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requires that reason- in relation to its causal power of commencing

a series of phenomena- should be independent of all sensuous

determining causes; and thus it seems to be in opposition to the law

of nature and to all possible experience. It therefore remains a

problem for the human mind. But this problem does not concern reason

in its practical use; and we have, therefore, in a canon of pure

reason, to do with only two questions, which relate to the practical

interest of pure reason: Is there a God? and, Is there a future

life? The question of transcendental freedom is purely speculative,

and we may therefore set it entirely aside when we come to treat of

practical reason. Besides, we have already discussed this subject in

the antinomy of pure reason.

SECTION II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining

Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason.

Reason conducted us, in its speculative use, through the field of

experience and, as it can never find complete satisfaction in that

sphere, from thence to speculative ideas- which, however, in the end

brought us back again to experience, and thus fulfilled the purpose of

reason, in a manner which, though useful, was not at all in accordance

with our expectations. It now remains for us to consider whether

pure reason can be employed in a practical sphere, and whether it will

here conduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure

reason, as we have just stated them. We shall thus ascertain

whether, from the point of view of its practical interest, reason

may not be able to supply us with that which, on the speculative side,

it wholly denies us.

The whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, is

centred in the three following questions:

1. WHAT CAN I KNOW?

2. WHAT OUGHT I TO DO?

3. WHAT MAY I HOPE?

The first question is purely speculative. We have, as I flatter

myself, exhausted all the replies of which it is susceptible, and have

at last found the reply with which reason must content itself, and

with which it ought to be content, so long as it pays no regard to the

practical. But from the two great ends to the attainment of which

all these efforts of pure reason were in fact directed, we remain just

as far removed as if we had consulted our ease and declined the task

at the outset. So far, then, as knowledge is concerned, thus much,

at least, is established, that, in regard to those two problems, it

lies beyond our reach.

The second question is purely practical. As such it may indeed

fall within the province of pure reason, but still it is not

transcendental, but moral, and consequently cannot in itself form

the subject of our criticism.

The third question: If I act as I ought to do, what may I then

hope?- is at once practical and theoretical. The practical forms a

clue to the answer of the theoretical, and- in its highest form-

speculative question. For all hoping has happiness for its object

and stands in precisely the same relation to the practical and the law

of morality as knowing to the theoretical cognition of things and

the law of nature. The former arrives finally at the conclusion that

something is (which determines the ultimate end), because something

ought to take place; the latter, that something is (which operates

as the highest cause), because something does take place.

Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires; extensive, in

regard to their multiplicity; intensive, in regard to their degree;

and protensive, in regard to their duration. The practical law based

on the motive of happiness I term a pragmatical law (or prudential

rule); but that law, assuming such to exist, which has no other motive

than the worthiness of being happy, I term a moral or ethical law. The

first tells us what we have to do, if we wish to become possessed of

happiness; the second dictates how we ought to act, in order to

deserve happiness. The first is based upon empirical principles; for

it is only by experience that I can learn either what inclinations

exist which desire satisfaction, or what are the natural means of

satisfying them. The second takes no account of our desires or the

means of satisfying them, and regards only the freedom of a rational

being, and the necessary conditions under which alone this freedom can

harmonize with the distribution of happiness according to

principles. This second law may therefore rest upon mere ideas of pure

reason, and may be cognized a priori.

I assume that there are pure moral laws which determine, entirely

a priori (without regard to empirical motives, that is, to happiness),

the conduct of a rational being, or in other words, to use which it

makes of its freedom, and that these laws are absolutely imperative

(not merely hypothetically, on the supposition of other empirical

ends), and therefore in all respects necessary. I am warranted in

assuming this, not only by the arguments of the most enlightened

moralists, but by the moral judgement of every man who will make the

attempt to form a distinct conception of such a law.

Pure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative, but in

its practical, or, more strictly, its moral use, principles of the

possibility of experience, of such actions, namely, as, in

accordance with ethical precepts, might be met with in the history

of man. For since reason commands that such actions should take place,

it must be possible for them to take place; and hence a particular

kind of systematic unity- the moral- must be possible. We have

found, it is true, that the systematic unity of nature could not be

established according to speculative principles of reason, because,

while reason possesses a causal power in relation to freedom, it has

none in relation to the whole sphere of nature; and, while moral

principles of reason can produce free actions, they cannot produce

natural laws. It is, then, in its practical, but especially in its

moral use, that the principles of pure reason possess objective

reality.

I call the world a moral world, in so far as it may be in accordance

with all the ethical laws- which, by virtue of the freedom of

reasonable beings, it can be, and according to the necessary laws of

morality it ought to be. But this world must be conceived only as an

intelligible world, inasmuch as abstraction is therein made of all

conditions (ends), and even of all impediments to morality (the

weakness or pravity of human nature). So far, then, it is a mere idea-

though still a practical idea- which may have, and ought to have, an

influence on the world of sense, so as to bring it as far as

possible into conformity with itself. The idea of a moral world has,

therefore, objective reality, not as referring to an object of

intelligible intuition- for of such an object we can form no

conception whatever- but to the world of sense- conceived, however, as

an object of pure reason in its practical use- and to a corpus

mysticum of rational beings in it, in so far as the liberum

arbitrium of the individual is placed, under and by virtue of moral

laws, in complete systematic unity both with itself and with the

freedom of all others.

That is the answer to the first of the two questions of pure

reason which relate to its practical interest: Do that which will

render thee worthy of happiness. The second question is this: If I

conduct myself so as not to be unworthy of happiness, may I hope

thereby to obtain happiness? In order to arrive at the solution of

this question, we must inquire whether the principles of pure

reason, which prescribe a priori the law, necessarily also connect

this hope with it.

I say, then, that just as the moral principles are necessary

according to reason in its practical use, so it is equally necessary

according to reason in its theoretical use to assume that every one

has ground to hope for happiness in the measure in which he has made

himself worthy of it in his conduct, and that therefore the system

of morality is inseparably (though only in the idea of pure reason)

connected with that of happiness.

Now in an intelligible, that is, in the moral world, in the

conception of which we make abstraction of all the impediments to

morality (sensuous desires), such a system of happiness, connected

with and proportioned to morality, may be conceived as necessary,

because freedom of volition- partly incited, and partly restrained

by moral laws- would be itself the cause of general happiness; and

thus rational beings, under the guidance of such principles, would

be themselves the authors both of their own enduring welfare and

that of others. But such a system of self-rewarding morality is only

an idea, the carrying out of which depends upon the condition that

every one acts as he ought; in other words, that all actions of

reasonable beings be such as they would be if they sprung from a

Supreme Will, comprehending in, or under, itself all particular wills.

But since the moral law is binding on each individual in the use of

his freedom of volition, even if others should not act in conformity

with this law, neither the nature of things, nor the causality of

actions and their relation to morality, determine how the consequences

of these actions will be related to happiness; and the necessary

connection of the hope of happiness with the unceasing endeavour to

become worthy of happiness, cannot be cognized by reason, if we take

nature alone for our guide. This connection can be hoped for only on

the assumption that the cause of nature is a supreme reason, which

governs according to moral laws.

I term the idea of an intelligence in which the morally most perfect

will, united with supreme blessedness, is the cause of all happiness

in the world, so far as happiness stands in strict } relation to

morality (as the worthiness of being happy), the ideal of the

supreme Good. supreme original good, that pure reason can find the

ground of the practically necessary connection of both elements of the

highest derivative good, and accordingly of an intelligible, that

is, moral world. Now since we are necessitated by reason to conceive

ourselves as belonging to such a world, while the senses present to us

nothing but a world of phenomena, we must assume the former as a

consequence of our conduct in the world of sense (since the world of

sense gives us no hint of it), and therefore as future in relation

to us. Thus God and a future life are two hypotheses which,

according to the principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the

obligation which this reason imposes upon us.

Morality per se constitutes a system. But we can form no system of

happiness, except in so far as it is dispensed in strict proportion to

morality. But this is only possible in the intelligible world, under a

wise author and ruler. Such a ruler, together with life in such a

world, which we must look upon as future, reason finds itself

compelled to assume; or it must regard the moral laws as idle

dreams, since the necessary consequence which this same reason

connects with them must, without this hypothesis, fall to the

ground. Hence also the moral laws are universally regarded as

commands, which they could not be did they not connect a priori

adequate consequences with their dictates, and thus carry with them

promises and threats. But this, again, they could not do, did they not

reside in a necessary being, as the Supreme Good, which alone can

render such a teleological unity possible.

Leibnitz termed the world, when viewed in relation to the rational

beings which it contains, and the moral relations in which they

stand to each other, under the government of the Supreme Good, the

kingdom of Grace, and distinguished it from the kingdom of Nature,

in which these rational beings live, under moral laws, indeed, but

expect no other consequences from their actions than such as follow

according to the course of nature in the world of sense. To view

ourselves, therefore, as in the kingdom of grace, in which all

happiness awaits us, except in so far as we ourselves limit our

participation in it by actions which render us unworthy of

happiness, is a practically necessary idea of reason.

Practical laws, in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions,

that is, subjective principles, are termed maxims. The judgements of

moral according to in its purity and ultimate results are framed

according ideas; the observance of its laws, according to according to

maxims.

The whole course of our life must be subject to moral maxims; but

this is impossible, unless with the moral law, which is a mere idea,

reason connects an efficient cause which ordains to all conduct

which is in conformity with the moral law an issue either in this or

in another life, which is in exact conformity with our highest aims.

Thus, without a God and without a world, invisible to us now, but

hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are, indeed, objects of

approbation and of admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose

and action. For they do not satisfy all the aims which are natural

to every rational being, and which are determined a priori by pure

reason itself, and necessary.

Happiness alone is, in the view of reason, far from being the

complete good. Reason does not approve of it (however much inclination

may desire it), except as united with desert. On the other hand,

morality alone, and with it, mere desert, is likewise far from being

the complete good. To make it complete, he who conducts himself in a

manner not unworthy of happiness, must be able to hope for the

possession of happiness. Even reason, unbiased by private ends, or

interested considerations, cannot judge otherwise, if it puts itself

in the place of a being whose business it is to dispense all happiness

to others. For in the practical idea both points are essentially

combined, though in such a way that participation in happiness is

rendered possible by the moral disposition, as its condition, and

not conversely, the moral disposition by the prospect of happiness.