make, and at the same time

directs reason to its proper field of action- nature and her

phenomena.

Thus, pure reason, which at first seemed to promise us nothing

less than the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of

experience, is found, when thoroughly examined, to contain nothing but

regulative principles, the virtue and function of which is to

introduce into our cognition a higher degree of unity than the

understanding could of itself. These principles, by placing the goal

of all our struggles at so great a distance, realize for us the most

thorough connection between the different parts of our cognition,

and the highest degree of systematic unity. But, on the other hand, if

misunderstood and employed as constitutive principles of

transcendent cognition, they become the parents of illusions and

contradictions, while pretending to introduce us to new regions of

knowledge.

Thus all human cognition begins with intuitions, proceeds from

thence to conceptions, and ends with ideas. Although it possesses,

in relation to all three elements, a priori sources of cognition,

which seemed to transcend the limits of all experience, a

thoroughgoing criticism demonstrates that speculative reason can

never, by the aid of these elements, pass the bounds of possible

experience, and that the proper destination of this highest faculty of

cognition is to employ all methods, and all the principles of these

methods, for the purpose of penetrating into the innermost secrets

of nature, by the aid of the principles of unity (among all kinds of

which teleological unity is the highest), while it ought not to

attempt to soar above the sphere of experience, beyond which there

lies nought for us but the void inane. The critical examination, in

our Transcendental Analytic, of all the propositions which professed

to extend cognition beyond the sphere of experience, completely

demonstrated that they can only conduct us to a possible experience.

If we were not distrustful even of the clearest abstract theorems,

if we were not allured by specious and inviting prospects to escape

from the constraining power of their evidence, we might spare

ourselves the laborious examination of all the dialectical arguments

which a transcendent reason adduces in support of its pretensions; for

we should know with the most complete certainty that, however honest

such professions might be, they are null and valueless, because they

relate to a kind of knowledge to which no man can by any possibility

attain. But, as there is no end to discussion, if we cannot discover

the true cause of the illusions by which even the wisest are deceived,

and as the analysis of all our transcendent cognition into its

elements is of itself of no slight value as a psychological study,

while it is a duty incumbent on every philosopher- it was found

necessary to investigate the dialectical procedure of reason in its

primary sources. And as the inferences of which this dialectic is

the parent are not only deceitful, but naturally possess a profound

interest for humanity, it was advisable at the same time, to give a

full account of the momenta of this dialectical procedure, and to

deposit it in the archives of human reason, as a warning to all future

metaphysicians to avoid these causes of speculative error.

METHOD

II.

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD.

If we regard the sum of the cognition of pure speculative reason

as an edifice, the idea of which, at least, exists in the human

mind, it may be said that we have in the Transcendental Doctrine of

Elements examined the materials and determined to what edifice these

belong, and what its height and stability. We have found, indeed,

that, although we had purposed to build for ourselves a tower which

should reach to Heaven, the supply of materials sufficed merely for

a habitation, which was spacious enough for all terrestrial

purposes, and high enough to enable us to survey the level plain of

experience, but that the bold undertaking designed necessarily

failed for want of materials- not to mention the confusion of tongues,

which gave rise to endless disputes among the labourers on the plan of

the edifice, and at last scattered them over all the world, each to

erect a separate building for himself, according to his own plans

and his own inclinations. Our present task relates not to the

materials, but to the plan of an edifice; and, as we have had

sufficient warning not to venture blindly upon a design which may be

found to transcend our natural powers, while, at the same time, we

cannot give up the intention of erecting a secure abode for the

mind, we must proportion our design to the material which is presented

to us, and which is, at the same time, sufficient for all our wants.

I understand, then, by the transcendental doctrine of method, the

determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure

reason. We shall accordingly have to treat of the discipline, the

canon, the architectonic, and, finally, the history of pure reason.

This part of our Critique will accomplish, from the transcendental

point of view, what has been usually attempted, but miserably

executed, under the name of practical logic. It has been badly

executed, I say, because general logic, not being limited to any

particular kind of cognition (not even to the pure cognition of the

understanding) nor to any particular objects, it cannot, without

borrowing from other sciences, do more than present merely the

titles or signs of possible methods and the technical expressions,

which are employed in the systematic parts of all sciences; and thus

the pupil is made acquainted with names, the meaning and application

of which he is to learn only at some future time.

CHAPTER I. The Discipline of Pure Reason.

Negative judgements- those which are so not merely as regards

their logical form, but in respect of their content- are not

commonly held in especial respect. They are, on the contrary, regarded

as jealous enemies of our insatiable desire for knowledge; and it

almost requires an apology to induce us to tolerate, much less to

prize and to respect them.

All propositions, indeed, may be logically expressed in a negative

form; but, in relation to the content of our cognition, the peculiar

province of negative judgements is solely to prevent error. For this

reason, too, negative propositions, which are framed for the purpose

of correcting false cognitions where error is absolutely impossible,

are undoubtedly true, but inane and senseless; that is, they are in

reality purposeless and, for this reason, often very ridiculous.

Such is the proposition of the schoolman that Alexander could not have

subdued any countries without an army.

But where the limits of our possible cognition are very much

contracted, the attraction to new fields of knowledge great, the

illusions to which the mind is subject of the most deceptive

character, and the evil consequences of error of no inconsiderable

magnitude- the negative element in knowledge, which is useful only

to guard us against error, is of far more importance than much of that

positive instruction which makes additions to the sum of our

knowledge. The restraint which is employed to repress, and finally

to extirpate the constant inclination to depart from certain rules, is

termed discipline. It is distinguished from culture, which aims at the

formation of a certain degree of skill, without attempting to

repress or to destroy any other mental power, already existing. In the

cultivation of a talent, which has given evidence of an impulse

towards self-development, discipline takes a negative,* culture and

doctrine a positive, part.

*I am well aware that, in the language of the schools, the term

discipline is usually employed as synonymous with instruction. But

there are so many cases in which it is necessary to distinguish the

notion of the former, as a course of corrective training, from that of

the latter, as the communication of knowledge, and the nature of

things itself demands the appropriation of the most suitable

expressions for this distinction, that it is my desire that the former

terms should never be employed in any other than a negative

signification.

That natural dispositions and talents (such as imagination and with,

which ask a free and unlimited development, require in many respects

the corrective influence of discipline, every one will readily

grant. But it may well appear strange that reason, whose proper duty

it is to prescribe rules of discipline to all the other powers of

the mind, should itself require this corrective. It has, in fact,

hitherto escaped this humiliation, only because, in presence of its

magnificent pretensions and high position, no one could readily

suspect it to be capable of substituting fancies for conceptions,

and words for things.

Reason, when employed in the field of experience, does not stand

in need of criticism, because its principles are subjected to the

continual test of empirical observations. Nor is criticism requisite

in the sphere of mathematics, where the conceptions of reason must

always be presented in concreto in pure intuition, and baseless or

arbitrary assertions are discovered without difficulty. But where

reason is not held in a plain track by the influence of empirical or

of pure intuition, that is, when it is employed in the

transcendental sphere of pure conceptions, it stands in great need

of discipline, to restrain its propensity to overstep the limits of

possible experience and to keep it from wandering into error. In fact,

the utility of the philosophy of pure reason is entirely of this

negative character. Particular errors may be corrected by particular

animadversions, and the causes of these errors may be eradicated by

criticism. But where we find, as in the case of pure reason, a

complete system of illusions and fallacies, closely connected with

each other and depending upon grand general principles, there seems to

be required a peculiar and negative code of mental legislation, which,

under the denomination of a discipline, and founded upon the nature of

reason and the objects of its exercise, shall constitute a system of

thorough examination and testing, which no fallacy will be able to

withstand or escape from, under whatever disguise or concealment it

may lurk.

But the reader must remark that, in this the second division of

our transcendental Critique the discipline of pure reason is not

directed to the content, but to the method of the cognition of pure

reason. The former task has been completed in the doctrine of

elements. But there is so much similarity in the mode of employing the

faculty of reason, whatever be the object to which it is applied,

while, at the same time, its employment in the transcendental sphere

is so essentially different in kind from every other, that, without

the warning negative influence of a discipline specially directed to

that end, the errors are unavoidable which spring from the

unskillful employment of the methods which are originated by reason

but which are out of place in this sphere.