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We may and must, therefore, regard the attempts hitherto made to

establish metaphysical science dogmatically as non-existent. For

what of analysis, that is, mere dissection of conceptions, is

contained in one or other, is not the aim of, but only a preparation

for metaphysics proper, which has for its object the extension, by

means of synthesis, of our a priori knowledge. And for this purpose,

mere analysis is of course useless, because it only shows what is

contained in these conceptions, but not how we arrive, a priori, at

them; and this it is her duty to show, in order to be able

afterwards to determine their valid use in regard to all objects of

experience, to all knowledge in general. But little self-denial,

indeed, is needed to give up these pretensions, seeing the undeniable,

and in the dogmatic mode of procedure, inevitable contradictions of

Reason with herself, have long since ruined the reputation of every

system of metaphysics that has appeared up to this time. It will

require more firmness to remain undeterred by difficulty from

within, and opposition from without, from endeavouring, by a method

quite opposed to all those hitherto followed, to further the growth

and fruitfulness of a science indispensable to human reason- a science

from which every branch it has borne may be cut away, but whose

roots remain indestructible.

VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the

Name of a Critique of Pure Reason.

From all that has been said, there results the idea of a

particular science, which may be called the Critique of Pure Reason.

For reason is the faculty which furnishes us with the principles of

knowledge a priori. Hence, pure reason is the faculty which contains

the principles of cognizing anything absolutely a priori. An organon

of pure reason would be a compendium of those principles according

to which alone all pure cognitions a priori can be obtained. The

completely extended application of such an organon would afford us a

system of pure reason. As this, however, is demanding a great deal,

and it is yet doubtful whether any extension of our knowledge be

here possible, or, if so, in what cases; we can regard a science of

the mere criticism of pure reason, its sources and limits, as the

propaedeutic to a system of pure reason. Such a science must not be

called a doctrine, but only a critique of pure reason; and its use, in

regard to speculation, would be only negative, not to enlarge the

bounds of, but to purify, our reason, and to shield it against

error- which alone is no little gain. I apply the term

transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with

objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far

as this mode of cognition is possible a priori. A system of such

conceptions would be called transcendental philosophy. But this,

again, is still beyond the bounds of our present essay. For as such

a science must contain a complete exposition not only of our

synthetical a priori, but of our analytical a priori knowledge, it

is of too wide a range for our present purpose, because we do not

require to carry our analysis any farther than is necessary to

understand, in their full extent, the principles of synthesis a

priori, with which alone we have to do. This investigation, which we

cannot properly call a doctrine, but only a transcendental critique,

because it aims not at the enlargement, but at the correction and

guidance, of our knowledge, and is to serve as a touchstone of the

worth or worthlessness of all knowledge a priori, is the sole object

of our present essay. Such a critique is consequently, as far as

possible, a preparation for an organon; and if this new organon should

be found to fail, at least for a canon of pure reason, according to

which the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason, whether it

extend or limit the bounds of that reason, might one day be set

forth both analytically and synthetically. For that this is

possible, nay, that such a system is not of so great extent as to

preclude the hope of its ever being completed, is evident. For we have

not here to do with the nature of outward objects, which is

infinite, but solely with the mind, which judges of the nature of

objects, and, again, with the mind only in respect of its cognition

a priori. And the object of our investigations, as it is not to be

sought without, but, altogether within, ourselves, cannot remain

concealed, and in all probability is limited enough to be completely

surveyed and fairly estimated, according to its worth or

worthlessness. Still less let the reader here expect a critique of

books and systems of pure reason; our present object is exclusively

a critique of the faculty of pure reason itself. Only when we make

this critique our foundation, do we possess a pure touchstone for

estimating the philosophical value of ancient and modern writings on

this subject; and without this criterion, the incompetent historian or

judge decides upon and corrects the groundless assertions of others

with his own, which have themselves just as little foundation.

Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for which the

Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan

architectonically, that is, from principles, with a full guarantee for

the validity and stability of all the parts which enter into the

building. It is the system of all the principles of pure reason. If

this Critique itself does not assume the title of transcendental

philosophy, it is only because, to be a complete system, it ought to

contain a full analysis of all human knowledge a priori. Our

critique must, indeed, lay before us a complete enumeration of all the

radical conceptions which constitute the said pure knowledge. But from

the complete analysis of these conceptions themselves, as also from

a complete investigation of those derived from them, it abstains

with reason; partly because it would be deviating from the end in view

to occupy itself with this analysis, since this process is not

attended with the difficulty and insecurity to be found in the

synthesis, to which our critique is entirely devoted, and partly

because it would be inconsistent with the unity of our plan to

burden this essay with the vindication of the completeness of such

an analysis and deduction, with which, after all, we have at present

nothing to do. This completeness of the analysis of these radical

conceptions, as well as of the deduction from the conceptions a priori

which may be given by the analysis, we can, however, easily attain,

provided only that we are in possession of all these radical

conceptions, which are to serve as principles of the synthesis, and

that in respect of this main purpose nothing is wanting.

To the Critique of Pure Reason, therefore, belongs all that

constitutes transcendental philosophy; and it is the complete idea

of transcendental philosophy, but still not the science itself;

because it only proceeds so far with the analysis as is necessary to

the power of judging completely of our synthetical knowledge a priori.

The principal thing we must attend to, in the division of the

parts of a science like this, is that no conceptions must enter it

which contain aught empirical; in other words, that the knowledge a

priori must be completely pure. Hence, although the highest principles

and fundamental conceptions of morality are certainly cognitions a

priori, yet they do not belong to transcendental philosophy;

because, though they certainly do not lay the conceptions of pain,

pleasure, desires, inclinations, etc. (which are all of empirical

origin), at the foundation of its precepts, yet still into the

conception of duty- as an obstacle to be overcome, or as an incitement

which should not be made into a motive- these empirical conceptions

must necessarily enter, in the construction of a system of pure

morality. Transcendental philosophy is consequently a philosophy of

the pure and merely speculative reason. For all that is practical,

so far as it contains motives, relates to feelings, and these belong

to empirical sources of cognition.

If we wish to divide this science from the universal point of view

of a science in general, it ought to comprehend, first, a Doctrine

of the Elements, and, secondly, a Doctrine of the Method of pure

reason. Each of these main divisions will have its subdivisions, the

separate reasons for which we cannot here particularize. Only so

much seems necessary, by way of introduction of premonition, that

there are two sources of human knowledge (which probably spring from a

common, but to us unknown root), namely, sense and understanding. By

the former, objects are given to us; by the latter, thought. So far as

the faculty of sense may contain representations a priori, which

form the conditions under which objects are given, in so far it

belongs to transcendental philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of

sense must form the first part of our science of elements, because the

conditions under which alone the objects of human knowledge are

given must precede those under which they are thought.

I.

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS.

FIRST PART. TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC.

SS I. Introductory.

In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate

to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which

it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition. To this as

the indispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition can

take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again,

is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect

the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving

representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are

affected by objects, objects, is called sensibility. By means of

sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone

furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought,

and from it arise conceptions. But an thought must directly, or

indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to

intuitions; consequently, with us, to sensibility, because in no other

way can an object be given to us.

The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far

as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of

intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called

an empirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical

intuition is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon

corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter; but that which

effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under

certain relations, I call its form. But that in which our sensations

are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a

certain form, cannot be itself sensation. It is, then, the matter of

all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori; the form must lie

ready a priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be

regarded separately from all sensation.

I call all representations pure, in the transcendental meaning of

the word, wherein nothing is met with that belongs to sensation. And

accordingly we find existing in the mind a priori, the pure form of

sensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of

the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations.

This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition. Thus, if

I take away from our representation of a body all that the

understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force,

divisibility, etc., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as

impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc.; yet there is still

something left us from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and

shape. These belong to pure intuition, which exists a priori in the

mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any real object of

the senses or any sensation.

The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori, I call

transcendental aesthetic.* There must, then, be such a science forming

the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in

contradistinction to that part which contains the principles of pure

thought, and which is called transcendental logic.

*The Germans are the only people who at present use this word to

indicate what others call the critique of taste. At the foundation

of this term lies the disappointed hope, which the eminent analyst,

Baumgarten, conceived, of subjecting the criticism of the beautiful to

principles of reason, and so of elevating its rules into a science.

But his endeavours were vain. For the said rules or criteria are, in

respect to their chief sources, merely empirical, consequently never

can serve as determinate laws a priori, by which our judgement in

matters of taste is to be directed. It is rather our judgement which

forms the proper test as to the correctness of the principles. On this

account it is advisable to give up the use of the term as

designating the critique of taste, and to apply it solely to that

doctrine, which is true science- the science of the laws of

sensibility- and thus come nearer to the language and the sense of the

ancients in their well-known division of the objects of cognition into

aiotheta kai noeta, or to share it with speculative philosophy, and

employ it partly in a transcendental, partly in a psychological

signification.

In the science of transcendental aesthetic accordingly, we shall

first isolate sensibility or the sensuous faculty, by separating

from it all that is annexed to its perceptions by the conceptions of

understanding, so that nothing be left but empirical intuition. In the

next place we shall take away from this intuition all that belongs

to sensation, so that nothing may remain but pure intuition, and the

mere form of phenomena, which is all that the sensibility can afford a

priori. From this investigation it will be found that there are two

pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge a priori,