第 80 页

possibility? But it is also demonstratively certain that no one will

ever be able to maintain the contrary with the least show of

probability. For, as he can attempt such a proof solely upon the basis

of pure reason, he is bound to prove that a Supreme Being, and a

thinking subject in the character of a pure intelligence, are

impossible. But where will he find the knowledge which can enable

him to enounce synthetical judgements in regard to things which

transcend the region of experience? We may, therefore, rest assured

that the opposite never will be demonstrated. We need not, then,

have recourse to scholastic arguments; we may always admit the truth

of those propositions which are consistent with the speculative

interests of reason in the sphere of experience, and form, moreover,

the only means of uniting the speculative with the practical interest.

Our opponent, who must not be considered here as a critic solely, we

can be ready to meet with a non liquet which cannot fail to disconcert

him; while we cannot deny his right to a similar retort, as we have on

our side the advantage of the support of the subjective maxim of

reason, and can therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with

calm indifference.

From this point of view, there is properly no antithetic of pure

reason. For the only arena for such a struggle would be upon the field

of pure theology and psychology; but on this ground there can appear

no combatant whom we need to fear. Ridicule and boasting can be his

only weapons; and these may be laughed at, as mere child's play.

This consideration restores to Reason her courage; for what source

of confidence could be found, if she, whose vocation it is to

destroy error, were at variance with herself and without any

reasonable hope of ever reaching a state of permanent repose?

Everything in nature is good for some purpose. Even poisons are

serviceable; they destroy the evil effects of other poisons

generated in our system, and must always find a place in every

complete pharmacopoeia. The objections raised against the fallacies

and sophistries of speculative reason, are objections given by the

nature of this reason itself, and must therefore have a destination

and purpose which can only be for the good of humanity. For what

purpose has Providence raised many objects, in which we have the

deepest interest, so far above us, that we vainly try to cognize

them with certainty, and our powers of mental vision are rather

excited than satisfied by the glimpses we may chance to seize? It is

very doubtful whether it is for our benefit to advance bold

affirmations regarding subjects involved in such obscurity; perhaps it

would even be detrimental to our best interests. But it is undoubtedly

always beneficial to leave the investigating, as well as the

critical reason, in perfect freedom, and permit it to take charge of

its own interests, which are advanced as much by its limitation, as by

its extension of its views, and which always suffer by the

interference of foreign powers forcing it, against its natural

tendencies, to bend to certain preconceived designs.

Allow your opponent to say what he thinks reasonable, and combat him

only with the weapons of reason. Have no anxiety for the practical

interests of humanity- these are never imperilled in a purely

speculative dispute. Such a dispute serves merely to disclose the

antinomy of reason, which, as it has its source in the nature of

reason, ought to be thoroughly investigated. Reason is benefited by

the examination of a subject on both sides, and its judgements are

corrected by being limited. It is not the matter that may give

occasion to dispute, but the manner. For it is perfectly permissible

to employ, in the presence of reason, the language of a firmly

rooted faith, even after we have been obliged to renounce all

pretensions to knowledge.

If we were to ask the dispassionate David Hume- a philosopher

endowed, in a degree that few are, with a well-balanced judgement:

What motive induced you to spend so much labour and thought in

undermining the consoling and beneficial persuasion that reason is

capable of assuring us of the existence, and presenting us with a

determinate conception of a Supreme Being?- his answer would be:

Nothing but the desire of teaching reason to know its own powers

better, and, at the same time, a dislike of the procedure by which

that faculty was compelled to support foregone conclusions, and

prevented from confessing the internal weaknesses which it cannot

but feel when it enters upon a rigid self-examination. If, on the

other hand, we were to ask Priestley- a philosopher who had no taste

for transcendental speculation, but was entirely devoted to the

principles of empiricism- what his motives were for overturning

those two main pillars of religion- the doctrines of the freedom of

the will and the immortality of the soul (in his view the hope of a

future life is but the expectation of the miracle of resurrection)-

this philosopher, himself a zealous and pious teacher of religion,

could give no other answer than this: I acted in the interest of

reason, which always suffers, when certain objects are explained and

judged by a reference to other supposed laws than those of material

nature- the only laws which we know in a determinate manner. It

would be unfair to decry the latter philosopher, who endeavoured to

harmonize his paradoxical opinions with the interests of religion, and

to undervalue an honest and reflecting man, because he finds himself

at a loss the moment he has left the field of natural science. The

same grace must be accorded to Hume, a man not less well-disposed, and

quite as blameless in his moral character, and who pushed his abstract

speculations to an extreme length, because, as he rightly believed,

the object of them lies entirely beyond the bounds of natural science,

and within the sphere of pure ideas.

What is to be done to provide against the danger which seems in

the present case to menace the best interests of humanity? The

course to be pursued in reference to this subject is a perfectly plain

and natural one. Let each thinker pursue his own path; if he shows

talent, if be gives evidence of profound thought, in one word, if he

shows that he possesses the power of reasoning- reason is always the

gainer. If you have recourse to other means, if you attempt to

coerce reason, if you raise the cry of treason to humanity, if you

excite the feelings of the crowd, which can neither understand nor

sympathize with such subtle speculations- you will only make

yourselves ridiculous. For the question does not concern the advantage

or disadvantage which we are expected to reap from such inquiries; the

question is merely how far reason can advance in the field of

speculation, apart from all kinds of interest, and whether we may

depend upon the exertions of speculative reason, or must renounce

all reliance on it. Instead of joining the combatants, it is your part

to be a tranquil spectator of the struggle- a laborious struggle for

the parties engaged, but attended, in its progress as well as in its

result, with the most advantageous consequences for the interests of

thought and knowledge. It is absurd to expect to be enlightened by

Reason, and at the same time to prescribe to her what side of the

question she must adopt. Moreover, reason is sufficiently held in

check by its own power, the limits imposed on it by its own nature are

sufficient; it is unnecessary for you to place over it additional

guards, as if its power were dangerous to the constitution of the

intellectual state. In the dialectic of reason there is no victory

gained which need in the least disturb your tranquility.

The strife of dialectic is a necessity of reason, and we cannot

but wish that it had been conducted long ere this with that perfect

freedom which ought to be its essential condition. In this case, we

should have had at an earlier period a matured and profound criticism,

which must have put an end to all dialectical disputes, by exposing

the illusions and prejudices in which they originated.

There is in human nature an unworthy propensity- a propensity which,

like everything that springs from nature, must in its final purpose be

conducive to the good of humanity- to conceal our real sentiments, and

to give expression only to certain received opinions, which are

regarded as at once safe and promotive of the common good. It is true,

this tendency, not only to conceal our real sentiments, but to profess

those which may gain us favour in the eyes of society, has not only

civilized, but, in a certain measure, moralized us; as no one can

break through the outward covering of respectability, honour, and

morality, and thus the seemingly-good examples which we which we see

around us form an excellent school for moral improvement, so long as

our belief in their genuineness remains unshaken. But this disposition

to represent ourselves as better than we are, and to utter opinions

which are not our own, can be nothing more than a kind of provisionary

arrangement of nature to lead us from the rudeness of an uncivilized

state, and to teach us how to assume at least the appearance and

manner of the good we see. But when true principles have been

developed, and have obtained a sure foundation in our habit of

thought, this conventionalism must be attacked with earnest vigour,

otherwise it corrupts the heart, and checks the growth of good

dispositions with the mischievous weed of air appearances.

I am sorry to remark the same tendency to misrepresentation and

hypocrisy in the sphere of speculative discussion, where there is less

temptation to restrain the free expression of thought. For what can be

more prejudicial to the interests of intelligence than to falsify

our real sentiments, to conceal the doubts which we feel in regard

to our statements, or to maintain the validity of grounds of proof

which we well know to be insufficient? So long as mere personal vanity

is the source of these unworthy artifices- and this is generally the

case in speculative discussions, which are mostly destitute of

practical interest, and are incapable of complete demonstration- the

vanity of the opposite party exaggerates as much on the other side;

and thus the result is the same, although it is not brought about so

soon as if the dispute had been conducted in a sincere and upright

spirit. But where the mass entertains the notion that the aim of

certain subtle speculators is nothing less than to shake the very

foundations of public welfare and morality- it seems not only prudent,

but even praise worthy, to maintain the good cause by illusory

arguments, rather than to give to our supposed opponents the advantage

of lowering our declarations to the moderate tone of a merely

practical conviction, and of compelling us to confess our inability to

attain to apodeictic certainty in speculative subjects. But we ought

to reflect that there is nothing, in the world more fatal to the

maintenance of a good cause than deceit, misrepresentation, and

falsehood. That the strictest laws of honesty should be observed in

the discussion of a purely speculative subject is the least

requirement that can be made. If we could reckon with security even

upon so little, the conflict of speculative reason regarding the

important questions of God, immortality, and freedom, would have

been either decided long ago, or would very soon be brought to a

conclusion. But, in general, the uprightness of the defence stands

in an inverse ratio to the goodness of the cause; and perhaps more

honesty and fairness are shown by those who deny than by those who

uphold these doctrines.

I shall persuade myself, then, that I have readers who do not wish

to see a righteous cause defended by unfair arguments. Such will now

recognize the fact that, according to the principles of this Critique,

if we consider not what is, but what ought to be the case, there can

be really no polemic of pure reason. For how can two persons dispute

about a thing, the reality of which neither can present in actual or

even in possible experience? Each adopts the plan of meditating on his

idea for the purpose of drawing from the idea, if he can, what is more

than the idea, that is, the reality of the object which it

indicates. How shall they settle the dispute, since neither is able to

make his assertions directly comprehensible and certain, but must

restrict himself to attacking and confuting those of his opponent? All

statements enounced by pure reason transcend the conditions of

possible experience, beyond the sphere of which we can discover no

criterion of truth, while they are at the same time framed in

accordance with the laws of the understanding, which are applicable

only to experience; and thus it is the fate of all such speculative

discussions that while the one party attacks the weaker side of his

opponent, he infallibly lays open his own weaknesses.

The critique of pure reason may be regarded as the highest

tribunal for all speculative disputes; for it is not involved in these

disputes, which have an immediate relation to certain objects and

not to the laws of the mind, but is instituted for the purpose of

determining the rights and limits of reason.

Without the control of criticism, reason is, as it were, in a

state of nature, and can only establish its claims and assertions by

war. Criticism, on the contrary, deciding all questions according to

the fundamental laws of its own institution, secures to us the peace

of law and order, and enables us to discuss all differences in the

more tranquil manner of a legal process. In the former case,

disputes are ended by victory, which both sides may claim and which is

followed by a hollow armistice; in the latter, by a sentence, which,

as it strikes at the root of all speculative differences, ensures to

all concerned a lasting peace. The endless disputes of a dogmatizing

reason compel us to look for some mode of arriving at a settled

decision by a critical investigation of reason itself; just as