Holbach，Paul Henri Dietrich d' 霍尔巴赫
Hume，David 休谟
I Iliad《伊利亚特》
J
Joseph Ⅱ 约瑟夫二世
Julie 朱丽
K
Keats，John 济慈
L
La Réforme Intellectuelle et Morale de la France《法国的道德和理智改造》
Leslie Stephen 莱斯利·斯蒂芬
Liberty《论自由》
Liberty，Equality，and Fraternity《自由、平等、博爱》
Lift and Correspondence of David Hume《大卫·休谟的生活与书信》
Locke，John 洛克
Lucretius 卢克莱修
Luther，Martin 路德
M
Renan，Ernest 勒南
Mably，Gabriel Bonnot de 马布利
Macaulay，Thomas Babington 麦考莱
Maistre，Joseph de 梅斯特
Martineau，Harriet 玛蒂诺
Meilhan，Gabriel Sènac de 塞纳·德·梅昂
Mill，John Stuart 约翰·密尔
Milton，John 约翰·弥尔顿
N
Napoléon Ⅲ 拿破仑三世
Natural History of Enthusiasm《热情的自然史》
Necker，Jacques 内克尔
New Heloïsa《新爱洛绮丝》
Newman，J. H. 纽曼
North and South《南方与北方》
O
Ode to a Nightingale《夜莺颂》
Oxford Movement 牛津运动
P
Pascal，Blaise 帕斯卡
Pensées《思想录》
Perikles 伯里克利
Pyrrhonism 极端怀疑主义
Pythian oracle 阿波罗神谕
R
Rousseau，Jean Jacques 卢梭
S
Sainte Bernard of Clairvaux 圣伯纳德
Sainte Paul 圣保罗
Sainte-Beuve，Charles-Augustin 圣伯夫
Savoyard Vicar 萨瓦牧师
Scotus，John Duns 司各脱
Scylla 斯库拉
Sermon on Subjects of the Day《关于现今课题的布道》
socinian 索齐尼派
Speech for Liberty of Unlicensed Printing《论出版自由》
Speech on Conciliation with
America《与美国和解的演讲》
Spencer，Herbert 斯宾塞
Spinosa，Benedictus 斯宾诺莎
Stephen，Sir J. F. 斯蒂芬爵士
System of Logic《逻辑体系》
Système de la Nature《自然体系》
T
Taylor，Issac 艾萨克· 泰勒
Taylor，Jeremy 杰里米· 泰勒
The Council of Trent 特兰托宗教会议
The Study of Sociology《社会学研究》
Three Essays on Religion《关于宗教的三篇随笔》
Tocqueville 托克维尔
Turgot，Anne Robert Jacques 杜尔哥
V
Voltaire 伏尔泰
Volupté《情欲》
W
Warburton Elphinstone，Sir Howard 沃伯顿勋爵
Whatley，Richard 理查德·惠特利
Williams，Roger 罗杰·威廉姆斯
Wolmar 沃尔玛
X
Xenophon 色诺芬
'It makes all the difference in the world whether we put Truth in the first place or in the second place.'
WHATLEY
NOTE
The writer has availed himself of the opportunity of a new edition to add three or four additional illustrations in the footnotes. The criticisms on the first edition call for no remark，excepting this，perhaps，that the present little volume has no pretensions to be anything more than an Essay. To judge such it performance as if it professed to be an exhaustive Treatise in casuistry，is to subject it to tests which it was never designed to bear. Merely to open questions，to indicate points，to suggest cases，to sketch outlines，—as an Essay does all these things，—may often be a process not without its own modest usefulness and interest.
May 4，1877.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY Design of this Essay
The question stated
Suggested by some existing tendencies in England
Comparison with other countries
Test of this comparison
The absent quality specifically defined
History and decay of some recent aspirations
Illustrations
Characteristics of one present mood
Analysis of its causes (1) Influence of French examples
(2) Influence of the Historic Method
(3) Influence of the Newspaper Press
(4) Increase of material prosperity
(5) Transformation of the spiritual basis of thought
(6) Influence of a State Church
CHAPTER II. OF THE POSSIBLE UTILITY OF ERROR Questions of a dual doctrine lies at the outset of our inquiry
This doctrine formulated
Marks the triumph of status quo
Psychological vindication of such a doctrine
Answered by assertion of the dogmatic character of popular belief
And the pernicious social influence of its priests
The root idea of the defenders of a dual doctrine
Thesis of the present chapter，against that idea
Examination of some of the pleas for error I. That a false opinion may be clothed with good associations
II. That all minds are not open to reason
III. That a false opinion，considered in relation to the general mental attitude，may be less hurtful than its premature demolition
IV. That mere negative truth is not a guide
V. That error has been a stepping-stone to truth
We cannot tell how much truth has been missed
Inevitableness is not utility
CHAPTER III. INTELLECTUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE POLITICAL SPIRIT The modern disciplina arcani
Hume's immoral advice
Evil intellectual effects of immoral compromise
Depravation that follows its grosser forms
The three provinces of compromise
Radical importance of their separation
Effects of their confusion in practical politics
Economy or management in the Formation of opinion
Its lawfulness turns on the claims of majority and minority ove r one another
Thesis of the present chapter
Its importance，owing to the supremacy of the political spirit in England
Effects of the predominance of this spirit
Contrasted with epochs of intellectual responsibility
A modern movement against the political spirit
An objection considered
Importance to character of rationalised conviction，and of idea ls
The absence of them attenuates conduct
Illustrations in modern politics
Modern latitudinarianism
Illustration in two supreme issues
Pascal's remarks upon a state of Doubt
Dr. Newman on the same
Three ways of dealing with the issues
Another illustration of intellectual improbity
The Savoyard Vicar
Mischievousness of substituting spiritual self-indulgence for r eason
CHAPTER IV. RELIGIOUS CONFORMITY Compromise in Expression
Touches religion rather than politics
Hume on non-resistance
Reason why rights of free speech do not exactly coincide with r ights of free thought
Digression into the matter of free speech
Dissent no longer railing and vituperative
Tendency of modern free thought to assimilate some elements from the old faith
A wide breach still remains
Heresy，however，no longer traced to depravity
Tolerance not necessarily acquiescence in scepticism
Object of the foregoing digression
The rarity of plain-speaking a reason why it is painful
Conformity in the relationship between child and parent
Between husband and wife
In the education of children
The case of an unbelieving priest
The case of one who fears to lose his influence
Conformity not harmless nor unimportant
CHAPTER V. THE REALISATION OF OPINION The application of opinion to conduct
Tempering considerations
Not to be pressed too far
Our action in realising our opinions depends on our social theo ry
Legitimate and illegitimate compromise in view of that
The distinction equally sound on the evolutional theory
Condition of progressive change
A plea for compromise examined
A second plea
The allegation of provisional usefulness examined
Illustrated in religious institutions
In political institutions
Burke's commendation of political compromise
The saying that small reforms may be the worst enemies of great ones
In what sense true
Illustration in the Elementary Education Act
Wisdom of social patience
The considerations which apply to political practice do not apply to our own lives
Nor to the publication of social opinions
The amount of conscience in a community
Evil of attenuating this element
Historic illustration
New side of the discussion
Is earnestness of conviction fatal to concession of liberty to others?
Two propositions at the base of an affirmative answer
Earnestness of conviction consistent with sense of liability to error
Belief in one's own infallibility does not necessarily lead to intolerance
The contrary notion due to juristic analogies in social discuss ion
Connection between the doctrine of liberty and social evolution
The timid compromisers superfluous apprehension
Material limits to the effect of moral speculation
Illustration from the history of Slavery
Illustration from French history
Practical influence of a faith in the self-protecting quality of a society
Conclusion
NOTE TO PAGE 326
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY
The design of the following essay is to consider，in a short and direct way，some of the limits that are set by sound reason to the practice of the various arts of accommodation，economy，management，conformity，or compromise. The right of thinking freely and acting independently，of using our minds without excessive awe of authority，and shaping our lives without unquestioning obedience to custom，is now a finally accepted principle in some sense or other with every school of thought that has the smallest chance of commanding the future. Under what circumstances does the exercise and vindication of the right，thus conceded in theory，become a positive duty in practice? If the majority are bound to tolerate dissent from the ruling opinions and beliefs，under what conditions and within what limitations is the dissentient imperatively bound to avail himself of this toleration? How far，and in what way，ought respect either for immediate practical convenience，or for current prejudices，to weigh against respect for truth? For how much is it well that the individual should allow the feelings and convictions of the many to count，when he comes to shape，to express，and to act upon his own feelings and convictions? Are we only to be permitted to defend general principles，on condition that we draw no practical inferences from them? Is every other idea to yield precedence and empire to existing circumstances，and is the immediate and universal workableness of a policy to be the main test of its intrinsic fitness?
To attempt to answer all these questions fully would be nothing less than to attempt a compendium of life and duty in all their details，a Summa of cases of conscience，a guide to doubters at every point of the compass. The aim of the present writer is a comparatively modest one; namely，to seek one or two of the most general principles which ought to regulate the practic e of compliance，and to suggest some of the bearings which they may have in their application to certain difficulties in modern matters of conduct.
It is pretty plain that an inquiry of this kind needs to be fixed by reference to a given set of social circumstances tolerably well understood. There are some common rules as to the expediency of compromise and conformity，but their application is a matter of endless variety and the widest elasticity. The interesting and useful thing is to find the relation of these too vague rules to actual conditions; to transform them into practical guides and real interpreters of what is right and best in thought and conduct，in a special and definite kind of emergency. According to the current assumptions of the writer and the preacher，the one commanding law is that men should cling to truth and right，if the very heavens fall. In principle this is universally accepted. To the partisans of authority and tradition it is as much a commonplace as to the partisans of the most absolute and unflinching rationalism. Yet in practice all schools alike are forced to admit the necessity of a measure of accommodation in the very interests of truth itself. Fanatic is a name of such ill repute，exactly because one who deserves to be called by it injures good causes by refusing timely and harmless concession; by irritating prejudices that a wiser way of urging his own opinion might have turned aside; by making no allowances，respecting no motives，and recognising none of those qualifying principles，which are nothing less than necessary to make his own principle true and fitting in a given society. The interesting question in connection with compromise obviously turns upon the placing of the boundary that divides wise suspense in forming opinions，wise reserve in expressing them，and wise tardiness in trying to realise them，from unavowed disingenuousness and selfillusion，from voluntary dissimulation，and from indolence and pusillanimity. These are the three departments or provinces of compromise. Our subject is a question of boundaries.[1] And this question，being mainly one of time and circumstance，may be most satisfactorily discussed in relation to the time and the circumstances which we know best，or at least whose deficiencies and requirements are most pressingly visible to us.
Though England counts her full share of fearless truth-seekers in most departments of inquiry，yet there is on the whole no weakening，but a rather marked confirmation，of what has become an inveterate national characteristic，and has long been recognised as such; a profound distrust，namely，of all general principles; a profound dislike both of much reference to them，and of any disposition to invest them with practical authority; and a silent but most pertinacious measurement of philosophic truths by political tests. 'It is not at all easy，humanly speaking,' says one who has tried the experiment，'to wind an Englishman up to the level of dogma.' The difficulty has extended further than the dogma of theology. The supposed antagonism between expediency and principle has been pressed further and further away from the little piece of true meaning that it ever could be rightly allowed to have，until it has now come to signify the paramount wisdom of counting the narrow，immediate，and personal expediency for everything，and the whole，general，ultimate，and completed expediency for nothing. Principle is only another name for a proposition stating the terms of one of these larger expediencies. When principle is held in contempt，or banished to the far dreamland of the philosopher and the student，with an affectation of reverence that in a materialist generation is in truth the most overweening kind of contempt，this only means that men are thinking much of the interests of today，and little of the more ample interests of the many days to come. It means that the conditions of the time are unfriendly to the penetration and the breadth of vision which disclose to us the whole range of consequences that follow on certain kinds of action or opinion，and unfriendly to the intrepidity and disinterestedness which make us willing to sacrifice our own present ease or near convenience，in the hope of securing higher advantages for others or for ourselves in the future.
Let us take politics，for example. What is the state of the case with us，if we look at national life in its broadest aspect? A German has his dream of a great fatherland which shall not only be one and consolidated，but shall in due season win freedom for itself，and be as a sacred hearth whence others may borrow the warmth of freedom and order for themselves. A Spaniard has his vision either of militant loyalty to God and the saints and the exiled line of his kings，or else of devotion to the newly won liberty and to the raising up of his fallen nation. An American，in the midst of the political corruption which for the moment obscures the great democratic experiment，yet has his imagination kindled by the size and resources of his land，and his enthusiasm fired by the high destinies which he believes to await its people in the centuries to come. A Frenchman，republican or royalist，with all his frenzies and 'fool-fury' of red or white，still has his hope and dream and aspiration，with which to enlarge his life and lift him on an ample pinion out from the circle of a poor egoism. What stirs the hope and moves the aspiration of our Englishman? Surely nothing either in the heavens above or on the earth beneath. The English are as a people little susceptible in the region of the imagination. But they have done good work in the world，acquired a splendid historic tradition of stout combat for good causes，founded a mighty and beneficent empire; and they have done all this notwithstanding their deficiencies of imagination. Their lands have been the home of great and forlorn causes，though they could not always follow the transcendental flights of their foreign allies and champions. If Englishmen were not strong in imagination，they were what is better and surer，strong in their hold of the great emancipating principles. What great political cause，her own or another's，is England befriending to-day? To say that no great cause is left，is to tell us that we have reached the final stage of human progress，and turned over the last leaf in the volume of human improvements. The day when this is said and believed marks the end of a nation's life. Is it possible that，after all，our old protestant spirit，with its rationality，its austerity，its steady political energy，has been struck with something of the mortal fatigue that seizes catholic societies after their fits o f revolution?
