第 87 页

For a disposition which should require the prospect of happiness as

its necessary condition would not be moral, and hence also would not

be worthy of complete happiness- a happiness which, in the view of

reason, recognizes no limitation but such as arises from our own

immoral conduct.

Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of

rational beings (whereby they are made worthy of happiness),

constitutes alone the supreme good of a world into which we absolutely

must transport ourselves according to the commands of pure but

practical reason. This world is, it is true, only an intelligible

world; for of such a systematic unity of ends as it requires, the

world of sense gives us no hint. Its reality can be based on nothing

else but the hypothesis of a supreme original good. In it

independent reason, equipped with all the sufficiency of a supreme

cause, founds, maintains, and fulfils the universal order of things,

with the most perfect teleological harmony, however much this order

may be hidden from us in the world of sense.

This moral theology has the peculiar advantage, in contrast with

speculative theology, of leading inevitably to the conception of a

sole, perfect, and rational First Cause, whereof speculative

theology does not give us any indication on objective grounds, far

less any convincing evidence. For we find neither in transcendental

nor in natural theology, however far reason may lead us in these,

any ground to warrant us in assuming the existence of one only

Being, which stands at the head of all natural causes, and on which

these are entirely dependent. On the other band, if we take our

stand on moral unity as a necessary law of the universe, and from this

point of view consider what is necessary to give this law adequate

efficiency and, for us, obligatory force, we must come to the

conclusion that there is one only supreme will, which comprehends

all these laws in itself. For how, under different wills, should we

find complete unity of ends? This will must be omnipotent, that all

nature and its relation to morality in the world may be subject to it;

omniscient, that it may have knowledge of the most secret feelings and

their moral worth; omnipresent, that it may be at hand to supply every

necessity to which the highest weal of the world may give rise;

eternal, that this harmony of nature and liberty may never fail; and

so on.

But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences-

which, as mere nature, is only a world of sense, but, as a system of

freedom of volition, may be termed an intelligible, that is, moral

world (regnum gratiae)- leads inevitably also to the teleological

unity of all things which constitute this great whole, according to

universal natural laws- just as the unity of the former is according

to universal and necessary moral laws- and unites the practical with

the speculative reason. The world must be represented as having

originated from an idea, if it is to harmonize with that use of reason

without which we cannot even consider ourselves as worthy of reason-

namely, the moral use, which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme

good. Hence the investigation of nature receives a teleological

direction, and becomes, in its widest extension, physico-theology. But

this, taking its rise in moral order as a unity founded on the essence

of freedom, and not accidentally instituted by external commands,

establishes the teleological view of nature on grounds which must be

inseparably connected with the internal possibility of things. This

gives rise to a transcendental theology, which takes the ideal of

the highest ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity;

and this principle connects all things according to universal and

necessary natural laws, because all things have their origin in the

absolute necessity of the one only Primal Being.

What use can we make of our understanding, even in respect of

experience, if we do not propose ends to ourselves? But the highest

ends are those of morality, and it is only pure reason that can give

us the knowledge of these. Though supplied with these, and putting

ourselves under their guidance, we can make no teleological use of the

knowledge of nature, as regards cognition, unless nature itself has

established teleological unity. For without this unity we should not

even possess reason, because we should have no school for reason,

and no cultivation through objects which afford the materials for

its conceptions. But teleological unity is a necessary unity, and

founded on the essence of the individual will itself. Hence this will,

which is the condition of the application of this unity in concreto,

must be so likewise. In this way the transcendental enlargement of our

rational cognition would be, not the cause, but merely the effect of

the practical teleology which pure reason imposes upon us.

Hence, also, we find in the history of human reason that, before the

moral conceptions were sufficiently purified and determined, and

before men had attained to a perception of the systematic unity of

ends according to these conceptions and from necessary principles, the

knowledge of nature, and even a considerable amount of intellectual

culture in many other sciences, could produce only rude and vague

conceptions of the Deity, sometimes even admitting of an astonishing

indifference with regard to this question altogether. But the more

enlarged treatment of moral ideas, which was rendered necessary by the

extreme pure moral law of our religion, awakened the interest, and

thereby quickened the perceptions of reason in relation to this

object. In this way, and without the help either of an extended

acquaintance with nature, or of a reliable transcendental insight (for

these have been wanting in all ages), a conception of the Divine Being

was arrived at, which we now bold to be the correct one, not because

speculative reason convinces us of its correctness, but because it

accords with the moral principles of reason. Thus it is to pure

reason, but only in its practical use, that we must ascribe the

merit of having connected with our highest interest a cognition, of

which mere speculation was able only to form a conjecture, but the

validity of which it was unable to establish- and of having thereby

rendered it, not indeed a demonstrated dogma, but a hypothesis

absolutely necessary to the essential ends of reason.

But if practical reason has reached this elevation, and has attained

to the conception of a sole Primal Being as the supreme good, it

must not, therefore, imagine that it has transcended the empirical

conditions of its application, and risen to the immediate cognition of

new objects; it must not presume to start from the conception which it

has gained, and to deduce from it the moral laws themselves. For it

was these very laws, the internal practical necessity of which led

us to the hypothesis of an independent cause, or of a wise ruler of

the universe, who should give them effect. Hence we are not entitled

to regard them as accidental and derived from the mere will of the

ruler, especially as we have no conception of such a will, except as

formed in accordance with these laws. So far, then, as practical

reason has the right to conduct us, we shall not look upon actions

as binding on us, because they are the commands of God, but we shall

regard them as divine commands, because we are internally bound by

them. We shall study freedom under the teleological unity which

accords with principles of reason; we shall look upon ourselves as

acting in conformity with the divine will only in so far as we hold

sacred the moral law which reason teaches us from the nature of

actions themselves, and we shall believe that we can obey that will

only by promoting the weal of the universe in ourselves and in others.

Moral theology is, therefore, only of immanent use. It teaches us to

fulfil our destiny here in the world, by placing ourselves in

harmony with the general system of ends, and warns us against the

fanaticism, nay, the crime of depriving reason of its legislative

authority in the moral conduct of life, for the purpose of directly

connecting this authority with the idea of the Supreme Being. For this

would be, not an immanent, but a transcendent use of moral theology,

and, like the transcendent use of mere speculation, would inevitably

pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason.

SECTION III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief.

The holding of a thing to be true is a phenomenon in our

understanding which may rest on objective grounds, but requires, also,

subjective causes in the mind of the person judging. If a judgement is

valid for every rational being, then its ground is objectively

sufficient, and it is termed a conviction. If, on the other hand, it

has its ground in the particular character of the subject, it is

termed a persuasion.

Persuasion is a mere illusion, the ground of the judgement, which

lies solely in the subject, being regarded as objective. Hence a

judgement of this kind has only private validity- is only valid for

the individual who judges, and the holding of a thing to be true in

this way cannot be communicated. But truth depends upon agreement with

the object, and consequently the judgements of all understandings,

if true, must be in agreement with each other (consentientia uni

tertio consentiunt inter se). Conviction may, therefore, be

distinguished, from an external point of view, from persuasion, by the

possibility of communicating it and by showing its validity for the

reason of every man; for in this case the presumption, at least,

arises that the agreement of all judgements with each other, in

spite of the different characters of individuals, rests upon the

common ground of the agreement of each with the object, and thus the

correctness of the judgement is established.

Persuasion, accordingly, cannot be subjectively distinguished from

conviction, that is, so long as the subject views its judgement simply

as a phenomenon of its own mind. But if we inquire whether the grounds

of our judgement, which are valid for us, produce the same effect on

the reason of others as on our own, we have then the means, though

only subjective means, not, indeed, of producing conviction, but of

detecting the merely private validity of the judgement; in other

words, of discovering that there is in it the element of mere

persuasion.

If we can, in addition to this, develop the subjective causes of the

judgement, which we have taken for its objective grounds, and thus

explain the deceptive judgement as a phenomenon in our mind, apart

altogether from the objective character of the object, we can then

expose the illusion and need be no longer deceived by it, although, if

its subjective cause lies in our nature, we cannot hope altogether

to escape its influence.

I can only maintain, that is, affirm as necessarily valid for

every one, that which produces conviction. Persuasion I may keep for

myself, if it is agreeable to me; but I cannot, and ought not, to

attempt to impose it as binding upon others.

Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgement in

relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, objectively

valid), has the three following degrees: opinion, belief, and

knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgement,

subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is subjectively

sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient.

Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient.

Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself); objective

sufficiency is termed certainty (for all). I need not dwell longer

on the explanation of such simple conceptions.

I must never venture to be of opinion, without knowing something, at

least, by which my judgement, in itself merely problematical, is

brought into connection with the truth- which connection, although not

perfect, is still something more than an arbitrary fiction.

Moreover, the law of such a connection must be certain. For if, in

relation to this law, I have nothing more than opinion, my judgement

is but a play of the imagination, without the least relation to truth.

In the judgements of pure reason, opinion has no place. For, as they

do not rest on empirical grounds and as the sphere of pure reason is

that of necessary truth and a priori cognition, the principle of

connection in it requires universality and necessity, and consequently

perfect certainty- otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at

all. Hence it is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics; we

must know, or abstain from forming a judgement altogether. The case is

the same with the maxims of morality. For we must not hazard an action

on the mere opinion that it is allowed, but we must know it to be so.

In the transcendental sphere of reason, on the other hand, the

term opinion is too weak, while the word knowledge is too strong. From

the merely speculative point of view, therefore, we cannot form a

judgement at all. For the subjective grounds of a judgement, such as

produce belief, cannot be admitted in speculative inquiries,

inasmuch as they cannot stand without empirical support and are

incapable of being communicated to others in equal measure.

But it is only from the practical point of view that a theoretically

insufficient judgement can be termed belief. Now the practical

reference is either to skill or to morality; to the former, when the

end proposed is arbitrary and accidental, to the latter, when it is

absolutely necessary.

If we propose to ourselves any end whatever, the conditions of its

attainment are hypothetically necessary. The necessity is

subjectively, but still only comparatively, sufficient, if I am

acquainted with no other conditions under which the end can be

attained. On the other hand, it is sufficient, absolutely and for

every one, if I know for certain that no one can be acquainted with

any other conditions under which the attainment of the proposed end

would be possible. In the former case my supposition- my judgement