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find based in reason itself, and which is suggested by the natural

unity of the parts of the science already accumulated. For it will

of ten be found that the originator of a science and even his latest

successors remain attached to an erroneous idea, which they cannot

render clear to themselves, and that they thus fail in determining the

true content, the articulation or systematic unity, and the limits

of their science.

It is unfortunate that, only after having occupied ourselves for a

long time in the collection of materials, under the guidance of an

idea which lies undeveloped in the mind, but not according to any

definite plan of arrangement- nay, only after we have spent much

time and labour in the technical disposition of our materials, does it

become possible to view the idea of a science in a clear light, and to

project, according to architectonical principles, a plan of the whole,

in accordance with the aims of reason. Systems seem, like certain

worms, to be formed by a kind of generatio aequivoca- by the mere

confluence of conceptions, and to gain completeness only with the

progress of time. But the schema or germ of all lies in reason; and

thus is not only every system organized according to its own idea, but

all are united into one grand system of human knowledge, of which they

form members. For this reason, it is possible to frame an

architectonic of all human cognition, the formation of which, at the

present time, considering the immense materials collected or to be

found in the ruins of old systems, would not indeed be very difficult.

Our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan of the

architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason; and we begin from

the point where the main root of human knowledge divides into two, one

of which is reason. By reason I understand here the whole higher

faculty of cognition, the rational being placed in contradistinction

to the empirical.

If I make complete abstraction of the content of cognition,

objectively considered, all cognition is, from a subjective point of

view, either historical or rational. Historical cognition is

cognitio ex datis, rational, cognitio ex principiis. Whatever may be

the original source of a cognition, it is, in relation to the person

who possesses it, merely historical, if he knows only what has been

given him from another quarter, whether that knowledge was

communicated by direct experience or by instruction. Thus the Person

who has learned a system of philosophy- say the Wolfian- although he

has a perfect knowledge of all the principles, definitions, and

arguments in that philosophy, as well as of the divisions that have

been made of the system, possesses really no more than an historical

knowledge of the Wolfian system; he knows only what has been told him,

his judgements are only those which he has received from his teachers.

Dispute the validity of a definition, and he is completely at a loss

to find another. He has formed his mind on another's; but the

imitative faculty is not the productive. His knowledge has not been

drawn from reason; and although, objectively considered, it is

rational knowledge, subjectively, it is merely historical. He has

learned this or that philosophy and is merely a plaster cast of a

living man. Rational cognitions which are objective, that is, which

have their source in reason, can be so termed from a subjective

point of view, only when they have been drawn by the individual

himself from the sources of reason, that is, from principles; and it

is in this way alone that criticism, or even the rejection of what has

been already learned, can spring up in the mind.

All rational cognition is, again, based either on conceptions, or on

the construction of conceptions. The former is termed philosophical,

the latter mathematical. I have already shown the essential difference

of these two methods of cognition in the first chapter. A cognition

may be objectively philosophical and subjectively historical- as is

the case with the majority of scholars and those who cannot look

beyond the limits of their system, and who remain in a state of

pupilage all their lives. But it is remarkable that mathematical

knowledge, when committed to memory, is valid, from the subjective

point of view, as rational knowledge also, and that the same

distinction cannot be drawn here as in the case of philosophical

cognition. The reason is that the only way of arriving at this

knowledge is through the essential principles of reason, and thus it

is always certain and indisputable; because reason is employed in

concreto- but at the same time a priori- that is, in pure and,

therefore, infallible intuition; and thus all causes of illusion and

error are excluded. Of all the a priori sciences of reason, therefore,

mathematics alone can be learned. Philosophy- unless it be in an

historical manner- cannot be learned; we can at most learn to

philosophize.

Philosophy is the system of all philosophical cognition. We must use

this term in an objective sense, if we understand by it the

archetype of all attempts at philosophizing, and the standard by which

all subjective philosophies are to be judged. In this sense,

philosophy is merely the idea of a possible science, which does not

exist in concreto, but to which we endeavour in various ways to

approximate, until we have discovered the right path to pursue- a path

overgrown by the errors and illusions of sense- and the image we

have hitherto tried in vain to shape has become a perfect copy of

the great prototype. Until that time, we cannot learn philosophy- it

does not exist; if it does, where is it, who possesses it, and how

shall we know it? We can only learn to philosophize; in other words,

we can only exercise our powers of reasoning in accordance with

general principles, retaining at the same time, the right of

investigating the sources of these principles, of testing, and even of

rejecting them.

Until then, our conception of philosophy is only a scholastic

conception- a conception, that is, of a system of cognition which we

are trying to elaborate into a science; all that we at present know

being the systematic unity of this cognition, and consequently the

logical completeness of the cognition for the desired end. But there

is also a cosmical conception (conceptus cosmicus) of philosophy,

which has always formed the true basis of this term, especially when

philosophy was personified and presented to us in the ideal of a

philosopher. In this view philosophy is the science of the relation of

all cognition to the ultimate and essential aims of human reason

(teleologia rationis humanae), and the philosopher is not merely an

artist- who occupies himself with conceptions- but a lawgiver,

legislating for human reason. In this sense of the word, it would be

in the highest degree arrogant to assume the title of philosopher, and

to pretend that we had reached the perfection of the prototype which

lies in the idea alone.

The mathematician, the natural philosopher, and the logician- how

far soever the first may have advanced in rational, and the two latter

in philosophical knowledge- are merely artists, engaged in the

arrangement and formation of conceptions; they cannot be termed

philosophers. Above them all, there is the ideal teacher, who

employs them as instruments for the advancement of the essential

aims of human reason. Him alone can we call philosopher; but he

nowhere exists. But the idea of his legislative power resides in the

mind of every man, and it alone teaches us what kind of systematic

unity philosophy demands in view of the ultimate aims of reason.

This idea is, therefore, a cosmical conception.*

*By a cosmical conception, I mean one in which all men necessarily

take an interest; the aim of a science must accordingly be

determined according to scholastic conceptions, if it is regarded

merely as a means to certain arbitrarily proposed ends.

In view of the complete systematic unity of reason, there can only

be one ultimate end of all the operations of the mind. To this all

other aims are subordinate, and nothing more than means for its

attainment. This ultimate end is the destination of man, and the

philosophy which relates to it is termed moral philosophy. The

superior position occupied by moral philosophy, above all other

spheres for the operations of reason, sufficiently indicates the

reason why the ancients always included the idea- and in an especial

manner- of moralist in that of philosopher. Even at the present day,

we call a man who appears to have the power of self-government, even

although his knowledge may be very limited, by the name of

philosopher.

The legislation of human reason, or philosophy, has two objects-

nature and freedom- and thus contains not only the laws of nature, but

also those of ethics, at first in two separate systems, which,

finally, merge into one grand philosophical system of cognition. The

philosophy of nature relates to that which is, that of ethics to

that which ought to be.

But all philosophy is either cognition on the basis of pure

reason, or the cognition of reason on the basis of empirical

principles. The former is termed pure, the latter empirical

philosophy.

The philosophy of pure reason is either propaedeutic, that is, an

inquiry into the powers of reason in regard to pure a priori

cognition, and is termed critical philosophy; or it is, secondly,

the system of pure reason- a science containing the systematic

presentation of the whole body of philosophical knowledge, true as

well as illusory, given by pure reason- and is called metaphysic. This

name may, however, be also given to the whole system of pure

philosophy, critical philosophy included, and may designate the

investigation into the sources or possibility of a priori cognition,

as well as the presentation of the a priori cognitions which form a

system of pure philosophy- excluding, at the same time, all

empirical and mathematical elements.

Metaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and that of the

practical use of pure reason, and is, accordingly, either the

metaphysic of nature, or the metaphysic of ethics. The former contains

all the pure rational principles- based upon conceptions alone (and

thus excluding mathematics)- of all theoretical cognition; the latter,

the principles which determine and necessitate a priori all action.

Now moral philosophy alone contains a code of laws- for the regulation

of our actions- which are deduced from principles entirely a priori.

Hence the metaphysic of ethics is the only pure moral philosophy, as

it is not based upon anthropological or other empirical

considerations. The metaphysic of speculative reason is what is

commonly called metaphysic in the more limited sense. But as pure

moral philosophy properly forms a part of this system of cognition, we

must allow it to retain the name of metaphysic, although it is not

requisite that we should insist on so terming it in our present

discussion.

It is of the highest importance to separate those cognitions which

differ from others both in kind and in origin, and to take great

care that they are not confounded with those with which they are

generally found connected. What the chemist does in the analysis of

substances, what the mathematician in pure mathematics, is, in a still

higher degree, the duty of the philosopher, that the value of each

different kind of cognition, and the part it takes in the operations

of the mind, may be clearly defined. Human reason has never wanted a

metaphysic of some kind, since it attained the power of thought, or

rather of reflection; but it has never been able to keep this sphere

of thought and cognition pure from all admixture of foreign

elements. The idea of a science of this kind is as old as

speculation itself; and what mind does not speculate- either in the

scholastic or in the popular fashion? At the same time, it must be

admitted that even thinkers by profession have been unable clearly

to explain the distinction between the two elements of our

cognition- the one completely a priori, the other a posteriori; and

hence the proper definition of a peculiar kind of cognition, and

with it the just idea of a science which has so long and so deeply

engaged the attention of the human mind, has never been established.

When it was said: "Metaphysic is the science of the first principles

of human cognition," this definition did not signalize a peculiarity

in kind, but only a difference in degree; these first principles

were thus declared to be more general than others, but no criterion of

distinction from empirical principles was given. Of these some are

more general, and therefore higher, than others; and- as we cannot

distinguish what is completely a priori from that which is known to be

a posteriori- where shall we draw the line which is to separate the

higher and so-called first principles, from the lower and

subordinate principles of cognition? What would be said if we were

asked to be satisfied with a division of the epochs of the world

into the earlier centuries and those following them? "Does the

fifth, or the tenth century belong to the earlier centuries?" it would

be asked. In the same way I ask: Does the conception of extension

belong to metaphysics? You answer, "Yes." Well, that of body too?

"Yes." And that of a fluid body? You stop, you are unprepared to admit

this; for if you do, everything will belong to metaphysics. From

this it is evident that the mere degree of subordination- of the

particular to the general- cannot determine the limits of a science;

and that, in the present case, we must expect to find a difference

in the conceptions of metaphysics both in kind and in origin. The

fundamental idea of metaphysics was obscured on another side by the

fact that this kind of a priori cognition showed a certain

similarity in character with the science of mathematics. Both have the

property in common of possessing an a priori origin; but, in the

one, our knowledge is based upon conceptions, in the other, on the