In short，then，the utmost that can be said on behalf of errors in opinion and motive，is that they are inevitable elements in human growth. But the inevitable does not coincide with the useful. Pain can be avoided by none of the sons of men，yet the horrible and uncompensated subtraction which it makes from the value and usefulness of human life，is one of the most formidable obstacles to the smoother progress of the world. And as with pain，so with error. The moral of our contention has reference to the temper in which practically we ought to regard false doctrine and ill-directed motive. It goes to show that if we have satisfied ourselves on good grounds that the doctrine is false，or the motive ill directed，then the only question that we need ask ourselves turns solely upon the possibility of breaking it up and dispersing it，by methods compatible with the doctrine of liberty. Any embarrassment in dealing with it，due to a semi-latent notion that it may be useful to some one else is a weakness that hinders social progress.
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[1] Mill's Autobiography p. 170.
[2] M. Renan's Réforme Intellectuelle et Morale de la France, p. 98.
[3] Etudes d'Histoire Religieuse, Preface，p. xvi.
[4] In 1779 the Academy of Prussia announced this as the question for their annual prize essay:—'S'il est utile au peuple d'être trompé.' They received thirty-three essays; twenty showing that it is not useful，thirteen showing that it is. The Academy，with an impartiality that caused much amusement in Paris and Berlin，awarded two prizes，one to the best proof of the negative answer，another to the best proof of the affirmative. See Bartholmess，Hist. Philosophique de l'Académie de Prusse，i. 281，and ii. 278. Condorcet did not actually compete for the prize，but he wrote a very acute piece，suggested by the theme，which was printed in 1790. Oeuv. v. 343.
To illustrate the common fact of certain currents of thought being in the air at given times，we may mention that in 1770 was published the posthumous work of another Frenchman，Chesneau du Marsais (1676-1756) entitled:—'Essai sur les Préjugés; ou de l'influence des Opinions sur les Moeurs et sur le Bonheur des Hommes.' The principal prejudices to which he refers are classed under Antiquity—Ancestry—Native Country—Religion—Respect for Wealth. Some of the reasoning is almost verbally identical with Condorcet's. For an account of Du Marsais，see D'Alembert，Oeuv. iii 481.
[5] Oeuv. v. 354.
[6] Mill's Three Essays on Religion，p. 73. I have offered some criticisms on the whole passage in Critical Miscellanies，Second Series，pp. 300-304.
[7] 'Enfin，supposons pour un instant que le dogme de l'autre vie soit de quelqu'utilité，et qu'il retienne vraiment un petit nombre d'individus，qu'estce que ces foibles avantages comparés à la foule de maux que l'on en voir découler? Contre un homme timide que cette idée contient，il en est des millions qu'elle ne peut contenir; il en des millions qu'elle rend insensés，farouches，fanatiques，inutiles et méchants; il en est des millions qu'elle d étourne de leurs devoirs envers la société; il en est une infinité qu'elle afflige et qu'elle trouble，sans aucun bien réel pour leurs associés.—Système de la Nature，i. xiii.
[8] Sir J.F. Stephen's Liberty，Equality，and Fraternity，2d. ed.，p. 19，note.
CHAPTER III INTELLECTUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE POLITICAL SPIRIT
We have been considering the position of those who would fain divide the community into two great castes; the one of thoughtful and instructed persons using their minds freely，but guarding their conclusions in strict reserve; the other of the illiterate or unreflecting，who should have certain opinions and practices taught them，not because they are true or are really what their votaries are made to believe them to be，but because the intellectual superiors of the community think the inculcation of such a belief useful in all cases save their own. Nor is this a mere theory. On the contrary，it is a fair description of an existing state of things. We have the old disciplina arcani among us in as full force as in the primitive church，but with an all-important difference. The Christian fathers practised reserve for the sake of leading the acolyte the more surely to the fulness of truth. The modern economiser keeps back his opinions，or dissembles the grounds of them，for the sake of leaving his neighbours the more at their ease in the peaceful sloughs of prejudice and superstition and low ideals. We quote Saint Paul when he talked of making himself all things to all men，and of becoming to the Jews a Jew，and as without the Law to the heathen. But then we do so with a view to justifying ourselves for leaving the Jew to remain a Jew，and the heathen to remain heathen. We imitate the same apostle in accepting old time-worn altars dedicated to the Unknown God. We forget that he made the ancient symbol the starting-point of a revolutionised doctrine. There is，as anybody can see，a whole world of difference between the reserve of sagacious apostleship，on the one hand，dealing tenderly with scruple and tearfulness and fine sensibility of conscience，and the reserve of intellectual cowardice on the other hand，dealing hypocritically with narrow minds in the supposed interests of social peace and quietness. The old disciplina arcani signified the disclosure of a little light with a view to the disclosure of more. The new means the dissimulation of truth with a view to the perpetuation of error. Consider the difference between these two fashions of compromise，in their effects upon the mind and character of the person compromising. The one is fully compatible with fervour and hopefulness and devotion to great causes. The other stamps a man with artifice，and hinders the free eagerness of his vision，and wraps him about with mediocrity，—not always of understanding，but that still worse thing，mediocrity of aspiration and purpose.
The coarsest and most revolting shape which the doctrine of conformity can assume，and its degrading consequences to the character of the conformer，may be conveniently illustrated by a passage in the life of Hume. He looked at things in a more practical manner than would find favour with the sentimental champions of compromise in nearer times. There is a well-known letter of Hume's，in which he recommends a young man to become a clergyman，on the ground that it was very hard to got any tolerable civil employment，and that as Lord Bute was then all powerful，his friend would be certain of preferment. In answer to the young man's scruples as to the Articles and the rest，Hume says:— 'It is putting too great a respect on the vulgar and their superstitions to pique one's self on sincerity with regard to them. If the thing were worthy of being treated gravely，I should tell him [the young man] that the Pythian oracle with the approbation of Xenophon advised every one to worship the gods [Greek: nhomô pholeôs]. I wish it were still in my power to be a hypocrite in this particular. The common duties of society usually require it; and the ecclesiastical profession only adds a little more to an innocent dissimulation，or rather simulation，without which it is impossible to pass through the world.'[1]
This is a singularly straightforward way of stating a view which silently influences a much greater number of men than it is pleasant to think of. They would shrink from throwing their conduct into so gross a formula. They will lift up their hands at this quotation，so strangely blind are we to the hiding-places of our own hearts，even when others flash upon them the terrible illumination that comes of calling conduct and motives by plain names. Now it is not merely the moral improbity of these cases which revolts us—the improbity of making in solemn form a number of false statements for the sake of earning a livelihood; of saying in order to get money or social position that you accept a number of propositions which in fact you utterly reject; of declaring expressly that you trust you are inwardly moved to take upon you this office and ministration by the Holy Ghost，when the real motive is a desire not to miss the chance of making something out of the Earl of Bute. This side of such dissimulation is shocking enough. And it is not any more shocking to the most devout believer than it is to people who doubt whether there be any Holy Ghost or not. Those who no longer place their highest faith in powers above and beyond men，are for that very reason more deeply interested than others in cherishing the integrity and worthiness of man himself. Apart，however，from the immorality of such reasoned hypocrisy，which no man with a particle of honesty will attempt to blink，there is the intellectual improbity which it brings in its train，the infidelity to truth，the disloyalty to one's own intelligence. Gifts of understanding are numbed and enfeebled in a man，who has once played such a trick with his own conscience as to persuade himself that，because the vulgar are superstitious，it is right for the learned to earn money by turning themselves into the ministers and accomplices of superstition. If he is clever enough to see through the vulgar and their beliefs，he is tolerably sure to be clever enough from time to time and in his better moments to see through himself. He begins to suspect himself of being an impostor. That suspicion gradually unmans him when he comes to use his mind in the sphere of his own enlightenment. One of really superior power cannot escape these better moments and the remorse that they bring. As he advances in life，as his powers ought to be coming to fuller maturity and his intellectual productiveness to its prime，just in the same degree the increasing seriousness of life multiplies such moments and deepens their remorse，and so the light of intellectual promise slowly goes out in impotent endeavour，or else in taking comfort that much goods are laid up，or，what is deadliest of all，in a soulless cynicism.
We do not find out until it is too late that the intellect too，at least where it is capable of being exercised on the higher objects，has its sensitiveness. It loses its colour and potency and finer fragrance in an atmosphere of mean purpose and low conception of the sacredness of fact and reality. Who has not observed inferior original power achieving greater results even in the intellectual field itself，where the superior understanding happens to have been unequally yoked with a self-seeking character，over scenting the expedient? If Hume had been in the early productive part of his life the hypocrite which he wished it were in his power to show himself in its latter part，we may be tolerably sure that European philosophy would have missed one of its foremost figures. It has been often said that he who begins life by stifling his convictions is in a fair way for ending it without any convictions to stifle. We may，perhaps，add that he who sets out with the notion that the difference between truth and falsehood is a thing of no concern to the vulgar，is very likely sooner or later to come to the kindred notion that it is not a thing of any supreme concern to himself.
Let thus much have been said as to those who deliberately and knowingly sell their intellectual birthright for a mess of pottage，making a brazen compromise with what they hold despicable，lest they should have to win their bread honourably. Men need to expend no declamatory indignation upon them. They have a hell of their own; words can add no bitterness to it. It is no light thing to have secured a livelihood on condition of going through life masked and gagged. To be compelled，week after week，and year after year，to recite the symbols of ancient faith and lift up his voice in the echoes of old hopes，with the blighting thought in his soul that the faith is a lie，and the hope no more than the folly of the crowd; to read hundreds of times in a twelvemonth with solemn unction as the inspired word of the Supreme what to him are meaningless as the Abracadabras of the conjuror in a booth; to go on to the end of his days administering to simple folk holy rites of commemoration and solace，when he has in his mind at each phrase what dupes are those simple folk and how wearisomely counterfeit their rites: and to know through all that this is really to be the one business of his prostituted life，that so dreary and hateful a piece of play-acting will make the desperate retrospect of his last hours—of a truth here is the very [Greek: bdhelygma tês erêmhôseôs]，the abomination of desolation of the human spirit indeed.
No one will suppose that this is designed for the normal type of priest. But it is well to study tendencies in their extreme catastrophe. This is only the catastrophe，in one of its many shapes，of the fatal doctrine that money，position，power，philanthropy，or any of the thousand seductive masks of the pseudo-expedient，may carry a man away from love of truth and yet leave him internally unharmed. The depravation that follows the trucking for money of intellectual freedom and self-respect，attends in its degree each other departure from disinterested following of truth，and each other substitution of convenience，whether public or private，in its place. And both parties to such a compromise are losers. The world which offers gifts and tacitly undertakes to ask no questions as to the real state of the timeserver's inner mind，loses no less than the timeserver himself who receives the gifts and promises to hold his peace. It is as though a society placed penalties on mechanical inventions and the exploration of new material resources，and offered bounties for the steadiest adherence to all ancient processes in culture and production. The injury to wealth in the one case would not be any deeper than the injury to morality is in the other.
To pass on to less sinister forms of this abnegation of intellectual responsibility. In the opening sentences of the first chapter we spoke of a wise suspense in forming opinions，a wise reserve in expressing them，and a wise tardiness in trying to realise them. Thus we meant to mark out the three independent provinces of compromise，each of them being the subject of considerations that either do not apply at all to the other two，or else apply in a different degree. Disingenuousness or self-illusion，arising from a depressing deference to the existing state of things，or to what is immediately practicable，or to what other people would think of us if they knew our thoughts，is the result of compromising truth in the matter of forming and holding opinions. Secondly，positive simulation is what comes of an unlawful willingness to compromise in the matter of avowing and publishing them. Finally，pusillanimity or want of faith is the vice that belongs to unlawful compromise in the department of action and realisation. This is not merely a division arranged for convenience of discussion. It goes to the root of conduct and character，and is the key to the present mood of our society. It is always a hardy thing to attempt to throw a complex matter into very simple form，but we should say that the want of energy and definiteness in contemporary opinions，of which we first complained，is due mainly to the following notion; that if a subject is not ripe for practical treatment，you and I are therefore entirely relieved from the duty of having clear ideas about it. If the majority cling to an opinion，why should we ask whether that is the sound and right opinion or the reverse? Now this notion，which springs from a confusion of the three fields of compromise with one another，quietly reigns almost without dispute. The devotion to the practical aspect of truth is in such excess，as to make people habitually deny that it can be worth while to form an opinion，when it happens at the moment to be incapable of realisation，for the reason that there is no direct prospect of inducing a sufficient number of persons to share it. 'We are quite willing to think that your view is the right one，and would produce all the improvements for which you hope; but then there is not the smallest chance of persuading the only persons able to carry out such a view; why therefore discuss it?' No talk is more familiar to us than this. As if the mere possibility of the view being a right one did not obviously entitle it to discussion; discussion being the only process by which people are likely to be induced to accept it，or else to find good grounds for finally dismissing it.
