第 83 页

stand in connection with the given phenomena according to the known

laws of experience. A transcendental hypothesis, in which a mere

idea of reason is employed to explain the phenomena of nature, would

not give us any better insight into a phenomenon, as we should be

trying to explain what we do not sufficiently understand from known

empirical principles, by what we do not understand at all. The

principles of such a hypothesis might conduce to the satisfaction of

reason, but it would not assist the understanding in its application

to objects. Order and conformity to aims in the sphere of nature

must be themselves explained upon natural grounds and according to

natural laws; and the wildest hypotheses, if they are only physical,

are here more admissible than a hyperphysical hypothesis, such as that

of a divine author. For such a hypothesis would introduce the

principle of ignava ratio, which requires us to give up the search for

causes that might be discovered in the course of experience and to

rest satisfied with a mere idea. As regards the absolute totality of

the grounds of explanation in the series of these causes, this can

be no hindrance to the understanding in the case of phenomena;

because, as they are to us nothing more than phenomena, we have no

right to look for anything like completeness in the synthesis of the

series of their conditions.

Transcendental hypotheses are therefore inadmissible; and we

cannot use the liberty of employing, in the absence of physical,

hyperphysical grounds of explanation. And this for two reasons; first,

because such hypothesis do not advance reason, but rather stop it in

its progress; secondly, because this licence would render fruitless

all its exertions in its own proper sphere, which is that of

experience. For, when the explanation of natural phenomena happens

to be difficult, we have constantly at hand a transcendental ground of

explanation, which lifts us above the necessity of investigating

nature; and our inquiries are brought to a close, not because we

have obtained all the requisite knowledge, but because we abut upon

a principle which is incomprehensible and which, indeed, is so far

back in the track of thought as to contain the conception of the

absolutely primal being.

The next requisite for the admissibility of a hypothesis is its

sufficiency. That is, it must determine a priori the consequences

which are given in experience and which are supposed to follow from

the hypothesis itself. If we require to employ auxiliary hypotheses,

the suspicion naturally arises that they are mere fictions; because

the necessity for each of them requires the same justification as in

the case of the original hypothesis, and thus their testimony is

invalid. If we suppose the existence of an infinitely perfect cause,

we possess sufficient grounds for the explanation of the conformity to

aims, the order and the greatness which we observe in the universe;

but we find ourselves obliged, when we observe the evil in the world

and the exceptions to these laws, to employ new hypothesis in

support of the original one. We employ the idea of the simple nature

of the human soul as the foundation of all the theories we may form of

its phenomena; but when we meet with difficulties in our way, when

we observe in the soul phenomena similar to the changes which take

place in matter, we require to call in new auxiliary hypotheses. These

may, indeed, not be false, but we do not know them to be true, because

the only witness to their certitude is the hypothesis which they

themselves have been called in to explain.

We are not discussing the above-mentioned assertions regarding the

immaterial unity of the soul and the existence of a Supreme Being as

dogmata, which certain philosophers profess to demonstrate a priori,

but purely as hypotheses. In the former case, the dogmatist must

take care that his arguments possess the apodeictic certainty of a

demonstration. For the assertion that the reality of such ideas is

probable is as absurd as a proof of the probability of a proposition

in geometry. Pure abstract reason, apart from all experience, can

either cognize nothing at all; and hence the judgements it enounces

are never mere opinions, they are either apodeictic certainties, or

declarations that nothing can be known on the subject. Opinions and

probable judgements on the nature of things can only be employed to

explain given phenomena, or they may relate to the effect, in

accordance with empirical laws, of an actually existing cause. In

other words, we must restrict the sphere of opinion to the world of

experience and nature. Beyond this region opinion is mere invention;

unless we are groping about for the truth on a path not yet fully

known, and have some hopes of stumbling upon it by chance.

But, although hypotheses are inadmissible in answers to the

questions of pure speculative reason, they may be employed in the

defence of these answers. That is to say, hypotheses are admissible in

polemic, but not in the sphere of dogmatism. By the defence of

statements of this character, I do not mean an attempt at

discovering new grounds for their support, but merely the refutation

of the arguments of opponents. All a priori synthetical propositions

possess the peculiarity that, although the philosopher who maintains

the reality of the ideas contained in the proposition is not in

possession of sufficient knowledge to establish the certainty of his

statements, his opponent is as little able to prove the truth of the

opposite. This equality of fortune does not allow the one party to

be superior to the other in the sphere of speculative cognition; and

it is this sphere, accordingly, that is the proper arena of these

endless speculative conflicts. But we shall afterwards show that, in

relation to its practical exercise, Reason has the right of

admitting what, in the field of pure speculation, she would not be

justified in supposing, except upon perfectly sufficient grounds;

because all such suppositions destroy the necessary completeness of

speculation- a condition which the practical reason, however, does not

consider to be requisite. In this sphere, therefore, Reason is

mistress of a possession, her title to which she does not require to

prove- which, in fact, she could not do. The burden of proof

accordingly rests upon the opponent. But as he has just as little

knowledge regarding the subject discussed, and is as little able to

prove the non-existence of the object of an idea, as the philosopher

on the other side is to demonstrate its reality, it is evident that

there is an advantage on the side of the philosopher who maintains his

proposition as a practically necessary supposition (melior est

conditio possidentis). For he is at liberty to employ, in

self-defence, the same weapons as his opponent makes use of in

attacking him; that is, he has a right to use hypotheses not for the

purpose of supporting the arguments in favour of his own propositions,

but to show that his opponent knows no more than himself regarding the

subject under 'discussion and cannot boast of any speculative

advantage.

Hypotheses are, therefore, admissible in the sphere of pure reason

only as weapons for self-defence, and not as supports to dogmatical

assertions. But the opposing party we must always seek for in

ourselves. For speculative reason is, in the sphere of

transcendentalism, dialectical in its own nature. The difficulties and

objections we have to fear lie in ourselves. They are like old but

never superannuated claims; and we must seek them out, and settle them

once and for ever, if we are to expect a permanent peace. External

tranquility is hollow and unreal. The root of these contradictions,

which lies in the nature of human reason, must be destroyed; and

this can only be done by giving it, in the first instance, freedom

to grow, nay, by nourishing it, that it may send out shoots, and

thus betray its own existence. It is our duty, therefore, to try to

discover new objections, to put weapons in the bands of our

opponent, and to grant him the most favourable position in the arena

that he can wish. We have nothing to fear from these concessions; on

the contrary, we may rather hope that we shall thus make ourselves

master of a possession which no one will ever venture to dispute.

The thinker requires, to be fully equipped, the hypotheses of pure

reason, which, although but leaden weapons (for they have not been

steeled in the armoury of experience), are as useful as any that can

be employed by his opponents. If, accordingly, we have assumed, from a

non-speculative point of view, the immaterial nature of the soul,

and are met by the objection that experience seems to prove that the

growth and decay of our mental faculties are mere modifications of the

sensuous organism- we can weaken the force of this objection by the

assumption that the body is nothing but the fundamental phenomenon, to

which, as a necessary condition, all sensibility, and consequently all

thought, relates in the present state of our existence; and that the

separation of soul and body forms the conclusion of the sensuous

exercise of our power of cognition and the beginning of the

intellectual. The body would, in this view of the question, be

regarded, not as the cause of thought, but merely as its restrictive

condition, as promotive of the sensuous and animal, but as a hindrance

to the pure and spiritual life; and the dependence of the animal

life on the constitution of the body, would not prove that the whole

life of man was also dependent on the state of the organism. We

might go still farther, and discover new objections, or carry out to

their extreme consequences those which have already been adduced.

Generation, in the human race as well as among the irrational

animals, depends on so many accidents- of occasion, of proper

sustenance, of the laws enacted by the government of a country of vice

even, that it is difficult to believe in the eternal existence of a

being whose life has begun under circumstances so mean and trivial,

and so entirely dependent upon our own control. As regards the

continuance of the existence of the whole race, we need have no

difficulties, for accident in single cases is subject to general laws;

but, in the case of each individual, it would seem as if we could

hardly expect so wonderful an effect from causes so insignificant.

But, in answer to these objections, we may adduce the transcendental

hypothesis that all life is properly intelligible, and not subject

to changes of time, and that it neither began in birth, nor will end

in death. We may assume that this life is nothing more than a sensuous

representation of pure spiritual life; that the whole world of sense

is but an image, hovering before the faculty of cognition which we

exercise in this sphere, and with no more objective reality than a

dream; and that if we could intuite ourselves and other things as they

really are, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures,

our connection with which did not begin at our birth and will not

cease with the destruction of the body. And so on.

We cannot be said to know what has been above asserted, nor do we

seriously maintain the truth of these assertions; and the notions

therein indicated are not even ideas of reason, they are purely

fictitious conceptions. But this hypothetical procedure is in

perfect conformity with the laws of reason. Our opponent mistakes

the absence of empirical conditions for a proof of the complete

impossibility of all that we have asserted; and we have to show him

that be has not exhausted the whole sphere of possibility and that

he can as little compass that sphere by the laws of experience and

nature, as we can lay a secure foundation for the operations of reason

beyond the region of experience. Such hypothetical defences against

the pretensions of an opponent must not be regarded as declarations of

opinion. The philosopher abandons them, so soon as the opposite

party renounces its dogmatical conceit. To maintain a simply

negative position in relation to propositions which rest on an

insecure foundation, well befits the moderation of a true philosopher;

but to uphold the objections urged against an opponent as proofs of

the opposite statement is a proceeding just as unwarrantable and

arrogant as it is to attack the position of a philosopher who advances

affirmative propositions regarding such a subject.

It is evident, therefore, that hypotheses, in the speculative

sphere, are valid, not as independent propositions, but only

relatively to opposite transcendent assumptions. For, to make the

principles of possible experience conditions of the possibility of

things in general is just as transcendent a procedure as to maintain

the objective reality of ideas which can be applied to no objects

except such as lie without the limits of possible experience. The

judgements enounced by pure reason must be necessary, or they must not

be enounced at all. Reason cannot trouble herself with opinions. But

the hypotheses we have been discussing are merely problematical

judgements, which can neither be confuted nor proved; while,

therefore, they are not personal opinions, they are indispensable as

answers to objections which are liable to be raised. But we must

take care to confine them to this function, and guard against any

assumption on their part of absolute validity, a proceeding which

would involve reason in inextricable difficulties and contradictions.

SECTION IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation

to Proofs.

It is a peculiarity, which distinguishes the proofs of

transcendental synthetical propositions from those of all other a

priori synthetical cognitions, that reason, in the case of the former,

does not apply its conceptions directly to an object, but is first

obliged to prove, a priori, the objective validity of these

conceptions and the possibility of their syntheses. This is not merely

a prudential rule, it is essential to the very possibility of the